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Abstract	
	
The	present	study	examines	the	semantic	structure	of	a	specific	class	of	Japanese	verbs	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 Cognitive	 Linguistics.	 The	 verbs	 in	 question	 are	 highly	
polysemous	and	assumed	 to	be	 centered	around	a	particular	 spatial	 or	 force-dynamic	
schema	 –	 hence	 the	 name	 image	 schema	 verbs.	 Further,	 they	 partake	 in	 verb-verb	
compounding	 as	 grammatical	 “auxiliaries”	 (V2s)	 which	 functionally	 resemble	 the	
particles	of	English	and	German	verb	particle	constructions	(VPCs).	Over	the	course	of	
five	case	studies	it	is	shown	that	the	respective	V2s	are	inherently	meaningful	and	that	
their	 senses	 are	motivated	 by	 the	 same	 image	 schematic	 structures	 that	motivate	 the	
senses	 of	 the	 simplex.	 Thus,	 simplex	 and	 V2	 are	 entangled	 in	 a	 complex	 network	 of	
family	resemblences.	Mechanisms	of	meaning	extension	such	as	metaphor,	metonymy,	
and	image	schema	transformation	are	examined	in	some	detail	and	often	from	a	cross-
linguistic	point	of	view.	Rejecting	a	principled	division	between	lexicon	and	grammar	in	
favor	of	 the	 symbolic	 continuum	hypothesis,	 argument	 structure	phenomena	are	 then	
reexamined	 and	 reframed	 as	 issues	 of	 cognitive	 prominence.	 In	 the	 same	 spirit,	 the	
traditional	dichotomy	of	“lexical”	vs	“grammatical”	V-V	compounds,	a	staple	of	Japanese	
linguistics,	 is	 challenged	 from	 a	 usage-based	 perspective.	 Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	
case	studies,	the	thesis	closes	with	a	brief	cross-cultural	inquiry	into	embodied	cognition,	
showing	 that	 directly	 embodied	 source	 domains	 tend	 to	 have	 similar	 metaphorical	
scope	in	Japanese	and	German.		
	
Keywords:	 cognitive	 semantics,	 image	 schemas,	 polysemy,	 V-V	 compounds,	 lexicon-
grammar	continuum	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 iv	
Gloss	abbreviations:	
	
The	interlinear	gloss	used	in	this	thesis	largely	follows	the	“Leipzig	Glossing	Rules”	
(https://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php).	
	
• Morphemes	are	separated	by	hyphens	“-“	(e.g.:	neko-ga	=	cat-NOM).	
• For	practical	reasons,	some	complex	grammatical	constructions	are	treated	as	
single	morphemes	(e.g.:		-te	iru	=PROG/RES,	-te	shimau	=	IRR).	
• When	a	single	object-language	element	corresponds	to	more	than	one	meta-
language	element,	dots	“.”	are	used	(e.g.:	desu	=	COP.POL).		
• Since	past	tense	is	indicated	by	PAST,	the	gloss	for	non-past	is	omitted	
(e.g.:	tabe-ta	=	eat-PAST;	but:	taberu	=	eat).		
	
ABL	=	ablative	
ACC	=	accusative	
ALL	=	allative	
ATT	=	attributive	
COM	=	comitative	
CON	=	conjecture	
CONJ	=	conjunction	
COND	=	conditional	
COP	=	copula	
DAT	=	dative	
DES	=	desiderative	
EMPH	=	emphatic	marker	
EVI	=	evidential	
HUM	=	humble	
HON	=	honorific	
IMP	=	imperative	
INF	=	infinitive	
INS	=	instrumental	
INT	=	intentional	
IRR	=	“irreversible”	aspect	(-te	shimau)	
LK	=	nominal	linker	
LOC	=	locative	
M	=	male	
NEG	=	negative	
NMLZ	=	nominalizer/nominalization	
NOM	=	nominative	
PAST	=	past	
PL	=	plural	
POL	=	polite	
POT	=	potential	
PROG	=	progressive/continuous	aspect	
Q	=	question	particle	
QT	=	quotative	
RES	=	resultative	aspect	
TE	=	“conjunctive	form”	(-te)	
TOP	=	topic		
VOL	=	volitional	
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0.	Scope,	Aims,	and	Structure	of	the	Thesis	
	
The	main	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 semantic	 structure	 of	 a	
specific	 class	 of	 Japanese	 verbs,	 i.e.	 image	 schema	 verbs,	 in	 accordance	 with	 general	
cognitive	principles.		
				The	verbs	under	consideration	here	fulfill	two	criteria.		
	
(i) They	are	highly	polysemous	with	a	basic	spatial	or	force-dynamic	meaning.	
(ii) They	partake	in	verb-verb	compounding	as	grammatical	“auxiliaries”.	
	
To	illustrate,	consider	the	following	examples:	
	
(1)	 Kabe-ni	 e-ga	 kakat-te	iru.		 	 	 	 	
	 Wall-DAT	 picture-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	picture	is	hanging	on	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
(2)	 Inochi-wo	 kake-ta	 gyanburu	 	 	 	 	
	 Life-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 gamble	 ‘A	gamble	with	one’s	life	at	stake’	 	 	 	
	
(3)	 Tarô-ga	 teki-no	 keiryaku-ni	 kakat-ta	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 enemy-LK	 scheme-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	fell	victim	to	the	enemy’s	scheme.’	 	 	 	
	
(4)	 Kuruma-wo	 kau	Ø-ni-wa	 okane-ga	 kakaru.	 	 	 	
	 Car-ACC	 buy	NMLZ-DAT-TOP	 money-NOM	 KAKARU	 	 	 	
	 ‘One	needs	money	to	buy	a	car.’	 	 	 	
	
(5)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-ni	 warai-kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-DAT	 smile-KAKERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	smiled	at	Tarô.’	 	 	 	
	
(6)	 Jirô-ga	 hon-wo	 yomi-kake-ta	 tokoro-e	 denwa-ga	 nat-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 book-ACC	 read-KAKERU-PAST	 moment-ALL	 phone	call-NOM	 ring-PAST	 	
	 ‘As	Tarô	began	to	read	the	book,	the	phone	rang.’	 	
	
(7)	 Tarô-ga	 jiko-ni	 at-te,	 shini-kake-te	i-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 accident-DAT	 meet-TE	 die-KAKERU-RES-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	got	into	an	accident	and	was	on	the	verge	of	dying.’	 	 	 	
	
My	working	hypothesis,	in	this	exemplary	case,	is	that	the	various	senses	of	kakaru	(and	
its	 transitive	 variant	 kakeru)	 are	 structured	 around	 the	 abstract	 schema	 CONTACT.	
Several	other	image	schema	verbs	are	given	below:	
	
verb	 central	schema	
	
iru/ireru	(enter/put	sth.	in)	 CONTAINMENT:	ENTRY	
deru/dasu	(move	out/	put	sth.	out)	 CONTAINMENT:	EXIT	
agaru/ageru	(rise/raise)	 VERTICALITY:	UP	
tsukiru/tsukusu	(run	out/use	up)	 DEPLETION	
kiru	(cut)	 SPLIT	
 1 
tôru/tôsu	(go	through/let	pass)	 PATH	TRAVERSAL	
au	(meet	with/match)	 MATCHING	
etc.	etc.	 	
	
As	per	the	above	criteria,	I	do	not	take	the	class	of	image	schema	verbs	to	have	clearly	
demarcated	boundaries.	Since	the	notion	of	image	schema	as	discussed	in	the	literature	
is	 itself	 somewhat	 fuzzy,	 it	 follows	 that	 image	schema	verbs,	 too,	are	best	 treated	as	a	
prototype-centered,	open	category	(see	chapter	2).		
				Why	are	these	verbs	of	any	interest	at	all?	There	are	several	reasons.	First,	there	is	a	
vast	body	of	research	on	the	topic	of	verb-verb	compounds	(fukugô	dôshi).	And	while	a	
huge	 part	 of	 it	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 verbs	 like	 the	 above,	 their	 existence	 as	
simplex	verbs	rarely	 receives	more	 than	a	passing	glance.	 In	other	words,	 few	studies	
draw	 a	 connection	 between	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 simplex	 verb	 and	 the	meaning	 of	 the	
corresponding	 auxiliary	 (henceforth	 called	 V2).	 The	 neglection	 of	 the	 simplex	 in	 the	
literature	either	vaguely	presupposes	its	semantic	significance	or	tacitly	denies	it.	In	this	
context,	the	present	study	seeks	to	fill	a	theoretical	void:	The	semantics	of	the	simplex	
and	the	semantics	of	the	V2	are	treated	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	Through	a	series	
of	case	studies	I	hope	to	show	that	the	V2	is	inherently	meaningful	and	that	its	senses,	
together	with	the	senses	of	the	simplex,	form	a	complex	network	of	family	resemblances.		
				Secondly,	 image	 schema	 verbs	 serve	 to	 illustrate	 the	 inextricable	 relation	 between	
lexicon	 and	 syntax.	 The	 present	 study	 assumes	 that	 both	 are	 poles	 on	 a	 continuum	
rather	 than	 discrete	 components	 and	 aims	 to	 show	 how	 lexical	 semantics,	 in	 tandem	
with	 salience,	 directly	 affects	 syntactic	 phenomena	 such	 as	 argument	 selection	 in	 the	
case	of	verbal	compounds.					
			Finally,	 image	 schema	 verbs	 in	 many	 ways	 resemble	 the	 particles	 of	 verb	 particle	
constructions	(VPCs)	in	other	languages.	Throughout	the	case	studies	of	this	thesis	I	will	
discuss	 Japanese	 image	 schema	 verbs	 in	 contrast	 and	 comparison	 with	 VPCs	 from	
German	and	English	such	as	an-V	or	V	up.	Therefore,	the	study	assumes	a	cross-linguistic	
perspective	and	will	hopefully	be	an	asset	to	future	investigations	into	VPCs	and	similar	
constructions	within	the	Cognitive	Linguistics	framework.			
				The	 thesis	 consists	 of	 three	 parts.	 Part	 1	 lays	 out	 the	 theoretical	 foundations	 by	
introducing	the	framework	of	Cognitive	Linguistics	and	its	major	guiding	assumptions.	
Basic	concepts	that	are	particularly	relevant	to	the	present	purpose	are	singled	out	and	
discussed	 in	some	detail.	The	study	 is	 then	situated	 in	 the	context	of	past	and	present	
research	on	spatial	expressions.		
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				Part	2	is	concerned	with	the	analysis	of	semantic	structure.	In	a	series	of	case	studies	I	
investigate	 five	 image	 schema	 verbs:	 kakaru,	 deru,	 kiru,	 agaru,	 and	 tôru.	 These	 verbs	
were	chosen	because	of	their	high	prototypicality,	 i.e.	they	are	both	highly	polysemous	
and	prominent	as	grammatical	V2s.	The	following	questions	present	themselves:	What	
is	the	semantic	structure	of	the	simplex?	Can	the	meaning	of	the	simplex	account	for	the	
meaning	 of	 the	 V2?	 What	 mechanisms	 of	 meaning	 extension	 are	 involved?	 Can	 we	
maintain	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 each	 of	 these	 verbs’	 semantics	 is	 centered	 around	 a	
particular	image	schema?	
				Based	 on	 this	 analysis,	 part	 3	 discusses	 further	 theoretical	 issues.	 The	 chapter	 on	
“compositional	disparity”	is	concerned	with	two	main	questions:	Given	a	non-algebraic	
approach	 to	 grammar,	 how	 can	 one	 account	 for	 the	 compositional	 properties	 of	
Japanese	 verb-verb	 compounds	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 Cognitive	 Linguistics?	Moreover,	
how	do	we	appraoch	the	issue	of	“lexical	vs	syntactic	compounds”	from	a	non-modular	
point	 of	 view?	 The	 second	 chapter	 of	 part	 3	 shifts	 the	 focus	 away	 from	 questions	 of	
compositionality	and	argument	structure	towards	an	important	topic	at	the	periphery	of	
our	main	enterprise:	The	universal	character	of	embodied	experience.	 In	a	small-scale	
comparative	 study	 of	 German	 and	 Japanese	 I	 explore	 the	 degree	 of	 variance	 in	
metaphorical	scope,	starting	out	from	a	common	set	of	embodied	source	domains.		
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PART	I:	THEORETICAL	FOUNDATIONS	
	
	
1.	The	Framework:	Cognitive	Linguistics	
	
Before	we	turn	our	attention	to	the	case	studies,	it	is	essential	to	clarify	what	conception	
of	language	and	linguistics	they	are	based	on	and	why	that	conception	is	preferable	to	its	
alternatives.	Cognitive	Linguistics	is	not	a	compact	theory	of	language	but	rather	a	loose	
framework,	 a	 relatively	 new	 paradigm	 of	 linguistic	 inquiry,	 consisting	 of	 diverse	
theoretical	approaches	sharing	a	common	perspective.	In	the	following	I	will	sketch	out	
what	I	consider	to	be	the	philosophical	foundation	of	the	cognitive	linguistic	enterprise	–	
the	 position	 known	 as	 experiential	 realism.	 First,	 however,	 we	 must	 consider	 the	
objectivist	tradition	in	oppostion	to	which	it	emerged.	
	
	
1.1.	The	Objectivist	Tradition	
	
Many	now	classic	works	in	the	field	of	Cognitive	Linguistics	include	at	least	one	passage	
or	 chapter	 akin	 to	 a	 “manifesto”	 in	which	 the	 respective	 authors	 distance	 themselves	
from	a	tradition	in	the	philosophy	of	mind	and	language	often	described	as	objectivism	
(e.g.	Lakoff	and	Johnson	2003;	Lakoff	1990b;	Johnson	1990;	Langacker	1990;	Sweetser	
1991).	 The	 term	objectivism	was	 coined	 by	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 in	 their	 seminal	 1980	
book	Metaphors	We	Live	By	and	is	probably	most	concisely	explained	in	Lakoff	(1990b).	
As	he	points	out,	objectivism	 is	not	a	 theory	of	mind	or	 language	but	rather	a	set	of	a	
priori	assumptions	deeply	entrenched	in	the	history	of	Western	philosophy	–	so	deeply	
that	many	of	 them	date	back	 to	 antiquity	 and	have	been	 taken	 for	 granted	 ever	 since	
(Lakoff	 1990b:	 xii).	 I	 believe	 that	 objectivist	 linguistics	 is	 best	 broken	 down	 into	 two	
main	tenets	from	which	its	other	assumptions	then	follow	(based	on	Lakoff	1990b):	
	
The	 correspondence	 model	 of	 meaning:	 Linguistic	 expressions	 have	 meaning	 only	 in	
virtue	of	 their	direct	 correspondence	 to	 the	 things,	 relations,	 and	 states	of	 affairs	 that	
make	up	objectively	given	reality.	That	is,	meaning	is	a	relation	between	words	and	the	
world	 without	 any	 kind	 of	 human	 mediation.	 Lexemes	 correspond	 to	 pre-existing	
categories	and	 their	meaning	 is	adequately	 represented	by	 feature	bundles.	 Sentences	
correspond	to	objective	state-of-affairs	and	their	meaning	is	adequately	given	in	terms	
of	truth	conditions.	
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The	 computational	 model	 of	 the	 mind:	 The	 human	 mind	 essentially	 functions	 like	 a	
machine	 operating	 on	 a	 set	 of	 algebraic	 rules.	 Linguistic	 activity	 is	 the	 application	 of	
combinatorial	rules	to	a	list	of	lexemes	in	order	to	assemble	well-formed	sentences.	
	
These	two	tenets	have	several	important	implications:	
	
Meaning	 is	 disembodied	 and	 culture-independent:	 If	 meaning	 is	 a	 relation	 between	
words	and	objective	reality,	it	follows	that	the	human	perspective	has	no	part	to	play	in	
category	structure.	The	biological	niche	we	have	come	to	occupy,	the	physiology	of	our	
bodies,	 the	 socio-cultural	 context	we	 live	 in,	while	 obviously	 shaping	 our	 view	 of	 the	
world,	has	no	bearing	on	semantics.	
	
Meaning	is	all	about	truth	and	reference:	Category	structure	is	neat	in	the	sense	that	it	
essentially	boils	down	to	a	“checklist”	of		necessary	and	sufficient	features	which	help	us	
identify	 category	members.	 In	 other	words,	 the	meaning	 of	 a	 lexeme	 is	 a	 guide	 to	 its	
reference.	For	example,	a	bachelor	is	an	unmarried	adult	man.	Everything	else	we	know	
about	or	associate	with	bachelors	 is	not	part	of	“semantics	proper”.	Sentences	express	
propositions	which	are	either	true	or	false.	To	understand	the	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	
to	be	able	to	give	its	truth	conditions.	Simply	put:	The	sentence	Snow	is	white	is	true	if	
and	 only	 if	 snow	 is	 white.	 Again,	 all	 non-truth	 conditional	 aspects	 of	 a	 sentence	 (e.g.	
speech	 act	 meaning,	 grammatical	 voice,	 politeness,	 etc.)	 are	 not	 part	 of	 semantics.	
Consequently,	there	is	a	sharp	divide	between	the	meaning	of	an	expression	(semantics)	
and	its	use	(pragmatics).	
	
Language	 is	 autonomous	 and	 compartmentalized:	 According	 to	 the	 computational	
model	 of	 the	 mind,	 language	 is	 an	 autonomous	 faculty,	 i.e.	 our	 linguistic	 ability	 is	
independent	from	the	rest	of	cognition	(e.g.	attention,	figure-ground	organization,	etc.).	
Within	 the	 language	 faculty	 semantics,	 syntax,	 and	 phonology	 exist	 as	 distinct	
components,	 each	with	 their	 own	 set	 of	 rules	 and	 constraints.	 These	 components	 are	
complemented	by	 the	 lexicon,	a	 list	of	 lexical	entries	upon	which	 they	operate.	 In	 this	
model	 “pragmatics”	 	 is	 an	 umbrella	 term	 for	 everything	 concerning	 the	 actual	 use	 of	
language	(as	opposed	to	the	internal	workings	of	the	language	faculty).1		
																																																								
1	It	is,	of	course,	impossible	within	the	confines	of	this	thesis	to	survey	over	two	thousand	years	of	
Western	philosophy	and	give	a	half-way	satisfiying	historical	portrayal	of	objectivism.	Nonetheless	some	
cornerstones	should	be	mentioned.	The	idea	that	an	objective	eternal	reality	divorced	from	human	
experience	is	accessible	by	disembodied	thought	can	be	traced	back	to	Plato’s	theory	of	forms.	The	
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1.2.	Experiential	Realism	
	
Given	 the	 above	 positions,	we	 can	 see	 how	 the	 objectivist	 paradigm	marginalizes	 the	
role	of	 the	conceptualizer.	Meaning	mirrors	 the	structure	of	an	objective	reality	and	 is	
grasped	 by	 logical	 thought.	 Thus,	 the	 conceptualizer	 has	 no	 active	 role	 in	 shaping	
semantic	 structure.	 This	 is	 problematic	 because,	 if	 it	 were	 true,	 many	 linguistic	
phenomena	would	become	either	inexplicable	or	irrelevant.	For	illustration,	consider	a	
passage	from	Sweetser	(1991).	While	admitting	that	questions	of	conceptualization	may	
be	of	little	relevance	in	determining	the	truth	value	of	sentences	such	as	Snow	is	white,	
she	goes	on	to	make	the	following	point:		
	
But	suppose	that,	instead	of	white,	I	take	Latin	candidus	as	my	sample	word.	Candidus	meant,	among	other	
things,	“white”	and	“bright”;	but	it	also	meant	“open,	honest”	–	as	in	its	English	descendent,	candid.	But	it	
seems	unlikely	that	there	is	any	objective	correlation	in	the	real	world	between	white	things	and	honest	
things,	or	any	larger	objectively	chosen	category	which	includes	just	these	and	no	others.	The	“real	world”,	
if	we	mean	one	which	 is	outside	of	human	cognitive	organization,	 is	not	so	constructed	as	 to	group	 the	
white	 with	 the	 honest.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 our	 cognitive	 structuring	 of	 the	 world	 which	 can	 create	 such	 an	
identification.	And	if	language	uses	a	word	of	our	cognitive	category,	then	language	cannot	be	described	in	
terms	of	Word	 and	World:	 unless,	 by	World,	we	mean	our	 experiential	 picture	 of	 the	world.	 (Sweetser	
1991:	4-5)	
	
What	we	can	take	from	this	passage	is	that	categories	in	natural	language	usually	exhibit	
polysemy,	 i.e.	 one	 lexical	 item	 often	 has	 several	 related	 senses	 (as	 illustrated	 by	
candidus).	Giving	an	account	of	meaning	extension	 in	order	to	explain	phenomena	 like	
polysemy	and	diachronic	change	 is	obviously	part	of	 linguistics.	However,	as	Sweetser	
points	 out	 above,	 such	 an	 account	 can	 only	 be	 given	 in	 terms	 of	 “human	 cognitive	
organization”	–	which	has	no	bearing	on	semantic	structure	according	to	objectivism.		
																																																																																																																																																																													
“dictionary	model”	(or	checklist	model)	of	lexical	semantics	(e.g.	Katz	1972)	originated	with	Artistotle’s	
decompositional	account	of	categories	in	terms	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions.	Mind-body	dualism	
(i.e.	the	rigid	separation	of	immatierial	mind	and		material	body)	is	a	central	theme	in	Descartes’	
epistemology	and	philosophy	of	mind.						
				However,	it	is	not	until	the	emergence	of	the	Fregean	philosophy	of	language	at	the	end	of	the	19th	
century	that	we	can	speak	of	an	objectivist	linguistics.	The	major	tenets	of	objectivist	semantics	were	
formulated	in	Frege’s	(1892)	seminal	paper	Über	Sinn	und	Bedeutung	(On	Sense	and	Reference),	in	which	
he	lays	the	groundwork	for	a	truth-conditional	theory	of	meaning.	Wittgenstein’s	picture	theory	of	
meaning	(i.e.	the	view	that	sentence	meaning	mirrors	states-of-affairs)	and	his	famous	claim	that	“[t]o	
understand	a	proposition	means	to	know	what	is	the	case	if	it	is	true”	(Wittgenstein	1922:	4.024)	are	
hardly	conceivable	without	Fregean	philosophy.	All	subsequent	formal	approaches	to	semantics	such	as	
Tarsky	([1944]	2004),	Montague	(1973),	and	Davidson	(1967)	are	built	upon	Wittgenstein’s	identification	
of	sentence	meaning	with	truth-conditions.	Unsurprisingly,	approaches	to	language	based	on	logic	and	
algebra	favor	a	computational	model	of	the	mind	such	as	the	one	assumed	by	the	various	iterations	of	
Chomskyian	Generative	Grammar	(e.g.	Chomsky	1957,	1965).		
				For	a	more	detailed	depiction	of	several	objectivist	positions	see	Johnson	(1990).	Part	two	of	Lakoff	
(1990b)	launches	a	comprehensive	attack	on	the	philosophical	foundations	of	objectivism.		
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				Another	example	is	the	following	sentence	pair	from	Langacker	(1990:	13):	
	
(1a)	 Billy	sent	a	walrus	to	Joyce.	
(1b)	 Billy	sent	Joyce	a	walrus.	
	 	
According	 to	 Langacker,	 these	 sentences	 offer	 an	 alternate	 construal	 of	 the	 same	
conceptual	content.	In	short,	to	 in	(1a)	emphasises	the	path	taken	by	the	walrus,	while	
the	direct	juxtaposition	of	Joyce	and	a	walrus	in	(1b)	emphasises	the	possessive	relation	
(Langacker	 1990:	 13-14).	 In	 other	 words,	 by	 choosing	 either	 (1a)	 or	 (1b)	 the	
conceptualizer	decides	on	a	specific	way	of	packaging	and	presenting	the	same	content.	
Each	 version	 conveys	 a	 different	 manner	 of	 experiencing	 the	 world.	 Importantly,	
construal	reflects	general	principles	of	human	cognition:	 in	this	case,	different	ways	of	
distributing	 attention	 across	 a	 given	 scene	 (see	 e.g.	 Talmy	 2003a:	 76ff.).	 From	 an	
objectivist	perspective	none	of	this	matters.	Since	both	versions	are	truth-conditionally	
equivalent	 (they	 are	 true	 in	 the	 same	 set	 of	 possible	 worlds),	 the	 preposition	 to	 is	
considered	to	be	semantically	vacuous.		
				Finally,	consider	the	story-telling	function	of	language.	In	the	following	passage	Lakoff	
and	Johnson	(2003)	illustrate	the	creation	of	a	coherent	narrative:	
	
[...]	faced	with	the	energy	crisis,	President	Carter	declared	“the	moral	equivalent	of	war.”	The	WAR	
metaphor	generated	a	network	of	entailments.	There	was	an	“enemy”,	a	“threat	to	national	security”,	
which	required	“setting	targets”,	“reorganizing	priorities”,	“establishing	a	new	chain	of	command”,	
“plotting	new	strategy”,	“gathering	intelligence”,	“marshaling	forces”	“imposing	sanctions”,	“calling	for	
sacrifices”,	and	on	and	on.	The	metaphor	was	not	merely	a	way	of	viewing	reality;	it	constituted	a	license	
for	policy	change	and	political	and	economic	action.	(Lakoff	and	Johnson	2003:	156)	
	
I	have	cited	this	passage,	because	it	underscores	how	human	understanding	works.	We	
understand	Carter’s	narrative	(regardless	of	whether	we	accept	or	reject	it),	because	we	
understand	 the	 metaphorical	 correspondences	 it	 is	 built	 on.	 Yet,	 from	 an	 objectivst	
perspective	 these	 correspondences	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 a	 theory	 of	 meaning	 which	
assumes	 a	 principled	 distinction	 between	 literal	 and	 figurative	 speech,	 as	 well	 as	
between	semantics	and	pragmatics.	Since	“semantics	proper”	is	only	concerned	with	so-
called	 literal	meaning	and	truth	conditions,	 the	meaning	of	Carter’s	view	amounts	to	a	
set	 of	 false	 and/or	 nonsensical	 propositions	 instead	 of	 a	 coherent	 whole.	 An	
experientialist	 account,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 recognizes	 communication	 as	 the	 primary	
function	of	language.	The	metaphorical	correspondences,	ultimately	grounded	in	human	
experience,	are	a	precondition	for	understanding	Carter’s	narrative.	And	all	phenomena	
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involved	 in	 understanding	 linguistic	 communication	 should	 be	 part	 of	 a	 theory	 of	
semantics.2	
				Much	more	could	be	said	about	the	differences	between	an	objectivist	and	a	cognitive	
linguistic	approach	to	language,	but	I	think	the	above	examples	capture	the	spirit	of	the	
experientialist	 enterprise	 quite	 well.	 In	 summary,	 then,	 experiential	 realism	 is	 the	
position	that	thought	and	meaning	arise	from	embodied	experience	and	are	imaginative	
in	 nature.	 Reality	 is	 not	 objectively	 given	 but	 only	 accessible	 via	 our	 species-specific	
sense-perceptual	 capabilities	 which	 in	 tandem	 with	 general	 cognitive	 principles	 give	
rise	 to	 imagistic	 structures	 (e.g.	 psychological	 gestalts)	 that	 go	 far	 beyond	 the	kind	of	
propositional	entities	posited	by	formal	semanticists		(Lakoff	1990b:	xv).	For	a	theory	of	
language	this	position	has	two	major	implications:	
	
Cognitive	 holism:	 As	 the	 above	 examples	 from	 Sweetser,	 Langacker,	 and	 Lakoff	 and	
Johnson	 illustrate,	 linguistic	 phenomena	 reflect	 general	 principles	 of	 human	 cognition	
(in	 the	 above	 cases:	 categorisation,	 attention,	 and	 conceptual	metaphor,	 respectively).	
“Even	if	the	blueprints	for	language	are	wired	genetically	into	the	human	organism,	their	
elaboration	 into	 a	 fully	 specified	 linguistic	 system	 during	 acquisition,	 and	 their	
implementation	in	everyday	language	use,	are	clearly	dependent	on	experiential	factors	
and	 inextricably	 bound	 up	 with	 psychological	 phenomena	 that	 are	 not	 specifically	
linguistic	in	character”	(Langacker	1987:	13,	emphasis	mine).	Thus,	Cognitive	Linguistics	
can	be	described	as	embracing	a	holistic	view	of	the	relationship	between	language	and	
cognition.	
	
Centrality	of	meaning:	Since	much	of	what	is	known	about	the	mind	from	the	congnitive	
sciences	is	incompatible	with	a	modular,	algebraic	view	of	language	(Lakoff	1990a:	42)	
cognitive	 linguists	 have	been	 free	 to	 discard	 the	 central	 commitments	 of	 such	 a	 view.	
First	 and	 foremost,	 rejecting	 the	 paradigm	 of	 empty	 symbol	 manipulation	 –	 a	
consequence	of	 the	strict	separation	of	syntax	and	semantics	–	has	reopened	 the	door	
for	 a	meaning-based	 linguistics.	 In	 other	words,	 there	 is	 no	a	priori	 need	 for	 positing	
semantically	vacuous	structures.	Nor	is	there	any	converging	evidence	suggesting	their	
																																																								
2	See	also	Langacker	(1990:	2):	“Meaning	is	equated	with	conceptualization.	Linguistic	semantics	must	
therefore	attempt	the	structural	analysis	and	explicit	description	of	abstract	entities	like	thoughts	and	
concepts.	The	term	conceptualization	is	interpreted	quite	broadly:	it	encompasses	novel	conceptions	as	
well	as	fixed	concepts;	sensory,	kinesthetic,	and	emotive	experience;	recognition	of	the	immediate	context	
(social,	physical,	and	linguistic);	and	so	on.”	
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existence.	 Therefore,	 Cognitive	 Linguistics	 assumes	 that	 “[l]exicon,	 morphology,	 and	
syntax	 form	 a	 continuum	 of	 symbolic	 units,	 divided	 only	 arbitrarily	 into	 separate	
components;	it	is	ultimately	as	pointless	to	analyze	grammatical	units	without	reference	
to	their	semantic	value	as	to	write	a	dictionary	which	omits	the	meanings	of	 its	 lexical	
items”	(Langacker	1990:	29).	
	
In	the	following	sections	I	will	introduce	several	key	concepts	that	are	central	to	my	
argumentation	in	the	subsequent	chapters.	
	
	
2.	Image	Schemas	
	
2.1.	Philosophical	and	Linguistic	Foundations:	Johnson	(1987)	and	Lakoff	(1987)	
	
Image	 schemas	 are	 non-propositional	 imagistic	 patterns	 which	 arise	 from	 bodily	
experience	 and	 structure	much	of	 our	 conceptualization	 and	 reasoning.	As	 such,	 their	
importance	for	the	principle	of	embodied	congnition	can	hardly	be	overstated.	The	term	
image	 schema	 was	 introduced	 by	 Mark	 Johnson	 ([1987]	 1990)	 and	 George	 Lakoff	
([1987]	 1990b)	 in	 two	 separate	 book-length	 studies	 and	 from	 slightly	 different		
perspectives.	While	Johnson	stresses	the	philosphical	underpinnings	of	image	schemas,	
Lakoff	presents	 linguistic	 evidence	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 case	 study.	Let	us	briefly	 consider	
both	perspectives	in	turn.	
				Johnson’s	 overarching	 goal	 is	 to	 present	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 Cartesian	mind-body	
dualism	 that	 –	 tacitly	 or	 explicitly	 –	 has	 dominated	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 Western	
philosophy	and	continues	to	be	influential	to	the	present	day.	All	philosophical	theories	
which	are	Cartesian	in	spirit	face	a	common	challenge:	They	must	somehow	explain	how	
the	mind	is	connected	to	the	body	and	how	the	two	could	possibly	work	together.	As	a	
prominent	attempt	to	answer	this	question,	Johnson	points	to	Kant’s	theory	of	mind	in	
the	Critique	of		Pure	Reason.	In	short,	Kant	assumes	a	division	of	labor	between	sensory-
motor	perception	(sensibility)	and	disembodied	concept	formation	(understanding):	
	
[...]	there	is	an	overly	rigid	dichotomy	between	the	conceptual	and	the	bodily.	Concepts	are	products	of	our	
understanding,	which	is	formal,	spontaneous,	and	rule-governed;	sensations	are	bodily,	given	through	our	
sensibility,	 which	 is	 material,	 passive,	 and	 lacking	 in	 any	 active	 principle	 of	 combination	 or	 synthesis.	
(Johnson	1990:	xxviii)	
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In	 order	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 sensibility	 and	 understanding,	 Kant	 postulates	 an	
intermediary	 faculty,	 imagination,	 tasked	 with	 unifiying	 the	 slew	 of	 perceptual	
impressions	into	a	coherent	whole:		
	
For	example,	in	my	perception	of	a	dog,	Kant	thought	that	imagination	ordered	various	sense	impressions	
(e.g.,	 the	feel	of	fur,	 four	legs,	a	trunk,	 long	teeth,	etc.)	 into	a	single	perceptual	experience	(e.g.,	a	unified	
image	of	 a	 furry	 creature),	 such	 that	 I	 can	 then	 recognize	 it	 (conceptualize	 it)	 as	 a	dog.	 (Johnson	1990:	
xxviii)	
	
Johnson	 goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 Kant’s	 account	 of	 imagination	 is	 ultimately	 self-
contradictory.	 Imagination	 seems	 to	 belong	 in	 equal	 parts	 to	 the	 realms	 of	 bodily	
experience	and	conceptual	 thought	–	despite	 the	 fact	 that	Kant’s	philosophical	 system	
precludes	this	very	possibility.	“Somehow	imagination	is	supposed	to	have	a	foot	in	both	
worlds	(in	the	‘formal’	and	the	‘material’),	and	yet	it	is	not	clear	how	it	can	have	this	dual	
nature”	(1990:	166).	Johnson’s	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	do	away	with	the	Cartesian	
legacy	which	gave	rise	to	it	in	the	first	place:	“Once	we	no	longer	demand	a	disembodied	
(or	 non-physical)	 rationality,	 then	 there	 is	 no	 particular	 reason	 to	 exclude	 embodied	
imagination	 from	 	 the	 bounds	 of	 reason”	 (1990:	 168).	 It	 is	 for	 this	 embodied	 view	 of	
reason	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 image	 schema	 is	 integral,	 since	 image	 schemas	 are	 both	
grounded	in	bodily	experience	and	employed	in	abstract	thought:	
	
The	view	I	am	proposing	 is	 this:	 in	order	 for	us	 to	have	meaningful,	connected	experiences	 that	we	can	
comprehend	 and	 reason	 about,	 there	 must	 be	 pattern	 and	 order	 to	 our	 actions,	 perceptions,	 and	
conceptions.	 A	 schema	 is	 a	 recurrent	 pattern,	 shape,	 and	 regularity	 in,	 or	 of,	 these	 ongoing	 ordering	
activities.	 These	 patterns	 emerge	 as	 meaningful	 structures	 for	 us	 chiefly	 at	 the	 level	 of	 our	 bodily	
movements	through	space,	our	manipulation	of	objects,	and	our	perceptual	interactions.	(Johnson	1990:	
29)	
	
Johnson	illustrates	this	by	pointing	out	the	pervasiveness	of	the	IN	and	OUT	schemas:	
	
Consider	just	a	small	fraction	of	the	orientational	feats	you	perform	constantly	and	unconsciously	in	your	
daily	activities.	Consider,	for	example,	only	a	few	of	the	many	in-out	orientations	that	might	occur	in	the	
first	few	minutes	of	an	ordinary	day.	You	wake	out	of	a	deep	sleep	and	peer	out	from	beneath	the	covers	
into	your	room.	You	gradually	emerge	out	of	your	stupor,	pull	yourself	out	 from	under	the	covers,	climb	
into	your	robe,	stretch	out	your	limbs,	and	walk	in	a	daze	out	of	the	bedroom	and	into	the	bathroom.	You	
look	in	the	mirror	and	see	your	face	staring	out	at	you.	You	reach	into	the	medicine	cabinet,	take	out	the	
toothpaste,	squeeze	out	some	toothpaste,	put	the	toothbrush	into	your	mouth,	brush	your	teeth	in	a	hurry,	
and	rinse	out	your	mouth.	At	breakfast	you	perform	a	host	of	further	in-out	moves	–	pouring	out	the	coffee,	
setting	out	the	dishes,	putting	the	toast	in	the	toaster,	spreading	out	the	jam	on	the	toast,	and	on	and	on.	
Once	 you	 are	more	 awake	 you	might	 even	 get	 lost	 in	 the	 newspaper,	might	 enter	 into	 a	 conversation,	
which	leads	to	your	speaking	out	on	some	topic.	(Johnson	1990:	30-31)	
					
The	 key	 point	 is	 that,	 from	 early	 infancy	 and	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 we	 are	 subjected	 to	
myriads	 of	 sensory-motor	 experiences	 involving	 CONTAINERS	 (e.g.	 grasping	 objects,	
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eating,	 being	 located	 in	 various	 bounded	 spaces)	 which	 eventually	 lead	 to	 the	
emergence	of	a	preconceptual	dynamic	pattern	entrenched	at	 the	non-conscious	 level.	
This	pattern,	the	image	schema	CONTAINER,	will	in	turn	give	meaning	to	all	our	future	
encounters	 with	 containers.	 Crucially,	 as	 we	 shall	 see	 below,	 image	 schemas	 are	 a	
precondition	for	abstract	thought,	e.g.	when	abstract	states	(walk	in	a	daze,	enter	into	a	
conversation)	are	made	sense	of	in	terms	of	physical	locations.		
				So	 far,	we	have	sketched	out	 Johnson’s	philosophical	motivations	 for	positing	 image	
schemas	and	given	a	preliminary	characterization	of	the	notion.	To	get	a	better	idea	of	
what	 image	 schemas	 are	 and	 how	 they	 structure	 our	 thought,	 a	 slight	 change	 of	
perspective	might	be	helpful.	I	therefore	suggest	that	we	take	a	look	at	George	Lakoff’s	
work	on	category	structure	in	order	to	observe	image	schemas	“in	action”.		
				Building	mainly	on	previous	work	by	Brugman	(1981),	Lakoff	(1990b)	asks	how	the	
various	senses	of	English	over	are	related	to	one	another.	One	of	 the	most	remarkable	
discoveries	of	 the	 study	 is	what	he	calls	 transformational	links.	 Consider	 the	 following	
sentences	(adapted	from	Lakoff	1990b):	
	
(2a)	 Sam	walked	over	the	Hill.	 (path	focus)	
(2b)	 Sam	lives	over	the	Hill.	 (end-point	focus)	
	 	 	
(3a)	 The	guards	were	posted	all	over	the	hill.	 (multiplex)	
(3b)	 The	board	is	over	the	hole.	 (mass)	
	 	 	
(4a)	 The	bird	flew	over	the	yard.	 (moving	0D	entity)	
(4b)	 The	power	line	stretches	over	the	yard.	 (1D	static	entity)	
	
In	 (2a)	we	mentally	 trace	 the	 trajectory	of	a	moving	entity	 (Sam).	 If	we	 then	 focus	on	
that	entity’s	resting	location	we	end	up	with	(2b).	The	hill	in	(3a)	is	covered	by	multiple	
individual	entities	(a	multiplexity).	However,	if	we	mentally	“zoom	out”	on	the	scene	(or	
squint	our	eyes)	the	guards	will	appear	as	an	undifferentiated	whole	(a	mass)	similar	to	
the	board	in	(3b).	In	(4a)	we	trace	the	bird’s	path	as	we	would	trace	a	moving	dot.	If	we	
then	mentally	connect	all	individual	locations	subsequently	occupied	by	the	bird,	we	end	
up	with	a	static	one-dimensional	entity,	just	like	the	power	line	in	(4b).3		
				As	 these	 examples	 show,	 over	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 spatial	 configurations.	
However,	 these	 configurations	 do	 not	 constitute	 an	 arbitrary	 collection.	 Instead,	 the	
																																																								
3	As	Lakoff’s	use	of	double-pointed	arrows	indicates	(cf.	1990b:	442f.),	all	of	these	transformations	are	
reversible.	The	end-point	in	(2b)	presupposes	a	path,	which	can	be	mentally	reconstructed.	Or	imagine	
looking	at	sand	through	a	magnifiying	glass,	so	that	the	individual	grains	become	discernable	(mass	to	
multiplex).	Similarly,	we	can	mentally	trace	the	power	line	in	(4b)	from	beginning	to	end	in	the	same	
fashion	we	would	follow	a	zero-dimensional	object	(“The	power	line	runs	over	the	yard.”).		
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various	uses	of	over	 in	(2)-(4)	are	motivated	by	schemas	such	as	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL,	
MULITPLEX,	MASS,	etc.	as	well	as	the	mental	operations	we	perform	on	them.	Crucially,	
these	 representations	 are	 neither	 propositional	 nor	 inherently	 linguistic	 in	 nature.	 As	
Lakoff	 puts	 it,	 “image	 schemas	 are	 a	 reflection	 of	 our	 sensory	 and	 general	 spatial	
experience”	 (1990b:	 443).	 Furthermore,	 they	 enable	 abstract	 thought	 by	 serving	 as	
input	 for	 metaphorical	 source	 domains.	 For	 example,	 the	 UP-DOWN	 axis	 can	 lend	
imagistic	structure	to	the	domain	of	control,	thus	motivating	expressions	such	as	She	has	
a	strange	power	over	me	(Lakoff	1990b:	435f.).4		
				Like	 Johnson,	 Lakoff	 concludes	 that	 image	 schemas	 “structure	 our	 perceptions	 and	
that	 their	structure	 is	made	use	of	 in	reason”	(1990b:	440).	And	certainly,	subsequent	
applications	of	 image	 schema	 theory	 to	 topics	 as	diverse	as	English	modals	 (Sweetser	
1991),	case	in	German	(Smith	1992),	mathematical	reasoning	(Lakoff	and	Núñez	2000),	
and	literary	theory	(Lakoff	and	Turner	1989;	Turner	1991)	provide	strong	evidence	in	
favor	 of	 this	 hypothesis.	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 notion	 of	 image	 schema,	 as	
introduced	by	Johnson	and	Lakoff,	remains	rather	vague	in	several	respects	and	this	has	
led	to	some	controversy	regarding	its	exact	characterization.	Let	us	take	inventory,	then,	
of	what	we	 know	 about	 image	 schemas	 at	 this	 point.	 So	 far,	we	 have	 established	 the	
following:	
	
• Image	schemas	are	entrenched	sensory-motor	patterns	that	emerge	from	
continued	bodily	interaction	with	our	environment	.	
• As	embodied	representations	they	play	an	important	role	in	structuring	both	
perception	and	thought.	
• They	are	imagistic	in	the	sense	the	term	image	is	used	in	Gestalt	psychology,	i.e.	
image	schemas	are	not	merely	visual	but	multimodal	representations.	For	
example,	schemas	like	BALANCE,	BLOCKAGE	or	CONTACT	rely	heavily	on	non-
visual	sense-data.	
• They	are	schematic	in	the	sense	that	they	are	maximally	underspecified.	In	other	
words,	even	the	most	general	depiction	(a	drawing/diagram)	of,	say,	a	container		
would	still	have	to	specify	the	boundaries,	shape,	size,	degree	of	opacity	etc.	of	
the	container	to	some	degree	and	therefore	fall	short	in	terms	of	schematicity.	
(Furthermore,	a	diagram	necessarily	fails	to	capture	the	dynamic	and	multimodal	
aspects	of	an	image	schema.)	
	
Yet,	as	we	will	see	in	the	following	section,	the	exact	definition	of	the	term	image	schema	
remains	a	hotly	contested	topic	among	researchers.	
	
	
																																																								
4	I	will	discuss	metaphorical	mappings	in	more	detail	later	on	(see	chapter	4).	
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2.2.	Refining	and	Defining	the	Notion:	Diverging	Opinions	
	
A	quick	review	of	the	literature	reveals	that	different	researchers	hold	different	opinions	
as	 to	 what	 counts	 as	 an	 image	 schema.	 The	most	 liberal	 use	 of	 the	 term	 is	 probably	
found	in	Turner	(1991):	
	
The	following	are	all	different	 image	schemas:	A	circle	with	a	marked	point	at	 its	center;	a	circle	with	a	
marked	point	somewhere	else	interior	to	the	boundary;	a	circle	with	a	marked	point	on	the	boundary;	and	
a	circle	with	a	marked	point	exterior	to	the	boundary.	[...]	The	image	schema	associated	with	cup	need	not	
have	an	exact	degree	of	curvature;	but	if	we	flatten	out	the	sides	to	the	point	that	the	image	schema	begins	
to	approach	an	image	schema	associated	with	plate,	for	example,	then	we	have	not	preserved	the	original	
image	schema.	(Turner	1991:	177)	
	
Following	 Johnson’s	 (1990)	 understanding	 of	 images	 as	 multimodal	 gestalts,	 Turner	
(1991:	 57)	 describes	 image	 schemas	 as	 “extremely	 skeletal	 images	 that	 we	 use	 in	
cognitive	 operations”.	 However,	 as	 the	 above	 passage	 shows,	 this	 characterization	 is	
apparently	 broad	 enough	 to	 include	 complex	 geometrical	 constellations	 as	 well	 as	
relatively	rich	visual	images	(cup,	plate)	into	the	category.		
				An	entirely	different	 approach	 is	 taken	by	Clausner	and	Croft	 (1999),	 for	whom	 the	
criterium	of	pervasiveness	is	central.	They	suggest	that	image	schemas	can	be	equated	
with	those	background	knowledge	structures	(i.e.	domains)	that	are	presupposed	by	the	
largest	number	of	concepts:	
	
For	example,	the	domain	APPLE	is	concrete,	that	is,	it	is	relatively	non-schematic.	In	the		scope	of	human	
experience	it	is	presupposed	by	relatively	few	other	domains	(e.g.,	CIDER).	On	the	other	hand,	almost	all	
domains	make	 some	 reference	 to	 SCALES;	 for	 example,	 any	domain	 involving	gradable	properties.	Also	
IDENTITY	 and	 SIMILARITY	 can	 be	 found	 in	 nearly	 every	 concept	 profile.	 The	 domains	 of	 TIME	 and	
CHANGE	(that	is,	the	PROCESS	image	schema)	can	be	found	in	the	matrix	of	any	event	or	process	concept.	
An	 enormous	 number	 of	 domains	 involving	 physical	 objects	 or	motion	 include	 SPACE	 in	 their	 domain	
matrix.		
				These	 facts	suggest	a	natural	definition	of	 image	schematicity:	domains	which	are	image	schematic	are	
those	 found	 in	 the	 largest	 number	 of	 domain	 matrices	 (for	 the	 concepts	 used	 in	 human	 experience).	
(Clausner	and	Croft	1999:	21-22)	
	
While	 this	 characterization	 excludes	 rich	 images	 such	 as	 cup	 and	 plate,	 it	 allows	
extremely	 general	 concepts	 such	 as	 the	 basic	 domains	 of	 TIME	 and	 SPACE	 into	 the	
category.	In	fact,	based	on	the	pervasiveness	criterium,	these	basic	domains	would	be	far	
better	examples	of	image	schemas	than	the	CONTAINER	schema,	which	is	only	granted	
peripheral	membership	by	Clausner	 and	Croft	 (1999:	22).	 Evidently,	 this	 clashes	with	
the	 understanding	 of	 image	 schematicity	 in	 Johnson	 (1990:	 126),	 who	 includes	
CONTAINER	 (but	 neither	 SPACE	 nor	 TIME)	 in	 his	 list	 of	 “the	 more	 important	 image	
schemata.”		
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				Grady,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 perceptual	 grounding	 in	 his	
definition	of	image	schemas	as	“mental	representations	of	fundamental	units	of	sensory	
experience”	 (2005:	44).	He	argues	 that	 several	 schemas	 such	as	CYCLE	or	SCALE	 (see	
Johnson	 1990:	 126)	 fail	 to	 qualify	 as	 image	 schemas	 because	 they	 are	 not	 inherently	
perceptual:	 “While	 schemas	 like	 CYCLE	 and	 SCALE	 may	 be	 strongly	 associated	 with	
perceptual	 content	 such	 as	 CIRCLE,	 PATH,	 etc.,	 the	 schemas	 are	 also	 recognizable	 as	
free-standing	concepts	in	their	own	right,	referring	to	basic	(nonsensory)	dimensions	of	
phenomenological	 experience,	 independent	 of	 the	 sensory	 associations”(Grady	 2005:	
41).	But	is	there,	in	principle,	any	reason	to	exclude	our	experience	of	temporal	passage	
from	 the	 realm	of	perception?	Surely,	 the	mechanisms	 that	 enable	us	 to	keep	 track	of	
time	are	biologically	no	less	real	than	our	other	senses.	And	can	we	truly	conceive	of	the	
SCALE	schema	in	a	way	that	is	“independent	of	sensory	associations”?	It	should	be	kept	
in	mind	that	scalarity	and	gradable	quality	(e.g.	amount,	intensity,	etc.)	are	not	the	same	
thing	 –	 scalarity	 is	 the	 superimposition	 of	 gradable	 quality	 onto	 the	 SOURCE-PATH-
GOAL	 schema.	 As	 these	 examples	 show,	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 make	 a	 clear-cut	
binary	distinction	between	what	is	inherently	perceptual	and	what	is	merely	associated	
with	perceptual	content.	Rather,	the	category	of	perceptual	representation	itself	seems	to	
exhibit	prototype-effects	and	graded	membership.	
				In	a	recent	paper	Mandler	and	Pagán	Cánovas	(2014)	attempt	to	define	the	notion	of	
image	 schema	 from	a	developmental	 perspective.	They	 argue	 that	 the	 term	 should	be	
reserved	 for	 those	 “[r]epresentations	of	 simple	 spatial	 events”	 (2014:	17)	 that	 infants	
rely	on	most	heavily	in	order	to	make	sense	of	their	surroundings	up	to	the	age	of	six	to	
seven	 months.	 They	 note,	 for	 example,	 that	 infants	 are	 aware	 of	 occlusion	 and	
containment	 events	 from	 the	 age	of	 two	and	a	half	months	 (2014:	6)	 and	 acquire	 the	
concept	of	a	goal-directed	motion	event	at	about	five	months	(2014:	8).	The	suggestion	
is	that	we	differentiate	between	these	simple	events	(e.g.	PATH	TO	THING,	THING	INTO	
CONTAINER),	 the	 building	 blocks	 they	 are	made	 up	 of	 (e.g.	 PATH,	 CONTAINER),	 and	
more	complex	representations	 that	emerge	by	adding	non-spatial	elements	 (e.g.	 force,	
time,	 emotion)	 to	 spatial	 events	 (2014:	 17).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 many	 image	 schemas	
from	 Johnson’s	 list	 (1990:	 126)	 such	 as	 PATH,	 LINK,	 THING	 or	 CONTAINER	 are	
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“demoted”	 to	 spatial	 primitives	 while	 others,	 such	 as	 FORCE,	 are	 considered	 part	 of	
more	complex	schematic	blends	due	to	their	non-spatial	nature.5	
				All	 of	 this	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 very	 little	 consensus	 on	 how	 to	 define	 the	 notion	 of	
image	 schema.	 In	 particular,	 we	 see	 that	 different	 researchers	 emphasize	 different	
aspects:	 For	 Clausner	 and	 Croft	 pervasiveness/schematicity	 is	 central.	 According	 to	
Grady,	the	criterium	of	perceptual	grounding	takes	precedence.	And	Mandler	and	Pagán	
Cánovas	suggest	 that	 image	schemas	are	best	understood	as	 simple	stories	which	are,	
first	and	foremost,	dynamic	and	spatial.	It	is	worth	noting	that	all	of	these	aspects	play	a	
role	 in	 Johnson’s	 and	 Lakoff’s	 early	 characterizations	 of	 image	 schemas.	 However,	 in	
their	 work	 no	 particular	 aspect	 seems	 to	 utterly	 outrank	 any	 other	 aspect.	 When	
Johnson	 revisits	 the	 notion	 in	 a	 later	 paper,	 he	 gives	 a	 relatively	 inclusive	 and	 broad	
characterization	 of	 an	 image	 schema	 as	 “a	 dynamic	 recurring	 pattern	 of	 organism-
environment	 interactions”	 that	 “will	 often	 reveal	 itself	 in	 the	 contours	 of	 our	 basic	
sensory-motor	 experience”	 (2005:	 19).	 Instead	 of	 postulating	 a	 set	 of	 definitional	
criteria,	 Johnson	 suggests	 that	most	 image	 schemas	will	 “show	 themselves”	 through	 a	
method	of	“informal	phenomenological	analysis”	(2005:	21).	He	gives	several	examples:	
	
Ask	yourself	what	the	most	fundamental	structures	of	your	perception,	object	manipulation,	and	 	bodily	
movement	 are,	 given	 that	human	bodies	 share	 several	 quite	 specific	 sensory-motor	 capacities	 keyed	 to	
the	size	and	constitution	of	our	bodies	and	the		common	characteristics	of	the	different	environments	we	
inhabit.	Certain	obvious	patterns	 immediately	 jump	out	at	you.	For	example,	given	 the	relative	bilateral	
symmetry	of	our	bodies,	we	have	an	intimate	acquaintance	with	right-left	symmetry.	[...]	Because	of	our	
particular	embodiment,	we	project	RIGHT	and	LEFT,	FRONT	and	BACK,	NEAR	and	FAR,	 throughout	 the	
horizon	of	our	perceptual	interactions.	[...]	Because	of	our	ongoing	bodily	encounter	with	physical	forces	
that	push	and	pull	us,	we	experience	the	image	schematic	structures	of	COMPULSION,	ATTRACTION,	and	
BLOCKAGE	OF	MOVEMENT	...	.	[...]	Because	we	must	continually	monitor	our	own	changing	bodily	states,	
we	are	exquisitely	attuned	to	changes	 in	degree,	 intensity,	and	quality	of	 feelings,	which	 is	 the	basis	 for	
our	sense	of	scales	of	intensity	of	a	quality	(the	SCALARITY	schema).	Because	we	must	constantly	interact	
with	containers	of	all	shapes	and	sizes,	we	naturally	learn	the	“logic”	of	containment	(for	the	CONTAINER	
schema).	(Johnson	2005:	20-21)	
	
One	might	 be	 inclined	 to	 dismiss	 this	 sort	 of	 survey	 as	 too	 subjective	 and	 vague,	 and	
object	 that	 it	dodges	the	real	 issue.	But	 I	believe	that	 Johnson	has	good	reason	for	not	
attempting	 to	 give	 a	 defintion	 of	 image	 schematicity.	 To	 be	 sure,	 image	 schema	 has	
become	 a	 technical	 term	 and	 a	 key	 notion	 in	 Cognitive	 Linguistics	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	
crucial	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 everyone	 is	 talking	 about	 the	 same	 thing.	 Nevertheless,	
expecting	a	definition	 to	solve	 the	 issue	seems	odd	to	begin	with	–	especially	within	a	
theoretical	 framework	 that	 has	 time	 and	 time	 again	 critisized	 how	 definitional	
																																																								
5	“[...]	so	far	as	we	know,	prelinguistic	image	schemas	are	strictly	SPATIAL.	[...]	Neither	force	nor	any	other	
non-imageable	information	is	available	to	the	conceptual	system	when	image	schemas	begin	to	be	formed”	
(Mandler	and	Pagán	Cánovas	2014:	17-18).	
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approaches	typically	misrepresent	category	structure.	After	all,	we	would	not	expect	a	
set	of	definitional	criteria	to	settle	once	and	for	all	the	seemingly	mundane	question	of	
what	 a	 table	 is.	 Carpenters	 might	 eventually	 agree	 on	 a	 definition	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	
lengthy	international	conference,	but	the	new	notion	would	be	artificial	and	somewhat	
arbitrary.	I	therefore	propose	that	we	should	avoid	an	impoverished	expert	definition	of	
image	schematicity	in	lieu	of	the	view	that	the	category	image	schema	exhibits	prototype	
effects	and	graded	membership	(I	made	the	same	suggestion	above	regarding	the	notion	
perceptual	representation).	From	this	perspective,	all	of	the	previously	discussed	criteria	
contribute	 to	 category	 structure.	 That	 is,	 a	 prototypical	 image	 schema	 is	 cognitively	
pervasive,	grounded	in	perception,	dynamic	and	spatial.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	
that	 not	 all	 image	 schemas	 rank	 equally	 in	 respect	 to	 each	 of	 these	 parameters.	 For	
example,	a	FORCE	schema	like	COMPULSION	is	highly	dynamic	but	does	not	necessarily	
evoke	 the	spatial	domain	as	strongly	as	 the	CONTAINER	schema	does.	Conversely,	 the	
CONTAINER	 schema	 is	 less	 dynamic:	 While	 the	 schema	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 our	
experiences	of	things	moving	IN	and	OUT,	a	static	CONTAINER	is	still	a	coherent	mental	
representation.	Schemas	like	OBJECT	and	PATH	are	more	pervasive	(i.e.	presupposed	by	
a	larger	number	of	cognitive	domains)	than	LEFT	and	RIGHT.	The	ITERATION	schema,	
while	 grounded	 in	 perceptual	 experience,	 has	 no	 perceptible	 instances.	 (I.e.,	 the	
perceptible	events	that	are	iterated	are	instances	of	the	event	schema,	not	instances	of	
the	ITERATION	schema.)	Now	compare	this	to	the	LINK	schema	and	its	instances,	which	
are	themselves	links.		
				The	conclusion	is	rather	straightforward.	The	best	examples	of	the	category	are	those	
image	schemas	that	rank	highly	with	respect	to	all	of	the	parameters.	At	the	other	end	of	
the	 spectrum	we	 have	 fringe	members	 that	 rank	 low	 in	 average	 or	with	 respect	 to	 a	
particular	 parameter.	 From	 this	 perspective	 it	 is	 probably	 impossible	 to	 exhaustively	
enumerate	all	image	schemas	in	existence.	But	this	does	not	imply	that	“anything	goes”,		
either.	For	instance,	we	can	confidently	exclude	relatively	rich	visual	images	such	as	cup	
and	plate	from	the	image	schema	category	for	their	lack	of	pervasiveness.	For	the	same	
reason,	image	schemas	cannot	be	infinitely	complex.	In	fact,	CONTAINER	–	with	its	sub-
schemas	INTERIOR,	EXTERIOR,	and	BOUNDARY	–	seems	to	be	among	the	more	complex	
ones.6		
																																																								
6	I	have	intentionally	left	out	discussion	of	one	key	aspect	within	the	image	schema	debate,	namely	the	
neuro-psychological	status	of	image	schemas	(see	e.g.	Gibbs	2005;	Rohrer	2005)	.	There	are	several	
reasons	for	this:	First,	research	into	this	topic	is	still	in	the	early	developing	stages	and	highly	speculative.	
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3.	Trajector/Landmark	Organization	(Figure	and	Ground)		
	
3.1	Linguistic	Structure	as	a	Reflection	of	Cognitive	Prominence	
	
Imagine	(visualize)	the	scenes	described	by	the	following	sentences:	
	
(5)	 The	dog	is	running	across	the	field.	
(6)	 The	book	is	on	the	table.	
(7)	 The	little	star	circles	the	big	star.	
	
In	each	of	these	scenes	one	participant	stands	out	as	particularly	salient	against	the	rest	
of	 the	 environment:	 The	 dog,	 the	 book,	 and	 the	 little	 star.	 This	 asymmetrical	
segmentation	of	the	visual	field	into	a	prominent	figure	and	a	less	prominent	ground	is	a	
basic	principle	of	human	perception	and	a	cornerstone	of	Gestalt	psychology	(see	Rubin	
[1915]	1958;	Bahnsen	1928;	Koffka	1935).		
				Cognitive	 linguists	 (e.g.	 Talmy	 1975;	 Langacker	 1987,	 1991)	 have	 subsequently	
adapted	 the	 notion	 of	 figure/ground	 organization	 into	 their	 frameworks	 on	 the	
assumption	 that	 linguistic	 structure	 reflects	 conceptual	 organization.	 Again,	 consider	
(5)-(7):	 The	 prominent	 subject	 role	 and	 sentence	 initial	 position	 are	 reserved	 for	 the	
entity	 corresponding	 to	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 encoded	 scene,	while	 the	 ground	 appears	 as	
direct	or	prepositional	object.	According	to	Talmy,	figure	and	ground	have	the	following	
associated	characteristics:	
	
figure	 ground	
• more	movable	 • more	permanently	located	
• smaller	 • larger	
• geometrically	simpler	(often	
pointlike)	in	its	treatment	
• geometrically	more	complex	in	its	
treatment	
• more	recently	on	the	scene/in	
awareness	
• more	familiar/expected	
• of	greater	concern/relevance	 • of	lesser	concern/relevance	
• less	immediately	perceivable	 • more	immediately	perceivable	
• more	salient,	once	perceived	 • more	backgrounded,	once	figure	is	
perceived	
• more	dependent	 • more	independent	
	
(adapted	from	Talmy	2003a:	315-16)	
																																																																																																																																																																													
Secondly,	discussion	would	require	the	introduction	of	numerous	experiments,	which	in	turn	presuppose	
concepts	from	neuroscience.	A	proper	representation	of	the	debate	would	therefore	go	beyond	the	scope	
of	this	introduction.	And	lastly,	while	anchoring	the	notion	of	image	schema	in	the	empirical	sciences	is	
ultimately	a	matter	of	fundamental	importance,	no	knowledge	of	the	topic	is	required	for	understanding	
any	of	the	arguments	presented	in	this	thesis.		
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				Based	on	Talmy’s	work,	Langacker	has	demonstrated	that	 figure/ground	asymmetry	
plays	a	fundamental	role	in	the	analysis	of	grammatical	structure.7	He	refers	to	the	most	
prominent	participant	of	a	profiled	relation	as	the	trajector	(TR)	and	to	the	second	most	
prominent	participant	as	the	landmark	(LM).	By	way	of	illustration,	consider	(8):	
	
(8)	 [the	lamp]TR	above	[the	table]LM	
	
	According	to	Langacker,	the	preposition	above	encodes	a	spatial	relation	between	two	
schematic	entities.	These	entities	are	elaborated	(instantiated)	by	the	lamp	and	the	table.	
It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	above	does	not	construe	the	two	as	equally	salient.	
I.e.,	 the	 thing	 profiled	 by	 the	 phrase	 the	 lamp	above	 the	 table	 is	 a	 lamp,	 not	 a	 table.8	
Hence,	the	lamp	is	the	most	salient	participant	in	the	relation	and	corresponds	to	the	TR	
of	above,	while	 the	table	as	second	most	prominent	participant	corresponds	the	LM	of	
above	(Langacker	1990:	25).	In	summary,	the	terms	TR	and	LM	are	functionally	roughly	
equivalent	 to	 the	 notions	 figure	 and	 ground.	 For	 Langacker,	 TR/LM	 alignment	 is	 an	
instance	of	figure/ground	asymmetry	pertaining	to	the	level	of	linguistic	structure.	But	
since	 the	 terms	 TR/LM	 have	 become	 prevalent	 in	 Cognitive	 Linguistics	 (e.g.	 Lindner	
1981;	 Lakoff	 1990b),	 I	 will	 use	 them	 exclusively,	 even	where	 non-linguistic	 cognitive	
structure	is	concerned.		
	
	
3.2.	Relevance	for	Image	Schematic	Structure	
	
Recall	 from	the	previous	discussion	that	 image	schemas	are	imagistic	and	grounded	in	
perception.	As	such,	the	principle	of	TR/LM	organization	will	naturally	play	a	role	when	
we	talk	about	a	given	schema.	Take	the	CONTACT	schema,	for	instance.	CONTACT,	even	
when	 considered	 in	 the	 most	 abstract,	 presupposes	 at	 least	 two	 schematic	 entities	
between	which	the	relation	obtains.	Confronted	with	a	scene	where	A	and	B	are	related	
via	 CONTACT,	we	will	 recognize	 one	 entity	 as	 the	 TR	 and	 the	 other	 entity	 as	 the	 LM.	
While	the	bare	image	schema	CONTACT	by	itself	is	neutral	in	terms	of	TR/LM	alignment,	
any	 scene	 which	 instantiates	 the	 schema	 will	 necessarily	 have	 to	 be	 construed	 in	 a	
certain	way,	i.e.	force	us	to	impose	TR/LM	organization	upon	it.	In	other	words,	we	will	
																																																								
7	One	of	the	most	significant	consequences	of	this	analysis	is	Langacker’s	characterization	of	the	
grammatical	notions	subject	and	direct	object	as	clausal	trajector	and	landmark,	respectively	(1987:	324).	
8	In	the	terminology	of	Cognitive	Grammar	lamp	is	the	profile	determinant	of	the	phrase.	
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(16a)	 The	paper	plane	flew	into	the	house.	
(16b)	 Jane	threw	the	paper	plane	into	the	house.	
	
The	 preposition	 into	 profiles	 a	 spatial	 relation	 between	 a	 CONTAINER	 (the	 LM)	 and	
some	other	 entity	 (the	TR)	which	moves	 from	 its	EXTERIOR	 to	 its	 INTERIOR.	 In	both	
sentences	 the	 TR	 and	 LM	 of	 into	 are	 elaborated	 by	 the	 paper	 plane	 and	 the	 house,	
respectively.	 However,	 in	 (16b)	 the	 paper	 plane	 also	 corresponds	 to	 the	 LM	 of	 threw	
(while	the	TR	of	threw	is	elaborated	by	Jane).	Furthermore,	in	Japanese,	the	motion	path	
expressed	by	the	prepositional	“satellite“	into	is	coded	by	the	verb	itself9:	
	
(17a)	 Saru-ga	 ori-ni	 hait-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Monkey-NOM	 cage-DAT	 enter-PAST	 ‘The	monkey	entered	the	cage.’	 	 	 	
	
(17b)	 Tarô-ga	 saru-wo	 ori-ni	 ire-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 monkey-ACC	 cage-DAT	 put	into-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	put	the	monkey	into	the	cage.’	 	 	 	
	
Note	 that	 (17)	 expresses	 roughly	 the	 same	 schematic	 content	 as	 (16):	 Y	 moves	 into	
CONTAINER	(a	version)	and	X	causes	Y	to	move	into	CONTAINER	(b	version).		Although	in	
(17b)	we	cannot	say	that	saru	elaborates	the	TR	of	some	overt	relational	element	(like	
into	in	the	English	sentences),	we	can	say	that	–	as	far	as	mental	imagery	is	concerned	–	
saru	 corresponds	 to	 the	 TR	 (the	 figure)	 of	 what	 we	 might	 call	 the	 “entry	 relation“.	
Therefore,	when	I	speak	of	“the	TR“	or	“the	LM“	throughout	this	thesis	I	will	be	referring	
to	 the	 level	 of	 image	 schematic	 structure.	 For	 example,	 in	 regards	 to	 (17b)	 –	 and	
focussing	on	the	ENTRY	schema	–	I	would	refer	to	saru	simply	as	“the	TR“	even	though	
the	TR	of		ireru	(i.e.	the	most	prominent	participant	of	the	process)	is	elaborated	by	Tarô.	
Conversely,	when	referring	to	the	level	of	grammatical	structure,	I	will	be	as	explicit	as	
possible,	 using	 terms	 such	 as	 “clausal	 TR“,	 etc.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 this	 use	 of	
terminology	is	mainly	a	concession	to	the	verb-framed	nature	of	Japanese.		
	
	
4.	Metaphor	
	
4.1.	Complex,	Primary,	and	Image	Metaphor	
	
Conceptual	metaphor,	as	first	described	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson	([1980]	2003),	is	a	basic	
principle	of	human	cognition	whereby	one	conceptual	domain	(the	target)	is	structured	
																																																								
9	See	Talmy’s	(1991)	distinction	between	satellite-framed	vs	verb-framed	languages.	
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and	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 another	 conceptual	 domain	 (the	 source).	 To	 illustrate,	
consider	 the	 classic	 example	 LOVE	 IS	A	 JOURNEY,	which	 underlies	 utterances	 such	 as	 the	
following:		
	
Look	how	far	we’ve	come.	
It’s	been	a	long,	bumpy	road.	
We	can’t	turn	back	now.	
We‘re	at	a	crossroads.	
We	may	have	to	go	our	separate	ways.	
The	relationship	isn’t	going	anywhere.		
We‘re	spinning	our	wheels.	
Our	relationship	is	off	the	track.	
The	marriage	is	on	the	rocks.	
We	may	have	to	bail	out	of	this	relationship.	
(from	Lakoff	2006:	189)	
	
According	to	metaphor	theory,	we	can	think	and	talk	about	the	target	domain	LOVE	in	
terms	of	the	source	domain	JOURNEY,	because	a	set	of	mappings	obtains	between	them	
(Lakoff	2006:	190ff.):	
	
JOURNEY	 	 LOVE	
travellers	 -->	 lovers	
vehicle	 -->	 relationship	
impediments	to	travel	 -->	 difficulties	encountered	
crossroads	 -->	 choices	
destination	 -->	 common	life	goals	
etc.	 	 	
	
Thus,	 the	mnemonic	 shorthand	 LOVE	 IS	 A	 JOURNEY	 is	 neither	 a	 proposition	 nor	 a	 single	
metaphorical	 expression.	 Instead	 it	 is	 the	 name	 for	 a	 cognitive	 operation	 that	maps	 a	
complex	 body	 of	 knowledge	 about	 our	 experiences	with	 journeys	 onto	 the	 domain	 of	
LOVE	via	a	set	of	systematic	correspondences.		
				Note,	 however,	 that	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 connection	 between	 love	 relationships	 and	
journeys	in	the	real	world	that	compels	us	to	draw	a	connection	between	these	domains.	
Love	and	 journeys	are	experiences	of	quite	a	different	nature	 that	do	not	 typically	co-
occur.	 How,	 then,	 is	 the	 metaphor	 motivated?	 Why	 does	 JOURNEY	 “fit”	 as	 a	 source	
domain	for	LOVE?	Why	can	we	map	travellers	onto	lovers,	destinations	onto	life	goals,	
and	so	on?	
				In	order	 to	answer	 the	question	of	motivatedness,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 realize	 that	 the	
metaphor	LOVE	IS	A	JOURNEY	can	only	exist	in	virtue	of	a	larger	system	of	more	schematic	
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metaphors	 collectively	 known	 as	 the	 EVENT	 STRUCTURE	 METAPHOR.	 Lakoff	 (2006:	 204)	
characterizes	this	system	as	follows:	
	
• States	are	locations	(bounded	regions	in	space).	
• Changes	are	movements	(into	or	out	of	bounded	regions).	
• Causes	are	forces.	
• Actions	are	self-propelled	movements.	
• Purposes	are	destinations.	
• Means	are	paths	(to	destinations).	
• Difficulties	are	impediments	to	motion.	
• Expected	progress	is	a	travel	schedule;	a	schedule	is	a	virtual	traveler,	who	
				reaches	prearranged	destinations	at	prearranged	times.	
• External	events	are	large,	moving	objects.	
• Long	term,	purposeful	activities	are	journeys.	
	
It	 immediately	 springs	 to	 attention	 that	 LOVE	 IS	 A	 JOURNEY	 is	 an	 instance	 of	 long	 term,	
purposeful	 activities	 are	 journeys.	 But	 there	 is	 more	 to	 it.	 All	 of	 the	 above	 mappings	
constitute	generic-level	metaphors	in	their	own	right.	More	specifically,	the	majority	of	
them	are	what	Grady	(e.g.	1997a,	1997b,	1999)	calls	primary	or	correlation	metaphors.			
				Primary	metaphors	 are	 different	 from	 complex	 conceptual	 metaphors	 like	 LOVE	 IS	 A	
JOURNEY	 in	 two	major	 respects.	 First,	 they	 only	 involve	 a	 single	mapping	between	 two	
experientially	 equally	 basic	 domains.	 As	 Grady	 (1997a:	 26)	 puts	 it,	 primary	 source	
domains	 have	 image	 content:	 “[...]content	 which	 is	 tied	 to	 physical	 perception	 or	
sensation.	 The	 feeling	 of	 an	 itch;	 the	 perception	 of	 shape,	 weight,	 and	 distance;	 the	
detection	 of	 movement	 –	 all	 of	 these	 experiences	 involve	 the	 (apparently)	 direct	
perception	of	features	of	our	bodies	or	our	environments.”	Primary	target	domains,	on	
the	other	hand,	have	response	content:	“They	are	not	direct	perceptions	of	the	world,	but	
responses	to	[...]	our	perceptions	of	the	world”	(1997a:	26).	In	other	words,	while	image	
and	 response	 content	 differ	 in	 kind,	 they	 do	 not	 differ	 in	 degree	 of	 abstractness	 or	
complexity.	 Secondly,	 primary	 metaphors	 are	 directly	 motivated	 by	 the	 experiential	
correlation	 of	 source	 and	 target	 domain.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 point,	 consider	 STATES	 ARE	
LOCATIONS:	
	
If	I	am	in	a	very	hot	place	[...]	I	will	find	myself	in	a	state	of	discomfort.	More	generally,	it	may	be	the	case	
that	 we	 form	 metaphorical	 associations	 between	 certain	 sensations	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 being	 in	
particular	places	–	i.e.	the	correlation	in	our	experience	between	the	places	and	the	states	leads	to	binding	
between	the	concepts.	(Grady	1997a:	106).		
	
				Returning	 to	 LOVE	 IS	A	 JOURNEY,	 we	 now	 see	 that	 the	metaphor	 is	 decomposable	 into	
several	 primary	 metaphors	 such	 as	 STATES	 ARE	 LOCATIONS,	 PURPOSES	 ARE	 DESTINATIONS,	
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DIFFICULTIES	ARE	IMPEDIMENTS	TO	MOTION,	 and	 so	 forth.	 I.e.,	 the	 states,	 common	goals,	 and	
difficulties	 of	 a	 love	 relationship	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 locations,	
destinations,	and	terrain	obstacles	of	a	journey	because	the	source	and	target	domains	
of	the	respective	primary	metaphors	–	which	in	turn	make	up	the	complex	metaphor	–	
correlate	in	experience.10		
				In	addition	to	complex	metaphors	and	the	primary	metaphors	that	constitute	them	we	
need	 to	 briefly	 consider	 a	 third	 kind	 of	 projection	 before	we	move	 on.	 The	 following	
expressions	are	examples	of	image	metaphors:		
	
(18)	 hourglass-waist	(based	on	Lakoff	and	Turner	1989:	90)	
(19)	 submarine	sandwich	(from	Benczes	2006:	108)	
(20)	 barcode	hairstyle	(from	Benczes	2006:	110)	
	
All	of	 the	above	are	“[o]ne-shot	 image	mappings”	(Lakoff	and	Turner	1989:	91)	which	
project	 the	 shape	properties	 of	 the	 source	onto	 the	 target	 concept.	Note,	 for	 example,	
that	a	submarine	sandwich	derives	its	name	exclusively	from	the	schematic	silhouette	of	
a	 submarine.	 No	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 SUBMARINE	 domain	 are	 mapped	 onto	 the	
SANDWICH	domain	(as	opposed	to	the	numerous	correspondences	in	LIVE	IS	A	JOURNEY).	
Nor	 is	 there	 any	 salient	 experiential	 correlation	 between	 submarines	 and	 sandwiches	
(as	opposed	to	PURPOSES	ARE	DESTINATIONS).		
	
	
4.2.	Metaphor	and	Meaning	Extension	
	
In	 the	 case	 studies	 of	 this	 thesis	 we	 will	 be	 interested	 in	 metaphor	 mainly	 as	 a	
mechanism	of	meaning	extension.	Let	us	therefore	consider	several	examples	from	the	
literature	that	illustrate	how	metaphor	functions	as	a	driving	force	behind	polysemy.		
				In	her	seminal	1981	study,	Lindner	analyses	the	systematic	relationships	between	the	
senses	of	verb	particle	constructions	with	out	and	up.	The	following	passage	deals	with	
the	relation	between	spatial	up	and	and	what	we	may	call	the	activity	sense	of	up:		
																																																								
10	It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	the	notions	of	image	content	and	image	schema	are	co-extensional	for	a	
large	number	of	primary	source	domains	(Grady	1997a:	179).	Observe,	for	example,	that	the	mappings	
which	constitute	the	EVENT	STRUCTURE	METAPHOR	have	the	following	image	schemas	among	their	source	
domains:	MOTION,	FORCE,	PATH,	GOAL,	BLOCKAGE,	OBJECT.	Lakoff’s	(2006:	199)	invariance	principle	
holds	that	“[m]etaphorical	mappings	preserve	the	cognitive	topology	(that	is,	the	image-schema	
structure)	of	the	source	domain,	in	a	way	consistent	with	the	inherent	structure	of	the	target	
domain.“	From	the	perspective	of	primary	metaphor	theory	this	preservation	of	image	schematic	topology	
is	an	emergent	aspect	of	the	experiential	correlation	between	primary	source	and	target.	For	example,	
destinations	are	mapped	onto	purposes	because	destination-reaching	and	purpose-fulfillment	naturally	
co-occur.		
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[...]	when	something	is	in	hand,	it	is	available	for	use	or	action.	Thus	when	I	pick	up	or	take	up	my	sword,	I	
am	ready	to	fight.	More	abstractly	we	may	pick	up	a	conversation	where	we	left	off	(‘continue	acting	on	it’)	
or	take	up	sailing	(‘incorporate	into	the	range	of	our	activities’).	(Lindner	1981:	161)	
	
With	 the	 gift	 of	 hindsight	 (Lindner’s	 study	 falls	 into	 the	 earliest	 days	 of	 metaphor	
theory),	we	can	attribute	this	semantic	extension	to	the	primary	metaphor	ACTIVITY	IS	UP.	
In	fact,	what	the	passage	cited	above	describes	is	exactly	the	experiential	correlation	the	
metaphor	is	based	on:	elevation	to	hand-level	and	readiness	for	use/action.		
				Several	 extensions	 of	 over	 into	 the	 non-physical	 domain	 are	 discussed	 by	 Lakoff	
(1990b).	Recall	the	example	mentioned	briefly	in	2.1.:	
	
(21)	 She	has	a	strange	power	over	me.	
	
As	Lakoff	(1990b:	435)	points	out,	this	sense	is	based	on	the	metaphor(s)	CONTROL	IS	
UP/LACK	 OF	 CONTROL	 IS	 DOWN.	 Again,	 the	 experiential	 correlation	 grounding	 this	
primary	metaphor	should	be	evident:	control	is	associated	with	an	elevated	position	and	
an	optimal	overview.		
				Finally,	consider	a	slightly	more	complex	example	concerning	grammatical	rather	than	
lexical	 polysemy.	 Sweetser	 (1991)	 has	 famously	 claimed	 that	 the	 epistemic	 sense	 of	
modals	 such	as	must	 and	may	 are	metaphorically	derived	 from	their	 root	 (or	deontic)	
sense.	Her	 argument	 is	 based	on	 a	 system	of	 correspondences	known	as	 the	mind-as-
body	 metaphor	 for	 which	 she	 provides	 extensive	 diachronic	 and	 cross-linguistic	
evidence	 –	 mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 mappings	 from	 the	 sense	 perceptual	 to	 the	 mental	
domain	(Sweetser	1991:	38):		
	
sense	perceptual/external	domain	 	 mental/internal	domain	
VISION	 -->	 KNOWLEDGE	
HEARING	 -->	 INTERNAL	RECIPTIVITY	
FEEL	 -->	 EMOTION	
TASTE	 -->	 PERSONAL	PREFERENCE	
	
As	Sweetser	(1991:	45)	puts	it,	“[t]he	internal	self	is	pervasively	understood	in	terms	of	
the	bodily	external	self,	and	is	hence	described	by	means	of	vocabulary	drawn	[...]	from	
the	physical	domain.”	In	light	of	this	system,	which	we	might	sum	up	under	the	generic	
level	 shorthand	 INTERNAL	IS	EXTERNAL,	 the	modals	may	 and	must	 can	be	paraphrased	 in	
the	following	fashion	(adapted	from	Sweetser	1991:	61):	
	
(22a)	 John	may	go.	(root)	
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	 “John	is	not	barred	by	my	or	some	other	authority	from	going.”	
	
(22b)	 John	may	be	there.	(epistemic)	
	 “I	am	not	barred	by	my	premises	from	the	conclusion	that	he	is	there.”	
	
(23a)	 You	must	come	home	by	ten.	(Mom	said	so.)	(root)	
	 “The	direct	force	(of	Mom’s	authority)	compels	you	to	come	home	by	ten.”	
	
(23b)	 You	must	have	been	home	last	night.	(epistemic)	
	 “The	available	(direct)	evidence	compels	me	to	the	conclusion	that	you	were	home.”	
	
That	 is,	 the	 epistemic	 senses	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 root	 senses	 by	mapping	 the	 image	
schemas	 FORCE,	 BLOCKAGE,	 and	 ENABLEMENT	 from	 the	 external	 sociophysical	 onto	
the	internal	psychological	domain.		
	
	
5.	Metonymy	
	
5.1.	Metonymic	Shifts	and	Encyclopedic	Knowledge	
	
	Metonymy	 is	another	mapping	process	central	 to	human	cognition.	Here,	one	concept	
serves	 as	 a	 point	 of	 access	 for	 another	 concept	 from	 within	 the	 same	 experiential	
domain	 or	 domain	 matrix	 (e.g.	 Langacker	 1993:	 30;	 Kövecses	 and	 Radden	 1998:	 39;	
Barcelona	2000:	37).	The	following	examples	illustrate	this:	
	
(24)	 The	Giants	need	a	stronger	arm	in	right	field.	 (BODY	PART	FOR	PERSON)	
(25)	 I’ll	have	a	Löwenbräu.	 (PRODUCER	FOR	PRODUCT)	
(26)	 The	sax	has	the	flu	today.	 (OBJECT	FOR	USER)	
(27)	 Watergate	changed	our	politics.	 (PLACE	FOR	EVENT)	
	 	 	
(from	Lakoff	&	Johnson	2003:	38-39)	
				
		The	notion	of	a	domain,	as	 introduced	by	Langacker	(1987:	147ff.),	 is	essential	 to	 the	
encyclopedic	view	of	semantics	assumed	by	cognitive	 linguists.	On	this	view,	 linguistic	
items	are	points	of	access	to	potentially	open-ended	background	knowledge	structures	
(as	 opposed	 to	 being	 definable	 by	 feature	 bundles).	 For	 example,	 the	word	knuckle	 is	
understood	relative	to	the	conceptual	domain	FINGER.	If	a	given	concept	is	understood	
relative	 to	more	 than	one	domain	 (which	 is	 the	norm),	we	speak	of	 its	domain	matrix	
(Langacker	 1987:	 147).	 Thus,	 additional	 domains	 in	 the	 domain	 matrix	 of	 KNUCKLE	
include	 HUMAN	 BODY	 PARTS,	 ANATOMY,	 BAR	 FIGHTS,	 and	 so	 forth.	 Note	 that	 some	
domains	are	strictly	presupposed	by	a	concept	(FINGER	for	KNUCKLE)	while	others	are	
more	peripheral	 (e.g.	BAR	FIGHTS).	Nevertheless,	 all	 are	part	of	 the	domain	matrix	as	
they	contribute	to	our	encyclopedic	knowledge.		
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				We	can	now	easily	see	how	the	above	sentences	involve	a	domain	internal	shift	from	
one	entity	to	another.	(24)	is	understood	against	the	experiential	domain	of	BASEBALL,	
which	 includes	 the	players,	 their	 functions	 and	 the	body	parts	used	 in	 the	 game.	 (25)	
evokes	a	RESTAURANT	domain	–	a	conceptual	structure	that	includes	drinks	as	physical	
objects	as	well	as	knowledge	about	their	producers,	branding,	and	so	on.	The	domain	of	
MUSIC	EVENTS	includes	musicians	and	their	instruments	among	its	parts.	The	POLITICS	
domain	includes	knowledge	of	political	events	as	well	as	the	places	they	occur	at.		
				As	pointed	out	by	Langacker	(1993)	and	Kövecses	and	Radden	(1998),	metonymical	
shifts	are	not	arbitrary	but	governed	by	principles	of	relative	salience.	According	to	the	
classification	of	Kövecses	and	Radden	 (1998:	63ff.),	 relative	 salience	 is	determined	by	
four	 major	 factors:	 human	 experience	 (e.g.	 HUMAN	 OVER	 NON-HUMAN,	 CONCRETE	 OVER	
ABSTRACT),	 perceptual	 selectivity	 (e.g.	MORE	 OVER	 LESS,	 GOOD	 GESTALT	 OVER	 POOR	 GESTALT),	
cultural	preferences	(e.g.	STEREOTYPICAL	OVER	NONSTEREOTYPICAL,	IDEAL	OVER	NON-IDEAL),	and	
communicative	 principles	 (CLEAR	 OVER	 LESS	 CLEAR,	 RELEVANT	 OVER	 IRRELEVANT).	
Furthermore,	they	(1998:	71ff.)	observe	that	several	conflicting	principles	may	apply	at	
the	same	time.	For	example,	in	(26)	the	principle	HUMAN	OVER	NON-HUMAN	is	at	odds	with	
RELEVANT	OVER	IRRELEVANT.	 In	 such	 cases,	 one	or	more	principles	 can	be	overridden	 for	
“social,	communicative	or	aesthetic	reasons”	(1998:	71).	Given	the	context	of	 (26),	 the	
musician’s	 function	of	playing	 the	 sax	 is	 considered	 the	most	 important	 aspect	by	 far,	
while	his	or	her	other	human	qualities	are	hardly	relevant.	Hence,	 the	PRINCIPLE	HUMAN	
OVER	NON-HUMAN	is	reversed	in	favor	of	RELEVANT	OVER	IRRELEVANT.	
									
	
5.2.	Metonymy	and	Meaning	Extension					
	
As	with	metaphor,	we	will	be	concerned	with	metonymy	primarily	as	a	mechanism	of	
semantic	extension.	To	illustrate,	consider	the	entry	for	the	verb	paint11	in	the	Merriam-
Webster	Dictionary:12	
	
	 	 	 transitive	verb	
1	 a	 (1)	 to	apply	color,	pigment,	or	paint	to	
	 	 (2)	 to	color	with	a	cosmetic	
	 b	 (1)	 to	apply	with	a	movement	resembling	that	used	in	painting	
	 	 (2)	 to	treat	with	a	liquid	by	brushing	or	swabbing	
																																																								
11	The	verb	paint	is	also	used	as	an	example	by	Tuggy	(1993)	in	his	discussion	of	ambiguity,	polysemy	and	
vagueness	(see	7.3.),	although	not	specifically	in	the	context	of	metonymy.	
12	"Paint."	Merriam-Webster.com.,	retrieved	18	Aug.	2016.	
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2	 a	 (1)	 to	produce	in	lines	and	colors	on	a	surface	by	applying	pigments	
	 	 (2)	 to	depict	by	such	lines	and	colors	
	 b	 	 to	decorate,	adorn,	or	variegate	by	applying	lines	and	colors	
	 c	 	 to	produce	or	evoke	as	if	by	painting	
3	 	 	 to	touch	up	or	cover	over	by	or	as	if	by	painting	
4	 	 	 to	depict	as	having	specified	or	implied	characteristics	
	 	 	 intransitive	verb	
1’	 	 	 to	practice	the	art	of	painting	
2’	 	 	 to	use	cosmetics	
	
Recall	 from	above	the	notion	of	a	domain.	What	elements	would	the	domain	of	PAINT	
include?	Surely,	it	includes	the	application	of	a	substance	onto	a	surface.	This	is	done	for	
some	 purpose	 which	 can	 be	 artistic	 or	 utilitarian.	 There	 is	 a	 set	 of	 characteristic	
movements	 involved.	Further,	painting	 can	have	a	variety	of	 effects,	 i.e.	 the	 result	 can	
have	 an	 expressive,	 evocative	 and/or	 representational	 function.	 All	 of	 this	 (and	much	
more)	is	part	of	our	encyclopedic	knowledge	about	painting.		
				Now,	 allowing	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 entry	 cited	 is	 not	 an	 entirely	 accurate	
representation	 of	 semantic	 structure,	 we	 still	 get	 a	 rough	 idea	 of	 what	 some	 of	 the	
senses	of	paint	are	and	how	they	differ	from	one	another.	The	main	point	is	this:	Many	of	
the	senses	characterized	above	can	be	distinguished	 in	 terms	of	 the	relative	weight	of	
the	 various	 elements	 constituting	 the	 domain(-matrix)	 of	 PAINT.13	This	 is	 a	 salience-
based	phenomenon	which	 is	 essentially	metonymic	 in	 character	 (see	 also	 Croft	 1993:	
348).	Consider,	for	example,	an	instance	of	1b(2):	
	
(28)	 The	doctor	painted	the	wound	with	iodine.	
	
			Here,	 the	use	of	paint	 is	 licensed	by	shifting	the	bulk	of	salience	to	the	subdomain	of	
ASSOCIATED	 CHARACTERISTIC	 MOVEMENT	 and	 away	 from	 other	 aspects	 such	 as	
DEPICTION,	ARTISTIC	EXPRESSION,	etc.	Compare	this	to	the	distribution	of	salience	in	
the	following	sentence,	an	instance	of	1’:		
	
(29)	 The	beauty	of	life	inspires	her	to	paint.	
	
				In	this	case,	paint	is	licensed	by	foregrounding	the	aesthetic	and	expressive	aspects	of	
painting	absent	in	(28)	while	ignoring	all	utilitarian	aspects.	
																																																								
13	See	also	Langacker’s	notion	of	centrality:	“The	multitude	of	specifications	that	figure	in	our	encyclopedic	
conception	of	an	entity	clearly	form	a	gradation	in	terms	of	their	centrality.	Some	are	so	central	that	they	
can	hardly	be	omitted	from	even	the	sketchiest	characterization,	whereas	others	are	so	peripheral	that	
they	hold	little	significance	even	for	the	most	exhaustive	description”	(1987:	159).	We	can	therefore	say	
that	many	senses	of	paint	differ	in	terms	of	the	centrality	of	domain-internal	elements.		
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6.	A	Note	on	the	Relation	between	Metaphor	and	Metonymy	
	
A	particularly	challenging	aspect	of	the	theory	of		conceptual	metaphor	and	metonymy	is	
the	interaction	and	distinction	between	the	two	(see	e.g.	Goossens	1990,	Radden	2000).	
In	some	expressions	the	relationship	is	quite	intricate:	
	
(30)	 He	laid	down	the	pen	and	took	up	the	sword.	
	
Here,	as	indicated	by	lay	down	and	take	up,	the	METAPHOR	UP	IS	ACTIVE/DOWN	IS	INACTIVE	is	
at	work	 	 (Lindner	1981:	161).	 In	 this	 regard,	 (30)	 is	no	different	 from	a	sentence	 like	
(31):	
	
(31)	 She	took	up	knitting	as	a	hobby.	
	
However,	 (30)	 also	 features	 an	 encapsulated	metonymy,	 i.e.	 pen	 and	 sword	 stand	 for	
scholarship	 and	 warfare,	 respectively	 (INSTRUMENT	 FOR	 ACTION).	 Goossens	 (1990)	 has	
coined	 the	 term	metaphtonymy	 for	 the	 interplay	between	metaphor	and	metonymy	 in	
linguistic	expressions.		
				Now,	note	 that	meaning	extension,	 too,	may	 involve	metaphor	and	metonymy	at	 the	
same	time.	Consider	the	following	sentence:	
	
(32)	 A	witness	at	Jian	Ghomeshi’s	trial	painted	him	as	a	violent	egomaniac.14	
	
On	the	one	hand,	this	use	of	paint	(sense	4	listed	in	the	Merriam	Webster	entry)	is	clearly	
metaphorical,	 since	 the	 domain	 of	 VERBAL	 DESCRIPTION	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	
PAINTING.	On	the	other	hand,	the	descriptive	and	evocative	function	of	painting	(EFFECT	
FOR	ACTION)	 is	 part	 of	 our	 encyclopedic	 knowledge	 about	 the	 PAINTING	domain	 –	 and	
thus	 metonymic.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 meaning	 extension	 process	 seems	 to	 have	 a	
bipartite	structure,	whereby	the	metonymy	licenses	the	metaphor:	
	
(i) Metonymy:	EFFECT	OF	PAINTING	(description,	evocation)	FOR	PAINTING		
(ii) Metaphor:	DESCRIBING	IS	PAINTING		
	
																																																								
14	http://www.vice.com/read/lucy-decouteres-testimony-paints-jian-ghomeshi-as-a-violent-egomaniac,	
retrieved	23	Aug.	2016.	
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In	fact,	this	example	is	no	different	from	the	primary	metaphors	discussed	earlier.	Recall	
that	primary	metaphors	are	based	on	the	experiential	correlation	of	source	and	target.	
For	 instance,	 the	 classic	MORE	 IS	UP	 is	 grounded	 in	 our	 experience	 that	 an	 increase	 in	
amount	 often	 causes	 an	 increase	 in	 hight	 (Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 2003:	 16).	 Likewise,	
painting	 and	 its	 descriptive/characterizing	 function	 are	 part	 of	 the	 same	 experiential	
domain.	Therefore,	 if	we	understand	metonymy	as	a	mental	access	operation	within	a	
given	experiential	domain	(and	not	merely	a	tool	of	linguistic	reference)	it	can	indeed	be	
claimed	that	all	metaphors	have	a	metonymic	basis	(Barcelona	2000:	51).	The	reasoning	
behind	 this	 is	 as	 follows:	 If	 complex	 metaphors	 (e.g.	 LOVE	 IS	 A	 JOURNEY)	 can	 be	
decomposed	 into	 primary	 metaphors	 (e.g.	 STATES	 ARE	 LOCATIONS),	 and	 if	 primary	
metaphors	have	a	metonymic	basis	(e.g.	the	correlation	between	being	in	certain	states	
and	 being	 in	 certain	 locations),	 then	 all	 metaphors	 are	 ultimately	 motivated	 by	
metonymy.15			
	
	
7.	Polysemy	and	Lexical	Networks	
	
7.1.	The	Case	for	Polysemy	
	
When	a	linguistic	item	has	several	interrelated	meanings,	we	speak	of	polysemy.	When	it	
has	only	a	single	meaning,	we	speak	of	monosemy.	The	dominant	view	within	Cognitive	
Linguistics	is	that	polysemy	is	the	norm,	not	the	exception	(e.g.	Langacker	1987,	1991;	
Lakoff	1990b;	Rice	1992).	When	we	look	at	something	like	the	dictionary	entry	of	paint,	
it	 seems	 innocuous	 enough	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 word	 has	 more	 than	 one	 meaning.	
However,	 instead	 of	 simply	 taking	 this	 view	 for	 granted,	 we	 should	 inquire	why	 it	 is	
preferable	over	a	strong	monosemy	position.	Such	a	position	would	amount	to	the	claim	
that	even	 linguistic	 items	with	many	different	established	usages	have	only	one	highly	
schematic	 meaning	 that	 subsumes	 all	 the	 variants	 (see	 Rice	 1992:	 89).	 That	 is,	 the	
variants	are	not	full-fledged	meanings	in	their	own	right,	but	created	and	understood	on	
the	fly	in	accordance	with	pragmatic	principles	on	the	basis	of	a	single	semantic	value.		
				There	 are	 several	 problems	with	 this	 account.	 First,	 this	 view	of	 semantic	 structure	
requires	 an	 all-encompassing	 meaning	 that	 is	 schematic	 enough	 for	 all	 category	
members	 to	 be	 subsumed	 under.	 In	many	 cases	 this	 seems	 extremely	 ambitious.	 For	
																																																								
15	Note	that	this	also	applies	to	the	one-shot	image	metaphors	(e.g.	hourglass-waist,	barcode	hairstyle)	
mentioned	earlier,	since	these	are	based	on	the	correlation	of	object	and	shape.	Missing	from	this	
discussion	are	synaesthetic	metaphors	(e.g.	loud	color,	sweet	music).	But	see	Barcelona	(2000:	35ff.)	for	a	
metonymy-based	account.		
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example,	it	is	unlikely	that	there	is	a	single	meaning	of	paint	that	is	schematic	for	both	
He	painted	the	house	green	and	His	story	painted	her	as	the	villain.	Yet,	as	we	have	seen	
above,	both	usages	are	related.	 In	other	cases,	 finding	such	a	super-schema	is	outright	
impossible.	 Wittgenstein’s	 observation	 about	 the	 category	 game	 comes	 to	 mind	 as	 a	
famous	counterexample	against	staunchly	monosemic	accounts:		
	
Consider	for	example	the	proceedings	that	we	call	"games".	I	mean	board-games,	card-games,	ball-games,	
Olympic	games,	and	so	on.	What	is	common	to	them	all?	–	Don't	say:	"There	must	be	something	common,	
or	they	would	not	be	called	'games'	"	–	but	look	and	see	whether	there	is	anything	common	to	all.	–	For	if	
you	 look	at	 them	you	will	not	see	something	that	 is	common	to	all,	but	similarities,	 relationships,	and	a	
whole	series	of	them	at	that.	[...]	(1953:	section	66)	
	
I	can	think	of	no	better	expression	to	characterize	these	similarities	than	"family	resemblances";	 for	the	
various	resemblances	between	members	of	a	family:	build,	features,	colour	of	eyes,	gait,	temperament,	etc.	
etc.	overlap	and	criss-cross	 in	the	same	way.	–	And	I	shall	say:	 'games'	 form	a	 family.	 [...]	(1953:	section	
67)	
	
				Secondly,	in	many	cases	where	a	super-schema	does	exist,	we	can	reasonably	doubt	its	
semantic	significance	on	the	grounds	of	insufficient	cognitive	entrenchment.	It	is	simply	
not	 plausible	 that	 a	 highly	 schematic	 concept	which	 abstracts	 away	 from	most	 of	 the	
characteristic	features	of	its	instances	should	be	stored	in	long-term	memory,	while	said	
instances	–	which	we	are	generally	much	better	acquainted	with	–	are	not.	As	Langacker	
(1987:	381)	notes,	“even	if	an	all-subsuming	superschema	can	plausibly	be	posited	for	a	
category,	 it	 may	 well	 be	 only	 minimally	 entrenched	 and	 have	 very	 little	 cognitive	
salience.”	 Empirical	 support	 for	 this	 view	 comes	 from	 studies	 such	 as	 Rosch	 (1977,	
1978),	who	 suggests	 that	 categories	 are	 structured	 around	 prototype	 effects	 and	 that	
these	effects	are	most	likely	to	emerge	at	intermediate	specificity	(i.e.	the	“basic	level”),	
not	at	the	level	of	highest	schematicity.16		
				Lastly,	 it	should	be	noted	that	the	strong	monosemic	view	has	been	so	attractive	for	
generative	and	formal	semanticists	not	least	because	of	its	alleged	economy:	Why	posit	
additional	semantic	entities	when	they	can	in	theory	be	“computed”	on	the	fly,	based	on	
a	single	value?	As	argued	above,	this	concern	flies	in	the	face	of	cognitive	reality.	For	an	
encyclopedic	semantics	that	embraces	redundancy	and	overlap	in	conceptual	structure	
it	is	a	non-issue	(Langacker	1987:	275).		
	
	
																																																								
16	For	example,	the	features	prototypically	associated	with	the	category	bird	(ability	to	fly,	feathers,	
average	size,	etc.)	emerge	at	an	intermediate	level	that	subsumes	only	“typical”	members	such	as	
sparrows,	doves,	and	so	forth.	A	super-schema	that	subsumes	all	members	(penguins,	ostriches,	etc.)	has	
to	abstract	away	from	these	features	and	is	therefore	not	as	well-entrenched	in	the	cognitive	system.		
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7.2.	Making	Sense	of	Senses	–	Some	Proposals	
	
Given	 these	 considerations,	 and	 based	 on	 the	 general	 theoretical	 commitments	 of	
Cognitive	 Linguistics	 outlined	 earlier,	 a	 lexical	 network	 model	 promises	 the	 most	
accurate	 representation	 of	 conceptual	 structure	 (and	 therefore	 semantic	 structure).	
According	 to	 this	 approach,	 linguistic	 categories	 are	 natural	 bundles	 of	 senses	 held	
together	 by	 family	 resemblances	 (e.g.	 Brugman	 1981,	 Lakoff	 1990b).	 Of	 course,	 this	
raises	the	delicate	question	of	how	to	identify	and	differentiate	the	senses	of	a	word	(or	
any	linguistic	construction,	for	that	matter).	As	may	be	expected,	this	is	a	topic	of	much	
heated	debate	among	cognitive	 linguists.	Consider,	 for	example,	some	of	 the	criticisms	
directed	 towards	 the	 seminal	Brugman/Lakoff	 analysis	 of	over	 (Lakoff	 1990b),	 one	 of	
the	 earliest	 lexical	 network	 proposals.	 According	 to	 Lakoff	 	 (1990b:	 420ff.),	 all	 of	 the	
following	usages	of	over	constitute	discrete	senses	(i.e.	meaning	variants):		
	
(33)	 The	bird	flew	over	the	yard	 (extended	LM,	no	contact)	
(34)	 The	plane	flew	over	the	hill	 (vertical	&	extended	LM,	no	contact)	
(35)	 The	bird	flew	over	the	wall	 (vertical	LM,	no	contact)	
(36)	 Sam	drove	over	the	bridge	 (extended	LM,	contact)	
(37)	 Sam	walked	over	the	hill	 (vertical	&	extended	LM,	contact)	
(38)	 Sam	climbed	over	the	wall	 (vertical	LM,	contact)	
	
				Thus,	 in	 the	 Brugman/Lakoff	 model	 each	 different	 combination	 of	 dimensional	
parameters	 is	 granted	 the	 status	of	 a	meaning	variant.	 Some	 linguists	 (e.g.	Vandeloise	
1990;	 Dewell	 1994)	 have	 criticized	 this	 “full-specification	 approach”	 (Lakoff	 1990b:	
420)	as	a	relapse	into	compositional	feature	analysis.	For	example,	instead	of	relying	on	
LM	 specifications	 (i.e.	 the	 bracketed	parameters	 above)	Dewell	 suggests	 that	 the	 only	
semantic	extension	mechanisms	relevant	for	over	are	image	schema	transformation	and	
metaphor.	He	 further	argues	 that	 the	categorial	prototype	 is	not	 the	above-and-across	
schema	posited	by	Lakoff	(1990b:	419)	but	a	curved	arc	schema	(Dewell	1994:	352ff.).	
Others	 (e.g.	 Kreitzer	 1997;	 Tyler	 and	 Evans	 2001,	 2003)	 have	 objected	 that	 the	
Brugman/Lakoff	 analysis	 is	 methodologically	 unconstrained	 and	 vastly	 inflates	 the	
number	 of	 senses	 by	 downplaying	 the	 role	 of	 context	 and	 on-line	 inference.	 Kreitzer	
argues	 that	 many	 of	 the	 parameters	 used	 by	 Brugman/Lakoff	 (contact,	 extended,	
vertical,	 etc.)	 actually	 belong	 to	 the	 component	 level	 of	 schematic	 structure,	 which	 is	
below	 “the	 basic	 level	 of	 granularity	 at	 which	 individual	 prepositions	 are	 defined”	
(1997:	304).	At	this	basic	relational	level	he	recognizes	only	three	schemas	from	which	
the	entire	range	of	usage	types	of	over	can	then	be	derived	(Kreitzer	1997:	308ff.):	
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over1	 static	relation	without	occlusion	 (e.g.	‘The	picture	is	over	the	fireplace.’)	
over2	 dynamic	relation	 (e.g.	‘The	cat	jumped	over	the	post.’)	
over3	 static	object	with	occlusion	 (e.g.	‘The	tablecloth	is	over	the	table.’)	
	
In	a	similar	spirit	(i.e.	of	providing	a	constraining	methodology),	Tyler	and	Evans	(2001:	
105)	propose	two	criteria	for	differentiating	the	senses	of	over:	
	
[...]	for	a	sense	to	count	as	distinct,	it	must	involve	a	meaning	that	is	not	purely	spatial	in	nature	and/or	in	
which	 the	spatial	 configuration	between	 the	TR	and	LM	 is	changed	vis-a-vis	 the	other	senses	associated	
with	a	particular	preposition.	Secondly,	there	must	be	instances	of	the	sense	that	are	context-independent,	
instances	in	which	the	distinct	sense	could	not	be	inferred	from	another	sense	and	the	context	in	which	it	
occurs.17		
	
				In	 summary,	 then,	 the	 discussion	 of	 over	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	 dissent	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 representing	 polysemy	 in	 a	 lexical	 network.	 Depending	 on	 which	
linguist	you	ask,	the	number	of	senses	proposed	varies	between	three	(Kreitzer	1997),	
sixteen	(Tyler	and	Evans	2001)	and	twenty-four	(Lakoff	1990b).	So	who	is	right?	
	
	
7.3.	Polysemy	as	a	Fuzzy	Notion	–	The	Langacker/Tuggy	Model	
	
Much	of	the	controversy	surrounding	polysemy	and	lexical	networks	in	general	hinges	
on	our	understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	meaning	variant.	However,	when	striving	for	
cognitive	realism	there	seems	to	be	only	one	plausible	way	of	characterizing	the	notion	
of	 sense,	 i.e.	 as	 a	 semantic	 structure	 that	 has	 achieved	unit	status	within	 the	 cognitive	
system.	Langacker	(1987:	57)	characterizes	a	unit	as	follows:	
	
A	unit	is	a	structure	that	a	speaker	has	mastered	quite	thoroughly,	to	the	extent	that	he	can	employ	it	in	
largely	automatic	fashion,		without	having		to	focus	his	attention	specifically	on	its	individual	parts	or	their	
arrangement.	Despite	its	internal	complexity,	a	unit	constitutes	for	a	speaker	a	“pre-packaged”	assembly;	
because	he	has	no	need	to	reflect	on	how	to	put	 it	 together,	he	can	manipulate	 it	with	ease	as	a	unitary	
entity.	It	is	effectively	simple,	since	it	does	not	demand	the	constructive	effort	required	for	the	creation	
of	novel	structures.	Psychologists	would	speak	of	a	“habit”,	or	say	that	“automization”	has	occured.		
	
	In	 other	words,	 whether	 a	 structure	 has	 unit	 status	 or	 not	 depends	 on	 its	 degree	 of	
entrenchment.	 As	 Tuggy	 puts	 it,	 entrenchment	 is	 best	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 “enduring	
salience”	 of	 a	 structure	 as	 a	 result	 of	 that	 structure’s	 repeated	 usage	 (1993:	 279).	
Crucially,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 “nonarbitrary	 cutoff	 point”	 for	 unit	 status,	 since	 cognitive	
entrenchment	is	clearly	a	matter	of	degree	(Langacker	1987:	59).	Thus,	if	we	accept	that	
																																																								
17	Recall	that	the	issue	of	contextual	inference	has	also	been	raised	by	proponents	of	the	monosemic	view.	
However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	both	Kreitzer	(1997)	and	Tyler	and	Evans	(2001)	reject	the	claim	
that	all	usages	of	over	are	inferred	on-line	from	a	single	super-schema.		
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senses	 are	 units,	we	must	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 no	 nonarbitrary	 line	 of	 demarcation	
separating	senses	from	less	well-entrenched	semantic	structures.		
				Based	on	the	insights	of	Langacker	(1987,	1991),	Tuggy	(1993)	proposes	a	model	that	
embraces	the	indeterminacy	of	polysemy	by	placing	the	notion	on	a	continuum	between	
the	poles	of	ambiguity	(homonymy)	and	vagueness.	A	prototypical	example	of	ambiguity	
would	be	the	case	of	bank1	(river	bank)	and	bank2	(financial	institution).	Both	are	very	
well	entrenched	and	there	is	no	salient	schema	subsuming	them.	The	structures	are	not	
even	etymologically	related,	and	if	one	were	to	look	for	a	common	schema,	it	would	have	
to	be	something	highly	abstract	like	thing.	Such	a	schema	would	also	show	a	high	degree	
of	elaborative	distance	from	both	instances,	i.e.	it	would	have	to	ignore	almost	all	of	their	
characteristic	 specifications.	 Conversely,	 aunt1	 (mother’s	 sister)	 and	 aunt2	 (father’s	
sister)	 is	 given	as	 an	example	of	prototypical	 vagueness.	Here,	 the	 subsuming	 schema	
(parent’s	sister)	is	much	better	entrenched	than	its	 instances.	Additionally,	elaborative	
distance	 is	 minimal,	 i.e.	 schema	 and	 instances	 are	 identical,	 except	 that	 the	 schema	
ignores	 the	parent’s	 gender	 specifications.18	In	 this	model	 polysemy	 constitutes	 an	 in-
between	 case.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 paint1	 (artistic	 painting)	 and	 paint2	 (utilitarian	
painting):	Both	structures	are	well-entrenched,	but	so	is	the	subsuming	schema	(apply	
paint	 to	 surface)	 which	 is	 located	 at	 intermediate	 elaborative	 distance	 (Tuggy	 1993:	
283).	This	is	exactly	the	kind	of	case	where	we	would	speak	of	paint1	and	paint2	(as	well	
as	the	subsuming	schema)	as	different	senses	of	paint.	
				To	 summarize,	we	 speak	of	 ambiguity	 if	 two	or	more	 semantic	 structures	have	unit	
status	while	the	subsuming	schema	does	not;	of	vagueness	if	they	lack	unit	status	while	
the	subsuming	schema	has	unit	 status;	and	of	polysemy	 if	both	 the	structures	and	 the	
subsuming	 schema	 have	 unit	 status.	 Yet,	 as	 Tuggy	 (1993:	 282)	 observes,	 due	 to	 the	
dynamic	and	gradual	nature	of	salience	it	is	“impossible	to	draw	absolute	boundary	lines	
between	the	categories	of	ambiguity,	polysemy	and	vagueness.”	
				So	how	do	the	various	analyses	of	over	fare	in	light	of	the	Langacker/Tuggy	model	and	
how	 can	we	 account	 for	 the	 differences	 in	 results?	 According	 to	 the	 Brugman/Lakoff	
analysis,	 each	minimal	 distinction	 in	TR/LM	 specifications	 qualifies	 as	 a	 sense.	 But	 as	
Tyler	 and	Evans	point	 out	 (2001:	 99),	 the	 linguistic	 expressions	 corresponding	 to	 the	
																																																								
18	As	Tuggy	(1993:	283)	notes,	there	is	an	inverse	(albeit	not	completely	parallel)	correlation	between	a	
schema’s	elaborative	distance	and	its	entrenchment.	That	is,	schemas	are	less	likely	to	become	entrenched	
vis-a-vis	their	instances	once	they	surpass	a	certain	threshold	of	abstractness,	i.e.	what	Rosch	(e.g.	1977)	
calls	the	basic	level	(see	also	7.1.).	This	is,	of	course,	the	result	of	usage-based	reinforcement:	Highly	
abstract	structures	tend	to	be	less	frequently	used/activated	than	their	elaborations.	
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TR/LM	 often	 underspecify	 these	 minimal	 distinctions.	 Consider	 the	 following	 two	
examples	from	Lakoff	(1990b:	421):		
	
(39)	 The	bird	flew	over	the	yard.	 (extended,	non-vertical	LM;	no	contact)	
(40)	 The	plane	flew	over	the	hill.	 (extended,	vertical	LM;	no	contact)	
	
In	the	Brugman/Lakoff	model	(39)	and	(40)	are	minimal	variants.	Everything	else	being	
equal,	 the	 former	 features	 a	 horizontally	 extended	 LM,	 whereas	 the	 latter	 features	 a	
horizontally	and	vertically	extended	LM.	Now	compare	this	to	(41):	
	
(41)	 The	bird/plane	flew	over	the	area.	 (extended,	?vertical	LM;	no	contact)	
	
Unlike	 yard	 and	 hill,	 the	 noun	 area	 underspecifies	 whether	 the	 LM	 is	 also	 vertically	
extended	or	not.	 Considering	 the	minimal	degree	of	 elaborative	distance	 from	 (41)	 to	
(39)	and	(40),	and	on	the	assumption	that	the	schema	in	(41)	is	more	firmly	entrenched,	
the	 Langacker/Tuggy	model	would	 predict	 that	over	 in	 (39)	 and	 (40)	 is	 vague	 rather	
than	 polysemous.	 Accordingly,	 one	 might	 argue	 that	 the	 Brugman/Lakoff	 account	
ascribes	polysemy	 to	several	 cases	 that	are	more	aptly	characterized	as	vague.	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 estimates	 of	 a	 structure’s	 degree	 of	 entrenchment	 based	on	 introspection	
are	best	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt	and	experimental	data	indeed	suggests	that	“subjects	
seem	to	make	distinctions	of	a	rather	fine-grained	nature”	(Sandra	and	Rice	1995:	122-
123)	 when	 confronted	 with	 semantic	 decision	 tasks.	 While	 a	 given	 structure	 is	 not	
automatically	 guaranteed	 unit	 status	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 TR/LM	 specifications,	 it	 is	 still	
plausible	that	language	users	make	distinctions	at	this	low	level	of	granularity.		
				Assuming	the	entrenchment-based	vagueness-polysemy	cline	of	the	Langacker/Tuggy	
model,	Kreitzer	(1997)	as	well	as	Tyler	and	Evans	(2001)	postulate	criteria	for	polysemy	
that	ultimately	seem	both	rigid	and	arbitrary.	Recall	from	above	Kreitzer’s	(1997:	304)	
claim	that	Brugman/Lakoff	style	TR/LM	specifications	are	below	the	level	of	granularity	
at	which	prepositions	are	defined,	and	thus	irrelevant.	Like	Tyler	and	Evans,	he	observes	
that	linguistic	expressions	such	as	The	man	went	over	the	fence	are	often	underspecified:	
“Here,	it	is	unimportant	whether	the	man	jumped	over	the	fence	or	climbed	the	fence	–	
over	 remains	 grammatical	 either	 way	 as	 long	 as	 (1)	 there	 is	 motion	 and	 (2)	 the	
trajectory	traverses	the	boudaries	of	the	landmark”	(Kreitzer	1997:	304).	In	other	words,	
Kreitzer	 suggests	 that	 a	 specification	 is	 only	 relevant	 if	 there	 are	 contexts	 where	 an	
expression’s	 grammaticality	 hinges	 on	 its	 presence	 or	 absence.	 But	 there	 is	 no	
psychological	evidence	to	suggest	that	a	semantic	structure	cannot	attain	unit	status	in	
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the	cognitive	system	of	a	 language	user	merely	because	 its	specifications	do	not	cause	
ungrammaticality	 in	 certain	 linguistic	 contexts.19	Likewise,	 Tyler	 and	 Evans’s	 (2001:	
105)	criterium	that	there	“must	be	[...]	instances	in	which	the	distinct	sense	could	not	be	
inferred	from	another	sense	and	the	context	in	which	it	occurs”	begs	the	question.	Even	
in	the	most	extreme	scenario	where	a	usage	type	can	always	be	 inferred	from	another	
usage	type	or	from	contextual	factors,	we	cannot	conclude	that	the	structure	in	question	
is	insufficiently	entrenched.	If	a	structure	is	mentally	accessed	time	and	time	again	it	will	
attain	 unit	 status,	 i.e.	 the	 language	 user	 will	 produce	 it	 without	 “constructive	 effort”	
(Langacker	 1987:	 57)	 –	 regardless	 of	 whether	 such	 effort	 could	 theoretically	 be	
employed	to	infer	it	or	not.		
	
	
7.4.	Implications	for	the	Present	Study	
	
				The	 above	 considerations	 have	 several	 implications	 for	 the	 following	 case	 studies.	
While	 I	 agree	 that	 lexical	 networks	 are	 the	most	 suitable	 tool	 available	 for	 accurately	
representing	semantic	structure,	it	is	also	important	to	be	aware	of	their	limitations.	As	
the	 Langacker/Tuggy	 model	 reminds	 us,	 the	 representation	 of	 polysemy	 is	 an	
approximation	at	best.	It	is	not	possible	to	draw	a	hard	and	fast	boundary	line	between	
vagueness	 and	 polysemy.	 Although	 there	 are	 certain	 indicators	 for	 clear	 cases	 of	
polysemy,	none	of	them	can	serve	as	necessary	or	sufficient	conditions.	For	example,	if	
usage	 type	 B	 is	 a	 metaphorical	 extension	 of	 usage	 type	 A,	 chances	 are	 that	 A	 and	 B	
represent	distinct	senses.	Yet,	we	cannot	conclude	that	metaphorical	extension	always	
entails	 polysemy.	 As	 Tuggy	 (1993:	 285)	 points	 out,	 during	 the	 process	 of	 meaning	
extension	a	given	semantic	structure	“can	straddle	the	the	fence	[i.e.	between	the	poles	
of	 vagueness	 and	 ambiguity]	 indefinitely,	 shifting	 its	 weight	 back	 and	 forth,	 before	
gradually	moving	more	to	one	side	than	the	other.”	This	applies	to	metaphor,	metonymy,	
and	any	other	mechanism	of	semantic	extension	alike.	If	we	want	something	resembling	
a	“perfect	inventory”	of	senses	for	some	construction	at	some	specific	point	in	time,	our	
best	bet	would	be	to	collect	large	amounts	of	data	on	language	user	intuitions	regarding	
entrenchment	–	whatever	the	exact	nature	of	such	an	experiment	might	be.20	It	should	
also	 be	 noted,	 that	 these	 experiments	 would	 somehow	 have	 to	 take	 into	 account	
																																																								
19	In	fact,	the	fine-grained	distinctions	attested	by	Sandra	and	Rice	(1995)	provide	evidence	to	the	
contrary.			
20	Semantic	decision	tasks	such	as	the	ones	presented	in	Sandra	and	Rice	(1995)	might	be	a	good	starting	
point.		
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individual	 as	 well	 as	 cultural	 variation	 among	 test	 subjects.	 For	 instance,	 Langacker	
(1987:	376)	remarks	that	“[e]lms	and	maples	may	not	survive	as	prototypical	trees	for	a	
speaker	who	has	lived	for	forty	years	in	the	desert.”	
				Meanwhile,	the	aim	of	my	case	studies	is	not	to	present	a	perfect	inventory	of	senses	
for	 the	verbs	under	scrutiny.	 Instead,	my	goal	 is	 to	give	 the	reader	an	 idea	of	how	the	
different	 usage	 types	 are	 connected	 via	 family	 resemblances	 and	 to	make	 explicit	 the	
mechanisms	of	meaning	extension	by	which	they	are	derivable	from	one	another.	In	the	
end	 it	 should	 hopefully	 become	 clear	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 these	 particular	 verbs,	 the	
respective	 image	 schemas	are	 the	glue	which	 “holds	 the	 family	 together”,	 so	 to	 speak.	
The	reader	should	keep	in	mind	that	the	senses	postulated	in	this	thesis	are	the	result	of	
introspection	 checked	 against	 the	 intuitions	 of	 native	 speakers.	 Consequently,	 the	
proposed	category	structures	are	best	viewed	as	approximations	and	to	be	taken	with	a	
grain	of	salt.	While	for	simplicity’s	sake	the	term	sense	is	used	for	each	proposed	usage	
type,	 the	 reader	 should	 be	 well	 aware	 that	 several	 cases	 are	 probably	 closer	 to	
vagueness	than	polysemy.		
	
	
8.	Spatial	Expressions	in	Cognitive	Linguistics:	An	Overview	of	the	
Literature	
	
Given	the	imagistic	stance	on	language	outlined	earlier,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	the	
analysis	 of	 spatial	 terms	 has	 been	 a	 staple	 of	 cognitive	 linguistic	 research	 since	 the	
earliest	days.	This	is	evidenced	by	a	variety	of	studies	featuring	network-type	analyses	
of	 prepositional	 polysemy	 and	 verb	 particle	 constructions.	 Of	 these	 I	 have	 already	
mentioned	 the	 pioneering	 contributions	 of	 Brugman	 (1981)	 and	 Lindner	 (1981).	 In	 a	
comprehensive	 case	 study	 Brugman	 has	 successfully	 shown	 that	 the	 various	 uses	 of	
English	 over	 are	 not	 a	 random	 aggregate,	 but	 instead	 constitute	 a	 systematically	
interrelated	category	of	senses.	This	work,	a	revised	version	of	which	appeared	in	Lakoff	
(1990b),	 illustrates	 how	 semantic	 structure	 is	 dependent	 on	 and	motivated	 by	 image	
schematic	 structure.	 In	 the	 same	 spirit,	 but	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 Langackarian	
Cognitive	 Grammar	 (then	 called	 “Space	 Grammar”),	 Lindner’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 English	
verb	 particle	 constructions	 V-out	 and	 V-up	 makes	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 the	 substantial	
semantic	contribution	of	the	respective	particles.	Alternative	analyses	of	over	within	the	
cognitive	 framework	 include	 Dewell	 (1994),	 Kreitzer	 (1997)	 and	 Tyler	 and	 Evans	
(2001).	 Morgan	 (1997)	 proposes	 a	 metaphor-based	 account	 of	 verb	 particle	
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constructions	 with	 out.	 Notable	 book-length	 studies	 of	 English	 prepositions	 and/or	
particles	 include	 Hawkins	 (1984),	 Herskovits	 (1986),	 Lindstromberg	 (1998),	 Hampe	
(2002),	 and	 Tyler	 and	 Evans	 (2003).	 Outside	 of	 English,	 spatial	 terms	 have	 been	
explored	from	a	cognitive	perspective	by	Smith	(1987)(German	two-way	prepositions),	
Cuyckens	 (1991)	 (Dutch	 prepositions),	 Vandeloise	 (1991)	 (French	 prepositions),	 and	
Delbeque	(1996)	(Spanish	por	and	para),	to	name	but	a	few	examples.	
				All	 of	 these	 studies	 agree	 in	 one	 central	 respect.	 Namely,	 that	 the	 image	 schematic	
structure	 of	 the	 preposition/particle	 is	 inherently	 meaningful.	 Insofar	 I	 am	 greatly	
indebted	 to	 these	 works	 for	 providing	 the	 major	 working	 hypothesis	 of	 the	 present	
thesis.	 Although	 Japanese	 has	 no	 verb	 particle	 constructions,	 the	 grammatical	 V2s	
considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 fulfill	 a	 similar	 function	 by	 contributing	 an	 abstract	 spatial	
meaning	–	which	may	then	serve	as	basis	for	various	mechanisms	of	semantic	extension.	
Since	there	is	currently	no	convenient	way	to	refer	to	this	specific	group	of	verbs	(akin	
to	spatial	preposition),	I	have	coined	the	term	image	schema	verb	for	practical	purposes.	
				As	briefly	mentioned	earlier,	 the	verb-verb	compound	(fukugô	dôshi)	 is	 likely	among	
the	 most	 widely	 studied	 phenomena	 in	 Japanese	 linguistics.21 	Nontheless,	 we	 can	
roughly	 divide	 the	 vast	 amount	 of	 research	 on	 the	 topic	 into	 theory	 neutral	 and	
generative	approaches.	The	former	camp	–	either	rooted	in	traditional	“school	grammar”	
(gakkô	bunpô)	or	assuming	no	specific	theoretical	framework	–	is	generally	open	to	the	
possibility	that	grammatical	V2s	such	as	-kakaru	or	-deru	may	carry	conceptual	content	
related	 to	 their	 simplex	 counterparts.	 However,	 the	 details	 of	 this	 relation	 remain	
implicit	and	no	sophisticated	explanation	is	usually	offered.	Most	of	the	earlier	research	
on	 V-V	 compounds	 falls	 into	 this	 category	 (e.g.	 Teramura	 1969;	Nagashima	 1976),	 as	
well	 as	 the	 insightful	 series	 of	 studies	 by	 Himeno	 (e.g.	 1976,	 1977,	 1979,	 1980).22	
Yamamoto’s	 (1984)	 famous	 essay	 on	 “case	 government”	 (kaku	 shihai)	 marks	 a	 shift	
towards	 syntactocentric	 accounts	 of	 V-V	 compounds,	 predominantly	 occupied	 with	
questions	 of	 “argument	 structure”.	 Then,	 ever	 since	 Kageyama’s	 (1993)	 highly	
influential	 introduction	 of	 the	 lexical	 vs.	 syntactic	 distinction	 –	 postulating	 two	
fundamentally	 different	 kinds	 of	 V-V	 compounds	 assumed	 to	 emerge	 in	 separate	
“components”	of	 the	grammar	–	 ,	 research	on	V-V	compounds	has	been	dominated	by	
																																																								
21	An	extensive	bibliography	is	available	from	the	hompage	of	the	National	Institute	for	Japanese	
Language	and	Linguistics	(NINJAL):	http://pj.ninjal.ac.jp/lexicon/files/bunken_v3.pdf;	retrieved	22	Oct.	
2016.	
22	But	note	that	Himeno	adopts	the	generative	distinction	between	lexical	and	syntactic	compounds	in	her	
later	work	(e.g.	1999).			
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generative	 approaches	 (e.g.	 Kageyama	 1996,	 2009;	 Yumoto	 1996,	 2008;	 	 Matsumoto	
1998a;	Fukushima	2005).		
				So	where	do	we	currently	 stand?	Although	Cognitive	Linguistics	has	become	a	well-
established	 research	 paradigm	 among	 Japanese	 scholars	 (e.g.	 Yamanashi	 2000,	 2009;	
Taniguchi	 2003,	 2005;	 Momiyama	 2014),	 and	 despite	 their	 many	 insightful	
contributions	 to	 the	 field,	 Japanese	 image	 schema	 verbs	 have	 rarely	 been	 a	 focus	 of	
interest. 23 	This	 is	 somewhat	 surprising,	 considering	 the	 amount	 of	 attention	
prepositions	and	verb	particle	constructions	have	received	from	a	cognitive	perspective	
since	 the	 early	 1980s.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 dominant	 generative,	 and	 thus	 formalist,	
approaches	 to	 Japanese	 V-V	 compounding	 make	 little	 to	 no	 attempt	 to	 draw	 a	
connection	between	the	meaning	of	grammatical	V2s	and	their	simplex	counterparts	–	
at	 least	not	in	the	sense	of	what	we	have	called	encyclopedic	semantics.	 In	this	context,	
the	present	 study	 is	 intended	as	 a	modest	 first	 step	 towards	establishing	 the	 study	of		
Japanese	image	schema	verbs	as	a	research	topic	in	Cognitive	Linguistics.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
				
																																																								
23	However,	see	Matsuda’s	(2001a,	2001b)	schema-based	studies	on	V-komu.		
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9.1.	The	Senses	of	KAKARU	
	
9.1.1.	Sense	(Ia):	Physical	Support	(fig.	2)	
	
(1)	 Kabe-ni	 e-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Wall-DAT	 picture-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	picture	is	hanging	on	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
(2)	 Monchû-ni	 hyôsatsu-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	
	 Gatepost-DAT	 nameplate-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	a	nameplate	on	(fixed	to)	the	gatepost.’	
	
(3)	 Yôfuku-ga	 hanga-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Clothes-NOM	 hanger-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	clothes	are	on	the	hanger.’	 	 	 	
	
(4)	 Kabe-ni	 hashigo-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Wall-DAT	 ladder-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	ladder	is	leaning	against	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
Both	 TR	 and	 LM	 are	 concrete	 objects.	 The	 TR	 exerts	 force	 on	 the	 LM,	 which	 the	 LM	
resists.	This	SUPPORT	configuration	 is	 typically	vertical,	 rarely	horizontal	 as	 in	 (4).	 In	
either	 case	 the	 force	 is	 gravitational.	 Since	 the	 TR	 is	 an	 inanimate	 entity	 incapable	 of	
self-propelled	movement,	construction	(B)	is	usually	not	realized.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	2	
	
9.1.2.	Sense	(Ib):	Imagined	Support	(fig.	3)	
	
(5)	 Tsuki-ga	 sora-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Moon-NOM	 sky-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	moon	is	hanging	in	the	sky.’	 	 	 	
	
(6)	 Sora-ni	 kumo-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Sky-DAT	 clouds-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Clouds	are	hanging	in	the	sky.’	 	 	 	
	
(7)	 Yama-no	 chôjô-ni	 moya-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	
	 Mountain-LK	 summit-DAT	 mist-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Mist	is	hanging	over	the	mountain	top.’	
	
This	sense	is	available	from	(Ia)	via	image	metaphor	(Lakoff	2006:	215ff.).	Due	to	similar	
TR-LM	 arrangements,	 the	 force	 dynamics	 of	 scenes	 like	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 are	 left	 intact	
although	no	actual	SUPPORT	is	 involved	 in	(5)-(7).	As	shown	below,	(1)	and	(5)	share	
the	same	basic	spatial	configuration.		
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FIGURE	3	
	
9.1.3.	Sense	(Ic):	Physical	Force	(fig.4)	
	
(8)	 Paipu-ni	 atsuryoku-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Pipe-DAT	 pressure-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	pressure	on	the	pipe.’	 	 	 	
	
(9)	 Migi	ashi-ni	 taijû-wo	 kakeru	 	 	 	 	
	 Right	foot-DAT	 body	weight-ACC	 KAKERU	 ‘To	shift	ones	weight	onto	the	right	foot’	 	 	 	
	
This	sense	is	available	via	metonymic	shift	 from	(Ia):	The	focus	is	not	on	the	source	of	
physical	 force,	but	on	 the	 force	 itself.	This	 force	need	not	be	vertically	orientated,	but	
can	include	various	kinds	of	internal	or	external	pressure,	as	exemplified	by	(8).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	4	
	
	9.1.4.	Sense	(Id):	Psychological	Burden	
	
(10)	 Seijika-ni	 fuhai-no	 utagai-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 Politician-DAT	 corruption-LK	 doubt-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	politician	is	suspected	of	corruption.’	 	 	 	
	
(11)	 Wakashachô-ni	 kitai-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Young	CEO-DAT	 expectations	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Expectations	rest	on	the	young	CEO.’	 	
	
(12)	 Kimi-ni	 meiwaku-wo	 kake-te,	 môshiwake	 na-ku	 omot-te	iru.	 	
	 You-DAT	 trouble-ACC	 KAKERU-TE	 excuse	 exist.NEG-INF	 think-RES	 	
	 ‘I	am	sorry	for	troubling	you.’	 	
	
(13)	 Jukensei-ni	 puresshâ-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Test	candidates-DAT	 pressure-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	pressure	on	the	test	candidates.’	 	
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Via	metaphor	 this	 sense	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 (Ia)	 or	 (Ic),	 depending	 on	whether	 the	
psychological	burden	 is	construed	as	an	object	 (10-12)	or	a	 force	(13).	The	respective	
metaphors	are	PSYCHOLOGICAL	BURDENS	ARE	PHYSICAL	BURDENS	and	PSYCHOLOGICAL	FORCES	ARE	
PHYSICAL	FORCES.	 In	 either	 case,	 the	 sensation	 of	weight	 is	mapped	 onto	 the	 domain	 of	
psychological	states.		
	
9.1.5.	Sense	(Ie):	Precondition	for	Success	(fig.	5)	
	
(14)	 Boku-no	 shôrai-ga	 kyô-no	 kaigi-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 I.M-LK	 future-NOM	 today-LK	 meeting-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 	 	
	 ‘My	future	depends	on	today’s	meeting.’	 	 	
	
(15)	 Rôjin-ga	 musuko-ni	 kakat-teiru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Old	man-NOM	 son-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	old	man	depends	on	his	son.’	 	 	 	
	
(16)	 Kare-ga	 keiba-ni	 zenzaisan-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 He-NOM	 horse	racing-DAT	 whole	fortune-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘He	bet	his	all	of	his	fortune	on	horse	races.’	 	 	 	
	
This	 sense	 involves	 the	 application	 of	 force	 dynamics	 to	 the	 domain	 of	 abstract	
reasoning.	 (Ie)	 is	 available	 from	 (Ia)	 via	 two	metaphors:	 PRECONDITIONS	ARE	SUPPORTING	
OBJECTS	and	the	more	general	STATES	OF	AFFAIRS	ARE	PHYSICAL	OBJECTS	(of	which	the	former	
is	 an	 instance).	 The	 underlying	 cognitive	 principle	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 conceive	 of	 non-
things	 as	 things	 has	 been	 variously	 discussed	 –	most	 prominently	 under	 the	 label	 of	
reification	 (e.g.	 Talmy	 2003a:	 43f.).	 Langacker	 (1991:	 35)	 	 refers	 to	 reification	 in	 the	
context	of	nominalization	and	relative	clauses,	noting	 that	 the	 latter	allow	us	 “to	 ‘step	
back’	from	the	situation	[...]	and	construe	it	as	an	abstract	object	or	proposition	capable	
of	being	manipulated,	evaluated,	and	commented	on.”	Abstract	objects,	 in	 turn,	 can	be	
construed	 metaphorically	 as	 concrete	 objects,	 making	 them	 compatible	 with	 force	
dynamic	 notions	 of	 the	 physical	 domain.	 We	 therefore	 speak	 of	 claims	 supported	 by	
evidence	or	certain	assumptions	resting	on	other	assumptions	etc.	In	(14)-(16)	one	state	
of	affairs	is	supported	by	another.	In	(14)	the	TR	boku-no	shôrai	metonymically	stands	
for	 a	 proposition	 like	 “I	will	 not	 be	 fired	 (or	might	 even	 get	 promoted)”	while	kyô	no	
kaigi	 metonymically	 stands	 for	 something	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 “the	 outcome	 of	 today’s	
meeting	will	be	positive”.3	Let	us	call	 the	 former	q	and	 the	 latter	p.	The	 implication	 in	
(14)-(16)	is:	If	p	turns	out	false,	q	will	be	false.	If	p	turns	out	true,	q	will	be	true.	In	other	
words,	q	(reified	as	a	THING)	is	supported	by	p	(also	reified	as	a	THING).	Thus,	(Ie)	is	an	
																																																								
3	Put	in	another	way,	the	overt	nominals	in	(14)-(16)	have	propositional	active	zones	(Langacker	1991:	
456).		
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example	 of	 construing	 the	 logical	 principle	 of	 entailment	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 embodied	
schema	SUPPORT.4	The	diagram	below	illustrates	this.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	5	
	
9.1.6.	Sense	(If):	Onotological	Dependence	
	
(17)	 Kuruma-ni	 hoken-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Car-DAT	 insurance-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	insurance	on	the	car.’	 	 	 	
	
(18)	 Subete-no	 shina-ni	 yu’nyûzei-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 All-LK	 goods-DAT	 import	tax-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 	 	 	
	 ‘All	goods	are	subject	to	import	tax.’	 	 	
	
(19)	 Dokusaisha-ga	 hangyakusha-no	 kubi-ni	 shôkin-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	
	 Dictator-NOM	 rebel-LK	 head-DAT	 bounty-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	dictator	put	a	bounty	on	the	rebels’	heads.’	 	 	
	
This	is	another	case	of	abstract	support	which	is	metaphorically	available	from	(Ia).	The	
TR	 is	 supported	by	 the	 LM	 insofar	 as	 the	TR’s	 existence	presupposes	 –	 and	 therefore	
depends	on	–	the	LM’s	existence.	The	relation	between	TR	and	LM	is	somewhat	akin	to	a	
mereological	one.	Although	one	would	be	hesistant	to	describe	car	insurance	as	part	of	a	
car,	it	is	certainly	impossible	to	grasp	the	concept	of	car	insurance	without	the	concept	
of	 a	 car.	 Neither	 can	 one	 conceive	 of	 import	 tax	 without	 the	 concept	 of	 goods.	 Prize	
money	is	only	meaningful	against	the	background	of	some	challenge	or	competition,	and	
so	forth.	In	Langackarian	terms,	TR	and	LM	in	(17)-(19)	are	connected	by	a	profile-base	
relationship,	where	the	base	is	a	cognitive	domain	(or	domain	matrix)	and	the	profile	a	
salient	 substructure	 within	 that	 domain	 (Langacker	 2006:	 34f).	 This	 explains	 why	 in	
(17)-(19)	the	TR	is	ontologically	and	conceptually	dependent	on	the	LM.		
	
9.1.7.	Sense	(II):	Elicited	Effect	(fig.	6)	
	
(20)	 Kare-ga	 pureiyâ-ni	 rekôdo-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 He-NOM	 player-DAT	 record-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 ‘He	put	a	record	on	the	player.’	 	 	
	
																																																								
4	For	further	discussion	of	how	logical	notions	are	understood	in	terms	of	image	schemas	see	Johnson	
(1990:	63f.)	and	Sweetser	(1991:	58ff.)	on	modality.	
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(21)	 Jazu-no	 kyoku-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Jazz-LK	 song-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	jazz	song	is	playing.’	 	 	 	
	
(22)	 Doa-ni	 kagi-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Door-DAT	 key-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	door	is	locked.’	 	 	 	
	
(23)	 PDF-ni	 rokku-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 PDF-DAT	 lock-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	PDF	file	is	locked.’	 	 	 	
	
(24)	 Kono	 ken-ni	 mahô-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 This	 sword-DAT	 magic-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	spell	rests	on	this	sword.’	 	 	
	
(25)	 Yatto	 kuruma-no	 enjin-ga	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Finally	 car-LK	 engine-NOM	 KAKARU-PAST	 ‘The	car’s	engine	finally	caught	(on).’	 	 	
	
(26)	 Ocha-ni	 akami-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tea-DAT	 redness-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	tea	has	a	reddish	hue.’	 	 	 	
	
This	 usage	 type	 exploits	 the	 experiential	 correlation	 between	CONTACT	 and	 resulting	
effect.	 It	 seems	 plausible	 to	 suppose	 that	 (II)	 gradually	 emancipated	 itself	 from	
SUPPORT	senses	such	as	(Ia)	and	(Id).	Note	that	(20)	can	be	read	as	an	instance	of	(Ia),	
since	the	record	player	physically	supports	the	record.	However,	 if	we	background	the	
physical	support	arrangement	and	 focus	our	attention	on	 the	effect	elicited	by	putting	
the	 record	 in	 contact	with	 the	 player,	we	 arrive	 at	 something	 like	 (21).	 There	 are	 no	
more	traces	of	the	SUPPORT	schema	in	(21),	since	the	sentence	is	felicitous	even	if	the	
music	 comes	 from	a	device	 such	 as	 an	MP3	player.	 Similar	 observations	 can	be	made	
about	 (22)	 and	 (23).	 Read	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 (Ia),	 the	 former	 describes	 the	 physical	
SUPPORT	arrangement	between	keyhole	and	key.	Again,	focussing	on	the	locking	effect	
instead,	we	arrive	at	scenes	like	(23),	devoid	of	any	SUPPORT	configuration.	Considering	
the	sentences	under	(Id),	we	can	see	how	(24)	is	related	to	abstract	SUPPORT.	In	English	
as	well,	a	spell	can	be	placed	on	a	sword	and	then	rest	on	the	sword	as	a	result.		In	fact,	
the	line	between	abstract	SUPPORT	and	elicited	effect	is	not	clear-cut	at	all,	since	cases	
like	(24)	(and	some	instances	of	[Id])	exhibit	both.	Of	course,	such	inbetween-cases	are	
to	 be	 expected	 in	 the	 gradual	 and	 dynamic	 process	 of	 meaning	 extension.	 Once	 the	
elicited	 effect	 sense	 of	 KAKARU	 is	 established,	 it	 can	 be	 extended	 to	 non-SUPPORT	
scenes	 such	 as	 (25)	 and	 (26)	 –	 since	 the	 the	 relevant	 experiential	 correlation	 obtains	
between	 CONTACT	 and	 effect,	 rather	 than	 SUPPORT	 and	 effect.	 That	 is,	 CONTACT	
between	functional	parts	elicits	an	effect,	whether	SUPPORT	is	involved	or	not		
				Before	moving	on,	it	is	worth	noting	that	(25)	(enjin	ga	kakaru)	is	never	realized	with	
a	ni-argument.	So	where	is	the	LM	in	(25)?	And	what	about	the	arrangement	in	(21)?		
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				Langacker	 (1991:	232)	distinguishes	between	 the	 “internal	 structure	of	a	predicate”	
and	 “its	 combinatorial	 properties”.	 The	 former	 pertains	 to	 the	 more	 general	 level	 of	
conceptual	 organization,	 the	 latter	 to	 the	 linguistic	 level	 of	 clause	 structure.	 It	 is	
therefore	possible	for	a	predicate	to	have	an	internal	TR/LM	(at	the	level	of	conceptual	
structure)	that	is	not	realized	as	an	overt	nominal.	In	(21)	and	(25)	the	matter	is	further	
complicated	by	metonymy	and	idiomaticity.	As	stated	above,	usage	type	(II)	focusses	on	
the	effect	elicited	when	one	functional	part	(the	TR)	of	a	system	comes	 into	CONTACT	
with	another	functional	part	(the	LM).	That	is,	the	verb	kakaru	profiles	the	relationship	
between	key	and	keyhole	or	record	and	record	player	etc.	Now	consider	(27)-(29):	
	
(27)	 Rekôdo-ga	 pureiyâ-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Record-NOM	 player-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	record	is	(playing?)	on	the	record	player.’	 	 	 	
	
(28)	 Rekôdo-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Record-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	record	is	playing.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(29)	 (Ribingu-ni)	 Shûberuto-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	
	 (Living	room-DAT)	 Schubert-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Schubert	is	playing	(in	the	living	room).’	
	
(27)	makes	overt	 linguistic	 reference	 to	 the	 functional	parts	 record	and	player,	which	
correspond	 to	 the	 schematic	 TR	 and	 LM	 of	 kakaru.	 This	 sentence	 is	 still	 ambiguous	
between	 usage	 types	 (Ia)	 and	 (II),	 although	 it	 will	 most	 likely	 be	 interpreted	
metonymically	(CONTACT	-->	effect	of	CONTACT)	in	favor	of	the	latter.	(28)	invites	this	
metonymical	interpretation	even	stronger	by	linguistically	omitting	the	record	player	as	
a	functional	part.	Finally,	as	stated	above,	(29)	is	felicitious	even	if	the	music	comes	from	
an	 MP3	 player.	 On	 this	 interpretation,	 kakaru	 has	 already	 assumed	 the	 idiomatic	
meaning	below	(see	fig.	6):	
	
(30)	 X-ga	 kakat-te	iru	
	 [Musical	entity]	 is	playing	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	6	
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In	 (27)	 we	 have	 two	 easily	 identifiable	 functional	 parts	 which,	 when	 brought	 in	
CONTACT,	 cause	 music	 to	 play.	 	 An	 MP3	 player	 with	 no	 physical	 medium	 however,	
causes	music	 to	 play	 in	 an	 entirely	 different	way	 –	 so	we	 have	 no	 TR	 and	 LM	 in	 the	
CONTACT	 sense	 of	 (27)	 anymore.	 Instead,	 kakaru	 in	 (29)	 is	 interpreted	 idiomatically	
according	 to	 (30)	 and	 the	 most	 salient	 participant	 (i.e.	 the	 music	 represented	
metonymically	by	its	composer)	 is	promoted	to	clausal	TR.	While	a	clausal	LM	such	as	
ribingu	can	be	intruduced,	such	a	LM	does	obviously	not	correspond	to	the	internal	LM	
of	kakaru	as	via	(27)	(i.e.,	the	living	room	is	not	a	functional	part	of	a	CONTACT-system	a	
la	record	–	record	player,	key	–	key	hole,	etc.).		
				Now	 let	 us	 consider	 (25),	 which	 is	 quite	 similar.	 Our	 layman’s	 knowledge	 or	 “folk-
model”	 of	 how	machinery	 works	 involves	 the	 CONTACT	 of	 functional	 parts:	 Entity	 A	
comes	 into	 CONTACT	 with	 entity	 B	 and	 something	 happens.	 This	 is	 no	 less	 true	 for	
starting	 up	 a	 car.	However,	 exactly	which	 parts	 of	 a	mechanical	 system	need	 to	 be	 in	
CONTACT	with	one	 another	 is	 usually	 expert	 knowledge	 and	beyond	 the	 grasp	of	 our	
folk-model.	 And	 even	 if	 we	 can	 identify	 those	 parts,	 their	 salience	 is	 usually	
overshadowed	by	other	entities.	Compare	the	following	sentences:	
	
(31)	 Enjin-ga	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Engine-NOM	 KAKARU-PAST	 ‘The	engine	caught	(on).’	 	 	 	 	
	
(32)	 With	a	roar	the	engine	caught	(on).	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Here	both	kakaru	 and	catch	on	have	a	non-transparent	argument	structure.	What	 is	 it	
the	 engine	 caught	(on)?	What	 functional	 parts	 are	 involved	 in	 both	 cases?	And	would	
they	be	relevant	from	a	layman’s	perspective	when	starting	up	a	car?	The	upshot	is	that	
kakaru	in	(31)	has	a	schematic	TR	and	LM	corresponding	to	functional	parts,	which	we	
may	or	may	not	be	able	to	identify	(depending	on	our	technical	expertise).	But	because	
of	 their	 low	 salience	 as	 far	 as	 our	 everyday	 experience	with	 cars	 is	 concerned,	 these	
parts	remain	conceptually	schematic	and	nebulous.	As	a	consequence,	kakaru	gains	an	
idiomatic	meaning	analogous	to	(30)	and	the	most	salient	entity	(car,	engine)	takes	the	
place	of	clausal	TR/subject.	This,	of	course,	 is	a	metonymic	process,	as	 it	 constitutes	a	
domain	internal	shift	(i.e.	WHOLE	FOR	PART).		
	
9.1.8.	Sense	(III):	Covering	(fig.	7)	
	
(33)	 Hanako-ga		 sarada-ni	 doresshingu-wo	 kake-ta.	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 salad-DAT	 dressing-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	put	dressing	on	the	salad.’	
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(34)	 Beddo-ni	 beroa-no	 kabâ-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 Bed-DAT	 velour-LK	 cover-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	a	velour	cover	over	the	bed.’	 	 	
	
(35)	 Kawazura-ni	 kiri-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 River	surface-DAT	 mist-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	river	is	coverd	by	mist.’	 	 	 	
	
The	 COVERING	 sense	 is	 obtained	 by	 backgrounding	 the	 force	 dynamics	 of	 SUPPORT	
from	certain	usages	of	(Ia)	or	(Ib),	such	as	(1),	(5),	or	(6).	There	are	two	requirements	
for	(III).	The	first	is	concerned	with	the	shape	of	the	TR,	which	must	be	planar	and	cover	
at	least	an	extended	portion	of	the	LM.	Secondly,	the	salience	of	the	COVERING	schema	
must	be	higher	vis-a-vis	the	salience	of	the	SUPPORT	schema.		
				Both	 applies	 to	 (33)-(35).	 The	 TR	 is	 a	 planar	 entity	 which	 makes	 a	 considerable	
portion	 of	 the	 LM	 visually	 inaccessible.	 This	 object	 can	 be	 either	 discrete	 (individual	
specks	 of	 dressing	 covering	 a	 salad)	 or	 continuous	 (a	 blanket	 covering	 a	 bed	 or	mist	
covering	 a	 river).	 In	 all	 of	 the	 above	 sentences	 the	 supporiting	 function	 of	 the	 LM	 is	
strongly	backgrounded	(33,	34)	or	non-existent	(35).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	7	
				It	 should	be	noted	 that	both	 the	TR’s	 shape	as	well	 as	 the	 salience	of	COVERING	vs	
SUPPORT	are	a	matter	of	degree.	Consequently,	categorial	fringe	cases	like	(36)	are	to	be	
expected.	
	
(36)	 Mado-ni	 kâten-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Window-DAT	 curtain-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘There	is	a	curtain	over	the	window.’	 	 	 	
	
There	are	two	possible	ways	to	construe	this	scene.		We	can	either	focus	on	the	curtain	
covering	 the	window,	yielding	a	COVERING	reading.	Or,	 alternatively,	we	 focus	on	 the	
curtain	 track	 supporting	 the	 curtain,	 yielding	 a	 physical	 SUPPORT	 reading	 (see	 Ia).	 In	
the	latter	case	mado	would	be	metonymically	representing	the	curtain	track.	Depending	
on	the	context,	either	schema’s	salience	can	be	hightened	vs	the	other:	
	
(37)	 Mado-ni	 kâten-ga	 kakat-te	i-te,	 heya-ga	 kurai.	 	 	
	 Window-DAT	 curtain-NOM	 KAKARU-RES-TE	 room-NOM	 dark	 	 	
	 ‘There	is	a	curtain	over	the	window,	so	the	room	is	dark.’	 	 	
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(38)	 Mado-ni	 kâten-wo	 kake-yô		to	shi-ta	 ga,	 uma-ku	 kakara-nakat-ta.	 	
	 Window-DAT	 curtain-ACC	 KAKERU-INT-PAST	 but	 good-INF	 KAKARU-NEG-PAST	 	
	 ‘I	tried	to	put	a	curtain	over	the	window	but	couldn’t	attach	it	properly.’	 	
	
Focussing	on	the	brightness	of	the	room	will	raise	the	salience	of	the	COVERING	schema.	
In	contrast,	 if	we	direct	our	efforts	 towards	 fixing	 the	curtain	 to	 the	curtain	 track,	 the	
SUPPORT	schema	will	gain	a	salience	boost.		
	
9.1.9	Sense	(IVa):	Physical	Restraint	(fig.	8)	
	
(39)	 Kitsune-ga	 wana-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Fox-NOM	 trap-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	fox	is	caught	in	the	trap.’	 	 	 	
	
(40)	 Sakana-ga	 hari-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Fish-NOM	 hook-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	fish	is	on	the	hook.’	 	 	 	
	
(41)	 Sêtâ-ga	 kugi-ni	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Sweater-NOM	 nail-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 ‘The	sweater	got	caught	on	a	nail.’	 	 	 	
	
(42)	 Oki-ni	 fune-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Offshore-DAT	 ship-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘A	ship	is	anchored	off	the	shore.’	 	 	 	
	
This	usage	type	is	linked	to	(Ia)	via	a	perspectival	shift,	since	the	notions	SUPPORT	and	
RESTRAINT	 refer	 to	 different	 construals	 of	 the	 same	 force	 dynamic	 arrangement.	
Adopting	Talmy’s	(2003a:	409ff.)	framework	and	terminology,	this	arrangement	can	be	
characterized	 as	 follows:	 An	 agonist	 with	 a	 tendency	 towards	 action	 is	 blocked	 by	 a	
stronger	antagonist	(see	fig.	8).	However,	SUPPORT	and	RESTRAINT	differ	as	to	whether	
the	 presence	 of	 the	 antagonist’s	 counterforce	 is	 deemed	 favorable	 from	 the	 agonist’s	
perspective.	The	English	verb	keep	illustrates	this	for	the	physical	–	and	by	metaphorical	
extension	 –	 for	 several	 abstract	 domains.	 By	way	 of	 example,	 consider	 the	 sentences	
below:	
	
(43)	 The	fence	keeps	the	wolves	from	attacking	the	sheep.	 (RESTRAINT)	
(44)	 The	tail	keeps	the	kangaroo	from	toppling	over.	 (SUPPORT)	
(45)	 Coffee	keeps	me	from	falling	asleep	on	the	job.	 (SUPPORT)	
(46)	 Too	much	coffee	kept	me	from	getting	a	good	night’s	sleep.		 (RESTRAINT)	
	
With	this	in	mind,	consider	the	SUPPORT	and	RESTRAINT	readings	of	KAKARU:	
	
(47)	 E-ga	 kabe-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Picture-NOM	 wall-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	picture	is	hanging	on	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
(48)	 Kitsune-ga	 wana-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Fox-NOM	 trap-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	fox	is	caught	in	the	trap.’	 	 	 	
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In	(47)	the	picture	is	subject	to	the	force	of	gravity	and	therefore	has	a	tendency	to	fall	
to	 the	 ground.	However,	 some	 other	 object	 (a	 nail	 etc.)	 is	 blocking	 this	 tendency.	We	
consider	 this	 BLOCKAGE	 a	 case	 of	 SUPPORT,	 since	 from	 the	 (admittedly	
anthropocentric)	 “perspective	 of	 the	 picture”	 falling	 to	 the	 ground	 and	 shattering	 to	
pieces	is	an	unfavorable	outcome.	In	(48)	the	fox’	self-propelled	motion	is	counteracted	
on	by	the	trap.	Since	this	counterforce	is	obviously	unfavorable	from	the	perspective	of	
the	 fox,	 it	 is	 interpreted	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 RESTRAINT.	 Now	 recall	 (42),	 which	 is	
particularly	interesting,	because	it	can	be	interpreted	either	way.		If	we	conceive	of	ships	
primarily	as	vehicles	controlled	and	operated	by	people,	(42)	yields	a	SUPPORT	reading.	
But	 if	we	choose	to	view	them	as	entities	which	are	capable	of	drifting	away	“on	their	
own”	 (backgrounding	 the	 current	 etc.)	 –	 i.e.	 construe	 the	 ship	 as	 	 capable	 of	 “self-
propelled”	motion	–	we	arrive	at	a	RESTRAINT	reading.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	8	
	
9.1.10.	Sense	(IVb):	Abstract	Restraint	
	
(49)	 Kare-wa	 teki-no	 keiryaku-ni	 kakat-ta.	 	 	
	 He-TOP	 enemy-LK	 scheme-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘He	fell	victim	to	the	enemy’s	scheme.’	 	
	
(50)	 shiken-no	 koto-ga	 ki-ni	 kakat-te,	 nemur-e-nai.	 	 	
	 Test-LK	 thing-NOM	 mind-DAT	 KAKARU-TE	 sleep-POT-NEG	 	 	
	 ‘(I’m)	worried	about	the	test	and	can’t	sleep.’	
	
(51)	 O-me-ni	 kakaru	 no-wo	 tanoshimi-ni	 shi-te	i-masu.	 	 	
	 HON-eye-DAT	 KAKARU	 NMLZ-ACC	 pleasure-DAT	 do-PROG-POL	 	 	
	 ‘I’m	looking	forward	to	meeting	you.’	 	 	
	
As	 stated	 under	 (IVa),	 force	 dynamic	 notions	 such	 as	 RESTRAINT	 are	 often	
metaphorically	extended	to	a	number	of	abstract	domains.	In	(49),	for	instance,	physical	
RESTRAINT	 is	mapped	onto	 the	social,	psychological,	or	other	 limitations,	 imposed	on	
the	 agonist.	 Notable	 in	 particular	 are	 the	 idiomatic	 uses	 that	 construe	 sense	 data	 or	
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propositional	 content	 as	 “free-floating”	 entities,	which	 	 are	 “caught	 on”	 the	 respective	
perceptive	or	mental	faculties	used	for	processing	them.		
	
9.1.11.	Sense	(Va):	External	Control	(fig.	9)	
	
(52)	 Tarô-ga	 wazawai-ni	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 misfortune-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	suffered	a	misfortune.’	 	 	 	
	
(53)	 Hanako-ga	 byôki-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 illness-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Hanako	is	sick.’	 	 	 	
	
(54)	 Kanja-ga	 isha-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Patient-NOM	 doctor-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	patient	is	consulting	a	doctor.’	 	 	 	
	
This	 sense	 is	 linked	 to	 (IVb)	 via	 a	 subtle	 metonymic	 shift,	 since	 we	 experience	
RESTRAINT	 usually	 in	 tandem	 with	 external	 control.	 The	 latter	 notion,	 however,	 is	
broader	and	not	limited	to	RESTRAINT.	I.e.,	an	illness,	a	misfortune	or	a	scheme	will		not	
just	limit	our	scope	of	action	but	can	affect	and	manipulate	our	behavior	in	various	ways.	
(Since	 the	 difference	 is	 gradual,	 [49]	would	 be	 somewhere	 inbetween	 [IVb]	 and	 [Va],	
depending	 on	 what	 exactly	 keiryaku	 denotes.)	 Note	 that	 (50)	 constitutes	 a	 curious	
unprototypical	 case,	 because	 the	TR	 intentionally	 surrenders	 itself	 to	 external	 control.	
This	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	9:	A	weaker	TR	in	the	sphere	of	influence	of	a	stronger	LM	
	
9.1.12.	Sense	(Vb):	Agentive	Control	(fig.	10)	
	
(55)	 Sate,	 shigoto-ni	 kakar-ô.	 	 	 	 	
	 Now	 work-DAT	 KAKARU-VOL	 ‘Now,	let’s	get	to	work.’	 	 	 	
	
(56)	 Hanako-ga	 kodomo-no	 sewa-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 children-LK	 care-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘Hanako	is	taking	care	of	the	children.’	 	
	
(57)	 Shôsetsuka-ga	 shinsaku-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Novelist-NOM	 new	work-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	novelist	is	working	on	a	new	book.’	 	 	 	
	
When	 comparing	 (53),	 (54),	 and	 (55),	 one	will	 notice	what	might	 be	 called	 a	 cline	of	
agentivity.	All	of	these	scenes	share	a	common	image	schematic	structure:	The	TR	moves	
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along	 a	 PATH,	 spatial	 or	 virtual,	 which	 terminates	 at	 the	 LM	 (recall	 the	 schematic	
constructions	 [B]	 and	 [C]	 from	 before).	 They	 differ,	 however,	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 TR’s	
intentionality	 and	 the	 perceived	 relative	 strength	 of	 TR	 and	 LM.	 Specifically,	 the	 TR’s	
“degree	of	agentivity“	gradually	increases	from	(53)	to	(55):		
	
	 TR’s	movement	towards	LM	 relative	strength	 degree	of	agentivity	
(52-53)	 unintentional	 TR		<	LM	 low	
(54)	 intentional	 TR		<	LM	 intermediate	
(55-57)	 intentional	 TR		>	LM	 high	
	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 cline	 of	 agentivity	 amounts	 to	 the	 following	 (reverse)	 hierarchy:	
unintentional	 movement	 towards	 stronger	 LM	 -->	 intentional	 movement	 towards	
stronger	 LM	 -->	 intentional	movement	 towards	weaker	 LM.	 In	 each	 case,	 the	weaker	
participant	is	construed	as	being	in	the	sphere	of	influence	of	the	stronger	participant.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	10:	A	weaker	LM	in	the	sphere	of	influence	of	a	stronger	TR	
	
9.1.13.		Sense	(VIa):	Physical	Arrival	(fig.	11)	
	
(58)	 Mori-wo	 deru	 to	 tôge-ni	 kakaru.	 	 	
	 Forest-ACC	 get	out	 COND	 mountain	pass-DAT	 KAKARU	 	 	
	 ‘Once	out	of	the	forest,	we’ll	arrive	at	the	mountain	pass.’	 	 	
	
The	 RESTRAINT	 and	 control	 senses	 (IV	 and	 V)	 have	 a	 strong	 tendency	 to	 feature	 an	
animate	 (or	 quasi-animate)	 TR	 capable	 of	 self-propelled	 motion,	 thereby	 raising	 the	
relative	salience	of	PATH	traversal	 inherent	 in	constructions	(A),	(B)	and	presupposed	
by	construction	(C).5	(VIa),	as	well,	foregrounds	PATH	traversal	but	abstracts	away	from	
any	 force	dynamic	notions.	 In	other	words,	 the	TR’s	PATH	terminates	as	 it	comes	 into	
CONTACT	with	the	LM,	but	neither	exerts	any	force	on	the	other.		
	
	
	
	
																																																								
5	I.e.	(C)	is	the	result	of	PATH	traversal.		
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FIGURE	11	
	
9.1.14.	Sense	(VIb):	Transmission	
	
(59)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-ni	 koe-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-DAT	 voice-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 'Hanako	said	hello	to	Tarô.’	 	 	
	
(60)	 (Tarô-kara)	 Hanako-no	 ie-ni	 denwa-ga	 kakat-ta.	 	 	
	 (Tarô-ABL)	 Hanako-LK	 house-DAT	 phone	call-NOM	 KAKARU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako’s	house	got	a	phone	call	(from	Tarô).’	 	 	
	
(61)	 (Taisa-kara)	 shôsa-ni	 meirei-ga	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 (Captain-ABL)	 major-DAT	 command-NOM	 KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	major	received	a	command	(from	the	captain).’	 	 	 	
	
This	sense	is	a	slight	variation	of	(VIa).	Here,	the	TR	is	an	informational	entity	travelling	
along	a	PATH	from	sender	(SOURCE)	to	recepient	(GOAL).	As	the	above	examples	show,	
the	SOURCE	can	be	linguistically	profiled	either	as	subject	of	a	caused	motion	event	(59)	
or,	if	the	TR’s	motion	is	construed	as	self-propelled,	as	an	oblique	(60,	61).	As	in	(VIa),	
the	relationship	between	TR	and	LM	is	force	dynamically	neutral.			
	
9.1.15.	Sense	(VIc):	Temporal	Arrival	
	
(62)	 Shingata	 terebi-no	 kaihatsu-ga	 oikomi-ni	 kakat-ta.	 	 	
	 New	model	 TV-LK	 development-NOM	 final	stage-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Development	of	the	new	TV	model	has	reached	the	final	stage.’	 	 	
	
(63)	 Koko-wa	 mô	sugu	 uki-ni	 kakaru.	 	 	
	 Here-TOP	 soon	 rainy	season-DAT	 KAKARU	 	 	
	 ‘We’re	headed	for	the	rainy	season.’	 	
	
This	is	a	straightforward	metaphorical	extension	of	(VIa)	into	the	temporal	domain.	The	
TIME	 IS	 SPACE	 metaphor	 is	 extremely	 pervasive	 cross-linguistically	 (Radden	 2006).	 For	
example,	in	English	one	can	“approach”	a	deadline	or	be	worried	about	an	“approaching”	
deadline.	Note	that	this	sense	may	feature	an	extended	TR	(such	as	kaihatsu	in	[62])	
	
9.1.16.	Sense	(VII):	Resource	Requirement	(fig.	12)	
	
(64)	 Kono	 shôsetsu-wo	 kaku	 no-ni	 gonenkan	 kakat-ta.	 	
	 This	 novel-ACC	 write	 NMLZ-DAT	 five	years	 KAKARU-PAST	 	
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	 ‘Writing	this	novel	took	five	years.’	 	
	
(65)	 Ie-wo	 kau-Ø-ni-wa	 takusan	 okane-ga	 kakaru.	 	 	
	 House-ACC	 buy-NMLZ-DAT-TOP	 a	lot	 money-NOM	 KAKARU	 	 	
	 ‘To	buy	a	house	one	needs	a	lot	of	money.’	 	 	
	
(66)	 Kanojo-wa	 tema-wo	 kake-te,	 sono	 e-wo	 kai-ta.	 	
	 She-TOP	 effort-ACC	 KAKERU-TE	 that	 picture-ACC	 draw-PAST	 	
	 ‘She	put	(a	lot	of)	effort	into	the	drawing.’	 	
	
The	resource	requirement	sense	is	a	variant	of	the	arrival	sense,	featuring	an	extended	
TR	 which	 incrementally	 “grows”	 from	 a	 SOURCE	 (0%)	 along	 a	 PATH,	 until	 it	 makes	
CONTACT	with	its	GOAL/LM	(100%).	This	image	schematic	structure	applies	to	all	kinds	
of	 resources,	 such	as	 time,	money,	 	 effort,	or	ability.	 In	each	case,	 there	 is	 some	GOAL	
which	represents	the	end-point	of	a	SCALE.	In	order	to	reach	(i.e.	make	CONTACT	with)	
this	GOAL,	 the	TR	needs	 to	be	of	 sufficient	 length.	The	conceptualization	of	amount	 in	
terms	of	physical	length	is	based	on	the	experiential	correlation	between	both	domains	
and	constitutes	a	primary	metaphor.6	Likewise,	there	is	a	very	real	experiential	basis	for	
understanding	the	achievement	of	a	goal	in	terms	establishing	physical	contact.		
				As	 is	 to	 be	 expected,	 then,	 expressions	 that	 construe	 resource	 requirement	 via	 the	
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	schema	are	not	 limited	to	 Japanese.	By	way	of	example,	consider	
the	German	verb	(aus)reichen	(reach)	and	its	dialectal	variant	langen,	derived	from	the	
adjective	lang	(long).		
	
(67)	 Mein	Geld	reicht	nicht	(aus),	um	ein	Boot	zu	kaufen.	
	 I	don’t	have	enough	money	to	buy	a	boat.	
	
(68)	 Die	Vorräte	langen	noch	bis	Monatsende.	
	 The	provisions	will	last	until	the	end	of	the	month.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	12	
	
9.1.17	Sense	(VIIIa):	Physical	Link	(fig.	13)	
	
(69)	 Murabito-tachi-ga	 kawa-ni	 hashi-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Villager-PL-NOM	 river-DAT	 brigde-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	villagers	built	a	bridge	across	the	river.’	 	 	 	 	
																																																								
6	Consider	the	similar	case	of	MORE	IS	UP	(Lakoff	and	Johnson	2003:	16).	
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(70)	 Toguchi-ni	 kumo-no	 su-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 Doorway-DAT	 spider-LK	 web-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 	 	 	
	 ‘There	is	a	spider	web	in	the	doorway.’	 	 	 	
	
(71)	 sora-ni	 niji-ga	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 Sky-DAT	 rainbow-NOM	 KAKARU-RES	 	 	 	
	 ‘A	rainbow	spans	across	the	sky.’	 	 	
	
Terminative	PATHs	and	LINKs	are	alternative	construals	of	one	another.	If	a	road	runs	
between	X	and	Y,	 it	 connects	Y	with	X.	We	construe	LINKs	when	 following	an	object’s	
trajectory	from	SOURCE	to	end-point.	Imagine	someone	swimming	across	a	river.	Then	
mentally	 connect	 all	 the	 “dots“	 on	 the	 swimmer’s	 PATH.	 This	 will	 yield	 a	 LINK	 from	
shore	to	shore.	We	can	also	go	the	opposite	route	and	construe	LINKs	as	PATHs:	
	
(72)	 That	mountain	range	goes	from	Canada	to	Mexico.	 (Talmy	2003a:	104)	
	
This	operation	involves	what	has	variously	been	called	virtual	motion	(Talmy	1983)	or	
abstract	 motion	 (Langacker	 1987:	 168ff.),	 i.e.	 mentally	 scanning	 an	 extended	 entity	
along	 a	 trajectory	 in	 successive	 fashion.7	In	 a	 way,	 then,	 (terminative)	 PATHs	 are	
“dynamically“	construed	LINKs	whereas	LINKs	are	 “statically“	construed	(terminative)	
PATHs.		
				Keeping	the	PATH-LINK	transformation	in	mind,	we	can	now	see	how	(VIIIa),	 too,	 is	
related	to	the	arrival	sense	(VI).	In	(69)-(71)	the	LINK	is	the	result	of	the	TR’s	extension	
from	SOURCE	to	GOAL.	I.e.,	the	bridge,	the	spiderweb,	and	the	rainbow	are	construed	as	
gradually	moving	from	one	side	to	the	other.	However,	like	the	TRs	in	(VII)	they	are	not	
punctual	but	extended	and	therefore	move	by	“growing”.	As	they	make	CONTACT	with	
their	GOAL,	these	TRs	have	evolved	into	static	structures	extending	from	their	point	of	
departure	to	their	point	of	termination.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	13	
					
																																																								
7	In	more	recent	work	Talmy	(2003a:	138f)	uses	the	term	coextension	path.		
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				(VIIIa)	 also	 features	 what	 we	 may	 call	 a	 salience	 based	 argument	 shift.	 (Recall	 our	
discussion	of	engine	ga	kakaru	under	[II].)	This	kind	of	metonymic	shift	occurs	when	the	
entity	 most	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 profiled	 relation	 is	 outranked	 in	 prominence	 by	
some	 other	 participant	 of	 the	 scene	 and	 thus	 fails	 to	 appear	 as	 an	 overt	 nominal.8	In	
(69)-(71)	this	entity	corresponds	to	the	point	at	which	the	TR’s	PATH	terminates,	i.e.	the	
“other	 side“	 of	 the	 river	 (69),	 the	 “other	 side“	 of	 the	 door	 frame	 (70),	 and	 the	 point	
where	 the	 rainbow	 terminates	 (71).	 However,	 since	 in	 each	 case	 the	 TR	 ends	 up	
occupying	 the	 whole	 PATH	 instead	 of	 just	 the	 GOAL	 and	 its	 vicinity,	 attention	 is	
redistributed	accordingly	and	the	PATH	replaces	the	GOAL	as	clausal	LM/DAT-Obj.	
	
9.1.18	Sense	(VIIIb):	Relevance	Link	
	
(73)	 Hanbai	keiyaku-ni	 kakaru	 shôhin	 	 	 	 	
	 Sales	contract-DAT	 KAKARU	 goods	 ‘Goods	subject	to	the	sales	contract’	 	 	 	
	
(74)	 Shôgai-no	 aru	 kodomo-ni	 kakaru	 kyôiku	 sôdan	 	
	 Disability-NOM	 exist	 children-DAT	 KAKARU	 education	 advice	 	
	 ‘Educational	advice	concerning	children	with	disabilities’	 	
	
The	 metaphorical	 construal	 of	 relevance	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 LINK	 schema	 is	 cross-
linguistically	 quite	 common.	 This	 is	 not	 suprising,	 since	 our	 most	 basic	 embodied	
experience	of	relevance	 involves	physical	LINKs	between	objects:	 “two	pieces	of	wood	
are	nailed	together,	the	child	holds	the	parent’s	hand,	the	snaps	on	the	child’s	coat	are	
connected,	the	lamp	is	plugged	into	the	wall	socket.	In	these	simple	physical	cases	there	
is	a	spatial	contiguity	and	closeness	of	the	linked	objects,	and	the	connected	objects	are	
related	 via	 the	 link”	 (Johnson	 1990:	 118).	 Likewise,	 TR	 and	 LM	 in	 (73)	 and	 (74)	 are	
metaphorically	construed	as	physically	connected	entities	in	virtue	of	being	relevant	to	
one	another.		As	in	(VIIIa),	we	may	view	the	TR	as	an	extended	object	making	CONTACT	
with	the	LM.		
	
9.1.19.	Summary		
	
The	 above	 analysis	 shows	 that	 the	 semantic	 structure	 of	 KAKARU	 consists	 of	 at	 least	
eight	clusters,	all	of	which	are	linked	to	the	CONTACT	schema	by	virtue	of	experiential	
correlation.	These	clusters	are	SUPPORT	(I),	effect	(II),	COVERING	(III),	RESTRAINT	(IV),	
CONTROL	(V),	arrival	(VI),	resource	requirement	(VII),	and	LINK	(VIII).	In	the	following	
																																																								
8	Again,	these	cases	can	be	analyzed	as	active	zone	phenomena.	Compare,	for	example,	I	blinked	vs	*My	
eyelid	blinked	(	Langacker	1987:	272).	
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sections	of	this	chapter	I	will	argue	that	the	senses	of	V-kakaru/V-kakeru,	too,	are	linked	
to	the	CONTACT	schema	and	consequently	should	be	viewed	as	part	of	the	same	lexical	
network.			
	
	
9.2.	The	Senses	of	V-KAKARU	
	
Himeno	 (1979,	 1999),	 who	 offers	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 treatment	 of	 V-KAKARU,	
recognises	two	general	meanings:	“do	towards”	(shikô)	and	“start	(and	be	interrupted)”	
(shidô)	(1979:	61).	She	further	subdivides	these	into	the	following	senses.	
	
(i)	 DO	TOWARDS	(shikô)	
	 	
(i1)	 contact	by	falling	(rakka	sesshoku)	
-kakaru	 Ha-ga	 atama-ni	 chiri-kakaru.	 	 	 	 	 	
Leaf-NOM	 head-DAT	 fall-KAKARU	 ‘The	leave	falls	onto	the	head.’	 	 	 	 	
	
-kakeru	 ---	
	 	
(i2)	 supportive	contact	(ikyo	sesshoku)	
-kakaru	 Hito-ga	 kabe-ni	 yori-kakaru.	 	 	
Person-NOM	 wall-DAT	 move	towards-KAKARU	 ‘Someone	leans	against	the	wall	 	
	
-kakeru	 Kabe-ni	 ita-wo	 tate-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	
Wall-DAT	 board-ACC	 put-KAKERU	 ‘To	put	a	board	against	the	wall’	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(i3)	 oriented	contact	(shikô	sesshoku)	
-kakaru	 Inu-ga	 hito-ni	 osoi-kakaru.	 	 	 	 	 	
Dog-NOM	 person-DAT	 attack-KAKARU	 ‘The	dog	pounces	at	the	person’	 	 	 	 	
	
-kakeru	 Hito-ni	 tsuba-wo	 haki-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	
Person-DAT	 spit-ACC	 spit-KAKERU	 ‘To	spit	at	a	someone’	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(i4)	 psychological	orientation	(shinriteki	shikô)	
-kakaru	 ---	
-kakeru	 Hito-ni	 warai-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Person-DAT	 smile-KAKERU	 ‘To	smile	at	someone’	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(i5)	 oriented	movement	(shikô	idô)	
-kakaru	 ---	
-kakeru	 Kaijô-ni	 tsume-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assembly	hall-DAT	 cram-KAKERU	 ‘To	crowd	(into)	an	assembly	hall’	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(i6)	 grasping	(hasoku)	
-kakaru	 ---	
-kakeru	 Inu-wo	 oi-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Dog-ACC	 chase-KAKERU	 ‘To	chase	after	a	dog’	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(i7)	 encounter	in	passing	(tsûka	sôgû)	
-kakaru	 Hito-ga		 mise-no	 mae-wo	 tôri-kakaru.	 	 	 	 	
Person-NOM	 store-LK	 front-ACC	 pass-KAKARU	 	 	 	 	
‘A	person	passes	by	in	front	of	a	store.’	 	 	 	 	
	
-kakeru	 ---	
	 	
(ii)	 START	(shidô)	
	 	
(ii1)	 beginning	(shidôtai)	
-kakaru	 ---	
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-kakeru	 Hon-wo	 yomi-kakeru	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Book-ACC	 read-KAKERU	 ‘To	begin	reading	a	book’	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(ii2)	 emergence	(shôgentai)	
-kakaru	 Jiko-ni	 at-te,	 shini-kakaru	 	 	 	 	 	
Accident-DAT	 meet-TE	 die-KAKARU	 	 	 	 	 	
‘To	be	on	the	verge	of	dying	after	an	accident.’	 	 	 	 	 	
	
-kakeru	 Jiko-ni	atte,	shini-kakeru	
(same	as	above)	
	 (based	on	Himeno	1979:	59)	
	
Is	 there	 reason	 to	 suggest	 conceptual	 links	 between	 the	 grammatical	 V2s	 	 -kakaru/-
kakeru	 and	 their	simplex	counterparts?	 I	believe	 there	 is,	and	 that	crosslinguistic	data	
can	provide	evidence	for	this.	As	we	have	seen,	 the	CONTACT	schema	is	central	 to	the	
semantics	of	KAKARU,	while	-kakaru/-kakeru	can	be	paraphrased	as	“do	V	towards”	and	
“begin	 to	 V/be	 about	 to	 V”.	 Curiously,	 this	 resembles	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
German	preposition	an	–	which	prototypically	involves	CONTACT	between	TR	and	LM	–	
and	 the	 derived	 verb	 particle	 construction	 an-V,	 which	 among	 its	 various	 meanings	
includes	two	senses	similar	to	(i)	and	(ii).	Let	us	suppose,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	the	
relationship	 between	 KAKARU	 and	 V-KAKARU	 is	 conceptually	 arbitrary.	 Then	 why	
would	we	encounter	a	highly	similar	relationship	in	a	drastically	different	 language?	It	
would	 be	 quite	 a	 coincidence,	 to	 say	 the	 least.	 Consequently,	 it	 seems	worthwhile	 to	
explore	 the	 possibility	 of	 conceptual	 links	 between	 the	 CONTACT	 schema	 and	 the	
notions	 of	 directedness	 and	 inchoative	 aspect.	 In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 (1)	 discuss	 the	
preposition	an	in	respect	to	the	CONTACT	schema,	(2)	compare	V-KAKARU	and	an-V	in	
respect	to	CONTACT	and	directedness,	and	(3)	compare	V-KAKARU	and	an-V	in	respect	
to	CONTACT	and	inchoative	aspect.		
	
9.2.1.	The	German	Preposition	an	and	the	CONTACT	Schema	
	
As	Smith	(1987:	94)	notes	in	his	study	of	German	2-way	prepositions	(i.e.	prepositions	
which	occur	with	both	dative	and	accusative	case),	an	“prototypically	profiles	a	relation	
between	a	TR	and	a	vertical	LM	in	which	the	TR	makes	contact	with	the	surface	of	the	
LM	itself.”	He	illustrates	this	with	the	following	pair	of	sentences:	
	
(75)	 Das	Bild	hängt	an	der	(DAT)	Wand.	
	 The	picture	hangs	on	the	wall.	
	
(76)	 Hans	hängt	das	Bild	an	die	(ACC)	Wand.	
	 Hans	hangs	the	picture	on(to)	the	wall.	
	 (Smith	1987:	95)	
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There	has	been	some	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	importance	of	CONTACT	for	
the	meaning	of	an.	While	some	(e.g.	Brinkmann	1962;	Saile	1984)	argue	that	an	entails	
some	form	of	CONTACT,	others	reject	this	view	maintaining	that	CONTACT	is	implied	by	
the	 verb	 rather	 than	 the	 prepositon	 itself	 (Li	 1994:	 76)	 or	 that	 “	 ‘contact’	 and	 ‘non-
contact	readings’	[...]	are	due	to	size	relationships,	edge	properties,	and	similar	features	
of	both	relatum	and	theme”	(Nüse	1999:	16).	First	of	all,	it	is	true	that	neither	CONTACT	
nor	 a	 vertical	 LM	 are	 necessary	 features	 of	 	 an.	 	 This	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 examples	
below:	
	
(77)	 Anna	wartet	an	der	Haltestelle.	
	 Anna	waits	at	the	bus	stop.	
	
(78)	 Das	Haus	steht	am	(an	dem)	See.	
	 The	house	stands	by	the	sea.	
	
My	stance	on	the	issue,	however,	is	not	that	an	necessarily	entails	CONTACT	but	rather	–	
following	 Smith	 (1987)	 –	 that	 an	 is	 prototypically	 associated	 with	 CONTACT.	 	 This	
position	is	compatible	with	the	possibility	that	the	issue	of	CONTACT	vs	non-CONTACT	
depends	on	factors	such	as	the	choice	of	verb	and/or	the	configurational	properties	of	
TR	 and	 LM.	 For	 an	 encyclopedic	 view	 of	 meaning	 this	 is	 of	 little	 relevance.	 If	 an	
frequently	 profiles	 	 CONTACT	 relations,	 then	 CONTACT	 will	 become	 conventionally	
associated	with	an.	Furthermore,	CONTACT	is	present	in	those	cases	where	an	profiles	
the	kinds	of	relations	that	are	most	deeply	entrenched	in	our	everyday	experience.	I.e.,	
an-relations	that	involve	physical	CONTACT	between	mundane	entities	from	the	domain	
of	daily	life	are	arguably	the	most	basic	in	terms	of	cognitive	entrenchment:	
	
(79)	 Der	Zettel	am	(an	dem)	Kühlschrank	
	 The	note	on	the	fridge	
	
(80)	 Der	Ring	am	(an	dem)	Finger	
	 The	ring	on	the	finger	
	
(81)	 Der	Knopf	am	(an	dem)	Mantel	
	 The	button	on	the	coat	
	
9.2.2.	CONTACT	and	Directedness:	The	DO	TOWARDS	Sense	of	an-V	and	V-KAKARU	
	
One	of	the	senses	of	the	German		particle	verb	construction	an-V	can	be	characterized	as	
“directed	activity”.	According	to	Fleischer	and	Barz	(2012:	402),	“[a]n-	indicates	that	the	
action	denoted	by	the	simplex	verb	is	directed	towards	a	person	or	thing.”	They	(2012:	
402)	 further	 observe	 that	 these	 simplex	 verbs	 characteristically	 belong	 to	 semantic	
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fields	such	as	seeing	and	speaking,	motion,	measuring	and	targeting,	as	well	as	touching,	
attaching,	and	resistance.	Some	examples	are:		
	
(82)	 Hans	sieht	Helga	an.	(ansehen)	
	 Hans	looks	at	Helga.	
	
(83)	 Helga	lächelt	Hans	an.	(anlächeln)	
	 Helga	smiles	at	Hans.	
	
(84)	 Der	Hund	springt	den	Jungen	an.	(anspringen)	
	 The	dog	jumps	at	the	boy.	
	
(85)	 Die	Yacht	segelt	den	Hafen	an.	(ansegeln)	
	 The	yacht	sails	towards	the	harbor.	
	
(86)	 Der	Jäger	visiert	den	Hirsch	an.	(anvisieren)	
	 The	hunter	takes	aim	at	the	stag.	
	
(87)	 Klara	kämpft	gegen	die	Langeweile	an.	(ankämpfen)	
	 Klara	fights	against	boredom.	
	
So	is	there	a	conceptual	link	between	(79)-(81)	and	(82)-(87)	–	between	CONTACT	and	
directedness?	For	illustrative	purposes,	I	suggest	that	we	consider	the	notion	of	a	search	
domain.	 The	 concept	 was	 originally	 introduced	 by	 Hawkins	 (1981)	 and	 subsequently	
adopted	 into	 Langacker’s	 framework	 of	 Cognitive	 Grammar.	 In	 Langackarian	 terms,	
“[t]he	 search	 domain	 (sd)	 of	 a	 locative	 predication	 (LOC)	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 region	 to	
which	 it	 confines	 the	 trajector”(Langacker	 1987:	 286).	 Based	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 search	
domain,	Smith	(1987:	91)	postulates	 the	 following	“configurationally-based	definitions	
for	DAT	and	ACC	in	the	2-way	prepositional	realm.”		
	
DAT:	the	TR	of	the	preposition	is	confined		throughout	the	process	to	a	set	of	points	satisfying	the	locative	
specification	of	the	preposition	(i.e.	the	SD	of	the	preposition).	In	this	respect,	the	situation	is	described	as	
unchanging.	
	
ACC:	the	TR	of	the	prepositon	is	NOT	always	confined	to	the	SD	of	the	preposition,	but	enters	the	SD	at	
some	point	along	a	path.	The	situation	involves	change	of	some	type	with	respect	to	the	locative	
configuration.		
(Smith	1987:	92)	
	
By	way	of	illustration	consider	the	sentences	with	auf	and	in	below:	
	
(88a)	 Die	Kinder	springen	auf	die	Parkbank.	(ACC)	
	 The	children	jump	on(to)	the	bench.	
	
(88b)	 Die	Kinder	sind	auf	der	Parkbank.	(DAT)	
	 The	children	are	on	the	bench.	
	
(88c)	 Die	Kinder	springen	auf	der	Parkbank.	(DAT)	
	 The	children	are	jumping	(up	and	down)	on	the	bench.	
	
(89a)	 Die	Kinder	rennen	in	den	Laden.	(ACC)	
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	 The	children	run	into	the	store.	
	
(89b)	 Die	Kinder	sind	im	Laden.	(DAT)	
	 The	children	are	in	the	store.	
	
(89c)	 Die	Kinder	rennen	im	(in	dem)	Laden.	(DAT)	
	 The	children	run	(around)	inside	the	store.	
	
The	dative	versions	confine	 the	TR	–	whether	stationary	(b)	or	 in	motion	(c)	–	 	 to	 the	
search	domain	of	the	LM,	whereas	the	accusative	versions	involve	motion	of	the	TR	into	
the	 LM’s	 search	 domain	 (Smith	 1987:	 93).	 So	 while	 the	 accusative	 versions	 “involve	
goal-oriented	movement”,	the	DAT	versions	do	not	(Smith	1992:	391).	Of	course,	this	is	
not	 the	whole	 story	 as	 far	 as	 German	 2-way	 prepositions	 are	 concerned.	 Smith	 notes	
that	there	are	many	instances	where	accusative	case	does	not	entail	spatial	motion,	but	
rather	some	kind	of	abstract	change	on	part	of	the	TR:	
	
(90)	 Die	Tablette	löst	sich	in	das	Wasser	auf.	
	 The	tablet	dissolves	into	the	water.	
	
(91)	 Er	hat	ein	Zitat	in	den	Text	eingefügt.	
	 He	put	a	quote	into	the	text.	
	 (from	Smith	1995:	312,	314)	
	
He	(e.g.	Smith	1995:	319f.)	therefore	argues	in	favor	of	a	more	schematic	change	vs	no	
change	 distinction	 which	 would	 subsume	 the	 motion	 vs	 location	 distinction,	 while	
accounting	 for	 these	 more	 abstract	 cases	 as	 well.9	For	 our	 purposes	 though,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 emphasize,	 firstly,	 that	 the	 goal	 oriented	 spatial	 motion	 sense	 is	 the	
categorial	prototype	for	accusative	case	in	German	and,	secondly,	that	 instances	which	
involve	 change	 still	 exploit	 the	motion	 concept	 via	 the	 EVENT	STRUCTURE	METAPHOR,	 e.g.	
STATES	 ARE	 LOCATIONS,	 CHANGES	 ARE	 MOVEMENTS,	 etc.	 (Lakoff	 2006:	 204).	 In	 fact,	 Smith	
(1992:	 387)	 holds	 that	 “[German]	 ACC	 is	 motivated	 whenever	 a	 grammatical	
construction	[...]	evokes	an	aspect	of	the	path-goal	schema.”	
				Having	discussed	German	2-way	prepositions	in	terms	of	confinement	to	vs	movement	
into	a	LM’s	search	domain,	we	can	now	return	to	the	specific	case	of	an.	As	I	have	argued	
above,	the	search	domain	of	an	prototypically	encompasses	the	external	boundaries	of	
the	 prepositional	 object	 (see	 also	 Leys	 1989:	 101).	 Again,	 consider	 the	DAT/ACC	pair	
from	before:	
	
(75)	 Das	Bild	hängt	an	der	(DAT)	Wand.	
																																																								
9	In	a	similar	vein,	Leys	(1989)	argues	for	an	account	in	terms	of	an	incipient	(ACC)	vs	an	existing	(DAT)	
relationship.		
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	 The	picture	hangs	on	the	wall.	
	
(76)	 Hans	hängt	das	Bild	an	die	(ACC)	Wand.	
	 Hans	hangs	the	picture	on(to)	the	wall.	
	
In	(75)	the	TR	(das	Bild)	is	at	all	times	confined	to	the	search	domain	of	the	LM.	In	(76)	
the	TR	starts	out	outside	the	LM’s	search	domain,	then	moves	along	a	PATH	towards	it,	
and	finally	comes	to	rest	within	the	search	domain.	Where	(76)	construes	the	LM	as	a	
GOAL,	 (75)	construes	 it	 as	a	PLACE.	Furthermore,	 since	 (75)	 is	easily	 interpretated	as	
the	 result	 of	 (76),	 the	 two	 configurations	 are	 closely	 interconnected	 by	 experiential	
correlation.	In	this	way,	a	search	domain	analysis	of	an	with	dative	vs	an	with	accusative	
reveals	a	conceptual	link	between	CONTACT	and	directedness.		
				If	we	extend	our	scope	from	concrete	spatial	 to	 fictive	motion	 (Talmy	2003a:	103ff.),	
we	can	account	for	directional	an-V	in	analogous	fashion.	In	other	words,	(82)-(87)	are	
all	instances	where	an	entity	moves	into	the	search	domain	specified	by	the	preposition	
an	–	either	via	self-propelled	or	via	caused	motion.	(82)	and	(83)	can	be	understood	as	
involving	caused	motion	of	reified	sense	data	(e.g.	a	gaze	or	a	smile)	along	a	PATH	that	
terminates	upon	CONTACT	with	the	LM.10	(84)	and	(85)	straightforwardly	involve	self-
propelled	spatial	motion	 into	 the	LM’s	search	domain.	 (86)	 traces	 the	 “targeting	path”	
(Talmy	2003a:	109f.)	of	the	bullet	until	CONTACT	with	the	stag	is	established.	And	(87)	
involves	 the	 TR’s	 psychological	 motion	 towards	 an	 abstract	 antagonist.	 I.e.,	
prepositional	 an	 with	 ACC	 and	 directional	 an-V	 share	 the	 same	 image	 schematic	
topology.		
				At	this	point	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	the	same	analysis	serves	to	account	for	
the	relation	between	KAKARU	and	directional	 -kakaru/-kakeru.	Consider	 the	 following	
pairs	of	sentences	in	light	of	the	above	discussion.		
	
(92a)	 Kôto-ga	 kabe-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Coat-NOM	 wall-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	coat	is	hanging	on	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
(92b)	 Tarô-ga	 kabe-ni	 kôto-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 wall-DAT	 coat-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	hung	the	coat	on(to)	the	wall.‘	 	 	
	
(93a)	 Sakana-ga	 hari-ni	 kakat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Fish-NOM	 hook-DAT	 KAKARU-RES	 ‘The	fish	is	caught	on	the	hook.’	 	 	 	
	
(93b)	 Sakana-ga	 hari-ni	 kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Fish-NOM	 hook-DAT	 KAKARU-PAST	 ‘The	fish	caught	the	hook.’	 	 	 	
																																																								
10	See	also	Felfe	(2012:	155),	who	points	to	the	conceptual	similarity	of		Er	lächelt	sie	an	(He	smiles	at	her)	
and	Sein	Lächeln	gelangt	an	sie	(His	smile	reaches	her).		
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Since	KAKARU	prototypically	 involves	CONTACT	between	TR	 and	LM,	we	 can	 assume	
that	 KAKARU	 and	 an	 specify	 roughly	 the	 same	 search	 domain,	 i.e.	 the	 external	
boundaries	of	the	LM.	Now,	comparing	the	(a)	and	(b)	versions,	it	is	plainly	evident	that	
in	 terms	 of	 TR-LM	 arrangement	 kakat-te	 iru	 (see	 schema	 C)	 corresponds	 to	 an	 with	
dative,	 while	 kakeru	 and	 kakaru	 (see	 schemas	 A	 and	 B)	 correspond	 to	 an	 with	
accusative:	
	
KAKARU	 an	 image	schematic	topology	
kakat-te	iru	 an	w/	DAT	 confinement	of	TR	to	SD	of	LM	
kakaru	 an	w/	ACC	(intransitive)	 (self-propelled)	motion	of	TR	into	SD	of	LM	
kakeru	 an	w/	ACC	(transitive)	 (caused)	motion	of	TR	into	SD	of	LM	
	
Consequently	the	relation	between	simplex	kakaru/kakeru	and	directional	V-kakaru/V-
kakeru	can	be	accounted	for	in	analogy	to	the	relation	between	an	with	accusative	and	
directional	an-V:	
	
an	w/	ACC	 à	 directional	an-V	 }	motion	of	TR	into	SD	of	LM	kakaru/kakeru	 à	 directional	V-kakaru/V-kakeru	
	
With	this,	we	can	straightforwardly	account	for	most	of	the	senses	listed	by	Himeno	
(1979):	
	
(i1)	 Ha-ga	 atama-ni	 chiri-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Leaf-NOM	 head-DAT	 fall-KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	leaf	landed	on	the	head.’	 	 	 	
	
(i2)	 Tarô-ga	 kabe-ni	 yori-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 wall-DAT	 move	towards-KAKARU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	leaned	aginst	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-ga	 kabe-ni	 ita-wo	 tate-kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 wall-DAT	 board-ACC	 put-KAKERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	put	the	board	against	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
(i3)	 Inu-ga	 Tarô-ni	 osoi-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Dog-NOM	 Tarô-DAT	 attack-KAKARU-PAST	 ‘The	dog	pounced	at	Tarô.’	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-ni	 tsuba-wo	 haki-kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-DAT	 spit-ACC	 spit-KAKERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	spat	at	Jirô.’	 	 	
	
(i4)	 Hanako-ga	 Jirô-ni	 warai-kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Jirô-DAT	 smile-KAKERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	smiled	at	Jirô.’	 	 	 	
	
(i6)	 Inu-ga	 neko-wo	 oi-kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Dog-NOM	 cat-ACC	 chase-KAKERU-PAST	 ‘The	dog	chased	after	the	cat.’	 	 	 	
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It	should	be	obvious	how	all	of	the	above	examples	involve	the	TR’s	movement	into	the	
search	domain	specified	by	KAKARU	–	especially	 in	 light	of	our	previous	discussion	of	
(82)-(87).	 Analogous	 to	 the	 case	 of	 directional	 an-V,	 this	 limits	 the	 choice	 of	 V1	 to	
semantic	fields	which	allow	for	spatial	or	fictive	motion.11	
				However,	we	might	ask	why	some	verbs	 that	normally	 take	a	direct	object	 (marked	
with	wo)	mark	 the	 corresponding	nominal	with	ni	 instead	when	appearing	 in	 tandem	
with	-kakaru.	As	Himeno	notes,	verbs	with	assault-like	meanings	are	particularly	prone	
to	this	shift:	
	
(94a)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-wo	 osot-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 attack-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	attacked	Jirô.’	 	 	 	
	
(94b)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-ni	 osoi-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-DAT	 attack-KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	darted	at	Jirô.’	 	 	 	
	
(95a)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-wo	 nagut-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 hit-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	hit	Jirô.’	 	 	 	
	
(95b)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-ni	 naguri-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 hit-KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	took	a	swing	at	Jirô.’	 	 	 	
	
She	(	1973:	43)	suggests	that	such	V1s	are	“influenced”	by	the	directional	meaning	of		
-kakaru,	 so	 that	 the	 compound	 as	 a	 whole	 marks	 the	 argument	 in	 question	 with	 ni	
instead	of	wo.	Building	on	this,	we	can	further	specify	the	issue	in	terms	of	alternative	
construal.	While	ni	marks	 an	 argument	 as	 indirect	 object	 and	GOAL12,	wo	marks	 it	 as	
direct	object	–	a	grammatical	role	prototypically	associated	with	the	notion	energy	sink	
(Langacker	1991:	292).	The	former	is	a	characterization	in	terms	of	what	we	might	call	
thematic	role	 (such	as	recepient,	experiencer,	 etc.),	 the	 latter	a	primarily	 force	dynamic	
characterization	 in	 terms	of	 the	 action	 chain	model.13	In	 other	words,	 the	 choice	 of	ni	
over	wo	by	the	above	compounds	raises	the	salience	of	the	PATH-GOAL	schema	favored	
by	 -kakaru	 vis-a-vis	 the	 force	 dynamic	 construal	 favored	 by	 the	 V1s	 (osou,	 naguru).	
																																																								
11	An	example	for	the	latter	would	be	(i4),	which	corresponds	to	(83).	
12	At	least	in	the	allative	sense	relevant	here.	For	a	network	analysis	of	ni	see	Kabata	and	Rice	(1997).	
13	See	Langacker’s	(1991:	304ff.)	discussion	of	basic	grammatical	relations.	While	he	suggests	that	
subjects	are	prototypical	action-chain	heads	and	objects	prototypical	action-chain	tails,	Langacker	seems	
to	reject	a	primarily	force	dynamic	characterization	for	indirect/oblique	objects.	Instead,	he	argues	that	
indirect	objects	are	best	understood	in	terms	of	the	experiencer	role.	Related	notions	such	as	recipient	or	
goal	may	be	viewed	as	semantic	extensions	of	this	thematic	role.		
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There	 is	 a	 fairly	 simple	 reason	 for	 this.	 Many	 of	 the	 compounds	 with	 assault-like	
meanings	do	not	strictly	entail	that	the	LM	is	actually	subjected	to	the	action	denoted	by	
the	V1.	Consider	these	sentence	pairs:	
	
(96a)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-ni	 naguri-kakat-ta	 ga,	 Jirô-ga	 kawashi-ta.	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-DAT	 hit-KAKARU-PAST	 CONJ	 Jirô-NOM	 dodge-PAST	
	 ‘Tarô	took	a	swing	at	Jirô,	but	Jirô	dodged	(the	blow).’	
	
(96b)	 *Tarô-ga	 Jirô-wo	 nagut-ta	 ga,	 Jirô-ga	 kawashi-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 hit-PAST	 CONJ	 Jirô-NOM	 dodge-PAST	 	
	 *Tarô	hit	Jirô,	but	Jirô	dodged	(the	blow).’	 	
	
(97a)	 Samurai-ga	 teki-ni	 kiri-kakat-ta	 ga,	 teki-ga	 kawashi-ta.	 	
	 Samurai-NOM	 enemy-DAT	 slash-KAKARU-PAST	 CONJ	 enemy-NOM	 dodge-PAST	 	
	 ‘The	samurai	lashed	his	sword	at	the	enemy,	but	the	enemy	dodged	away.’	 	
	
(97b)	 *Samurai-ga	 teki-wo	 kit-ta	 ga,	 teki-ga	 kawashi-ta.	 	
	 Samurai-NOM	 enemy-ACC	 slash-PAST	 CONJ	 enemy-NOM	 dodge-PAST	 	
	 *‘The	samurai	cut	(down)	the	enemy	with	his	sword,	but	the	enemy	dodged	away.’	 	
	
In	 other	words,	 in	 the	 (a)	 versions	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 simplex	 verb/V1	 on	 the	 LM	 (Jirô,	
Hanako)	can	be	felicitously	cancelled.	In	comparison	to	the	(b)	versions	this	makes	the	
LM	a	 relatively	poor	 energy	 sink,	 but	 a	better	 candidate	 for	 the	 role	 of	experiencer	 or	
goal.14	This	kind	of	alternative	construal	is	not	limited	to	Japanese.	Similar	constructions	
can	be	encountered	in	English	and	German:	
	
(98a)	 He	stabbed	at	me,	but	I	dodged	the	knife.	
	
(98b)	 *	He	stabbed	me,	but	I	dodged	the	knife.	
	
(99a)	 Er	hat	nach	mir	(DAT)	getreten,	aber	ich	bin	ausgewichen.	
	 He	kicked	at	me,	but	I	dodged.	
	
(99b)	 *	Er	hat	mich	(ACC)	getreten,	aber	ich	bin	ausgewichen.	
	 He	kicked	me,	but	I	dodged.	
	
					Still,	two	senses	from	Himeno’s	list	may	strike	us	as	somewhat	problematic:		
	
(i5)	 Hito-ga	 kaijô-ni	 tsume-kake-ta.	 	
	 People-NOM	 assembly	hall-DAT	 cram-KAKERU-PAST	 	
	 ‘People	crowded	(into)	the	assembly	hall.’	 	
	
(i7)	 Hito-ga	 mise-no	 mae-wo	 tôri-kakat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Person-NOM	 store-LK	 front-ACC	 pass-KAKARU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Someone	passed	by	in	front	of	the	store.'	 	 	 	
	
																																																								
14	The	fact	that	no	physical	CONTACT	is	entailed	does	not	affect	our	search	domain	interpretation.	Rather,	
such	cases	are	best	understood	as	involving	a	targeting	path	(Talmy	2003a:	109f.)	along	the	lines	of	(86).		
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(i5)	 seems	 to	 not	 quite	 fit	 our	 interpretation,	 since	 it	 emphasises	 the	 interior	 region	
rather	than	the	external	boundaries	of	the	LM.	However,	the	issue	is	easily	resolved	once	
we	 realize	 that	 this	 particular	 example	 involves	 a	 metonymic	 shift	 triggered	 by	 the	
gestalt	properties	of	 the	LM	rather	 than	by	tsume-kakeru	 itself.	Consider	 the	 following	
examples:	
	
(100)	 Hôdôjin-ga	 joyû-ni	 tsume-kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Press-NOM	 actress-DAT	 cram-KAKERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	press	besieged	the	actress.’	 	 	 	
	
(101)	 Hitogomi-ga	 ie-no	 iriguchi-ni	 tsume-kake-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Crowd-NOM	 house-LK	 entrance-DAT	 cram-KAKERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	crowd	besieged	the	entrance	of	the	house.’	 	 	 	
	
(102)	 Hitogomi-ga	 ie-ni	 tsume-kake-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Crowd-NOM	 house-DAT	 cram-KAKERU-PAST.	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	crowd	besieged	the	house.’	Or:	 	 	
	 ‘The	crowd	poured	into	the	house.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(100)	is	completely	consistent	with	an	external	boundary	interpretation.	This	is	true	for	
(101)	as	well.	Although,	since	 iriguchi	 is	 the	BOUNDARY	of	a	CONTAINER,	 the	 interior	
region’s	 salience	 is	 hightened.	 (102),	 finally,	 is	 vague	 between	 a	 BOUNDARY	 and	 an	
INTERIOR	reading.	That	is,	tsume-kakeru	will	by	default	specify	the	LM’s	BOUNDARY	as	
its	search	domain,	but	a	CONTAINER-like	LM	–	which	consists	of	both	BOUNDARY	and	
INTERIOR	 –	 can	 metonymically	 override	 the	 BOUNDARY	 reading	 in	 favor	 of	 an	
INTERIOR	reading.		
				(i7)	 is	somewhat	 idiosyncratic	because	 tôri-kakaru	 takes	a	PATH	argument	 (marked	
by	wo)	although	-kakaru/-kakeru	 typically	 favors	a	GOAL	argument.	 It	seems	plausible	
to	suggest	that	the	specific	usage	context	of	tôri-kakaru	is	responsible	for	this.	According	
to	 Himeno	 (1979:	 44)	 tôri-kakaru	 typically	 appears	 within	 the	 limited	 syntactic	
environment	of	certain	temporal	clauses	expressing	coincidence.	Some	examples	are:	
	
(103)	 Heya-no	 mae-wo	 tôri-kakat-tara,	 hito-ga		 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	
	 Room-LK	 front-ACC	 pass-KAKARU-when	 person-NOM	 move	out-TE	 come-PAST	 	
	 ‘As	I	passed	by	(in	front	of)	the	room,	someone	came	out.’	 	
	
(104)	 Kafeteria-wo	 tôri-kakaru	 to,	 shiriai-ga	 koe-wo	 kake-ta.	 	 	
	 Cafeteria-ACC	 pass-KAKARU	 as	 acquaintance-NOM	 voice-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘As	I	passed	by	(in	front	of	)	the	cafeteria,	an	acquaintance	greeted	me.’	 	 	
	
(105)	 Kôsaten-wo	 tôri-kakat-ta	 tokoro,	 kôtsu	jiko-ga	 oki-ta.	 	 	
	 Crossing-ACC	 pass-KAKARU-PAST	 moment		 traffic	accident-NOM	 happen-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘As	I	crossed	the	intersection,	a	traffic	accident	occured.’	 	 	
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That	 is,	 we	 might	 characterize	 the	 majority	 of	 constructions	 containing	 tôri-kakaru	
informally	as:	
	
(106)	 As	X	passes	by	Y	[LOC],	X	encounters	Z	[EVENT]	
	
I	 therefore	 suggest	 that	 tôri-kakaru	 does	 in	 some	 abstract	 sense	 indeed	 have	 a	 GOAL	
argument,	 namely	 the	 event	 Z.	On	 this	 interpretation,	 one	might	 paraphrase	 (103)	 by	
something	like:	
	
(107)	 [Heya-no	mae]LOC-
wo	
tôt-tara,	 [hito-ga	de-te	kuru	no]EVENT-ni	 sashi-kakat-ta.	
	 [Room-LK	front]-
ACC	
pass-
when	
[Person-NOM	move	out-TE	come	NMLZ]-
DAT	
come	across-
PAST	
	 ‘As	I	passed	by	(in	front	of)	the	room	I	encountered	the	event	of	someone	coming	out.’	
	
Of	course,	this	is	just	a	rough	paraphrase	and	should	in	no	way	be	understood	as	some	
sort	 of	 underlying	 structure.	 It	 merely	 serves	 to	 illustrate	 how	 tôri-kakaru	 might	 be	
understood	as	implying	a	GOAL	although	no	GOAL	argument	is	linguistically	realized.15	
But	what	about	our	initial	example?	
	
(i7)	 Hito-ga	 mise-no	 mae-wo	 tôri-kakat-ta.	 	
	 Person-NOM	 store-LK	 front-ACC	 pass-kakaru-PAST	 	
	 ‘Someone	passed	by	(in	front	of)	the	store.’	 	
	
I	would	argue	that	even	without	the	kind	of	clause	linkage	found	in	(103)-(105)	such	a	
sentence	still	tends	to	imply	some	sort	of	schematic	event	Z.	This	seems	plausible,	since	
expressions	 of	 coincidence	 from	 English	 and	 German	 invite	 the	 same	 interpretation.	
Compare	the	following	sentence	pairs:	
	
(108a)	 I	passed	by	a	furniture	store.	
	
(108b)	 I	happend	to	pass	by	a	furniture	store.	
	
(109a)	 Ich	bin	an	einem	Möbelgeschäft	vorbeigekommen.	
	 (corresponds	to	110a)	
	
(109b)	 Ich	bin	zufällig	an	einem	Möbelgeschäft	vorbeigekommen.	
	 (corresponds	to	110b)	
	
Here	 the	 (b)	 versions,	 more	 so	 than	 the	 (a)	 versions,	 seem	 to	 suggest	 some	 kind	 of	
unforseen	 event	 or	 state	 of	 affairs.	 I.e.,	 (108b)	 and	 (109b)	may	 be	 followed	 up	more	
																																																								
15	This	is	consistent	with	Chen’s	(2013)	observation	that	important	frame	elements	–	e.g.	“core	
arguments“	of	V1	or	V2	–	are	not	always	overtly	realized	as	arguments	of	the	compound.		
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naturally	by	something	like:	“And	guess	what	–	they	had	that	lamp	you’ve	been	looking	
for!”16			
		
9.2.3.	CONTACT	and	Inchoativity:	The	START	Sense	of	an-V	and	V-KAKARU	
	
In	 this	 section	 I	 will	 make	 the	 case	 for	 a	 conceptual	 relation	 between	 CONTACT	 and	
inchoative	 aspect.	 While	 an	 account	 of	 directional	 V-KAKARU	 in	 terms	 of	 image	
schematic	topology	agrees	with	our	pretheoretic	intuitions,	the	same	can	hardly	be	said	
for	inchoative	V-KAKARU.	In	her	study	on	the	grammaticalization	of	inchoative		
-kakaru/-kakeru,	Kikuta	(2008:	118)	remarks	that	directedness	–	but	not	inchoativity	–	
can	be	traced	back	to	the	semantics	of	the	simplex	verb.	Dismissing	the	possibility	of	any	
conceptual	 links	 between	 inchoative	 -kakaru/-kakeru	 and	 its	 simplex	 counterpart	
(2008:	157,	165),	she	proposes	a	strong	version	of	an	invited	inferencing	account	based	
on	the	usage	of	the	compound	kure-kakaru:	
	
According	to	the	data	examined,	in	the	case	of	V-kakar,	the	inchoative	interpretation	was	made	available	
in	such	collocations	as	kure-kakar,	which	originally	meant	‘the	sun	sets	and	the	darkness	hangs	low.’	Since	
becoming	dark	 takes	a	while	after	 the	sunset,	 this	phrase	 implies	 some	kind	of	 indeterminacy	as	 to	 the	
exact	 time	 denoted.	 In	 addition,	 the	 phrase	 apparently	 became	 idiomatic,	 referring	 to	 dusk	 in	 general,	
which	is	at	the	onset	of	night.	The	inchoative	sense	associated	with	kure-kakar	was	gradually	generalized	
and	 schematized	 until	 around	 12-13C,	 when	 V-kakar	 became	 a	 productive	 pattern	 of	 inchoatives	
applicable	 to	other	verbs	 than	kure.	 The	gradual,	 context-based	process	of	 the	 emergence	of	 inchoative	
usage	directly	follows	the	prediction	made	by		the	usage-based	approach	to	grammaticalization	(Traugott	
&	Dasher	2002;	Hopper	&	Traugott	2003).	[…]	[T]he	inchoative	usage	of	V-kake	started	analogically	after	
its	 intransitive	counterpart	V-kakar	had	been	sufficiently	grammaticalized	and	recognized	as	 inchoative	
construction.	(Kikuta	2008:	164)	
		
I	 agree	 that	 invited	 inferencing	 can	 play	 a	 substantial	 role	 in	 semantic	 change	 and	
consequently	 take	 no	 issue	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 certain	 items	 may	 feature	 more	
prominently	 than	others	 in	 the	early	stages	of	grammaticalization.	However,	 there	are	
two	points	to	consider	here	–	one	general	and	one	more	specific.		First,	an	account	like	
the	 above,	which	 relies	 on	pragmatic	 reanalysis	 alone,	 runs	 the	 risk	of	 trivializing	 the	
role	 of	 image	 schematic	 topology	 and	 conceptual	 metaphor	 in	 meaning	 extension.17	
Secondly,	 Kikuta’s	 emphasis	 on	 kure-kakaru	 in	 this	 specific	 case	 begs	 the	 question	 in	
light	of	the	linguistic	evidence	she	provides.	To	back	up	her	claim	that	frequency	of	use	
along	with	contextual	reinterpretation	of	kure-kakaru	led	to	the	emergence	of	inchoative	
V–kakaru,	she	cites	only	a	handful	of	occurrences	from	classical	literature	(2008:	141ff.).	
																																																								
16	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	unforseen	event	reading	is	a	cancellable	conversational	
implicature	(Grice	1975)	rather	than	an	entailment.		
17	For	the	role	of	metaphor	in	grammaticalization	see	e.g.	Heine	et	al.	(1991)	and	Sweetser	(1991).	
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For	a	grass-roots	level	phenomenon	like	pragmatic	strengthening	this	is	a	rather	shaky	
empirical	basis	–	leaving	room	for	the	possibility	that	other	factors	might	have	played	a	
role	after	all.	 In	 the	 following	 I	will	argue,	not	 from	a	historical	but	 from	a	synchronic	
and	cross-linguistic	viewpoint,	that	the	conceptual	links	dismissed	by	Kikuta	do	indeed	
exist	and	may	well	have	provided	the	macro-structure	for	the	meaning	extension	from	
simplex	verb	to	inchoative	marker	(and	in	the	case	of	German:	from	spatial	preposition	
to	inchoative	marker).			
				I	will	begin	by	examining	the	inchoative	sense	of	German	an-V.	Consider	the	following	
examples:		
	
(110)	 Ich	habe	das	Buch	angelesen.	(anlesen)	
	 I	have	started	reading	the	book.	
	
(111)	 Hans	brät	das	Fleisch	an.	(anbraten)	
	 Hans	cooks	the	meat	gently.	(i.e.,	until	it	is	rare/medium-rare)	
	
(112)	 Lisa	hat	das	Auto	angezahlt.	(anzahlen)	
	 Lisa	has	made	a	down	payment	on	the	car.	
	
(113)	 Wenn	du	die	Bretter	anbohrst,	hast	du	es	später	leichter.	(anbohren)	
	 If	you	partly	drill/pre-drill	the	boards,	you’ll	have	it	easier	later.	
	
(114)	 Das	Brot	schimmelt	an.	(anschimmeln)	
	 The	bread	starts	to	get	moldy.	
	
(115)	 Das	Auto	fuhr	hupend	an.	(anfahren)	
	 Honking,	the	car	started	moving.	
	
According	to	Felfe	(2012:	156ff.),	an-V	in	the	above	examples	expresses	transitive	(110-
113)	or	 intransitive	(114-115)	partiality	(Partialität),	 i.e.	 the	beginning,	weak	intensity	
or	 weak	 after-effect	 of	 an	 event	 or	 action.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 process	 denoted	 by	 the	
simplex	verb	has	entered	but	not	surpassed	the	initial	stage,	which	is	why	I	will	refer	to	
all	such	instances	as	“inchoative	an-V”.18		
				Felfe	 (2012:	 164)	 argues	 that	 this	 sense	 is	 related	 to	 directional	 an-V	 in	 two	ways.	
Firstly,	 he	 notes	 that	 establishing	 physical	 contact	 with	 a	 concrete	 object	 often	
																																																								
18	Here	the	term	“initial	stage”	pertains	to	an	ideal	script	of	going	through	all	possible	stages	of	a	process	
from	start	to	finish,	regardless	of	whether	these	stages	are	actually	realized	or	not.	In	this	sense	anbraten	
refers	to	the	initial	stage	of	cooking	something	until	it	is	well	done	(German:	durchbraten,	lit.	“cook	
through”)	–	not	the	initial	stages	of	the	actual	process	(which	might	end	prematurely).		
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It	would	be	inappropriate	to	speak	of	a	“surface”	in	one-dimensional	space.	We	should	
rather	say	that,	by	default,	processes	have	up	to	two	external	boundaries	(depending	on	
telicity)	 –	 a	 point	 of	 entry	 and	 a	 point	 of	 exit.	 As	 the	 name	 suggests,	 we	 come	 into	
CONTACT	with	the	point	of	entry	 first,	since	we	have	no	choice	but	 to	enter	a	process	
from	 the	 “front”.	 Now	 recall	 that	 the	 external	 boundaries	 of	 an	 object	 constitute	 the	
search	domain	 of	an.	 Viewed	 in	 this	 light	 the	 usage	 of	an	 as	 inchoative	marker	 is	 not	
surprising	at	 all:	The	process	 (e.g.	braten,	 cook)	 is	 reified	as	 a	one-dimensional	object	
located	 in	 front	 of	 the	 TR.	 Consequently,	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 the	 process	 –	 which	
corresponds	to	the	object’s	frontal	boundary	–	comprises	the	search	domain	of	an.	The	
mappings	are:	
	
(non-punctual)	process	 IS	 one-dimensional	object		
starting	point	 à	 frontal	boundary	
(duration	 à	 middle	portion)	
(end	point	 à	 rearward	boundary)	
etc.	 	 	
	
On	this	view,	inchoative	an-V	is	a	metaphorical	extension	of	directional	an-V.	Both	share	
the	 same	 image	 schematic	 topology,	 i.e.	 movement	 of	 the	 TR	 into	 the	 search	 domain	
specified	 by	 an.	 However,	 in	 case	 of	 inchoative	 an-V	 the	 LM	 of	 an	 is	 the	 process	
expressed	by	the	simplex	verb.	To	illustrate	this,	consider	(111)	from	above:	
	
(111)	 Hans	brät	das	Fleisch	an.	(anbraten)	
	 Hans	cooks	the	meat	gently.	(i.e.,	until	it	is	rare/medium-rare)	
	
The	schematic	LM	of	the	prefix	an	is	elaborated	by	the	process	braten.	This	is	not	to	be	
confused	 with	 the	 LM	 of	 the	 compound	 anbraten,	 which	 is	 elaborated	 by	 the	 object	
nominal	das	Fleisch.	The	TR	of	both	an	and	anbraten	is	elaborated	by	Hans.	In	summary,	
an	in	anbraten	expresses	that	Hans	establishes	CONTACT	with	the	“frontal	boundary”	of	
the	process	braten.	Keep	in	mind	that	this	schematic	“boundary”	is	not	a	hard	and	fast	
line	of	demarcation.	As	search	domain	of	an	 it	mereley	serves	as	 the	relevant	point	of	
reference	for	entry	into	the	process,	and	thus	allows	for	superficial	ingression.		
				But	 is	 the	above	account	psychologically	plausible?	 I	would	argue	that	 it	 is,	and	that	
converging	 evidence	 comes	 in	 form	 of	 all	 kinds	 of	 charts	 that	 we	 naturally	 use	 to	
visualize	planning	and	progress.	Consider,	for	example,	figure	15	which	shows	a	popular	
type	of	project	schedule	known	as	“Gantt	Chart”.	The	planned	activities	in	this	chart	are	
visualized	exactly	as	hypothesized	above	–	as	one-dimensional	extents.	Accordingly,	the	
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				I	 will	 now	 demonstrate	 that	 everything	 which	 applies	 to	 the	 relation	 between	
directional	 and	 inchoative	 an-V	 applies	 to	 the	 relation	 between	 directional	 and	
inchoative	V-KAKARU	as	well.	Consider	the	case	of	yomi-kakeru:	
	
(120)	 Tarô-ga	 hon-wo	 yomi-kake-ta	 tokoro-e	 denwa-ga	 nat-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 book-ACC	 read-KAKERU-PAST	 moment-ALL	 phone	call-NOM	 ring-PAST	 	
	 ‘As	Tarô	began	to	read	the	book,	the	phone	rang.’	 	
	
For	reasons	I	will	elaborate	on	later	(see	14.4.)	the	V2	-kakeru	in	inchoative	V-kakeru	is	
assumed	 to	 be	 intransitive.	 Recall	 from	 our	 previous	 discussion	 that	 KAKARU	 and	an	
specify	 roughly	 the	same	search	domain,	 i.e.	 the	external	boundaries	of	 the	LM.	Recall	
further,	that	the	image	schematic	topology	of	kakaru	(and	an	with	accusative)	has	been	
characterized	as	movement	of	the	TR	into	the	SD	of	the	LM.	In	the	above	example	the	LM	
of	 kaketa	 is	 the	 process	 expressed	 by	 yom(u),	 its	 TR	 is	 Tarô	 (again,	 applying	 the	
metaphorical	view	of	durative	processes	as	one-dimensional	extents).	Consequently,	the	
interpretation	of	kakeru	 in	 (120)	 is	 analogous	 to	 that	of	an	 in	anbraten:	 both	 indicate	
CONTACT	with	 the	 frontal	 boundary	 of	 (and	 subsequently	 superficial	 ingression	 into)	
the	 process	 designated	 by	 the	 simplex	 verb.	 That	 is,	 in	 the	 above	 example	 kaketa	
indicates	that	the	TR	(Tarô)	has	come	into	CONTACT	with	(and	moved	slightly	beyond)	
the	frontal	temporal	boundary	of	yom(u)	when	the	telephone	rang.		
				But	what	of	punctual	processes	expressed	by	verbs	like	shinu?	
	
(121)	 Tarô-ga	 jiko-ni	 at-te,	 shini-kake-te	i-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 accident-DAT	 meet-TE	 die-KAKERU-RES-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	got	into	an	accident	and	was	on	the	verge	of	dying.’	 	 	 	
	
Here,	too,	a	search	domain	analysis	along	with	a	metaphorical	interpretation	yields	the	
correct	 results.	 If	 durative	 processes	 are	 one-dimensional	 extents	 then	 punctual	
processes	 are	 zero-dimensional	 objects.	 I.e.,	 if	 yomu	 is	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 line,	 shinu	 is	
conceived	 of	 as	 a	 point.	 Since	 there	 can	 be	 no	 superficial	 ingression	 into	 (or	 partial	
overlap	 with)	 zero-dimensional	 objects,	 the	 “start	 V-ing”	 interpretation	 is	 rendered	
impossible	by	image	schematic	topology.	Instead	–	in	keeping	with	the	one-dimensional	
to	zero-dimensional	LM	transformation	–	CONTACT	with	the	frontal	boundary	of	shinu	
can	 only	 correspond	 to	 immediate	 temporal	 adjecency	 of	 TR	 and	 process.	 Therefore,	
kake-te	i-ta	in	(121)	indicates	that	Tarô	was	confined	to	a	state	immediately	adjecent	to	
that	of	death.		
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				In	this	 	way	a	metaphorical	 interpretation	can	easily	accommodate	both	the	shidôtai	
and	 the	 shôgentai	 readings	 via	 image	 schema	 transformation.	 Note,	 however,	 that	
examples	like	the	following	challenge	the	prototypical	shidôtai	=	durative	and	shôgentai	
=	punctual	pairings	(Himeno	1979:	52f.).		
	
(122)	 Kare-wa	 nanika-wo	 ii-kake-ta	 ga,	 futakoto-mikoto-de	 yame-ta.	 	
	 He-TOP	 something-ACC	 say-KAKERU-PAST	 CONJ,	 few	words-INS	 quit-PAST	 	
	 He	was	about	to	say	something,	but	stopped	after	a	few	words.	 	
	
(123)	 Kare-
wa	
nanika-wo	 ii-kake-ta	 ga,	 yahari	 kotoba-wo	 nonde-shimat-ta.	
	 He-TOP	 something-
ACC	
say-KAKERU-
PAST	
CONJ	 after	
all	
words-
ACC	
swallow-IRR-
PAST	
	 ‘He	was	about	to	say	something,	but	(instead)	kept	silent	after	all.’	
	
(124)	 Hana-ga	 yuru-ku	 hiraki-kake-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Flower-NOM	 slow-INF	 open-KAKERU-RES	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	flower	has	opened	up	slightly.’	 	 	 	
	
				Examples	 (122)	 and	 (123)	 show	 that	 durative	 processes	 are	 compatible	 with	 both	
shidôtai	and	shôgentai	readings.	According	to	Himeno	(1979:	53)	shôgentai	focusses	on	
the	beginning	of	a	process	while	shidôtai	focusses	on	the	beginning	of	the	continuation	
of	an	interrupted	process.	The	above	search	domain	analysis	suggests	a	different	picture.	
Inchaotive	-kakaru/-kakeru	specifies	the	vicinity	of	the	V1’s	 frontal	boundary	as	 its	SD	
and	is	therefore	slightly	vague	with	respect	to	the	exact	location	of	the	TR:	If	the	TR	is	
immediately	in	front	of	the	boundary	we	get	the	shôgentai	reading.	If	the	TR	is	slightly	
past	 the	 boundary	 (superficial	 ingression)	 we	 end	 up	 with	 the	 shidôtai	 reading.	 This	
vagueness	is	usually	resolved	by	the	context,	as	in	(122)	and	(123).	Punctual	processes,	
on	the	other	hand,	limit	V-kakeru	to	the	shôgentai	reading,	since	they	are	incompatible	
with	superficial	ingression.	However,	as	Himeno	(	1979:	53)	notes,	processes	which	are	
typically	 punctual	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 durative	 under	 certain	 circumstances.	 For	
example,	 the	verb	hiraku	 (open)	 is	usually	 construed	as	 a	punctual	 event,	 but	may	be	
interpreted	duratively	when	referring	to	slow,	gradual	processes	as	is	the	case	in	(124).			
				In	conclusion,	then,	durative	processes	are	compatible	with	both	the	shidôtai	and	the	
shôgentai	reading	(although	the	latter	pairing	is	less	common),	while	punctual	processes	
force	 a	 shôgentai	 interpretation.23	The	 possible	 pairings	 are	 illustrated	 in	 figure	 16	
below:	
																																																								
23	As	for	the	question	why	inchoative	an-V	has	no	interpretation	corresponding	to	the	shôgentai	reading:	
Since	image	schematic	topology	does	not	preclude	such	a	reading,	its	absence	is	best	regarded	as	a	
contingent	phenomenon.	I.e.,	not	everything	that	is	theoretically	possible	becomes	a	linguistic	reality.	
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FIGURE	16:	The	hatched	area	indicates	the	search	domain	of	the	LM.	
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10.	DERU	and	the	EXIT	Schema	
	
The	 intransitive/transitive	 verb	 pair	 deru/dasu	 –	 at	 its	 most	 schematic	 level	 –	 is	
characterized	by	the	following	constructions.	
	
(A)	 X-ga	 Y-wo	 Z-kara	 dasu	
	 X	CAUSE	 Y	MOVE	OUT	OF	 CONTAINER	 	
		
(B)	 	 Y-ga	 Z-kara/Z-wo	 deru	
	 	 Y	MOVE	OUT	OF	 CONTAINER	 	
	
That	is,	deru	profiles	a	relation	between	some	thing	(the	TR)	and	a	CONTAINER	(the	LM),	
whereby	the	TR	moves	from	the	INTERIOR	to	the	EXTERIOR	of	the	LM.	I	shall	refer	to	
this	 image	 schematic	 configuration	 as	 EXIT.	 The	 transitive	 variant	 dasu	 introduces	 a	
third	participant	which	causes	the	TR’s	movement.		
				I	will	use	DERU	(upper	case)	as	an	umbrella	term	for	both	(A)	and	(B).	
	
10.1.	The	Senses	of	DERU	
	
10.1.1.	Sense	(I):	Spatial	EXIT	(fig.	1)	
	
As	the	following	examples	show,	the	semantics	of	DERU	cover	a	wide	variety	of	TR-LM	
configurations	in	the	spatial	domain.	To	illustrate	this,	I	have	chosen	eight	parameters	in	
respect	 to	which	 configurations	might	 differ.	 These	 parameters	 are	 based	 on	 Talmy’s	
work	 on	 configurational	 structure	 (e.g.	 Talmy	 2006)	 and	 not	meant	 to	 be	 exhaustive.	
Rather,	 the	 following	 is	 intended	 to	 give	 the	 reader	 an	 idea	 of	 the	 vast	 number	 of	
configurational	 possibilities,	 without	 spelling	 each	 one	 out	 individually.	 In	 fact,	 If	 we	
were	 to	count	each	possible	combination	of	parameter	settings	as	a	case	of	 full-blown	
polysemy,	we	would	end	up	with	an	 intuitively	questionable	amount	of	senses.	This	 is	
not	to	say,	however,	that	spatial	DERU	exhibits	no	polysemy	at	all	either.	Since	my	main	
goal	 is	 to	 show	 how	 image	 schematic	 structure	 allows	 for	 meaning	 extension	 into	
abstract	domains	(and	not	to	give	an	exhaustive	inventory	of	senses	for	a	given	item),	I	
will	simply	group	all	spatial	configurations	of	DERU	under	the	 label	“spatial	EXIT”	and	
remain	agnostic	in	regards	to	the	issue	of	polysemy	vs	vagueness	(see	7.4.).		
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FIGURE	1:	The	schematic	prototype	for	spatial	exit	
	
--Parameter	1:	Dimensionality	of	the	TR	(and	degree	of	enclosure)--	
	
0D	moving	TR:	
(1)	 Nezumi-ga	 ana-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouse-NOM	 hole-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘A	mouse	came	out	of	the	hole.’	 	 	 	
	
1D	static	TR:	
(2)	 Hana-kara	 ke-ga	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Nose-ABL	 hair-NOM	 DERU-RES	 ‘A	nose	hair	is	sticking	out.’	 	 	 	
	
1D	moving	TR:	
(3)	 Hari-ga	 ude-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Needle-NOM	 arm-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	needle	came	out	(was	removed)	from	the	arm.’	 	 	 	
	
	
Note	 that	 (2)	 is	 available	 from	 (1)	 via	 the	 image	 schema	 transformation	 0DMTR	 <->	
1DTR	 described	 by	 Lakoff	 (1990:	 442),	 i.e.	 the	 construal	 of	 a	 one-dimensional	 TR	 by	
mentally	connecting	the	positions	occupied	over	time	by	a	zero-dimensional	moving	TR.	
	
(4)	 She	went	to	the	top	of	the	mountain.	(0DMTR)	
(5)	 The	road	went	to	the	top	of	the	mountain.	(1DTR)	
	 (Lakoff	1990:	442)	
	
A	 third	 configuration	 involves	 a	 one-dimensional	 moving	 TR.	 Consider	 the	 following	
sentences,	which	are	all	supposed	to	feature	a	partially	enclosed	1DTR:	
	
(6a)	 Hana-kara	 ke-ga	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Nose-ABL	 hair-NOM	 DERU-RES	 ‘A	nose	hair	is	sticking	out.’	 	 	 	
	
(6b)	 (??)	Ude-kara	 hari-ga	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Arm-ABL	 needle-NOM	 DERU-RES	 (??)	‘A	needle	is	sticking	out	of	the	arm.’	 	 	 	
	
(6c)	 Kabe-kara	 kugi-ga	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Wall-ABL	 nail-NOM	 DERU-RES	 ‘A	nail	is	sticking	out	of	the	wall.’	 	 	 	
	
Here	 the	 questionable	 status	 of	 (6b)	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 ideal	
default	 locations	of	 the	 respective	TRs.	Nose	hairs	as	well	 as	nails	 are	 supposed	 to	be	
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fully	 enclosed	 by	 their	 respective	 LMs	 (or	 almost	 fully	 in	 case	 of	 the	 nail).	 Therefore,	
partial	 enclosure	will	 be	 construed	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 EXIT.	 A	 foreign	 object	 such	 as	 a	
needle,	 however,	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 even	 partially	 enter	 the	 body.	 Therefore,	 in	 (6b)	
partial	 enclosure	 is	 construed	as	ENTRY,	not	as	EXIT.	 In	other	words,	whether	partial	
enclosure	of	a	1DTR	will	be	construed	as	EXIT	or	ENTRY	seems	to	depend	on	the	TR’s	
ideal	 default	 location.	 As	 (6c)	 shows,	 depending	 on	 its	 function	 (and	 possibly	 other	
factors),	a	TR’s	ideal	default	location	can	be	inside	the	LM,	even	though	its	initial	location	
is	completely	outside	the	LM.		
				In	summary:	When	partial	enclosure	 is	construed	as	EXIT,	no	movement	 is	required	
and	 DERU	 takes	 a	 1D	 static	 TR.	 By	 constrast,	 when	 partial	 enclosure	 is	 construed	 as	
ENTRY,	then	EXIT	requires	movement	of	the	complete	TR	to	the	exterior	of	the	LM	–	in	
which	case	DERU	takes	a	1D	moving	TR.		
	
--Parameter	2:	Dimensionality	of	the	LM--	
	
3DLM	(volume):	
(7)	 Tarô-ga	 heya-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 room-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	room.’	 	 	 	
	
2DLM	(plane):	
(8)	 Tarô-ga	 machi-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 town-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	town.’	 	 	 	
	
--Parameter	3:	Boundedness	of	the	TR--	
	
Bounded	TR:	
(09)	 Entotsu-kara	 kômori-ga	 de-te		 ki-ta.	 	 	 	
	 chimney-ABL	 bat-NOM	 DERU-TE		 come-PAST	 ‘A	bat	came	out	of	the	chimney.’	 	 	
	
Unbounded	TR:	
(10)	 Entotsu-kara	 kemuri-ga	 de-ta	 	 	 	
	 chimney-ABL	 smoke-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Smoke	came	out	of	the	chimney.’	 	 	
	
--Parameter	4:	Nature	of	the	LM’s	boundaries--	
	
Environmental	boundaries:	
(11)	 Shukudai-wo	 wasure-ta	 mono-wa	 kyôshitsu-wo	 de-nasai.	 	 	
	 homework-ACC	 forget-PAST	 persons-TOP	 classroom-ACC	 DERU-IMP	 	 	
	 ‘Those	who	forgot	their	homework,	leave	the	classroom!’	 	 	
	
Mentally	imposed	boundaries:	
(12)	 Shukudai-wo	 wasure-ta	 mono-wa	 mae-ni	 de-nasai.	 	 	
	 homework-ACC	 forget-PAST	 persons-TOP	 front-DAT	 DERU-IMP	 	 	
	 ‘Those	who	forgot	their	homework,	come	to	the	front!’	 	 	
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--Parameter	5:	LM’s	phase	of	matter--	
	
Empty:	
(13)	 Tarô-ga	 kissaten-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 cafe-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	cafe.’	 	 	 	
	
Liquid:	
(14)	 Mizu-no	 naka-kara	 awa-ga	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Water-LK	 interior-ABL	 bubbles-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Bubbles	surfaced	from	the	water.’	 	 	
	
Solid:	
(15)	 Yubi-kara	 chi-ga		 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Finger-ABL	 blood-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Blood	oozed	from	the	finger.’	 	 	 	
	
--Parameter	6:	TR’s	phase	of	matter--	
	
Empty:	
(16)	 Taiya-kara	 kûki-ga	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tire-ABL	 air-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Air	left	the	tire.’	 	 	 	
	
Liquid:	
(17)	 Jaguchi-kara	 mizu-ga	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 faucet-ABL	 water-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Water	came	out	of	the	faucet.’	 	 	 	
	
Solid:	
(18)	 Hako-wo	 furu	 to	 hyakuen	dama-ga	 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	
	 Box-ACC	 shake	 when	 hundred	yen	coin-NOM	 DERU-TE	 come-PAST	 	
	 ‘When	I	shook	the	box,	a	hundred	yen	coin	came	out.’	 	
	
--Parameter	7:	Plexity	of	the	LM--	
	
Uniplex	LM:	
(19)	 Tarô-ga	 ie-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 house-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	house.’	 	 	 	
	
Multiplex	LM:	
(20)	 Tarô-ga	 hito	gomi-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 crowd-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 Tarô	emerged	from	the	crowd.’	 	 	 	
	
--Parameter	8:	Part-whole	relation--	
	
TR	is	not	a	part	of	the	LM:	
(21)	 Ushi-ga	 koya-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Cow-NOM	 barn-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	cow	came	out	of	the	barn.’	 	 	 	
	
TR	is	a	sub-part	of	the	LM:	
(22)	 Ushi-ga	 mure-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Cow-NOM	 herd-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	cow	emerged	from	the	herd.’	 	 	 	
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10.1.2.	Sense	(II):	Activity	
	
(23)	 Tarô-ga	 niwa-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 garden-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	went	to	the	garden.’	 	 	 	
	
(24)	 Hanako-ga	 mise-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 store-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	went	to	the	store.’	 	 	 	
	
(25)	 Tarô-ga	 kaisha-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 office-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	went	to	the	office.’	 	 	 	
	
(26)	 Hanako-ga	 gakkô-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 school-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	went	to	school.’	 	 	 	
	
(27)	 Tarô-ga	 shigoto-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 work-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	went	to	work.’	 	 	 	
	
The	 activity	 sense	 is	 available	 via	 metonymic	 shift	 from	 spatial	 usages	 that	 profile	 a	
GOAL	outside	the	LM.	According	to	our	encyclopedic	knowledge	of	the	world,	places	are	
usually	associated	with	certain	activities:	Schools	with	learning	and	teaching,	companies	
with	working,	and	so	on.	Further,	when	we	leave	our	homes	in	order	to	carry	out	some	
activity	someplace	else,	we	EXIT	our	private	domain.	Activities	in	the	public	domain	are	
not	 just	 spatially	 outside	 our	 homes,	 but	 also	 likely	 to	 be	 of	 a	 more	 public	 nature.	
Compare,	 for	 example,	 knitting	 at	 home	 for	 leisure	 with	 knitting	 at	 a	 company	 for	
commercial	purposes.		
				As	the	above	sentences	show,	spatial	EXIT	and	activity	are	best	thought	of	as	poles	on	
a	 continuum	with	 no	 clear	 cut	 line	 of	 demarcation.	 Take	 (23),	 for	 instance.	 Here	 the	
metonymic	 implicature	place	-->	activity	at	place	 is	rather	weak	and	easily	cancellable:	
I.e.,	(23)	is	consistent	with	an	interpretation	on	which	Tarô	takes	a	leisurely	stroll	in	his	
own	 backyard.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 the	 change	 of	 location	 implies	 little	 activity,	 let	 alone	
public	activity.	In	other	words,	(23)	is	a	rather	mediocre	example	for	the	activity	sense.	
(24)	 is	 a	 better	 example,	 since	 going	 to	 the	 store	 is	 conventionally	 understood	 as	
involving	either	work	(Hanako	as	employee	scenario)	or	shopping	(Hanako	as	shopper	
scenario),	both	of	which	are	good	examples	for	activities.		
				Generally,	 then,	 places	 that	 are	 not	merely	 physical	 locations,	 but	 also	 instances	 of	
institutions,	tend	to	invite	the	place	-->	activity	reading	most	strongly.	While	companies	
and	schools	are	represented	by	buildings	that	occupy	physical	locations,	they	are	at	the	
same	 time	 abstract	 purpose-bound	 entities	 in	 the	 social	 realm	 –	 and	 as	 such	
conventionally	 associated	 with	 prototypical	 activities	 such	 as	 learning,	 teaching	 or	
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working.1	This	is	why	in	(25)	and	(26)	the	activity	interpretation	is	harder	to	cancel	than	
in	 (23).	 Finally,	 in	 (27),	 the	 activity	 lexically	 replaces	 the	 locus	 of	 action	 as	 GOAL	
argument.	Although	change	of	 location	is	still	 implied,	 it	 is	clearly	backgrounded	vis-a-
vis	the	activity	itself.		
	
10.1.3.	Sense	(III):	Incubation	(fig.	2)	
	
(28)	 Kono	 daigaku-kara	 yumei-na	 gakusha-ga	 takusan	 de-ta.	 	
	 This	 university-ABL	 famous-COP.ATT	 scholar-NOM	 many	 DERU-PAST	 	
	 ‘This	university	brought	forth	many	famous	scholars.’	 	
	
(29)	 Kono	 go-wa	 ratengo-kara	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 This	 word-TOP	 Latin-ABL	 DERU-RES	 ‘This	word	is	derived	from	Latin.’	 	 	
	
(30)	 Sono	 shûkan-wa	 ikyôto-no	 matsuri-kara	 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	
	 This	 custom-TOP	 heathen-LK	 festival-ABL	 DERU-TE	 come-PAST	 	
	 ‘This	custom	developed	out	of	a	heathen	festival.’	 	
	
An	important	aspect	of	our	experience	with	physical	CONTAINERS	is	the	knowledge	that	
the	 INTERIOR	 is	often	qualitatively	different	 from	 the	EXTERIOR.	Take	 the	 inside	of	 a	
house,	which	 is	warm	and	sheltered	 from	the	elements.	But	 then	we	step	outside	 into	
the	cold	rain.	Caves	are	dark,	bodies	of	water	are	wet,	the	interior	of	refrigerators	cold,	
and	so	forth.	When	more	abstract	entities	are	metaphorically	construed	as	CONTAINERS,	
this	difference	in	quality	is	frequently	mapped	onto	the	new	domain.	One	such	example	
is	the	case	of	social	restriction	and	obligation	(Lindner	1981:	104f.;	Johnson	1990:	35).	
Entities	 like	agreements	and	contracts	are	construed	as	bounded	entities.	Within	their	
boundaries	 we	 are	 subject	 to	 social,	 legal,	 or	 moral	 forces.	 But	 once	 we	 get	 out	 of	 a	
contract	or	an	agreement,	we	are	free	from	these	forces.		
				This	 notion	 of	 qualitative	 difference	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 incubation.	 If,	 over	
some	period	of	 time,	something	 is	subjected	to	and	 influenced	by	certain	 forces	which	
obtain	within	a	CONTAINER,	then	it	will	most	likely	emerge	from	the	CONTAINER	with	
characteristic	 features.	 Consider	 the	 case	 of	 baking:	 You	 put	 dough	 into	 an	 oven.	 The	
dough	is	subjected	to	the	heat	inside	the	oven.	After	a	certain	amount	of	time	the	dough	
emerges	 as	 bread.	 This	 concept	 of	 incubation	 is	 frequently	 applied	 to	 abstract	
CONTAINERS	as	well.	Suppose	someone	grows	up	in	a	certain	culture.	That	person	will	
likely	 be	 shaped	 by	 that	 culture,	 even	 if	 they	 end	 up	 living	 in	 another	 culture	outside	
																																																								
1	See	also	Radden	(2000:	101):	“The	association	between	such	man-designed	spaces	and	the	activities	
typically	performed	there	is	so	tight	that	the	mention	of	the	place	suffices	to	evoke	the	implicature	of	a	
special	activity.”	
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their	own.	Now	consider	 (28).	The	 implication	here	 is	 that	 the	academic	 forces	within	
the	institution	shape	students	in	such	a	way	that	they	emerge	as	eminent	scholars.	The	
same	 reasoning	 applies	 to	 the	 remaining	 examples.	A	 loanword	 is	 located	outside	 the	
language	 it	originated	 in,	but	 still	bears	 characteristics	of	 that	 language	 (phonological,	
etc.),	and	so	forth.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	2	
	
10.1.4.	Sense	(IV):	Transfer	(fig.	3)	
	
(31)	 Kono	 ryô-wa	 asagohan	 to	 bangohan-ga	 deru.	 	 	
	 This	 dormitory-TOP	 breakfast	 and	 dinner-NOM	 DERU	 	 	
	 ‘This	dormitory	offers	breakfast	and	dinner.’	 	 	
	
(32)	 Kono	 sagyô-wa	 kyûryô-ga	 deru.	 	 	 	
	 This	 work-TOP	 payment-NOM	 DERU	 ‘This	is	payed	work.’	 	 	
	
(33)	 Shachô-kara	 kyoka-ga	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 CEO-ABL	 approval-NOM	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	CEO	gave	his	approval.’	 	 	 	
	
(34)	 Akutagawashô		 sakka-no	 hon-ga	 yo-ku	 deru.	 	 	
	 Akutagawa	Prize	 authors-LK	 books-NOM	 good-INF	 DERU	 	 	
	 ‘Books	by	Akutagawa	Prize	winners	sell	well.’	 	 	
	
(35)	 Gakuhi-wa	 kikin-ga	 dasu.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tuition-TOP	 foundation-NOM	 DASU	 ‘Tuition	is	payed	for	by	the	foundation.’	 	 	 	
	
In	 the	 above	 examples	 the	 TR	 is	 a	 concrete	 or	 abstract	 object	 undergoing	 change	 of	
ownership	or	control.	As	Lindner	(1981:	105)	notes,	the	LM	in	such	cases	“is	construed	
as	an	abstract	neighborhood	around	a	person,	a	sort	of	 	 sphere	of	 influence,	 such	 that	
items	 owned	 are	 IN	 it	 and	 items	 transferred	 to	 someone	 else	 are	 OUT.”	 This	
metaphorical	 construal	 of	 transfer	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 EXIT	 schema	 is	 hardly	 surprising,	
seeing	 how	 the	 concepts	 of	 ownership	 and	 control	 are	 experientially	 grounded	 in	 the	
sensation	of	 spatial	proximity.	Prototypically,	 if	A	owns/controls	B,	 then	B	 is	 spatially	
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proximal	 to	 A.	 If	 B	 leaves	 the	 proximity	 of	 A	 and	 becomes	 proximal	 to	 some	 other	
individual	C,	then	change	of	ownership/control	of	B	from	A	to	C	is	implied.2		
				In	summary,	what	the	scenes	described	 in	(31)-(35)	have	 in	common,	 is	 that	 the	TR	
leaves	 the	 sphere	of	 influence3	of	 some	entity	and	coincidentially	 enters	 the	 sphere	of	
influence	of	another	entity.	Note	 that	neither	 the	old	nor	 the	new	owner/controller	of	
the	TR	needs	to	be	mentioned	explicitly.	Often,	as	in	(31),	(32)	and	(34),	both	are	only	
implied	and	remain	schematic.	 In	(31),	 for	 instance,	 the	dormitory	as	an	 institution	or	
the	kitchen	personnel	 concede	ownership	of/control	over	breakfast	 and	dinner	 to	 the	
inhabitants,	although	none	of	these	entities	are	linguistically	realized.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	3	
	
10.1.5.	Sense	(V):	Access	(fig.	4)	
	
(35)	 Negi-no	 kaori-ga	 de-te	 ki-tara,	 shio-wo	 furi-ireru.	 	
	 Scallion-LK	 aroma-NOM	 DERU-TE	 come-when	 salt-ACC	 sprinkle	 	
	 ‘Once	the	scallions	become	fragrant,	add	salt.’	 	
	
(36)	 Supiikâ-kara	 oto-ga	 de-nai.	 	 	 	 	
	 Speaker-ABL	 sound-NOM	 DERU-NEG	 ‘No	sound	comes	from	the	speaker.’	 	 	 	
	
(37)	 Kinô	 shiriai-ga	 terebi-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Yesterday	 acquaintance-NOM	 TV-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Yesterday	an	acquaintance	appeared	on	TV.’	 	 	
	
(38)	 Kono	 yashiki-ni	 yûrei-ga	 deru-rashii.	 	
	 This	 mansion-DAT	 ghosts-NOM	 DERU-EVI	 ‘This	mansion	is	said	to	be	haunted	by	ghosts.’	
	
(39)	 Nakushi-ta	 saifu-ga	 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Lose-PAST	 wallet-NOM	 DERU-TE	 come-PAST	 ‘(My)	lost	wallet	turned	up.’	 	 	
	
																																																								
2	See	also	Taylor	(1996:	340),	who	suggests	that	proximity	is	an	aspect	of	the	“possession	gestalt”:	“In	
order	that	the	possessor	can	have	easy	access	to	the	possessed,	the	possessed	is	typically	located	in	the	
proximity	of	the	possessor.	In	some	cases	the	possessed	may	be	a	permanent,	or	at	least	regular	
accompaniment	of	the	possessor.”	Note	that	ownership	and	control	are	specific	instances	of	possession.	
For	an	overview	of	possession	relations	see	e.g.	Langacker	(1991:	169).	
3	I	have	opted	for	Lindnder’s	(1981:	105)	term	“sphere	of	influence”	over	Langacker’s	(1991:	170)	term	
“dominion”	in	this	case	to	exclude	possession	relations	where	the	possessor	does	neither	own	nor	control	
the	possessed	(e.g.	The	dog	has	fleas).	The	transfer	sense	of	DERU	always	entails	ownership	or		control.		
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(40)	 Yo-ku	 kangae-tara	 kitto	 kotae-ga	 deru.	 	 	
	 Good-INF	 think-COND	 surely	 answer-NOM	 DERU	 	 	
	 ‘If	you	think	hard,	the	answer	will	surely	come	to	you.’	 	 	
	
(41)	 Rainen	 shingata	 pasokon-ga	 deru-rashii.	 	 	 	
	 Next	year	 new	model	 PC-NOM	 DERU-EVI	 	 	 	
	 ‘Reportedly,	a	new	PC	model	will	release	next	year.’	 	 	 	
	
(42)	 Mada	 honki-wo	 dashi-te	i-nai	 dake	 da.	 	 	
	 Yet	 seriousness-ACC	 DASU-RES-NEG	 just	 COP	 ‘I’ve	just	not	gotten	serious	yet.’	 	
	
Among	 our	most	 fundamental	 experiences	with	 CONTAINERS	 is	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	
their	INTERIOR.	One	of	the	most	prototypical	concepts	of	inaccessibility,	OCCLUSION,	is	
acquired	 during	 early	 infancy:	 „Presumably	 infants	 are	 attracted	 to	 containment	 and	
occlusion	events	because	the	objects	they	are	watching	disappear	from	sight;	people	go	
out	of	the	room,	objects	go	into	pans	and	cupboards.	It	may	be	these	acts	of	disappearing	
that	make	containers	the	first	objects	we	are	sure	that	infants	conceptualize	(other	than	
people	and	their	eyes)“	(Mandler	and	Pagán	Cánovas	2014:	6).	Besides	OCCLUSION,	we	
experience	 acoustic	 and	 olfactoric	 inaccessibility,	 e.g.	when	 a	 room	holds	 in	 noises	 or	
smells.	 In	other	words,	 sensory	 inaccessibility	 is	 an	essential	 aspect	of	our	knowledge	
concerning	 CONTAINERS.	 Further,	 since	 knowledge	 is	 ultimately	 grounded	 in	
perception,	 sensory	 inaccessibility	 entails	 epistemic	 inaccessibility.	 (We	 understand	
metaphors	 such	 as	 KNOWING	 IS	 SEEING	 [I	 see	 your	 point,	 He	 showed	 me	 the	 truth,	 etc.]	
precisely	because	of	this	correlation	between	perception	and	knowledge.4)			
				Based	 on	 our	 experience	 with	 physical	 CONTAINERS,	 it	 makes	 sense,	 then,	 to	
metaphorically	 construe	 inaccessibility	 in	 terms	 of	 CONTAINMENT	 and	 –	 by	 image	
schematic	entailment	–	the	change	to	accessibility	in	terms	of	EXIT.	The	image	schematic	
topology	 of	 the	 metaphor	 equates	 inaccessibility	 with	 being	 located	 inside	 and	
accessibility	with	being	 located	outside	of	a	CONTAINER.	This	explains	cases	 like	(39):	
Here,	DERU	indicates	that	the	wallet,	while	remaining	lost,	was	perceptually	inaccessible	
to	its	owner	–	a	state	that	changed	by	its	being	found.	Likewise,	the	TRs	in	(40)	and	(41)	
become	 epistemically	 and	 economically	 accessible,	 respectively.	 Also	 note	 that	
sometimes	 various	 kinds	 of	 accessibility	 are	 conflated.	 Someone	 who	 appears	 on	
television	can	be	seen	and	heard.	A	new	computer	becomes	available	 for	sale	and	use,	
etc.	 Finally,	 as	 (42)	 perhaps	 shows	best,	 TRs	 exist	 as	 unrealized	 “potentials”	 (Lindner	
1981:	109)	for	as	long	as	they	are	located	inside	the	CONTAINER.		
	
																																																								
4	See	also	Sweetser’s	(1991:	32ff.)	study	of		English	and	Indo-European	sense-perception	verbs.	
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FIGURE	4	
	
10.1.6.	Sense	(VI):	Excess	(fig.	5)	
	
(43)	 Hiyô-wa	 sanmanen-wo	 de-nai.	 	 	 	 	
	 Expenses-TOP	 30.000	yen	 deru-NEG	 ‘The	expenses	don’t	exceed	30.000	yen.’	 	 	 	
	
(44)	 Tarô-no	 ryôri-wa	 shirôto-no	 iki-wo	 de-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Tarô-LK	 cooking-TOP	 amateur-LK	 level-ACC	 deru-RES	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô’s	cooking	is	past	the	amateur	level.’	 	 	
	
(45)	 Hanako-wa	 rokujussai-wo	 de-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-TOP	 sixty	years-ACC	 deru-RES	 ‘Hanako	is	over	sixty.’	 	 	 	
	
If	 STATES	ARE	LOCATIONS5	and	 CONTAINERS	 (by	 their	 nature)	 are	 bounded	 regions,	 then	
normativity	can	be	construed	as	a	CONTAINER	(or	a	SCALE,	i.e.	a	1D	bounded	region).	In	
the	 construal	 of	 non-normativity	 there	 are	 two	major	 image	 schematic	 variants:	 One	
with	 a	 uniplex	 TR	 and	 one	 with	 a	 mass	 TR.	 Consider	 the	 following	 examples	 from	
English:	
	
(46)	 His	behavior	lies	outside	the	norm.	
(47)	 Her	skill	exceeds	the	norm.	
	
In	 (46)	 the	 TR	 his	 behavior	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 a	 zero-dimensional	 object	 (a	 point)	
which	is	located	outside	the	boundaries	of	the	LM	the	norm.	Thus,	there	is	no	overlap	at	
all	between	TR	and	LM.	In	contrast,	the	mass	TR	in	(47)	“spills	across”	the	boundaries	of	
a	scalar	LM.	That	 is,	 the	TR	both	occupies	and	exceeds	the	 interior	of	 the	LM.	It	 is	 this	
schema	of	EXCESS	which	 is	at	work	 in	(43)-(45).	For	example,	 in	(45)	Hanako’s	age	 is	
understood	 to	 occupy	 all	 locations	 on	 the	 age	 scale	 up	 to	 sixty,	 plus	 some	 amount	
exceeding	 the	 scale.	 Note	 that	 the	 EXCESS	 schema	 (an	 instance	 of	 EXIT)	 is	 firmly	
																																																								
5	Recall	our	discussion	of	the	event	structure	metaphor	under	4.1.	
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grounded	 in	 our	 experience	 with	 the	 physical	 world,	 e.g.	 overflowing	 or	 bursting	
CONTAINERS,	linear	objects	exceeding	other	objects	in	height	or	length,	etc.6		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	5	
	
10.1.7	Relations	Between	Senses	and	Categorial	Fringe	Cases		
	
From	 the	 above	 analysis	 it	 is	 plain	 that	 several	 examples	 fall	 somewhere	 “in	between	
senses”.	 Since	 the	 senses	 themselves	are	 related	 systematically,	 this	 is	 to	be	expected.	
Consider	the	following	sentence:	
	
(48)	 Senshu-ga	 shiai-ni	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Athlete-NOM	 game-DAT	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	athlete	appeared	in	(took	part	in)	the	game.’	 	 	
	
This	can	be	categorized	as	either	activity	or	access	or	both.	The	reason	is	that	shiai	 is	a	
cluster	 model	 in	 Lakoff’s	 sense	 (1990:	 74ff.),	 which	 means	 that	 the	 word	 can	 be	
understood	 in	 reference	 to	 more	 than	 one	 background	 frame	 or	 idealized	 cognitive	
model	(ICM).	In	particular,	what	concerns	us	here	is	the	conflation	of	the	following	two	
ICMs:	
	
The	work/profession	ICM:	Partaking	in	sporting	contests	is	the	athlete’s	job.	It	is	an	
activity	which	earns	him	money	and	a	social	obligation.		
	
																																																								
6	At	this	point	it	is	interesing	to	note	in	passing	that	the	semantics	of	DERU	as	outlined	above	show	
considerable	overlap	with	the	semantics	of	“out”	in	English	verb	particle	constructions.	In	fact,	many	of	
the	senses	we	have	encountered	above	are	familiar	from	Lindner’s	(1981)	seminal	analysis	of	“out”.	These	
include:	LM	as	abstract	neighborhood	of	possession,	LM	as	privacy,	and	change	from	hiddenness	to	
accessibility.	DERU	and	“out”	are	far	from	synonymous,	however,	and	differ	in	important	respects.	For	
example,	while	the	particle	“out”	can	indicate	change	from	inaccessibility	to	accessibility	(find	out	the	
truth)	as	well	as	change	from	accessibility	to	inaccessibility	(rule	out	a	possibility),	DERU	is	unidirectional.	
While	DERU	can	indicate	scalar	excess	(i.e.	exceed	a	certain	amount	of	quantity),	English	uses	over	rather	
than	out	in	such	cases,	etc.	
				Of	course,	overlap	is	to	be	expected		considering	the	universal	nature	of	the	embodied	schema	EXIT.	But	
at	the	same	time	conceptualization	is	flexible	and	we	are,	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases,	not	forced	to	
construe	a	certain	concept	in	terms	of	one	and	only	one	corresponding	schema.		
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The	spectator	sports	ICM:	In	Japanese	culture	sporting	events	are	a	popular	form	of	
public	entertainment.	That	is,	baseball	and	soccer	are	“spectator	sports”.		
	
What	 to	make	of	 this?	Note	 that	 the	above	 ICMs	are	 (a)	 intrinsically	 related	while	 (b)	
presupposing	different	 viewing	 arrangements.	 In	 the	discussion	of	 the	activity	 sense	 I	
have	 already	 mentioned	 that	 activity	 implies	 some	 degree	 of	 publicness.	 Now,	
publicness	 in	 turn	 implies	 accessibility.	 To	 engage	 in	 a	 sporting	 contest,	 an	 athlete	
moves	out	of	the	private	domain	and	thereby	becomes	publicly	accessible	to	a	spectator	
crowd.	But	note	that	“moving	out	of	the	private	domain”	is	tied	to	the	athletes	internal	
perspective,	whereas	“becoming	publicly	accessible”	 is	 tied	to	the	external	perspective	
of	 the	 spectator.	 I.e.,	 there	 is	 a	 cline	 from	 activity	 to	 publicness	 to	 accessibility,	
accompanied	by	a	shift	from	internal	to	external	perspective.	Consequently,	whether	we	
categorize	a	particular	use	of	DERU	(such	as	48)	as	activity	or	access	will	often	depend	
on	 whether	 we	 adopt	 an	 internal	 or	 an	 external	 viewing	 arrangement	 where	 human	
activity	is	concerned.7	In	fact,	if	one	were	to	employ	a	“god’s	eye	view”	the	activity	sense	
could	be	subsumed	under	the	access	sense,	since	human	activity	usually	implies	(some	
degree	of)	public	access,	whereas	not	all	kinds	of	access	imply	human	activity.	However,	
since	 the	 access	 sense	 presupposes	 an	 external	 viewing	 arrangement,	 instances	 of	
activity	which	employ	an	internal	viewing	arrangement	should	not	be	subsumed	under	
access.		
				Much	of	 the	same	could	be	reiterated	 for	 the	 transfer	 sense.	 If	we	define	 transfer	as	
change	of	ownership/control	and	accept	Taylor’s	view	that	possession	typically	implies	
“easy	 access”	 (1996:	 340),	 then	 it	 follows	 that	 transfer	 implies	 access.	 Recall	 the	
following	examples	from	above:	
	
(31)	 Kono	 ryô-wa	 asagohan	 to	 bangohan-ga	 deru.	 	
	 This	 dormitory	 breakfast	 and	 dinner-NOM	 DERU	 	
	 ‘This	dormitory	offers	breakfast	and	dinner.’	 	
	
(34)	 Akutagawashô	 sakka-no	 hon-ga	 yo-ku	 deru.	 	 	
	 Akutagawa	Prize	 authors-LK	 book-NOM	 good-INF	 DERU	 	 	
	 ‘Books	by	Akutagawa	Prize	winners	sell	well.’	 	 	
	
As	 these	 sentences	 show,	 change	 of	 ownership/control	 coincides	 with	 change	 from	
inaccessibility	 to	 accessibility	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 new	 owner/controller	 (and	
																																																								
7	Note	that	the	grammatical	“first	person“	is	not	necessarily	an	indicator	of	an	internal	viewing	
arrangement.	As	Dewell	(1997:	24)	observes,	the	utterer	of	the	sentence	We	look	like	a	bunch	of	idiots	
sitting	here	nevertheless	adopts	an	external	viewing	arrangement.		
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(49)	 Tarô-ga	 Shinjuku-kara	 Shinagawa-made	 arui-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Shinjuku-ABL	 Shinagawa-ALL	 walk-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	walked	from	Shinjuku	to	Shinagawa.’	 	 	 	
	
(50a)	 Tarô-ga	 Shinjuku-wo	 arui-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Shinjuku-ACC	 walk-PAST	 ‘Tarô	walked	through	(wandered	about)	Shinjuku.’	 	
	
(50b)	 Tarô-ga	 chûô	dôri-wo	 arui-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 central	street-ACC	 walk-PAST	 ‘Tarô	walked	down	the	central	street.’	 	 	 	
	
While	 (49)	construes	 the	LM	as	a	zero-dimensional	point	of	departure,	 (50)	construes	
the	LM	as	a	planar	(50a)	or	linear	(50b)	traversable	extent.		
				In	 this	 section	 I	will	 attempt	 to	 give	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 principles	 governing	 the	
felicitous	use	of	kara	and	wo	in	tandem	with	deru.	Let	us	start	with	the	observation	that	
the	particles	cannot	always	be	used	interchangeably:	
	
(51a)	 Kemuri-ga	 entotsu-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Smoke-NOM	 chimney-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Smoke	came	out	of	the	chimney.’	 	 	 	
	 ‘Smoke	came	out	of	the	chimney.’	 	 	 	
	
(51b)	 (??)	Kemuri-ga	 entotsu-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Smoke-NOM	 chimney-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
(52a)	 Nezumi-ga	 ana-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouse-NOM	 hole-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘The	mouse	came	out	of	the	hole.’	 	 	 	
	
(52b)	 (??)	Nezumi-ga	 ana-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouse-NOM	 hole-ACC	 DERU-PAST.	 	 	 	 	
	
(53a)	 Tarô-ga	 ie-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 house-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	house.’	 	 	 	
	
(53b)	 Tarô-ga	 ie-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 house-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	left	the	house.’	 	 	 	
	
Himeno	 (1977:	76)	has	 suggested	 that	wo	 requires	 the	TR	of	deru	 to	be	 animate.	The	
questionable	felicity	of		sentences	such	as	(52b)	and	the	successful	substitution	in	(53b)	
seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 TR	 need	 not	 only	 be	 animate	 but	 also	 human	 (or	 at	 least	
anthropomorphic).	I	will	argue	that	indeed	human	TRs	have	the	best	compatibility	with	
wo.	However,	 this	does	not	entail	 that	animacy	 is	 the	central	 issue	here.	Moreover,	we	
should	 be	 able	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 (53a)	 and	 (53b).	 In	
summary,	we	must	ask	two	questions:	
	
• Why	are	humans	the	best	candidates	for	TR	of	deru	in	tandem	with	wo?	
• In	cases	where	[N-kara	deru]	and	[N-wo	deru]	can	be	used	interchangeably,	what	
is	the	semantic	difference?	
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Again,	 consider	 the	 difference	 between	 external	 and	 internal	 viewing	 arrangement	
discussed	in	the	previous	section.	If	we	assume	–	based	on	our	experiences	with	houses,	
caves,	boxes,	etc.	–	that	non-transparency	is	a	prototypical	feature	of	CONTAINERS,	then	
the	change	from	external	to	internal	viewpoint	(and	vice	versa)	is	quite	drastic.	Imagine	
a	house	from	an	external	viewpoint.	As	Dewell	(1997:	24)	puts	it,	the	house	will	be	“like	
a	 black	 box“	 hiding	 everything	 inside	 it.	 By	 contrast,	 imagine	 an	 interior	 path	 going	
through	it:	
	
A	LM	such	as	a	house	contains	a	heterogenous	collection	of	distinct	objects	or	parts,	including	structurally	
inherent	rooms	and	hallways	and	doors,	a	variety	of	pieces	of	furniture,	 inhabitants,	etc.	A	path	through	
such	 as	 space	 [...]	 is	 naturally	defined	as	 a	 continuous	progression	 from	one	 such	visible	 component	 to	
another,	for	example	from	a	door	through	a	hallway	past	another	door	and	disappearing	at	another	door.	
(Dewell	1997:	26)	
	
Apply	this	to	(53b).	This	sentence	is	most	felicitously	uttered	by	someone	located	inside	
the	house	at	the	time	of	Tarô’s	leaving.	As	a	comment	from	someone	on	the	outside	who	
saw	Tarô	emerging	from,	say,	the	front	door	into	the	streets	(53b)	would	sound	rather	
odd.	In	the	case	of	(53a),	the	exact	opposite	applies.		
				In	other	words,	wo	in	tandem	with	deru	construes	the	LM	as	an	internal	PATH.	In	an	
wo-construal	 we	 trace	 the	 TR’s	 PATH	 through	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 CONTAINER.	 The	
tracing	stops	as	the	TR	exits	the	CONTAINER	and	the	world	on	the	outside	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	the	conceptualizer’s	view.	A	kara-construal,	on	the	other	hand,	implies	that	the	
conceptualizer	 is	 located	 outside	 the	 CONTAINER.	 This	 is	 the	 “black	 box”	 perspective	
with	no	knowledge	of	 the	LM’s	 internal	 structure.	 Instead,	 all	 attention	 is	 focussed	on	
the	point	of	emergence,	from	which	the	TR	will	make	its	appearance.	The	difference	in	
construal	is	illustrated	in	figure	7:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	7:	kara-constural	(left)	vs	wo-construal	(right)	
	
 89 
The	 view	 that	 [N-wo	 deru]	 presupposes	 an	 internal	 viewing	 arrangement	 is	 also	
supported	by	the	incompatibility	of	wo	with	the	somewhat	lexicalized	variant	de-te	kuru	
(‘come	out’):	
		
(54)	 Tarô-ga	 ie-kara	 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 house-ABL	 DERU-TE	 come-PAST	 ‘Tarô	emerged	from	the	house.’	 	 	
	
(55)	 (??)	Tarô-ga	 ie-wo	 de-te	 ki-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 house-ACC	 DERU-TE	 come-PAST	 	 	 	
	
The	construction	[V-te	kuru]	indicates	a	deictic	path	towards	the	conceptualizer.	I.e.,	de-
te	 kuru	 requires	 the	 TR	 to	 exit	 a	 CONTAINER	 and	 subsequently	 move	 towards	 the	
conceptualizer	 –	 which	 is	 impossible	 if	 the	 conceptualizer	 is	 located	 inside	 that	
CONTAINER.8		
				Note	that	a	perspective-based	explanation	can	account	for	the	selection	of	kara	vs	wo	
in	the	abstract	domain	as	well.	Consider	the	following	sentence	pairs:	
	
(56a)	 Kono	 daigaku-kara	 yumei-na	 gakusha-ga	 takusan	 de-ta.	 	
	 This	 university-ABL	 famous-COP.ATT	 scholars-NOM	 many	 DERU-PAST	 	
	 ‘This	university	brought	forth	many	famous	scholars.’	 	
	
(56b)	 (??)	Kono	 daigaku-wo	 yumei-na	 gakusha-ga	 takusan	 de-ta.	 	
	 This	 university-ACC	 famous-COP.ATT	 scholars-NOM	 many	 DERU-PAST	 	
	
(57a)	 Tarô-ga	 kyonen	 daigaku-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 last	year	 university-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	graduated	from	university	last	year.’	 	
	
(57b)	 (??)	Tarô-ga	 kyonen	 daigaku-kara	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 last	year	 university-ABL	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
(56a)	emphasizes	the	quality	(famous)	of	the	TR	and	implies	a	link	between	this	quality	
and	some	quality	of	the	LM.	It	is	suggested	that	the	TR	has	quality	F	because	it	emerged	
from	the	LM,	which	has	some	quality	G.	It	is	this	causal	link	–	the	LM	as	the	SOURCE	of	
and	the	TR	as	the	bearer	of	famousness	–	which	is	emphasized	here,	not	the	process	by	
which	 the	 TR	 acquired	 said	 quality.	 In	 other	 words,	 (56a)	 construes	 the	 LM	 as	 the	
SOURCE	of	some	output	(famous	scholars),	while	backgrounding	the	interior	PATH	taken	
by	the	TR	(i.e.	how	the	scholars	make	their	way	through	the	institution).	Since	no	such	
“causal	 frame“	 is	 evoked	 by	 (57a),	 the	 sentence	 is	 interpreted	 against	 a	 default	
																																																								
8	Granted,	this	is	a	slight	oversimplification	for	illustrative	purposes.	To	be	sure,	one	can	assume	an	
internal	perspective	without	actually	being	located	inside	a	CONTAINER.	The	point	is	that	one	cannot	at	
the	same	time	assume	both	the	external	perspective	presupposed	by	[V-te	kuru]	and	the	internal	
perspective	presupposed	by	[N-wo	deru].	Hence	the	infelicity	of	(55).		
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“graduation	frame”	which	foregrounds	the	internal	structure	of	the	LM.	For	example,	we	
know	that	graduation	is		the	final	component	of	an	academic	program	which	consists	of	
ca.	 four	 years,	with	 each	 year	 consisting	 of	 several	 semesters.	 The	 semesters,	 in	 turn,	
consist	of	courses.	Courses	require	course	work	and	exams	for	which	credit	points	are	
awarded,	 etc.	 The	 default	 “graduation	 frame”,	 then,	 causes	 us	 to	 trace	 the	 students	
interior	path	through	an	academic	program.		
				So	far	we	have	accounted	for	the	difference	between	kara	and	wo	in	terms	of	external	
vs	internal	viewing	arrangement.	But	why	does	the	internal	variant	[N-wo	deru]	seem	to	
favor	 a	 human	 TR?	 The	 answer	 is	 quite	 straightforward:	 An	 internal	 perspective	
typically	 requires	 a	 CONTAINER-internal	 conceptualizer	 –	 and	 conceptualizers	 are	
human.	 For	 a	 human	 conceptualizer	 and	 a	 non-human	 TR	 to	 be	 both	 located	
CONTAINER-internally	 is	 simply	 a	 very	 rare	 state	 of	 affairs.9	The	 following	 examples	
illustrate	this:	
	
(58)		 (??)	Kanjûsu-ga	 jidô	hanbaiki-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Can	of	juice-NOM	 vending	machine-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 Intended	meaning:	‘A	can	of	juice	came	out	of	the	vending	machine.’	 	
	
(59)	 (??)	Kemuri-ga	 entotsu-wo	 de-ta.	 	
	 Smoke-NOM	 chimney-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 Intended	meaning:	‘Smoke	rose	from	the	chimney.’	
	
(60)	 (??)	Nezumi-ga	 kabe-no	 ana-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Mouse-NOM	 wall-LK	 hole-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 Intended	meaning:	‘A	mouse	came	out	of	the	hole.’	
	
(61)	 (??)	Kuma-ga	 dôkutsu-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Bear-NOM	 cave-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 Intended	meaning:	‘A	bear	came	out	of	the	cave.’	 	 	 	
	
(62)	 (??)	Namida-ga	 me-wo	 de-ta.	 	 	
	 Tears-NOM	 eyes-ACC	 DERU-PAST	 Intended	meaning:	‘Tears	came	out	of	(his/her)	eyes.’	 	
	
The	problem	with	all	of	these	sentences	is	that	it	would	be	extremely	odd	for	a	human	
conceptualizer	to	have	a	CONTAINER-internal	perspective.	Humans	are	usually	located	
outside	of	vending	machines,	chimneys,	animal	habitats,	and	so	on.	Of	course,	specialists	
																																																								
9	Note	however,	that	this	constellation	is	not	impossible.	For	example,	(61)	might	be	felicitously	uttered	
by	a	spelunker.	Furthermore,	a	quick	search	on	the	internet	brought	up	the	following	example:	
	
Kyôgaku-no	kyû-byô!	Heya-wo	deta	inu-ga	ikinari	kaidan-wo	...	
Nine	seconds	of	astonishment!	Dog	leaves	room	and	(dashes	down)	the	stairs	...	
(http://petfilm.biz/?p=5760,	retrieved	22	Apr.	2015)	
	
Since	the	keeping	of	pets	constitutes	one	of	the	rare	cases	in	which	humans	and	animals	share	a	habitat,	
usage	of	[N-wo	deru]	is	unproblematic	here.		
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may	have	an	“internal	perspective”	as	far	as	some	of	these	CONTAINERS	are	concerned.	
But	 such	 highly	 atypical	 construal	 has	 little	 impact	 on	 the	 entrenchment	 of	 linguistic	
constructions	in	general	usage.		
	
10.2.	The	Senses	of	V-DERU	
	
The	semantics	of	V-DERU	follow	straightforwardly	from	the	semantics	of	the	simplex.	I	
will	briefly	touch	upon	the	corresponding	senses	of	–DERU	before	discussing	inchoative	
-dasu	 in	 some	 more	 detail.	 The	 question	 why	 the	 transitive	 variant	 -dasu	 is	 often	
attached	to	intransitive	verbs	will	be	addressed	in	a	later	chapter	(see	14.4.).		
	
10.2.1.	Spatial	V–DERU	
	
(63)	 Chi-ga	 shatsu-kara	 nijimi-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Blood-NOM	 shirt-ABL	 ooze-DERU-PAST	 ‘Blood	oozed	from	the	shirt.’	 	 	 	
	
(64)		 Me-kara	 Namida-ga	 kobore-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Eye-ABL	 Tears-NOM	 drop-DERU-PAST	 ‘Tears	dropped	from	(his/her)	eyes.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(65)	 Tamago-ga	 su-kara	 korogari-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Egg-NOM	 nest-ABL	 roll-DERU-PAST	 ‘The	egg	rolled	out	of	the	nest.’	 	 	 	
	
(66)	 Tarô-ga		 heya-wo	 tobi-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 room-ACC	 dash-DERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	dashed	out	of	the	room.’	 	 	 	
	
As	Himeno	(1977:	75)	notes,	-DERU	can	be	attached	to	both	path	verbs	(63	and	64)	and	
motion	verbs	(65	and	66).	While	the	former	include	the	EXIT	schema	as	part	of	their	
meaning,	the	latter	express	a	path-neutral	manner	of	motion.	Therefore	-deru	in	(63)	
and	(64)	is	best	understood	as	additional	emphasis	of	the	EXIT	schema,	whereas	in	(65)	
and	(66)	-deru	serves	as	a	kind	of	framing	satellite.10	
	
10.2.2.	Activity	
	
(67)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-ni	 shien-wo	 môshi-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-DAT	 support-ACC	 speak.HUM-DERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	asked	Tarô	for	support.’	 	 	
	
(68)	 Jirô-ga	 kaisha-ni	 jishoku-wo	 negai-de-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Jirô-NOM	 company-DAT	 resignation-ACC	 wish-DERU-PAST.	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Jirô	submitted	his	resignation	to	the	company.’	 	
	
																																																								
10	According	to	Talmy	(2003b:	221f.),	languages	tend	to	either	express	motion	paths	via	the	main	verb		or	
via	a	satellite	(e.g.	a	particle	such	as	out	in	move	out),	i.e.	languages	are	either	verb-framed	or	satellite	
framed.	While	he	counts	Japanese	among	the	verb-framed	kind,	examples	like	the	above	serve	as	a	
reminder	that	the	distinction	is	not	absolute.		
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In	 sentences	 like	 the	 above	 the	 TR	 leaves	 the	 private	 domain	 for	 communicative	
purposes.	 Since	 the	 TR	 thereby	 makes	 itself	 accessible,	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 perspective	
whether	to	categorize	these	compounds	as	instances	of	activity	or	access	(see	discussion	
above).	 As	 a	 rule	 of	 thumb,	 if	 the	 compound	 is	 primarily	 associated	with	 an	 internal	
viewing	arrangement,	it	should	be	categorized	under	activity.		
	
10.2.3.	Incubation	
	
(69)	 Tarô-ga	 ii	 hôhô-wo	 kangae-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 good	 method-ACC	 think-DASU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	came	up	with	a	good	method.’	 	 	
	
(70)	 Kaihatsubu-ga	 shinseihin-wo	 tsukuri-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Development	department-NOM	 new	product-ACC	 create-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	development	department	created	a	new	product.’	 	
	
Note	 that	 the	 direct	 objects	 in	 these	 sentences	 are	 understood	 as	 having	 existed	 as	
unrealized	 potentials	 within	 the	 mental	 domain	 of	 the	 TR	 from	 which	 they	 are	 then	
“released	unto	the	world”.	These	entities	exist	“inside	the	minds”	of	their	creators	for	an	
incubation	period	before	they	emerge	with	characteristic	features	(e.g.,	Tarô’s	idea	will	
be	shaped	by	Tarô’s	way	of	thinking).	Again,	this	usage	type	is	conflated	with	the	access	
sense.		
	
10.2.4.	Transfer	
	
(71)	 Tarô-ga	 Hanako-ate-ni	 tegami-wo	 okuri-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Hanako-aim-DAT	 letter-ACC	 send-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	sent	a	letter	addressed	to	Hanako.’	 	
	
Here	-dasu	can	be	understood	as	emphasizing	the	change	of	control/ownership	encoded	
by	the	V1.	There	are	hardly	any	instances	of	transfer	apart	from	okuri-dasu.		
	
10.2.5.	Access	
	
(72)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-wo	 kissaten-ni	 yobi-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-ACC	 cafe-DAT	 call-DASU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	called	Tarô	to	the	cafe.’	 	 	
	
(73)	 Keiji-ga	 hannin-no	 dôki-wo	 saguri-dashita.	 	 	 	
	 Detective-NOM	 criminal-LK	 motive-ACC	 search-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	detective	sought	out	the	criminal’s	motive.’	 	
	
(74)	 Tarô-ga	 	tsuri-ni	 ik-ô	 to	 ii-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 fishing-DAT	 go-VOL	 QT	 say-DASU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	suggested	to	go	fishing.’	 	 	
	
(75)	 Akari-ga	 otoko-no	 kao-wo	 terashi-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
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	 Lamplight-NOM	 man-LK	 face-ACC	 illuminate-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	lamplight	illuminated	the	man’s	face.’	 	
	
(76)	 Hanako-ga	 kami-ni	 namae-wo	 kaki-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 paper-DAT	 name-ACC	 write-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	wrote	her	name	on	the	paper.’	 	
	
Among	the	abstract	senses	of	V-DERU	access	is	by	far	the	most	productive	one.	In	terms	
of	image	schematic	structure,	everything	that	applies	to	the	access	sense	of	the	simplex	
applies	 here	 as	 well.	 The	 acces	 sense	 of	 -dasu	 is	 represented	 by	 the	 following	
constructional	schema:	
	
X-ga	 Y-wo/to	 V-dasu	
X	CAUSE		 Y	BECOME	ACCESSIBLE	 BY	(X’s)	DOING	V	
	
As	mentioned	above,	 it	 is	not	uncommon	for	a	 lexical	 item	to	belong	to	more	than	one	
category.	For	example,	(69)	can	be	thought	of	as	instantiating	both	incubation	and	access.		
	
10.2.6	Inchoative	V-dasu	(fig.	8)	
	
(77)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-no	 fukusô-wo	 mi-te,	 warai-dashi-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-LK	 clothes-ACC	 see-TE	 laugh-DASU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	saw	Tarô’s	outfit	and	burst	into	laughter.’	 	
	
(78)	 Tarô-ga	 shiken-no	 kekka-wo	 shit-ta	 totan,	 watto	 naki-dashi-ta.	
	 Tarô-NOM	 test-LK	 results-ACC	 learn-PAST	 moment	 suddenly	 cry-DASU-PAST	
	 ‘The	moment	Tarô	learned	of	his	test	results	he	burst	into	tears.’	
	
(79)	 Enjin-no	 oto-ga	 nari,	 kuruma-ga	 ugoki-dashi-ta.	 	 	
	 Motor-LK	 sound-NOM	 make	sound.CONJ	 car-NOM	 move-DASU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	engine	roared	and	the	car	started	to	move.’	 	 	
	
(80)	 Kyû-ni	 ame-ga	 furi-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Suddenly	 rain-NOM	 fall-DASU-PAST	 ‘Suddenly,	it	began	to	rain.’	 	 	 	
	
In	 this	 section	 I	will	 argue	 that	 inchaotive	 V-dasu	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	access	 sense.	
There	are	two	main	arguments	to	consider	in	support	in	this	view.	
	
(i)	The	argument	from	perceptibility	
	
Note	 that	 there	 is	 a	 good	 amount	 of	 experiential	 correlation	 between	 access	 and	
inchoativity.	 The	 beginning	 of	 a	 process	 often	 coincides	 with	 a	 perceptible	 change	 of	
state.	Obviously,	this	is	the	case	when	someone	begins	to	laugh,	cry,	move,	etc.	In	other	
words,	 the	 process	 described	 by	 the	 V1s	 in	 (77)-(80)	 becomes	 externally	 accessible.	
However,	many	processes	lack	this	kind	of	perceptible	change,	e.g.	mental	or	attentional	
 94 
activities	 such	 as	 thinking	 or	 listening.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 the	 collocational	 behavior	 of	
inchoative	 -dasu	 is	quite	 telling.	Consider	 the	 findings	of	 two	recent	corpus	studies	by	
Yamaguchi	 (2009)	 and	 Ishikawa	 (2010).	 The	 most	 frequent	 collocational	 V1s	 of	
inchaotive	-dasu	from	both	studies	are	listed	below:	
		
collocational	V1s	of	inchaotive	-dasu	(total	frequency,	descending	order)	
	
Yamaguchi	(2009)	 Ishikawa	(2010)	
	
Corpus	used:	
43	novels	written	by	Japanese	native	
speakers	and	released	between	1898	and	
2009	
	
Corpus	used:	
Balanced	Corpus	of	Contemporary	Written	
Japanese	(2009)11	
	
ugoku	(move)	 iu	(say)	
aruku	(walk)	 aruku	(walk)	
naku	(cry)	 warau	(laugh)	
suru	(do)	 hashiru	(run)	
okoru	(become	angry)	 naku	(cry)	
hanasu	(speak)	 kakeru	(run)	
warau	(laugh)	 ugoku	(move)	
utau	(sing)	 furu	(rain)	
naru	(sound)	 hanasu	(speak)	
odoru	(dance)	 naru	(sound)	
	
Considering	 that	 different	 corpora	 have	 been	 used,	 both	 studies	 yield	 fairly	 similar	
results.	 As	 Ishikawa	 (2010:	 26)	 observes,	 inchoative	 -dasu	 has	 a	 strong	 tendency	 to	
occur	with	V1s	that	profile	a	“clear-cut	physical	action”	(hakkiri	shita	butsuriteki	dôsa).	
He	notes	that	inchoative	-dasu	prefers	those	V1s	that	imply	a	stark	contrast	between	the	
poles	 of	 inactivity	 and	 activity.	 For	 example,	 as	 far	 as	 verbs	 of	 verbal	 expression	 are	
concerned,	 	-dasu	shows	strong	collocational	ties	with	hanasu	(speak)	and	kataru	(talk,	
narrate),	 but	 never	 attaches	 to	 sasayaku	 (whisper)	 or	 tsubuyaku	 (murmur)	 (Ishikawa	
2010:	27).	Further,	Himeno	 (1977:	90)	points	out	 that	 inchoative	 -dasu	 frequently	 co-
occurs	 with	 expressions	 indicating	 sudden	 and	 abrupt	 change,	 such	 as	 fui	 ni	
(unexpectedly)	and	kyû	ni	(suddenly).	In	fact,	she	suggests	that	inchoative	-dasu	is	best	
understood	as	a	spontaneous	outburst	of	internal	energy	and	therefore	as	an	extension	
of	the	central	sense	of	outwards	movement	(Himeno	1977:	89).		
				Although	I	am	in	general	agreement	with	Himeno’s	assessment,	my	view	differs	in	one	
respect:	 Inchaotive	 -dasu	 is	 not	 a	 direct	 extension	 of	 the	 spatial	 sense	 but	 rather	
																																																								
11	http://pj.ninjal.ac.jp/corpus_center/bccwj/,	link	retrieved	24	Apr.	2015	
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mitigated	 via	 the	 access	 sense.	 What	 the	 most	 frequent	 V1s	 from	 the	 above	 corpus	
studies	have	in	common	is	their	external	accessibility:	When	someone	begins	to	speak,	
dance,	laugh,	cry,	etc.,	there	is	an	immediate	an	externally	perceptible	change	of	state,	i.e.	
others	have	sensory	access	 to	 the	state	of	 speaking,	dancing,	 laughing,	 and	so	on.	And	
the	more	 sudden	 and	 abrupt	 the	 change	 of	 state	 is,	 the	 higher	 the	 chance	 of	 external	
sensory	 access	 becomes.	 Contrast	 this	 with	 the	 above	 verbs	 of	 “low	 key”	 verbal	
expression	 (whisper,	murmur)	or	verbs	denoting	 internal	processes.	 It	 can	be	hard	 to	
tell	when	someone	starts	whispering,	because	the	change	from	silence	to	non-silence	is	
gradual	 and	 subtle.	Whispering	by	 its	 very	nature	poses	 a	 challenge	 to	perception.	Or	
consider	 an	 internal	 process	 such	 as	 listening:	 How	 can	 one	 be	 sure	 when	 exactly	
someone	starts	listening	to	a	radio	program	(token	reading)?	The	cues	to	pick	up	on	are	
limited	and	subtle.	Consider	an	example:	
	
(81)	 Rajio	kôza-wo	 kiki-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Radio	lectures-ACC	 listen-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	As	Suk	(2004:	159)	notes,	the	default	interpretation	of	(81)	is	a	habitual	reading	along	
the	 lines	 of	 	 (One	 day)	 she	 started	 listening	 to	 radio	 lectures	 or	 (One	 day)	 she	 started	
listening	to	(some	particular	series	of)	radio	lecture.	On	the	view	that	inchoative	-dasu	 is	
conceptually	 linked	to	the	access	sense	we	can	easily	explain	why	we	end	up	with	this	
interpretation:	 The	 beginning	 of	 a	 particular	 listening	 event	 is	 difficult	 to	 discern,	
whereas	a	change	 in	habit	 is	often	plainly	noticeable	 to	one’s	 surroundings	 (e.g.	when	
someone	who	never	showed	an	interest	in	radio	lectures	becomes	an	ardent	follower).		
	
(ii)	The	argument	from	non-intentionality	
	
It	 has	 often	 been	 pointed	 out	 (e.g.	 Himeno	 1977;	 Morita	 1991)	 that	 inchoative	 -dasu	
seems	to	be	incompatible	with	the	expression	of	intentionality:	
	
(82)	 (??)	Ronbun-wo	 kaki-dashi-tai.	 	 	 	 	
	 Thesis-ACC	 write-DASU-DES	 Intended	meaning:	‘I	want	to	start	writing	the	thesis.’	 	 	 	
	
(83)	 (??)	Ronbun-wo	 kaki-das-ô.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Thesis-ACC	 write-DASU-VOL	 Intended	meaning:	‘Let’s	start	writing	the	thesis.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(84)	 (??)	Ronbun-wo	 kaki-das-e.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Thesis-ACC	 write-DASU-IMP	 Intended	meaning:	‘Start	writing	the	thesis!’	 	 	 	 	
	
Such	 expressions	 require	 the	 TR	 of	 the	 V1	 to	 be	 in	 a	 mental	 state	 that	 is	 about	 the	
process	profiled	by	 the	V1,	 prior	 to	 that	 process’	 realization.	 For	 example,	wanting	 to	
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write	something	entails	 thinking	about	writing	before	actually	doing	 it.	Now	recall	 the	
conceptual	 metaphor(s)	 underlying	 the	 access	 sense	 of	 DERU:	 OUT	 IS	 ACCESSIBLE/IN	 IS	
INACCESSIBLE.	 According	 to	 the	 “logic“	 of	 this	 metaphor,	 access	 is	 inevitably	 tied	 to	 an	
external	viewpoint.	Applied	to	inchaotive	-dasu	 this	means:	Realized	processes,	 insofar	
as	 they	 are	 accessible	 by	 our	 sensory	 faculties,	 are	 OUT.	 Unrealized	 processes	 (i.e.	
processes	that	exist	only	as	intentional	objects	“in	the	mind”,	as	possibilities	or	in	some	
other	non-actual	state)	are	inaccessible	by	our	sensory	faculties	and	therefore	IN.	If	this	
is	so,	we	can	easily	account	for	the	infelicity	of	(82)-(84):	Intentionality	presupposes	an	
internal	 viewpoint	 and	 entails	 access	 to	 unrealized	 processes	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 form	 of	
intentional	objects),	but	according	to	the	above	mappings	unrealized	processes	are	IN	–	
and	therefore	inaccessible.	In	other	words,	the	metaphorical	structure	which	underlies	
the	meaning	of	inchaotive	-dasu	is	at	odds	with	the	concept	of	intentionality.		
				In	 summary,	 then,	 both	 the	 fact	 that	 inchoative	 -dasu	 entails	 perceptible	 change	 as	
well	 as	 its	 incompatibility	 with	 expressions	 of	 intentionality	 are	 straightforwardly	
accounted	for	if	we	treat	this	sense	as	an	extension	of	the	access	sense.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	8.1.:	furi-dasu	(begin	to	rain)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 FIGURE	8.2.:	hanashi-dasu	(begin	to	speak)	
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11.	Kiru	and	the	SPLIT	Schema	
	
For	 the	 majority	 of	 its	 senses	 the	 verb	 kiru	 can	 be	 schematically	 characterized	 as	
follows:	
	
X-ga	 Y-wo	 kiru	 	
X	CAUSE		 Y	SPLIT	 	 	
	
	
11.1.	The	senses	of	kiru	
	
11.1.1.	Sense	(Ia):	Physical	Discontinuity	-	LM	is	a	Solid	Extent	of	Matter	(fig.	1)	
	
(1)	 Tarô-ga	 niwa-no	 ki-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 garden-LK	 tree-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	cut	the	tree	in	the	garden.’	 	 	
	
(2)	 Hanako-ga	 tsume-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 fingernails-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	cut	her	fingernails.’	 	 	 	
	
(3)	 Kêki-wa	 yottsu-ni	 kit-te	 kudasai.	 	 	 	
	 Cake-TOP	 four	pieces-DAT	 KIRU-IMP	 please	 ‘Please	cut	the	cake	into	four	pieces.’	 	 	
	
This	sense	features	a	spatially	extended	solid	LM	which	is	segmented	into	numerically	
distinct	parts	as	a	result	of	the	TR’s	action.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	1	(POS	stands	for	point	of	segmentation)	
	
11.1.2.	Sense	(Ib):	Unintentional	Self-injury	-	No	Segmentation	(fig.	2)	
	
(4)	 Hanako-ga	 naifu-de	 yubi-wo	 kit-te	shimat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 knife-INS	 finger-ACC	 kiru-IRR-PAST	 ‘Hanako	cut	her	finger	with	a	knife.’	 	 	
	
(5)	 Tarô-ga	 kamisori-de	 kao-wo	 kit-te	shimat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 razor-INS	 face-ACC	 kiru-IRR-PAST	 ‘Tarô	cut	his	face	with	a	razor.’	 	 	
	
(Ib)	 is	 related	 to	 (Ia)	 in	 that,	 here	 too,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 LM	 is	 altered	 by	 a	 cutting	
instrument.	 Apart	 from	 this,	 (Ib)	 is	 much	 more	 narrow	 in	 its	 application	 due	 to	 the	
following	constraints:		
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• The	LM	must	be	a	body	part.	
• The	cutting	of	the	body	part	must	be	unintentional.	
• The	cutting	does	not	result	in	segmentation.	
	
Although	 this	 sense	 is	 related	 to	 (Ia)	via	 family	 resemblance,	 it	does	not	qualify	 as	 an	
instance	of	the	SPLIT	schema	due	to	the	third	constraint.	Note	that	the	no	segmentation	
reading	is	not	available	for	non-animate	LMs	in	the	physical	domain:	
	
(6)	 (??)	Hanako-ga	 kêki-wo	 kit-te	shima-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 cake-ACC	 KIRU-IRR-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	2	
	
11.1.3.	Sense	(Ic):	Opening	-	LM	is	a	CONTAINER	(fig.	3)	
	
(7)	 Ryôrinin-ga	 futa-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Cook-NOM	 lid-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	cook	lifted	the	lid.’	 	 	 	
	
(8)	 Shachô-ga	 kaigi-de	 kuchi-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	
	 CEO-NOM	 meeting-LOC	 mouth-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	CEO	broke	the	silence	at	the	meeting.’	 	
	
Splitting	a	CONTAINER	entails	opening	it.	The	examples	above	involve	metonymic	shifts.	
(7)	is	a	case	of	part-whole	metonymy,	whereby	part	of	the	LM	stands	for	the	LM.	The	lid	
stands	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 CONTAINER	 (the	 pot-lid	 structure),	 because	 it	 is	 the	
substructure	of	 the	CONTAINER	the	TR	directly	 interacts	with	 in	causing	the	SPLIT.	 In	
Langackarian	terms,	the	lid	is	the	active	zone	of	the	LM	(Langacker	1987:	271).	Note	that	
(7)	 is	 somewhat	uncommon	 in	 that	 the	active	 zone	 takes	 linguistic	precedence	 (i.e.,	 is	
overtly	realized	as	an	argument)	over	the	super-structure.	In	the	majority	of	active	zone	
phenomena	the	super-structure	is	deemed	more	salient	than	the	substructure/facet:	
	
(9)	 We	all	heard	the	trumpet.	(instrument	for	sound)	
(10)	 I	finally	blinked.	(person	for	eyelid)	
	 (from	Langacker	1987:	271)	
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The	 idiomatic	 expression	 in	 (8)	 –	 kuchi-wo	 kiru	 –	 exploits	 the	 metonymy	 ONE	 ACTION	
STANDS	FOR	ANOTHER	ACTION.	That	 is,	 the	act	of	opening	one’s	mouth	stands	for	the	act	of	
speaking.	This	presupposes	metaphorical	 construal	of	 the	mouth	as	 a	CONTAINER	 for	
words.	Splitting	the	lips	apart	causes	the	CONTAINER	to	open	and	allows	the	words	to	
flow	out.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	3:	schematic	depiction	of	futa-wo	kiru	
	
11.1.4.	Sense	(Id):	Traversal	of	Non-solid,	Unbounded	LM	(fig.	4)	
	
(11)	 Jûdan-ga	 kaze-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Bullet-NOM	 wind-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	bullet	cut	through	the	air.’	 	 	 	
	
(12)	 Fune-ga	 kanâru-no	 mizu-wo	 kit-te	 susun-da.	 	 	
	 Ship-NOM	 canal-LK	 water-ACC	 KIRU-TE	 proceed-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Cutting	through	the	water	the	ship	advanced	though	the	canal.’	 	
	
This	 sense	 is	 available	 from	 (Ia)	 but	 differs	 in	 respect	 to	 phase	 of	 matter	 and	
boundedness.	Here	 the	LM	 is	 an	unbounded	extent	of	 empty	or	 liquid	matter	 through	
which	the	TR	moves	along	a	linear	path,	resulting	in	the	LM’s	spatial	segmentation.	This	
construal	of	segmentation	exploits	 the	 image	schema	transformation	moving	0DTR	-->	
static	1DTR,	as	described	by	Lakoff	(1990:	442).	I.e.,	the	path	taken	by	the	TR	constitutes	
a	dividing	line	through	the	LM	(although	no	permanent	segmentation	is	achieved).			
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	4	
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11.1.5.	Sense	(Ie):	Disconnection	-	LM	is	an	Assembly	of	Functional	Parts	(fig.	5)	
	
(13)	 Tarô-ga	 enjin-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 engine-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	turned	off	the	engine.’	 	 	 	
	
(14)	 Hanako-ga	 terebi-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 TV-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	turned	off	the	TV.’	 	 	 	
	
(15)	 Tarô-ga	 dengen-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 power	supply-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	cut	the	power	supply.’	 	 	 	
	
This	 sense	 is	 closely	 associated	 with	 the	 “turning	 off”	 of	 electrical	 appliances.	 Such	
appliances	 rely	 on	 the	CONTACT	of	 certain	 components	 and	 an	uninterrupted	 flow	of	
electricity	to	function	properly.		Therefore,	(Ie)	can	be	understood	as	the	counterpart	of	
the	elicited	effect	sense	of	KAKARU	discussed	earlier	(see	9.1.7.).	Consider	the	following	
pair:	
	
(16a)	 Enjin-ga	 kakaru	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Engine-NOM	 KAKARU	 ‘The	Engine	catches	(on).’	 	 	 	 	
	
(16b)	 Enjin-wo	 kiru	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Engine-ACC	 KIRU	 ‘To	turn	off	the	engine.’	 	 	 	 	
	
Where	KAKARU	codes	the	connection	of	functional	parts	via	the	CONTACT	schema,	kiru	
codes	their	disconnection	via	the	SPLIT	schema.	Like	the	elicited	effect	sense	of	KAKARU,	
(Ie)	 is	 an	 extension	 via	 the	 metonymic	 shift	 ACTION	 FOR	 EFFECT	 OF	 ACTION	 (i.e.,	 the	
disconnection	of	functional	parts	stands	for	disabling	the	appliance).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	5	
	
	
11.1.6.	Sense	(If):	Disconnection	-	LM	is	an	Abstract	Relation	(fig.	6)	
	
(17)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-to-no	 kankei-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-COM-LK	 ties-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	severed	ties	with	Tarô.’	 	 	
	
(18)	 Tarô-ga	 mae-no	 jinsei-to	 en-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 former-LK	 life-COM	 relationship-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	put	his	former	life	behind.’	 	
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Similar	 to	 (Ie),	 this	 sense	 presupposes	 the	 LINK	 schema	 and	 then	 applies	 the	 SPLIT	
schema	to	 it.	However,	(If)	 is	arrived	at	via	a	metaphorical	extension,	which	construes	
the	 target	 domain	 of	 abstract	 relations	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	 connection.	 As	 Johnson	
(1990:	 117)	 observes,	 “physical	 linking	 is	 never	 the	 full	 story	 of	 humanity,	 which	
requires	a	certain	nonphysical	linking	to	our	parents,	our	siblings,	and	our	society	as	a	
whole.”	This	is	evidenced	by	many	metaphorical	expressions	exploiting	the	LINK/SPLIT	
schemas,	such	as	I	severed	ties	with	him,	She	burned	all	bridges	to	her	past,	I	cut	him	loose,	
etc.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	6	
	
11.1.7.	Sense	(Ig):	Temporal	Discontinuity	-	LM	is	an	Activity	(fig.	7)	
	
(19)	 ‘Sore-wa	 hitei	 deki-nai	 ga...’	 to	 Hanako-wa	 ii-kake-te,	 kotoba-wo	 kit-ta.	
	 That-
TOP	
denial	 can-
NEG	
CONJ	 QT	 Hanako-
TOP	
say-KAKERU-
TE	
words-
ACC	
KIRU-
PAST	
	 ‘’Well,	that	can’t	be	denied...’	said	Hanako	and	paused.’	
	
(20)	 Toriaezu	 kono	hen-de	 shigoto-wo	 kit-te,	 ashita	 tsuzuki-mash-ô.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 First	 around	here-LOC	 work-ACC	 KIRU-TE	 tomorrow	 continue-POL-VOL	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Let’s	call	it	a	day	and	continue	tomorrow.’	
	
Due	 to	 the	 homologous	 structure	 of	 the	 categories	 space	 and	 time	 (see	Talmy	2003a:	
47ff.),	 temporal	 entities	 are	 frequently	 construed	 in	 terms	 of	 spatial	 entities.	 For	
instance,	 both	 action	 and	 matter	 are	 quantifiable	 amounts.	 (Ig),	 in	 particular,	 is	 an	
extension	 via	 the	 high-level	 ontological	metaphor	 ACTIVITY	 IS	 A	ONE-DIMENSIONAL	 SPATIAL	
EXTENT.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 discontinuation	 of	 an	 activity	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	
segmentation	of	a	physical	object	(see	[Ia]).	It	is	worthy	of	mention	that	(Ig)	may	include	
expected	 but	 unrealized	 activity.	 In	 (19),	 for	 example,	 Hanako	might	 not	 continue	 to	
speak	at	all.	In	this	case,	the	application	of	the	SPLIT	schema	still	makes	sense,	because	it	
is	our	general	understanding	that	Hanako	was	expected	to	utter	more	than	she	actually	
did.	 (For	 the	 same	reason	 it	 is	 felicitous	 to	 say	You	interrupted	me	in	the	middle	of	the	
sentence,	even	if	the	sentence	has	not	been	completely	uttered.)	
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FIGURE	7	
	
	
11.1.8.	Sense	(Ih):	Reduction	-	LM	is	an	Abstract	Scalar	Extent	(fig.	8)	
	
(21)	 Tarô-ga	 kyôsô-de	 jûbyô-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 race-LOC	 ten	seconds-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘At	the	race,	Tarô	shaved	ten	seconds	off	the	record.’	 	
	
(22)	 Sekai-no	 kiga	 jinkô-ga	 hachiokunin-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	
	 World-LK	 hunger	 population-NOM	 800	million	people-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	hungering	world	population	dropped	below	800	million.’	 	
	
(23)	 Kono	 shôhin-no	 nedan-ga	 ichimanen-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	
	 This	 product-LK	 price-NOM	 10.000	yen-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	price	of	this	product	dropped	below	10.000	yen.’	 	
	
In	 (Ie),	 (If),	 and	 (Ig)	 we	 have	 seen	 semantic	 extensions	 that	 emphasize	 the	 aspect	 of	
discontinuity	or	disconnectivity.	This	is	especially	plain	in	(If)	and	(Ig),	where	the	SPLIT	
schema	is	imposed	on	the	LINK	schema.		
				(Ih),	 like	 (If)	 and	 (Ig),	 is	 the	 result	 of	 metaphorical	 extension.	 But	 here,	 SPLIT	 is	
imposed	 on	 the	 SCALE	 schema	 rather	 than	 the	 LINK	 schema.	What	makes	 the	 SCALE	
schema	compatible	with	the	SPLIT	schema	is	 its	one-dimensionality.	This	follows	from	
what	 Johnson	 (1990:	 122)	 calls	 the	 “fixed	 directionality”	 of	 SCALEs.	 I.e.,	 the	 amount,	
number,	 degree,	 etc.	measured	 by	 a	 SCALE	 is	 always	 organized	 along	 a	 single	 salient	
dimension.	 Examples	 of	 this	 are	 the	 vertical	 UP-DOWN	 axis	 underlying	 the	MORE	 IS	UP	
metaphor	 (Johnson	 1990:	 121f.)	 and	 the	 horizontal	 LEFT-RIGHT	 axis	 used	 to	 express	
political	alignment.		
				Given	 the	 above,	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 SPLIT	 schema	 can	 be	 imposed	 on	 SCALEs	 to	
metaphorically	 express	 the	 reduction	 of	 an	 abstract	 extent	 (such	 as	 an	 amount	 or	
degree).	Since	SCALES	are	construed	as	one-dimensional	–	and	since	a	one-dimensional	
object	split	in	multiples	yields	several	one-dimensional	objects	of	lesser	length	than	the	
original	 –	 a	 split	 SCALE	 will	 yield	 at	 least	 two	 parts	 of	 lesser	 length.	 By	 way	 of	
illustration,	consider	 (21).	The	LM	here	 is	 jûbyô	 (10	seconds),	a	scalar	extent	with	 the	
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value	0	at	one	pole	and	the	value	10	at	the	other.	A	new	record,	let	us	say	at	9.8	seconds,	
will	SPLIT	this	SCALE	into	two	parts.	The	portion	from	0	to	9.8	replaces	the	old	SCALE	as	
the	 new	 standard	 for	 record	 attempts,	 while	 the	 portion	 from	 9.8	 to	 10	 becomes	
obsolete	for	that	purpose.		
				In	summary,	 then,	 the	SPLIT	 in	 (21)	–	and	(Ih)	 in	general	–	divides	 the	LM	 into	 two	
qualitatively	distinct	parts,	one	relevant	and	one	obsolete.	By	 implication,	reduction	of	
the	LM	is	achieved	by	getting	rid	of	the	obsolete	part.		
	
	
	
					
	
	
	
FIGURE	8	
	
	
11.1.9.	Sense	(II):	Focus	on	Obsolete	Portion	of	LM	(fig.	9)	
	
(24)	 Hanako-ga	 mikan-no	 kusat-ta	 bubun-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 mandarine	orange-LK	 rot-PAST	 part-ACC	 KIRU-TE	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	cut	the	rotten	part	from	the	mandarine	orange.’	
	
(25)	 Seijika-ga	 tônai-no	 hantaiha-wo	 kir-ô	to	shi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Politician-NOM	 party	internal-LK	 opposition-ACC	 KIRU-INT-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	politician	tried	to	get	rid	of	the	party-internal	opposition.’	 	
	
It	is	part	of	our	encyclopedic	knowledge	that	objects	are	often	divided	for	the	purpose	of	
getting	 rid	of	 (or	otherwise	 singling	out)	 some	 specific	portion.	As	 shown	above,	 (1h)	
heavily	 relies	 on	 this	 implication.	 In	 English	 and	 German,	 this	 cutting	 off	 sense	 is	
expressed	by	verb	particle	constructions	such	as	V-off	and	ab-V:	
	
(26)	 The	wound	festered,	so	his	foot	had	to	be	cut	off.	
	
(27)	 Sie	hat	sich	von	dem	Brotlaib	ein	Stück	abgeschnitten.	
She	cut	off	some	bread	from	the	loaf	(for	herself).	
	
Similarly,	in	Japanese,	focus	shift	from	the	object	which	is	split	to	the	object	which	is	split	
off	is	usually	achieved	by	attaching	one	of	several	V2s:	
	
(28)	 Zentai-kara	 10cm-wo	 kiri-hanasu	 	 	 	 	
	 Whole-ABL	 10cm-ACC	 KIRU-set	apart	 ‘To	cut	10cm	off		from	the	whole’	 	 	 	
	
(29)	 Sentan-wo	 kiri-toru	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tip-ACC	 KIRU-take	 ‘To	cut	the	tip	off’	 	 	 	 	
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11.1.11.	Sense	(IV):	Focus	on	Manner		
	
(32)	 Tarô-ga	 handoru-wo	 migi-ni	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 steering	wheel	 right-DAT	 KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	turned	the	steering	wheel	to	the	right.’	 	
	
(33)	 Hanako-ga	 bôru-wo	 kit-te,	 tsuyoi	 kaiten-wo	 kake-ta.	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 ball-ACC	 KIRU-TE	 strong	 spin-ACC	 KAKERU-PAST	 	
	 ‘Hanako	hit	the	ball	in	a	slice,	putting	a	strong	spin	on	it.’	 	
	
(34)	 Shinpu-ga	 jûjika-wo	 kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Priest-NOM	 cross-ACC	 KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	priest	made	the	sign	of	the	cross.’	 	 	 	
	
Like	 (II)	 and	 (III),	 this	 sense	 is	 an	 extension	 via	metonymic	 shift.	 None	 of	 the	 above	
objects	are	actually	split	into	multiples.	(IV)	is	not	even	an	instance	of	the	SPLIT	schema.	
It	is	connected	to	the	other	senses	merely	by	experiential	correlation,	i.e.	the	knowledge	
that	the	splitting	of	objects	usually	involves	a	certain	type	of	“cutting”	motion.	Here,	this	
latter	aspect	completely	replaces	the	former	aspect	within	the	frame,	giving	rise	to	the	
new	schema	[X	affects	Y	via	a	cutting	motion].			
				In	summary,	 then,	our	analysis	of	kiru	yields	 four	sense	clusters	associated	with	 the	
SPLIT	schema,	based	on	their	respective	focus	properties:	(I)	focus	on	the	LM	as	a	whole,	
(II)	 focus	on	 the	obsolete	part	of	 the	LM,	 (III)	 focus	on	 the	POS,	and	 (IV)	 focus	on	 the	
manner	in	which	the	TR	affects	the	LM.	With	this	in	mind	let	us	now	turn	to	the	senses	of	
V-kiru.		
	
11.2.	The	Senses	of	V-kiru	
	
11.2.1.	Previous	Suggestions		
	
Over	 the	 past	 decades	 linguists	 have	made	 several	 suggestions	 on	how	 to	 classify	 the	
senses	 of	 V-kiru.	 The	 following	 is	 a	 short	 breakdown	 of	 the	 categorization	 attempts	
based	on	Sugimura	(2008:	64ff.).1	
	
Morita	[1977](1989)		
	
• The	physical	cutting	sense:	The	V1	expresses	a	manner	of	cutting	a	physical	
object	in	multiples.	
• The	perfective	sense	(kanryô):	-kiru	expresses	that	the	action	profiled	by	
the	V1	is	carried	out	completely	and	properly.	
• The	augmentative	sense:	-kiru	expresses	that	the	action	profiled	by	the	V1	
is	carried	out	with	sufficient	confidence	and	intensity,	precluding	any	need	
																																																								
1	For	example	sentences	see	the	discussion	in	the	next	section.	
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for	further	action.	
• The	limit	sense:	-kiru	expresses	the	maxing	out	of	a	scalar	process.	
	
Himeno	(1980)	
	
• The	physical	cutting	sense	(setsudan):	See	Morita	(1989)	above.	
• The	conclusion	sense	(shûketsu):	-kiru	expresses	determination	and	goal-
orientedness	on	the	agent’s	part;	corresponds	to	Morita’s	(1989)	
augmentative	sense.	
• The	accomplishment	sense	(kansui):	-kiru	expresses	not	only	the	
completion	of	an	action,	but	its	completion	to	the	satisfaction	of	its	agent.	
• The	limit	sense	(kyokudo):	Roughly	corresponds	to	Morita	(1989)	above.		
	
Lee	(1997)	
	
• The	physical	cutting	sense	(mono	no	setsudan):	See	Morita	(1989)	above.	
• The	accomplishment	sense	(kansui):	See	Himeno	(1980)	above.	
• The	limit	sense	(kyokugen):	See	Himeno	(1980)	above.	
• The	“full	of	confidence”	sense	(jishin	manman):	Roughly	corresponds	to	
Morita’s	(1989)	augmentative	sense.		
	
• Lexicalized	senses	(goika):	Instances	of	V-kiru	that	are	not	easily	analyzable		
	
Sugimura	(2008)	
	
Senses	that	preserve	the	severance	(setsudan)	meaning	of	the	simplex	verb:	
	
• The	physical	cutting	sense	(setsudan):	See	Morita	(1989)	above.	
• The	conclusion	sense	(shûketsu):	A	state	of	affairs	(jitai)	is	discontinued	by	
the	action	corresponding	to	the	V1.		
	
Senses	that	do	not	seem	to	preserve	the	severance	meaning	of	the	simplex	verb;	-kiru	
functions	as	a	grammatical	suffix:	
	
• The	accomplishment	sense	(kôi	no	kansui):	-kiru	expresses	that	the	action	
profiled	by	the	V1	has	been	carried	out	completely.	
• The	completion	of	change	sense	(henka	no	tassei):	-kiru	expresses	that	the	
process	of	change	profiled	by	the	V1	has	reached	its	final	state	(i.e.	non-F	to	
max-F).	
• The	limit	sense	(kyokugen	jôtai):	-kiru	expresses	the	maxing	out	of	an	
already	ongoing	scalar	process	(i.e.	F	to	max-F).	
	
	
11.2.2.	Discussion	
	
Although	 the	above	classifications	are	not	entirely	 in	agreement	with	one	another,	we	
can	nevertheless	distill	 roughly	 three	 senses	of	V-kiru	 from	 them	–	plus	 several	 “odd”	
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items	 that	 seem	 somewhat	difficult	 to	 categorize.	 (The	 following	 are	 only	preliminary	
sketches,	amalgams	based	on	the	above	classifications	–	not	my	final	suggestions.)	
	
The	physical	cutting	sense	(mono	no	setsudan)	
	
(35)	 Nezumi-ga	 dengen	kôdo-wo	 kami-kit-ta.	 	 	
	 Mouse-NOM	 power	cord-ACC	 bite-KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	mouse	chewed	through	the	power	cord.’	 	
	
(36)	 Tarô-ga	 rôpu-wo	 tachi-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 rope-ACC	 cut-KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	cut	the	rope.’	 	 	 	
	
(37)	 Hanako-ga	 niku-wo	 tataki-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 meat-ACC	 hit-KIRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	chopped	the	meat.’	 	 	 	
	
The	V1	profiles	a	way	of	segmenting	a	physical	entity.		
	
The	limit	sense	(genkai,	kyokudo,	kyokugen	jôtai):		
	
(38)	 Kuchi-ga	 kawaki-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouth-NOM	 dry-KIRU-RES	 ‘(My)	mouth	is	all	dried	up.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(39)	 Sora-ga	 sumi-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Sky-NOM	 become	clear-KIRU-RES	 ‘The	sky	is	cloudless.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(40)	 Tarô-ga	 tsukare-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 tire-KIRU-RES	 ‘Tarô	is	completely	exhausted.’	 	 	 	 	
	
The	 V1	 is	 typically	 intransitive	 and	 telic	 (i.e.	 goal-oriented).	 The	 subject	 is	 typically	
either	non-human	or	human	but	non-intentional.		
				As	 Himeno	 (1980:	 29)	 notes,	 the	 V1	 often	 belongs	 to	 the	 domains	 of	 natural	
phenomena,	 physiological,	 emotional,	 or	 psychological	 change.	 In	 case	 of	 a	 human	
subject,	 there	 is	 a	 rather	 strong	 tendency	 for	 the	 process	 to	 be	 non-intentional	 and	
beyond	the	subject’s	control.		
				Sugimura	 (2008:	74-76)	 further	distinguishes	between	processes	of	 “limit	 reaching”	
(kyokugen	 jôtai)	 and	 those	 that	 indicate	 “completion	 of	 change”	 (henka	no	 tassei).	 An	
example	of	the	former	would	be	hieru	(become	cold):	Something	can	be	described	using	
the	resultative	hie-te	iru	(cool/cold)	even	when	the	inherent	telicity	scale	of	the	process	
is	 not	maxed	out	 (i.e.,	when	 it	 could	 still	 get	 colder).	 In	 contrast,	 one	 cannot	 describe	
something	as	naot-te	iru	unless	the	scale	of	naoru	(heal)	is	maxed	out.	That	is,	a	wound	
can	gradually	heal,	but	 it	can	only	be	described	as	naot-te	iru	when	there	is	no	further	
room	for	betterment.	Although	this	 is	an	 interesting	observation,	one	should	note	that	
both	variants	have	their	inherently	telic	nature	in	common.		
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The	accomplishment	sense		(kansui):		
		
(41)	 Tarô-ga	 gyûdon-no	 tokumori-wo	 hitori-de	 tabe-kit-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 gyûdon-LK	 extra	large	serving-ACC	 alone	 eat-KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	ate	(up)	an	extra	large	serving	of	gyûdon	all	by	himself.’	 	
	
(42)	 Hanako-ga	 senpêji-no	 chôhen	shôsetsu-wo	 yomi-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 thousand	pages-LK	 full-length	novel-ACC	 read-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	read	a	full-length	novel	of	a	thousand	pages	(to	the	end).’	 	
	
(43)	 Tarô-ga	 sanjûkiro-no	 kyori-wo	 hashiri-kit-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 30km-LK	 distance-ACC	 run-KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	ran	the	(whole)	30km	distance.’	
	
The	V1	is	typically	transitive	and	atelic,	the	subject	an	intentional	human	agent.	There	is	
most	likely	a	scalar	modifier	–	either	overt	or	implicit	–	that	imposes	telicity	on	the	atelic	
V1.	For	example,	senpêji-no	chôhen-shôsetsu	serves	as	a	telic	modifier	for	yomu,	which	by	
itself	is	a	non-goal-oriented,	potentially	open-ended	process.		
				As	 Himeno	 (1980:	 27)	 notes,	 the	 agent	 usually	 feels	 some	 kind	 of	 satisfaction	 for	
having	successfully	handled	a	quantifiable	“workload”	(sagyôryô).		
	
11.2.2.1.	Some	Remarks	on	Limit	vs	Accomplishment	
	
While	it	might	be	practical	to	distinguish	between	a	“limit“	and	“accomplishment“	sense,	
the	 two	 are	 best	 thought	 of	 as	 poles	 on	 a	 continuum	 rather	 than	 as	 having	 clear-cut	
boundaries.	For	example,	Omata	(2007:	213)	points	out	 that	 tsukai-kiru	 is	hardly	ever	
accompanied	by	a	feeling	of	achievement	on	part	of	the	agent.	Consider	(44):	
	
(44)	 Tarô-ga	 okane-wo	 tsukai-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 money-ACC	 use-KIRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	used	up	all	of	his	money.’	 	 	 	
	
In	a	similar	vain,	shinji-kiru	 requires	an	 intentional	human	agent	but	can	often	carry	a	
negative	connotation,	as	in:	
	
(45)	 Hanako-ga	 uso-wo	 shinji-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 lie-ACC	 believe-KIRU-RES	 ‘Hanako	is	utterly	convinced	of	a	lie.’	 	 	 	
	
While	the	agent	in	such	scenes	could	be	described	as	intentional,	one	might	argue	that	
the	degree	of	control	exercised	in	acts	of	resource	usage	or	belief	is	typically	lower	than	
in	other	types	of	activities,	such	as	running,	reading,	etc.		
				Furthermore,	 Himeno	 (1980)	 places	 moe-kiru	 in	 the	 accomplishment	 (kansui)	
category,	stating	that	the	accomplishment	sense	expresses	“not	only	the	end	of	an	action,	
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but	 that	 the	 action	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 completely	 (in	 both	 quantity	 and	 quality)	 in	
accordance	with	the	agent’s	expectations”	(1980:	27).	This	seems	a	bit	odd	considering	
the	following	sentences:	
	
(46)	 Tarô-ga	 yonjûnikiro-no	 furumarason-wo	 hashiri-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 42km-LK	 full	marathon-ACC	 run-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	ran	a	full	marathon	of	42km.’	 	
	
(47)	 Hanako-ga	 saigo-made	 tatakai-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 end-ALL	 fight-KIRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	fought	to	the	end.’	 	 	 	
	
(48)	 Rôsoku-ga	 moe-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Candle-NOM	 burn-KIRU-PAST	 ‘The	candle	burned	out.’	 	 	 	 	
	
According	to	Himeno,	all	three	of	the	above	are	accomplishment	verbs.	However,	in	the	
case	 of	moe-kiru,	 agency,	 intentionality,	 and	 sense	 of	 achievement	 seem	 to	 be	 much	
lower	than	in	the	other	two	examples.	In	fact,	moeru	–	denoting	a	natural	phenomenon	–	
seems	more	akin	 to	 limit	 verbs	 such	as	hieru	(become	cold)	or	kawaku	(become	dry).	
And	while	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	moeru,	 unlike	 these	verbs,	 is	not	 inherently	 telic,	 it	 is	
typically	 understood	 as	 being	 temporally	 bounded.	 In	 other	 words,	 something	 might	
burn	 indeterminately	 long	(say,	a	ceremonial	 fire	 that	must	not	go	out)	–	but	 typically	
there	is	a	limited	burning	substance	involved	that	will	burn	down	after	a	certain	amount	
of	time	has	passed.		
				The	 upshot	 is	 that	 cases	 like	 shinji-kiru,	 tsukai-kiru	 and	 moe-kiru	 are	 peripheral	
examples	located	somewhere	between	the	limit	and	the	accomplishment	sense.			
					
Although	the	limit	vs	accomplishment	distinction	has	its	merits,	I	believe	that	–	for	the	
purpose	 of	 this	 study	 –	 one	 can	 make	 a	 more	 useful	 distinction	 based	 on	 the	 V1’s	
ontological	 specifications.	 In	 his	 study	 on	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 V-kiru,	 Aoki	
(2004)	makes	an	 interesting	observation	 in	 this	 respect.	He	points	out	 that	 inherently	
telic	verbs	(genkai	dôshi)	do	not	appear	as	V1	until	the	late	middle	ages	(chûsei	kôki)	and	
non-telic	 verbs	 (higenkai	 dôshi)	 not	 until	 early	modern	 times	 (kinsei	 ikô).	 In	 order	 of	
historical	emergence	Aoki	(2004:	39)	lists	the	following	senses:		
	
A			physical	segmentation	(mono-no	setsudan)	
Some	action	verbs	(ichibu-no	dôsa	dôshi)	
(i-kiru,	tachi-kiru,	kaki-kiru,	...)	
	
A’		spatial	partitioning	(kûkan-no	shadan)	
Some	action	verbs	
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(shi-kiru,	tate-kiru,	seki-kiru,	...)? 	
	
B			closure	–	emphasis	(shûketsu	–	kyôchô)	
Verbs	of	thought	and	speech	(hatsuwa-,	shikô	dôshi)? 	
(ii-kiru,	omoi-kiru,	furi-kiru,	...)	
	
C			extreme	state/limit	(kyokudo-no	jôtai)		
Verbs	of	change,	telic	verbs	(henka	dôshi,	genkai	dôshi)		
(sumi-kiru,	shizumari-kiru,	kawaki-kiru,	...)	
	
D			accomplishment	(dôsa-no	kansui)		
Action	verbs,	atelic	verbs	(dôsa	dôshi,	higenkai	dôshi)		
					
As	 we	 can	 see,	 this	 classification	 is	 not	 much	 of	 a	 divergence	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
literature.	A	 is	 the	physical	 cutting	 sense.	A’	 is	 an	 extension	of	A	 from	solid	matter	 to	
empty	matter.	C	and	D	correspond	to	the	limit	and	accomplishment	senses,	respectively	
(indeed,	they	are	labeled	as	such).	However,	Aoki	makes	the	important	observation	that	
the	 limit	 sense	 involves	 a	 telic	V1	whereas	 the	 accomplishment	 sense	 involves	 a	non-
telic	V1.	His	distinction	is	therefore	not	only	historically	sound	but	also	grounded	in	the	
V1s	 configurational	 structure.	 And	 since	 configurational	 (i.e.	 schematic)	 structure	 is	
what	 mainly	 concerns	 us,	 we	 can	 from	 here	 on	 dismiss	 the	 limit	 vs	 accomplishment	
distinction	in	lieu	of	the	telic	vs	atelic	distinction.		
	
11.2.2.2.	‘Odd’	Cases	
	
What	 to	 make	 of	 Aoki’s	 category	 B	 though?	 This	 is	 the	 class	 of	 “odd	 cases“	 I	 have	
mentioned	 earlier.	 Aoki	 calls	 this	 sense	 closure	 (shûketsu)	 and	 emphasis	 (kyôchô).	
Himeno,	too,	uses	the	term	shûketsu	 to	describe	 ii-kiru	(assert).	Morita	(1989)	and	Lee	
(1997),	however,	place	ii-kiru	in	a	class	of	“confidence”	verbs	(jishin,	jishin	manman).	As	
for	 furi-kiru	 (shake	off,	 decline)	 and	omoi-kiru	(give	up),	 Lee	 (1997)	 categorizes	 these	
into	their	own	class	of	“lexicalized”	verbs	(goika).		
				In	 conclusion,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 group	 of	 verbs	 –	 variously	 termed	 “closure”,	
“emphasis”,	 “confidence”	 or	 “lexicalized”	 –	 	 which	 fit	 neither	 the	 cutting,	 limit	 or	
accomplishment	 categories.	 Historically,	 these	 verbs	 follow	 the	 cutting	 sense	 and	
precede	the	limit	and	achievement	senses.	
	
To	summarize,	we	have	identified	three	major	senses	of	V-kiru:	
	
• Sense	1:	The	V1	profiles	a	way	of	physical	segmentation.		
• Sense	2:	The	V1	profiles	an	inherently	goal-oriented	process.	
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• Sense	3:	The	V1	profiles	a	non-goal-oriented	process.	The	LM	of	the	V1	functions	
as	a	telic	modifier.		
	
Additionally,	we	will	need	to	address	several	“odd”	cases	which	seem	to	fit	neither	of	the	
above	very	well.	These	include:	omoi-kiru,	ii-kiru,	furi-kiru,	etc.		
				I	will	now	proceed	to	analyze	the	topological	structure	of	these	senses.		
	
11.2.3.	Revisiting	V-kiru:	A	Categorization	Based	on	Schematic	Topology	
	
11.2.3.1.	Sense	(I):	The	V1	Profiles	a	Way	of	Physical	Segmentation		
	
(see	examples	35-37)	
	
This	 is	 the	physical	 cutting	 sense	which	has	 already	been	adequately	 characterized	 in	
the	literature.	The	LM	is	an	extended	quantity	of	matter.	It	is	split	into	multiples	by	the	
TR	in	the	manner	profiled	by	the	V1.		
	
11.2.3.2.	Sense	(IIa):	The	V1	Profiles	an	Inherently	Goal-oriented	Process	(“Limit”	Sense)	
(fig.	11)	
	
(see	examples	38-40)	
	
Recall	 from	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 simplex	 verb	 the	 various	 implications	 of	 the	 SPLIT	
schema,	 i.e.	 consider	 our	 encyclopedic	 knowledge	 about	 splitting	 things.	 Specifically,	
recall	 the	 cases	where	 the	 location	 of	 the	 POS	 is	 non-arbitrary,	 because	 it	marks	 the	
division	between	qualitatively	distinct	parts	of	the	LM.	For	example,	we	might	cut	stalks	
of	asparagus	along	a	tender/non-tender	divide,	then	use	the	tender	part	for	cooking	and	
throw	away	the	non-tender	part.	Similarly,	when	setting	a	deadline	(see	example	[30])	
we	divide	the	timeline	into	two	qualitatively	distinct	parts	–	with	the	POS	marking	the	
division	between	timely	and	too	late.		
				Now	consider	V-kiru	in	a	sentence	like	(38):	
	
(38)	 Kuchi-ga	 kawaki-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouth-NOM	 dry-KIRU-RES	 ‘(My)	mouth	is	all	dried	up.’	 	 	 	 	
	
The	qualitative	SPLIT	is	quite	obvious.	The	V1	kawaku	profiles	a	goal-oriented	process.	
Let	us	say	0	is	not	dry	at	all,	5	somewhat	dry,	and	10	is	devoid	of	any	liquid.	It	is	worth	
emphasizing	that	the	V1s	participating	in	(IIa)	do	not	represent	open	scales	but	closed	
ones.	 That	 is,	 if	 something	 is	 completely	 devoid	 of	 liquid,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 it	 to	 get	
drier.	The	same	is	true	for	tsukareru	(become	exhausted),	sumu	(become	clear),	and	so	
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forth.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 see	how	 the	end	point	of	 a	 such	a	 scale	 functions	as	a	natural	POS,	
since	 it	marks	 the	 temporal	division	between	a	goal-oriented	process	and	 the	 state	of	
having	reached	that	goal.2	This	leaves	us	with	the	following	specifications:	
	
LM	specifications	for	(IIa):	The	LM	is	a	timeline	(an	unbounded	extent	of	time).	The	V1	
has	the	structure	of	a	closed	temporal	SCALE	(a	bounded	axial	extent	of	time),	which	is	
imposed	on	 a	 portion	of	 this	 timeline.	 The	 end-point	 of	 the	 SCALE	 (i.e.	 the	GOAL	of	 a	
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	 schema)	 functions	 as	 the	 POS.	 The	 LM	 is	 thus	 segmented	 into	 a	
pre-GOAL	and	a	post-GOAL	portion.	The	pre-GOAL	portion	 is	dynamic:	 it	 is	a	bounded	
extent	 of	 time	 during	 which	 change	 occurs.	 The	 post-GOAL	 portion	 is	 static:	 it	 is	 an	
unbounded	extent	of	time	during	which	no	change	occurs.		
				In	 other	 words,	 the	 end-point	 of	 the	 scalar	 process	 profiled	 by	 the	 V1	 divides	 the	
timeline	into	a	dynamic	segment	and	a	steady-state	segment.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	11	
	
	
11.2.3.3.	Sense	(IIb):	The	V1	Profiles	a	Non-goal-oriented	Process;	The	LM	of	the	V1	
Functions	as	a	Telic	Modifier	(“Accomplishment”	Sense)	(fig.	12)	
	
By	now	it	should	be	obvious	that	–	in	terms	of	image	schematic	topology	–	this	sense	is	
merely	a	variant	of	(IIa).	While	the	V1s	participating	in	(IIa)	are	inherently	goal-oriented,	
the	V1s	participating	in	(IIb)	are	potentially	open-ended.	However,	by	taking	a	LM	with	
closed	scale	structure,	open-ended	processes	become	goal-oriented.		
	
LM	specifications	for	(IIb):	The	LM	is	a	timeline	(an	unbounded	extent	of	time).	The	V1	
profiles	an	activity	(an	unbounded	temporal	quantity).	A	telic	modifier	(either	explicit	or	
implicit)	 imposes	 a	 SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	 structure	 on	 this	 activity,	 yielding	 a	 closed	
temporal	SCALE	(a	bounded	axial	extent	of	 time).	This	 temporal	scale	 is	 imposed	on	a	
																																																								
2	This	view	is	consistent	with	Nakashima’s	(2006:	43ff)	suggestion	that	the	grammatical	senses	of	V-kiru	
are	the	result	of	a	semantic	extension	via	the	concept	of	discontinuity	(hirenzokusei).			
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portion	of	 the	timeline.	The	end-point	of	 the	SCALE	(i.e.	 the	GOAL	of	a	SOURCE-PATH-
GOAL	schema)	 functions	as	 the	POS.	The	LM	is	 thus	segmented	 into	a	pre-GOAL	and	a	
post-GOAL	 portion.	 The	 pre-GOAL	 portion	 is	 dynamic:	 it	 is	 a	 bounded	 extent	 of	 time	
during	which	change	occurs.	The	post-GOAL	portion	is	static:	it	is	an	unbounded	extent	
of	 time	 during	 which	 no	 change	 occurs.	 Again,	 the	 end-point	 of	 the	 scalar	 process	
profiled	 by	 the	 V1	 divides	 the	 timeline	 into	 a	 dynamic	 segment	 and	 a	 steady-state	
segment.	
	
Example:	Consider	(41)	from	above.	
	
(41)	 Tarô-ga	 gyûdon-no	 tokumori-wo	 hitori-de	 tabe-kit-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 gyûdon-LK	 extra	large	serving-ACC	 alone	 eat-KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	ate	(up)	an	extra	large	serving	of	gyûdon	all	by	himself.’	 	
	
In	 this	 sentence	we	have	an	activity	 tabe(ru)	 and	a	 telic	modifier	gyûdon	no	tokumori.	
The	latter	imposes	the	scalar	structure	of	0%	depletion	–	100%	depletion	on	the	process	
of	eating.	I.e.,	at	the	SOURCE	point	of	the	process	there	is	0%	depletion	of	the	quantity	
profiled	 by	 gyûdon	 no	 tokumori,	 while	 at	 the	 GOAL	 point	 there	 is	 100%	 depletion.	
Consequently,	the	GOAL	functions	as	POS,	deviding	the	timeline	into	a	dynamic	segment	
during	 which	 depletion	 occurs	 and	 a	 steady-state	 segment	 during	 which	 no	 more	
depletion	occurs.		
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	12	
	
11.2.3.4.	Other	Senses	
	
What	about	the	aforementioned	“odd”	cases?	It	turns	out	that	many	of	these	are	simply	
lexicalized	 metaphorical	 extensions	 of	 the	 physical	 cutting	 sense.	 Take	 the	 following	
uses	of	furi-kiru,	for	example:		
	
(42)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-no	 te-wo	 furi-kit-te	 nige-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-LK	 hand-ACC	 shake-KIRU-TE	 run-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	shook	off	Tarô’s	grasp	and	ran	away.’	 	
	
(43)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-no	 tanomi-wo	 furi-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-LK	 request-ACC	 shake-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	declined	Tarô’s	request.’	 	
 114 
	
Earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 in	 our	 discussion	 of	 (If),	 we	 have	 already	 come	 across	 the	
conceptual	metaphor	ABSTRACT	RELATIONS	ARE	PHYSICAL	CONNECTIONS.	 In	 a	 similar	manner,	
the	metaphorical	use	of	furi-kiru	construes	social	forces	(43)	in	terms	of	physical	forces	
(42).	By	denying	a	request	etc.	we	“free	ourselves	from	the	grasp“	of	social	forces.	It	can	
reasonably	be	suggested	that	such	force	dynamic	metaphors	underly	other	cases	as	well:	
	
hari-kiru	(stretch	out	–	KIRU)	 -->	 work	hard,	be	vigorous	
oshi-kiru	(push	–	KIRU)	 -->	 force	one’s	way	through	sth.	
fumi-kiru	(tread	on	–	KIRU)		 -->	 make	up	one’s	mind,	take	measures	towards	sth.	
	
The	 compounds	 ii-kiru	 and	 omoi-kiru	 are	 highly	 lexicalized	 and	 therefore	 not	
straightforwardly	 analyzable.	 Nonetheless	 we	 can	 try	 to	 give	 a	 tentative	 account	 in	
terms	of	the	LM	specifications	of	-kiru:		
	
(44)	 Tarô-ga	 ‘machigai	 ari-masen!’	 to	 ii-kit-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 mistake-TOP	 exist-POL.NEG	 QT	 say-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘‘I	am	absolutely	positive!’	Tarô	said	with	confidence.’	
	
LM	specifications	for	ii-kiru:	The	LM	is	a	stretch	of	discourse	(covering	an	extent	of	time).	
An	utterance	(a	punctual	event)	 functions	as	POS.	The	segment	of	discourse	preceding	
the	 utterance	 is	 characterized	 by	 uncertainty	 or	 dispute	 regarding	 the	 utterance’s	
content	 or	 the	 speaker’s	 belief.	 The	 segment	 of	 discourse	 succeeding	 the	 utterance	 is	
supposed	to	be	free	from	any	such	uncertainty.	
	
(45)	 Hanako-ga	 shôsetsuka-no	 yume-wo	 omoi-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 novelist-LK	 dream-ACC	 think-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	gave	up	her	dream	of	becoming	a	novelist.’	 	
	
LM	specifications	for	omoi-kiru:	The	LM	is	the	cognitive	subject’s	mental	state	(covering	
an	extent	of	time).	A	punctual	mental	event	functions	as	POS.	The	mental	state	preceding	
the	event	 is	characterized	by	being	about	a	certain	entity.	The	mental	state	succeeding	
the	event	is	characterized	by	not	being	about	this	entity.   
 
Thus,	ii-kiru	and	omoi-kiru	are	instances	of	the	SPLIT	schema,	in	which	the	POS	divides	
the	LM	into	qualitatively	distinct	parts.		
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11.3.	Related	Constructions	
	
Before	 concluding	 this	 chapter,	 let	 us	briefly	 consider	 some	 related	 constructions	 and	
see	how	they	fit	in	with	the	above	analyses.	
	
11.3.1.	V-kiri/V-ta	kiri	(da)	(fig.	13)	
	
(46)	 Tarô-ga	 byôki-de	 ne-ta	 kiri	 da.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 illness-INS	 sleep-PAST	 KIRI	 COP	 ‘Tarô	is	bedridden	with	an	illness.’	 	 	
	
(47)	 Hanako-ga	 ‘shira-nai’	 to	 it-te,	 damari-kiri	 dat-ta.	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 know-NEG	 QT	 say-TE	 be	silent-KIRI	 COP-PAST	 	
	 ‘Hanako	said	‘I	don’t	know’	and	then	remained	silent.’	 	
	
(48)	 Tarô-ga	 tabi-ni	 de-ta	 kiri	 kaera-nai.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 journey-DAT	 leave-PAST	 KIRI	 return-NEG	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	went	on	a	journey,	never	to	return.’	 	
	
(49)	 ‘Mata	 kake-naosu’	 to	 iw-are-ta	 kiri	 renraku-ga	 ko-nai.	
	 Again	 call-repeat	 QT	 say-PASS-PAST	 KIRI	 contact-NOM	 come-NEG	
	 ‘I’ll	call	again’	I	was	told	but	never	heard	back	(from	him/her).’	 	
	
What	 is	 important	to	note	here,	 is	 that	our	knowledge	about	the	world	equips	us	with	
certain	expectations	or	 	mental	 “scripts”	of	how	things	will	normally	play	out	 (see	e.g.	
Schank	 and	Abelson	 1977).	 For	 example,	 if	 you	 lie	 down	 (because	 you	 are	 exhausted	
etc.),	you	will	eventually	get	up	again.	A	conversation	is	characterized	by	a	steady	flow	of	
utterances.	 Someone	 who	 goes	 on	 a	 journey	 eventually	 returns.	 Someone	 makes	 a	
promise	and	then	keeps	it,	and	so	on.		
				In	the	case	of	V-ta	kiri,	however,	these	scripts	are	disrupted.	This	is	why	V-ta	kiri	often	
appears	 as	 part	 of	 the	 larger	 construction	 V-ta	 kiri	 …	 V-nai,	 where	 the	 second	 verb	
profiles	the	default	continuation	of	a	given	mental	script	(48,	49).		
	
LM	specifications	for	V-ta	kiri	(da):	The	LM	is	a	timeline	(an	unbounded	extent	of	time).	
The	V1	either	profiles	an	act	(a	punctual	event)	or	an	activity	(an	extended	event).	The	
POS	is	either	the	puncutal	event	or	the	starting	point	of	the	activity.	The	segment	of	time	
preceding	 the	 POS	 is	 characterized	 by	 conforming	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	
conceptualizer.	The	segment	of	time	succeeding	the	POS	is	characterized	by	defying	the	
expectations	of	the	conceptualizer.	
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FIGURE	13	
	
11.3.2.	Numeral	Classifier	+	kiri	
	
(50)	 Shinrai	 dekiru	 no-wa	 nijûroku-nin-no	 uchi	 tatta	 shichi-nin	 kiri	 da.	 	
	 Trust	 can	 NMLZ-TOP	 26-persons-LK	 among	 just	 seven-persons	 KIRI	 COP	 	
	 ‘Out	of	the	26	persons	a	mere	seven	can	be	trusted.’	 	
	
(51)	 DVD	media-wa	 ik-kai	 kiri-no	 kaki-komi	 da.	 	 	
	 DVD	media-TOP	 one-time	 KIRI-LK	 data	writing	 COP	 	 	
	 ‘You	can	only	burn	data	to	a	DVD	once.’		 	
	
(52)	 Machi-ni	 dekake-ta	 no-wa	 ni-do	 kiri	 da.	 	
	 Town	 go	out-PAST	 NMLZ-TOP	 two-times	 KIRI	 COP	 	
	 ‘I	only	went	to	the	town	twice	(and	never	again	since).’	 	
	
LM	 specifications	 for	 numerical	 classifier	 +	 kiri:	 The	 LM	 is	 a	 numerical	 ray	 (an	 open	
SCALE).	The	POS	is	a	point	on	this	ray.	On	the	segment	up	to	and	including	the	POS	all	
numerical	 instances	are	realized.	On	the	segment	succeeding	 the	POS	no	 instances	are	
realized.		
	
11.3.3.	kiri-ga	nai	(fig.	14)	
	
(53)	 Sonna	 koto-wo	 ki	ni	shi-te	i-tara,	 kiri-ga	 nai.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Such	as	that	 things-ACC	 worry-PROG-COND	 KIRI-NOM	 exist.NEG	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘If	you	worry	about	such	things,	there	will	be	no	end	to	it.’	
	
(54)	 Itsumade	 mat-te	mo	 kiri-ga	 nai.	 	 	 	
	 Forever	 wait-even	if	 KIRI-NOM	 exist.NEG	 ‘It’s	no	use	waiting	(here)	forever.’	 	 	
	 	 	
	
(55)	 jirei-wo	 kazoe-ageru	 to	 kiri-ga	 nai.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 examples-ACC	 count-raise	(enumerate)	 COND	 KIRI-NOM	 exist.NEG	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘(I)	could	go	on	listing	examples	forever.’	 	 	
	
This	construction	constitutes	another	“script	violation”.	Kiri-ga	nai	usually	occurs	within	
the	scope	of	a	conditional	or	counterfactual	(e.g.	V-tara,	V-eba,	V	to,	V-te	mo)	and	marks	
the	utterance	it	appears	in	as	a	warning:	Once	carried	out	the	action	profiled	by	V	will	–	
to	the	dismay	of	the	conceptualizer	–	continue	or	re-occur	ad	nauseam.		
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				In	a	“script-conforming”	timeline	V-ing	would	be	followed	by	non-V-ing.	For	example,	
someone	would	count,	finish	counting,	and	then	be	done	counting.	That	is,	the	end	of		V-
ing	would	divide	the	timeline	into	qualitatively	distinct	parts.	However,	in	the	scenario	
described	by	kiri-ga	nai,	V	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 infinite	 and	no	 such	 segmentation	 can	
occur.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	14	
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12.	AGARU	and	the	UP	Schema	
	
The	 intransitive/transitive	 pair	 agaru/ageru	 can	 be	 schematically	 characterized	 as	
follows:	
	
(A)	 X-ga	 Y-wo	 ageru	 	
	 X	CAUSE	 Y	MOVE	UP	 	 	
		
(B)	 	 Y-ga	 agaru	 	
	 	 Y	MOVE	UP	 	 	
	
AGARU	prototypically	codes	the	TR’s	movement	along	the	vertical	axis.	However,	as	we	
will	see,	some	senses	have	abandoned	the	verticality	aspect	in	favor	of	direction-neutral	
GOAL-oriented	movement.		
	
12.1.	The	Senses	of	AGARU	
	
12.1.1.	Sense	(Ia):	Spatial	Ascension	of	a	Zero-dimensional	TR	(fig.	1)	
	
(1)	 Taiyô-ga	 higashi-kara	 agaru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Sun-NOM	 east-ABL	 AGARU	 ‘The	sun	rises	from	the	east.’	 	 	 	
	
(2)	 Hikôki-ga	 sorataka-ku	 agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Plane-NOM	 sky-high-INF	 AGARU-PAST	 ‘The	plane	took	to	the	sky.’	 	 	 	
	
(3)	 Tarô-ga	 yane-no	 ue-ni	 agat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 roof-LK	 top-DAT	 AGARU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	climbed	onto	the	roof.’	 	 	
	
(4)	 Manshon-no	 erebêtâ-ga	 yonkai-made	 agaru.	 	 	 	
	 Mansion-LK	 elevator-NOM	 fourth	floor-ALL	 AGARU	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	mansion’s	elevator	goes	up	to	the	fourth	floor.’	 	 	 	
	
(5)	 Seijika-ga	 endan-ni	 agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Politician-NOM	 podium-DAT	 AGARU-PAST	 ‘The	politician	assumed	the	podium.’	 	 	 	
	
This	sense	corresponds	to	a	punctual	(zero-deminsional)	TR’s	vertical	motion	in	space.	
The	TR’s	motion	is	either	GOAL-directed	or	not.	In	configurations	like	(1)	and	(2),	there	
is	no	entity	in	profile	which	could	serve	as	GOAL	of	the	TR’s	motion.	Rather,	the	LM	here	
is	implicit	and	best	thought	of	as	“the	projection	on	the	vertical	axis	of	the	ordered	series	
of	 spatial	points	 that	 the	 trajector	occupies,	often	successively	 through	 time”	 (Lindner	
1981:	148).	Sentences	(3)-(5),	on	the	other	hand,	profile	a	LM	–	marked	by	ni	or	made	–		
towards	 which	 the	 TR’s	 path	 of	 motion	 is	 directed,	 i.e.	 a	 GOAL.	 Note	 that	 AGARU	 is	
neutral	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 TR’s	manner	 (float,	 jump,	 etc.)	 and	 path	 of	motion	 (zig-zag,	
swerve,	etc.)	–	although	a	straight	vertical	line	is	arguably	the	most	prototypical	PATH.		
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FIGURE	1	
	
12.1.2.	Sense	(Ib):	Abstract	Ascension	of	Zero-dimensional	TR	(Social	Ascension)	
	
(6)	 Hanako-ga	 kotoshi-no	 shiken-de	 jûban	 agat-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 this	year-LK	 test-INS	 ten	places	 AGARU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	went	up	ten	places	in	this	year’s	exam.’	 	
	
(7)	 Kono	 jôhô-ga	 shachô-ni-made	 agat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 This	 information-NOM	 CEO-DAT-ALL	 AGARU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘This	information	made	its	way	up	to	the	CEO.’	 	
	
(8)	 Tarô-ga	 shusse	 shi-te,	 takai	 chii-ni	 agat-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 success	 do-TE	 high	 position-DAT	 AGARU-PAST	 	
	 ‘Tarô	has	reached	a	high	position	in	his	career.’	 	
	
(9)	 Hanako-ga	 kodomo-wo	 ii	 gakkô-ni	 ageru	 to	 kesshin	 shi-ta.	
	 Hanako-NOM	 children-ACC	 good	 school-DAT	 AGERU	 QT	 determination	 do-PAST	
	 ‘Hanako	is	determined	to	send	her	children	to	a	good	school.’	
	
This	is	an	extension	of	(Ia)	which	maps	rise	in	the	social	domain	onto	vertical	motion	in	
space,	while	preserving	the	zero-dimensional	nature	of	the	TR.	I.e.,	Hanako,	jôhô,	etc.	are	
all	conceived	of	as	punctual	entities.	Again,	there	is	a	GOAL-directed	(7,8,9)	and	a	non-
GOAL-directed	variant	(6).		
	
12.1.3.	Sense	(IIa):	Spatial	Extension	along	the	Vertical	Axis	(fig.	2)	
	
(10)	 Entotsu-kara	 kemuri-ga	 agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Chimney-ABL	 smoke-NOM	 AGARU-PAST	 ‘Smoke	rose	from	the	chimney.’	 	 	 	
	
(11)	 Shio-ga	 hiza-made	 agat-te	 ki-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tide-NOM	 knee-ALL	 AGARU-TE	 come-PAST	 ‘The	tide	has	risen	knee-high.’	 	 	
	
In	contrast	to	(Ia)	and	(Ib),	this	sense	does	not	involve	a	change	of	location	of	the	TR	in	
its	entirety,	but	rather	the	TR’s	extension	along	the	vertical	axis.	In	other	words,	the	TR		
successively	 comes	 to	 occupy	 additional	 points	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis	 without	
abandoning	 the	ones	 it	 is	already	occupying.	Although	verticality	 is	 certainly	 the	most	
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salient	dimension	here	it	would	seem	odd	to	speak	of	a	“one-dimensional”	TR	(e.g.,	the	
TR	in	[11]	is	clearly	horizontally	extended	as	well).		
				The	 connection	between	 this	 sense	 and	 (Ia)	 becomes	obvious	once	we	 consider	 the	
concept	of	active	zones:		
	
“Entities	are	often	multifaceted,	only	certain	facets	being	able	to	interact	with	a	particular	domain	or	play	
a	direct	role	 in	a	 	particular	relationship.	Those	 facets	of	an	entity	capable	of	 interacting	directly	with	a	
given	domain	or	relation	are	referred	 to	as	 the	active	 zone	of	 the	entity	with	respect	 to	 the	domain	or	
relation	in	question.”	(Langacker	1987:	272-73)	
	
I.e.,	in	(10)	and	(11)	it	is	only	a	facet	(a	substructure)	of	the	TR	that	actually	undergoes	a	
change	of	location.	Consequently,	if	we	focus	our	attention	only	on	the	top	portion	of	the	
respective	TRs	(e.g.	just	the	surface	instead	of	the	whole	body	of	water	in	[11]),	we	end	
up	with	sense	(Ia).	However,	the	water	and	the	smoke	as	a	whole	are	more	salient	than	
their	 respective	 active	 zones	 –	 presumably	 because	 they	 are	 more	 coherent	 gestalts.	
Thus,	the	larger	structures	are	elevated	to	the	level	of	TR,	resulting	in	an	image	schema	
transformation	of	the	type	punctual	TR	-->	extended	TR.		
				Like	the	previous	senses,	(IIa)	varies	with	respect	to	GOAL-orientation.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	2	
		
12.1.4.	Sense	(IIb):	Abstract	Extension	along	the	Vertical	Axis		
	
(12)	 Kion-ga	 37-do-made	 agat-ta.	 	
	 Temperature-NOM	 37	degrees-ALL	 AGARU-PAST.	 ‘The	temperature	has	risen	to	37	degrees.’	
	
(13)	 Kono	 terebi	dorama-no	 ninki-ga	 agat-te,	 fan-mo	 fue-ta.	 	
	 This	 TV	series-LK	 popularity-NOM	 AGARU-TE	 fans-also	 increase-PAST	 	
	 ‘This	TV	series	has	risen	in	popularity	and	garnered	more	fans.’	 	
	
(14)	 Tarô-ga	 kodomo-no	 seiseki-wo	 ageru	 tame-ni	 katei	kyôshi-wo	 yatot-ta.	
	 Tarô-NOM	 children-LK	 grades-ACC	 AGERU	 sake-DAT	 private	teacher	 hire-PAST	
	 ‘Tarô		hired	a	private	teacher	in	order	to	improve	his	children’s	grades.’	
	
(15)	 Iraira	suru	 to,	 ketsuatsu-ga	 agat-te	shimau.	 	 	 	
	 Get	irritated	 COND	 blood	pressure	 AGARU-IRR	 	 	 	
	 ‘If	you	get	irritated,	your	blood	pressure	will	go	up.’	 	
	
 121 
This	sense	is	an	extension	from	(IIa)	via	the	conceptual	metaphor	MORE	IS	UP.	As	Lakoff	
and	 Turner	 (1989:	 83)	 have	 pointed	 out,	 verticality	 and	 quantitative	 increase	 are	
experientially	 correlated,	 since	 “we	 constantly	 encounter	 cases	 where	 an	 increase	 in	
substance	(e.g.,	pouring	more	water	in	a	glass)	increases	the	height	of	the	substance	(e.g.,	
the	level	of	the	water	in	the	glass).”	For	image	schematic	topology,	this	means	that	the	
abstract	TR	(temperature,	blood	pressure,	etc.)	is	conceived	of	as	an	object	successively	
extending	along	the	vertical	dimension.	Quantitative	increase	is	therefore	incompatible	
with	a	zero-dimensional	TR	(obviously	a	0DTR	lacks	height).		
	
12.1.5.	Sense	(III):	Subtractive	Completion	(fig.	3)	
	
(16)	 Ame-ga	 agat-tara,	 soto-ni	 de-yô.	 	
	 Rain-NOM	 AGARU-when	 outside-DAT	 go	out-VOL	 ‘Let’s	go	outside	once	the	rain	has	ceased.’	
	
(17)	 Kuruma-no	 batterii-ga	 agat-te	shimat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Car-LK	 battery-NOM	 AGARU-IRR-PAST	 ‘The	car	battery	is	drained.’	 	 	 	
	
(18)	 Kono	 shigoto-ga	 kotoshi	 inai-ni	 agaru	 to	 ii	 nâ.	
	 This	 work-NOM	 this	year	 within-DAT	 AGARU	 COND	 good	 EMPH	
	 ‘I	sure	hope	we	can	finish	this	work	within	the	year.’	
	
In	 the	 above	 sentences	agaru	 expresses	 completion.	We	 find	 a	 similar	 extension	 from	
vertical	motion	to	completion	in	English	and	German	verb	particle	constructions	(V	up	
and	auf-V,	respectively).	As	Lindner	(1981)	has	pointed	out	in	her	discussion	of	the	V	up	
construction,	vertical	motion	is	often	GOAL-directed:	“[…]	most	extensions	from	vertical	
UP	incorporate	with	increased	salience	a	final,	bounding	loacation	or	state	[…]	The	more	
saliently	the	final	locaton	or	state	figures	in	the	meaning	of	UP,	the	more	this	location	or	
state	may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 directing	 or	 defining	 the	 path”	 (Lindner	 1981:	 180).	 This	
applies	 to	 AGARU	 as	 well.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 senses	 (I)	 and	 (II)	 may	 involve	 GOALs	
(marked	by	ni	or	made)	which	indicate	the	final	location	of	the	TR	or	the	end	point	of	the	
TR’s	 extension.	 She	 further	 notes	 that	 “[a]s	 	 UP	 extends	 into	 abstract	 domains,	 literal	
verticality	becomes	less	salient”	(Lindner	1981:	180).	Here,	too,	we	see	a	parallel.	While	
the	 vertical	 dimension	 of	 AGARU	 is	 preserved	 throughout	 the	 mappings	 in	 the	 non-
spatial	senses	(Ib)	and	(IIb),	its	salience	is	certainly	lowered.	For	example,	although	we	
tend	to	think	of	a	“rise”	in	temperature	in	terms	of	extension	along	the	vertical	axis,	it	is	
not	 impossible	 to	 conceptualize	 such	 quantitative	 increases	 in	 terms	 of	 horizontal	
extension	 as	 well	 (e.g.	 form	 left	 to	 right).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 take-off	 of	 a	 plane	 etc.	
necessarily	 involves	 the	vertical	dimension.	We	can	 therefore	conclude	 that	verticality	
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gradually	“bleaches	out”	as	AGARU	extends	 into	abstract	domains.	 (III)	seems	to	mark	
the	end	point	of	this	development:	The	vertical	dimension	simply	plays	no	role	in	(16)-
(18).		
				In	 summary,	 then,	we	can	attribute	 the	extension	of	AGARU	 from	vertical	motion	 to	
completion	to	two	major	salience	shifts:		
	
• The	heightened	salience	of	GOAL-directedness	
• The	lowered	salience	of	the	vertical	dimension	
	
Let	us	now	examine	what	kind	of	completive	process	AGARU	expresses.	Lindner	(1981:	
194)	recognizes	“at	least	two	ways	a	process	can	reach	a	goal	–	by	acting	on	the	entire	
substance	of	 its	object	and	by	effecting	a	sufficiently	salient	state	change	in	 its	object.”	
To	illustrate,	consider	the	following	sentences	(based	on	Lindner	1981):	
	
(19)	 John	ate	up	the	sandwich.	 (congruence	between	process	and	processed	region)	
(20)	 Sally	tightened	up	the	screw.	 (achievement	of	goal	state)	
	
	The	major	difference	between	(19)	and	(20)	 lies	 in	how	the	process	expressed	by	the	
simplex	 verb	 acts	 on	 its	 object.	 As	 Lindner	 (1981:	 204)	 points	 out,	 processes	 such	 as	
eating	are	special	in	that	they	“measure	completeness	against	the	amount	of	the	object	
affected;	 UP	 codes	 the	 gradual	 spreading	 out	 of	 the	 abstract	 processed	 region	 as	 it	
reaches	 its	goal,	which	 is	 the	 capacity	or	boundary	or	 limits	of	 the	object	affected.”	 In	
other	words,	one	can	measure	the	progress	of	eating	by	tracking	the	state	of	whatever	is	
being	eaten.	The	same	observation	underlies	Dowty’s	notion	of	incremental	theme:		
	
[…]	if	I	tell	my	son	to	mow	the	lawn	(right	now)	and	then	look	at	the	lawn	an	hour	later,	I	will	be	able	to	
conclude	something	about	the	“aspect”	of	the	event	of	his	mowing	the	lawn	fromt	the	state	of	the	lawn,	viz.,	
that	the	event	is	either	not	yet	begun,	partly	done	but	not	finished,	or	completed,	according	to	whether	the	
grass	on	the	 lawn	 is	all	 tall,	partly	short	or	all	 short.	On	the	other	hand	I	will	not	necessarily	be	able	 to	
inspect	the	state	of	my	son	and	conclude	anything	at	all	about	his	completion	of	his	mowing	the	lawn.	In	
this	event,	my	son	is	the	Agent	and	the	lawn	is	the	Theme,	in	fact	the	Incremental	Theme.	(Dowty	1991:	
567)	
	
In	contrast,	the	screw	in	(20)	is	not	an	incremental	theme	in	the	above	sense,	since	there	
is	 no	 portion	 of	 the	 screw	 which	 is	 gradually	 consumed	 or	 encroached	 upon	 by	 the	
process	of	tightening.		
				Returning	 to	agaru	 (note,	by	 the	way,	 that	 there	 is	no	 transitive	variant	of	 [III]),	we	
can	now	see	that	the	relevant	entities	in	(16)-(18)	–	rain,	battery,	and	work	–	are	similar	
in	 their	 behavior	 to	 incremental	 themes.	 	 Take	 (18)	 for	 example:	 Here,	 we	 have	 a	
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quantifiable	 amount	 of	 a	 certain	 (abstract)	 substance,	 i.e.	 work.	 This	 substance	 is	
implicitly	 assumed	 to	 be	 bounded,	 its	 boundaries	 constituting	 the	 LM	 of	 agaru.	
Consequently,	agaru	profiles	what	Lindner	(1981:	194)	calls	a	“subtractive	process”,	i.e.	
a	process	which	gradually	encroaches	upon	a	substance	towards	its	intrinsic	boundaries	
–	 the	TR	of	agaru	 being	 the	processed	 region.	 In	other	words,	 as	we	are	working,	 the	
“substance	of	work”	gradually	depletes	until	 the	depleted	region	 finally	coincides	with	
the	initial	workload.	The	same	topology	is	easily	applicable	to	the	depletion	of	a	battery,	
so	(17)	is	straightforwardly	accounted	for.	But	what	about	(16)?	To	be	sure,	rain	seems	
to	be	 lacking	 in	 incrementality,	since	the	corresponding	process	 is	not	 inherently	telic,	
i.e.	goal-oriented	like	the	draining	of	a	battery.	By	inspecting	how	much	rain	has	fallen	
we	cannot	(at	least	not	reliably)	tell	how	much	rain	“is	left”.	However,	telicity,	where	not	
inherent,	 is	 usually	 supplied	 by	 our	 knowledge	 that	 potentially	open-ended	processes	
(like	 working	 or	 raining)	 are	 not	 actually	 endless.	 	 Therefore,	 considering	 our	
encyclopedic	knowledge,	the	schematic	topology	of	agaru	is	perfectly	coherent	in	cases	
like	(16):	Since	rain	does	not	continue	endlessly,	it	makes	sense	to	imagine	that	there	is	
some	 limited	 amount	 of	 rain	 (although	we	 do	 not	 know	 how	much),	which	 gradually	
depletes	 until	 the	 depleted	 amount	 coincides	with	 the	 initial	 amount	 (however	much	
that	may	be).	Viewed	in	this	light,	the	question	of	telicity	becomes	an	epistemic	one.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	3:	The	hatched	area	marks	the	unprocessed	region	of	the	LM.	
	
12.1.6.	Sense	(IV):	Access	(fig.	4)	
	
(21)	 Konkai-no	 torihiki-de	 hyakumanen-no	 rieki-ga	 agat-ta.	 	 	
	 Last-LK	 deal-INS	 1.000.000	yen-LK	 profit-NOM	 AGARU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	last	deal	yielded	a	profit	of	1.000.000	yen.’	 	
	
(22)	 Gutaiteki-na	 shôko-ga	 agaru-made	 matsu	 shika	nai.	 	 	
	 Concrete-COP.ATT	 evidence-NOM	 AGARU-ALL	 wait	 no	choice	but	 	 	
	 ‘We	have	no	choice	but	to	wait	until	some	concrete	evidence	emerges.’	 	
	
(23)	 Kôhosha	 toshite	 kare-no	 namae-ga	 agat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Candidate	 as	 he-LK	 name-NOM	 AGARU-RES	 	 	
	 ‘His	name	popped	up	for	the	candidacy.’	 	
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(24)	 Betsu-no	 rei-wo	 age-te	 kudasai.	 	 	 	
	 Different-LK	 example-ACC	 AGERU-IMP	 please	 ‘Please	give	a	different	example.’	 	 	
	
We	have	access	to	the	world	through	our	perceptive	faculties	–	our	sense	of	vision	being	
of	 paramount	 importance.	 However,	 the	 structure	 of	 our	 bodies	 (assuming	 a	
prototypical	 upright	 pose)	 limits	 the	 scope	 of	 our	 visual	 field.	What	 is	 on	 the	 ground,	
below	the	waist,	etc.	is	outside	the	field	of	vision	(again,	assuming	a	prototypical	pose)	
and	cannot	be	accessed	unless	we	either	look	down	or	the	entity	in	question	is	elevated	
to	 the	 line	of	visual	access.1	Therefore,	 if	we	want	someone	to	consider	something,	we	
need	to	“bring	it	up“.	This	construal	of	access	in	terms	of	vertical	elevation	subtly	differs	
from	the	alternate	construal	 in	 terms	of	CONTAINMENT	which	I	have	discussed	 in	the	
study	of		DERU:	In	the	case	of	AGARU	there	is	no	particular	obstacle	(e.g.	a	CONTAINER)	
which	 is	 blocking	 the	TR	 from	being	 accessed.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 difference	between	
DERU	 and	 AGARU	 corresponds	 to	 the	 difference	 between	 out	 and	 up	 in	 English	 verb	
particle	constructions.	As	Lindner	puts	it:		
	
OUT	profiles	as	its	LM	its	trajector’s	original	private	or	concealed	state,	whereas	UP	codes	its	trajector’s	
coming	into	view	with	no	salient	previous	history	or	source.	Compare	100	people	turned	out	for	the	party	
to	100	people	turned	up	for	the	party.	The	 former	has	a	 feeling	that	 the	people	came	from	the	privacy	of	
their	 homes	 into	 the	 domain	 of	 possible	 interaction	 with	 others.	 The	 latter	 suggests	 that	 they	 simply	
appeared,	with	the	feeling	that	they	may	have	come	spontaneously	off	the	street.	(Lindner	1982:	319)		
	
Consider	the	following	pairs:		
	
(25a)	 Tarô-ga	 shôko-wo	 dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 evidence-ACC	 DASU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
(25b)	 Tarô-ga		 shôko-wo	 age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 evidence-ACC	 AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
‘Tarô	gave	evidence.’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(26a)	 Tarô-ga	 jirei-wo	 dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 example-ACC	 DASU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
(26b)	 Tarô-ga	 jirei-wo	 age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 example-ACC	 AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
‘Tarô	gave	an	example.’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
																																																								
1	See	Lindner	(1981:	163):	“From	our	experience,	we	know	that	when	an	object	is	low,	it	often	is	among	
other	objects	which	obscure	it	from	view;	when	it	is	prone,	we	are	likely	to	overlook	it.	An	object	that	is	
high	appears	larger,	is	unobstructed	and	easier	to	see.”	
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Both	(a)	and	(b)	have	in	common	that	Tarô	makes	the	TR	accessible,	but	differ	in	how	
this	is	achieved.	In	the	(a)	versions	the	evidence	and	the	example	are	construed	as	being	
brought	out	of	an	 initially	concealed	state.	 In	contrast,	 the	(b)	versions	construe	 these	
entities	as	“public”.	In	these	cases	they	are	made	accessible	merely	by	pointing	them	out,	
i.e.	by	directing	someone	else’s	attention	towards	what	is	already	in	the	public	domain.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	4	
	
12.2.	The	Senses	of	V-AGARU	
	
12.2.1.	Spatial	Ascension	of	a	Zero-dimensional	TR		
	
(27)	 Sore-wo	 kiku	 to	 Tarô-ga	 tobi-agat-te,	 yorokon-da.	 	
	 That-ACC	 hear	 when	 Tarô-NOM	 jump-AGARU-TE	 rejoice-PAST	 	
	 ‘When	Tarô	heard	that,	he	jumped	for	joy.’	 	
	
(28)	 Hanako-ga	 jûwaki-wo	 tori-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 receiver-ACC	 take-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	took	up	the	receiver.’	 	 	 	
	
(29)	 Tarô-ga	 bôru-wo	 taka-ku	 keri-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 ball-ACC	 high-INF	 kick-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	kicked	the	ball	high.’	 	 	
	
This	usage	corresponds	to	sense	(Ia)	of	the	simplex	verb.	The	V1	expresses	the	manner	
or	 cause	 of	 the	 TR’s	 ascension.	 Analogous	 senses	 of	 the	 V-up	 and	 German	 auf-V	
constructions	are	given	below:	
	
(30)	 John	picked	up	the	receiver.	
(31)	 The	rocket	shot	up	into	the	air.	
(32)	 Mary	climbed	up	the	wall.	
	
(33)	 Hans	hob	den	Ball	vom	Boden	auf.	 (aufheben)	
	 Hans	picked	up	the	ball	from	the	floor.	
	
	
(34)	 Die	Rakete	schoss	in	den	Himmel	auf.	 (aufschießen)	
	 The	rocket	shot	up	into	the	sky.	
	
	
(35)	 Anna	scheuchte	die	Tauben	auf.	 (aufscheuchen)	
	 Anna	scared	up	the	pigeons	 	
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Note	 that	 the	metaphor	 ELEVATION	TO	HANDLEVEL	 IS	 AVAILABILITY	 FOR	USE/ACTION	 (Lindner	
1981:	161)	applies	cross-linguistically:	
	
(36)	 Iinkai-ga	 kaiin-no	 teian-wo	 tori-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 	Committee-NOM	 member-LK	 proposal-ACC	 take-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	committee	took	up	the	member’s	proposal.’	 	
	
(37)	 John	took	up	tennis	as	a	hobby.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(38)	 Der	Physiker	hat	seine	alte	Theorie	wieder	aufgegriffen.	(aufgreifen)	
	 ‘The	physicist	took	up	his	former	theory	again.’	
	
As	Himeno	(1976:	101)	points	out,	some	uses	of	V-ageru	do	not	involve	the	ascension	of	
a	concrete	object	but	rather	indicate	the	vertical	direction	of	the	process	itself:	
	
(39)	 Tarô-ga	 sora-wo	 mi-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 sky-ACC	 look-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	gazed	at	the	sky.’	 	 	 	
	
The	TR	in	(39)	is	Tarô’s	gaze	itself,	reified	as	the	vector	of	his	line	of	vision.	Since	a	line	is	
obviously	one-dimensional,	it	seems	counterintuitive	to	speak	of	a	zero-dimensional	TR	
in	 this	 case.	However,	 the	 relevant	motion	 is	not	 extension	along	 the	vertical	 axis	but	
ascension	of	 the	 individual	points	(zero-dimensional	entities)	which	together	make	up	
his	line	of	vision.	In	terms	of	schematic	topology,	this	is	similar	to	the	case	of	flip	up	the	
lever,	where	the	end	of	the	lever	serves	as	active	zone	for	up		(Lindner	1981:	153).	The	
difference	 between	 a	 lever	 and	 a	 line	 of	 sight	 is,	 of	 course,	 that	 the	 line	 of	 sight	 is	
unbounded	 (i.e.,	 there	 is	 no	 single	 point	 corresponding	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 lever).	
Consequently,	the	role	of	active	zone	is	assumed	by	the	entirety	of	points	on	the	line	of	
sight,	 rather	 than	 one	 salient	 point	 in	 particular	 (although	 one	 could	 single	 out	 a	
particular	point	at	random).		
				As	far	as	argument	structure	is	concerned,	note	that	(39)	can	roughly	be	paraphrased	
as:	
	
(40)	 Tarô-ga	 shisen-wo	 age-te,	 sora-wo	 mita.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 gaze-ACC	 ageru-TE	 sky-ACC	 look	 ‘Tarô	directed	his	gaze	upwards	to	the	sky.’	
	
In	contrast	to	(27)-(29),	the	entity	which	undergoes	ascension	in	(39)	is	quite	abstract	
and	 therefore	not	salient	enough	 to	be	realized	as	an	overt	nominal.	This	explains	 the	
infelicity	of	*Tarô-ga	sora-wo	age-ta.		
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12.2.2.	Abstract	Ascension	of	a	Zero-dimensional	TR	(Social	Ascension)	
	
(41)	 Fuka-ku	 o-rei-wo	 môshi-age-masu.	 	 	 	 	
	 Deep-INF	 HON-thank-ACC	 speak.HUM-AGERU-POL	 ‘I	thank	you	deeply.’	 	 	 	
	
(42)	 Seifu-ga	 nômin-kara	 kome-wo	 kai-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Government-NOM	 farmers-ABL	 rice-ACC	 buy-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	government	bought	rice	from	the	farmers.’	 	
	
(43)	 Shachô-ga	 hikui	 mibun-kara	 nari-agat-ta.	 	 	 	
	 CEO-NOM	 low	 status-ABL	 become-AGARU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	CEO	made	his	way	up	from	a	modest	background.’	 	
	
This	sense	is	analogous	to	sense	(Ib)	of	the	simplex	verb	in	that	it	maps	vertical	motion	
in	space	onto	 the	social	domain.	To	be	sure,	entities	such	as	kome	 (rice)	are	not	zero-
dimensional	 per	 se	 (i.e.,	 rice	 is	 an	 unbounded	 mass).	 However,	 kau	 (buy)	 evokes	 a	
commercial	 frame	 in	 which	 bounded	 quantities	 are	 exchanged.	 Secondly,	 on	 a	 more	
general	note,	AGARU	in	the	above	sentences	entails	change	of	place	in	the	social	domain	
–	which	in	turn	requires	that	the	TR	be	construed	as	a	bounded	moving	entity	with	no	
salient	 dimensions.	 Therefore	 “ascension	 of	 0DTR”	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 follows:	
Although	the	TR	may	have	more	than	zero	dimensions,	none	of	them	are	salient	in	terms	
of	 image	 schematic	 topology.	 Therein	 lies	 the	 contrast	 to	 spatial	 extension,	 which	
requires	precisely	one	salient	dimension.			
				Since	 structuring	 the	 social	 domain	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis	 is	 cross-culturally	
widespread	(although	I	would	not	venture	to	say	“universal”),	it	is	hardly	surprising	to	
find	parallel	constructions	in	English	and	German:	
	
(44)	 John	climbed	up	the	ladder	to	vice	president.	
	
(45)	 Hans	ist	bis	zum	Vizepräsidenten	aufgestiegen.	(aufsteigen)	
	 Hans	made	it	to	vice	president.	
	
12.2.3.	GOAL-oriented	Spatial	Movement	(Bleached	Verticality)	(fig.	5)	
	
(46)	 Nibanme-no	 uma-ga	 kyûsoku-ni	 oi-age-te	 ki-ta.	 	 	
	 Second-LK	 horse-NOM	 rapidly	 chase-AGERU-TE	 come-past	 	 	
	 ‘The	horse	in	second	place	caught	up	rapidly.’	 	
	
Recall	 from	 (III)	 above	 that	 heightened	 salience	 of	 GOAL-directedness	 can	 eventually	
“bleach	out”	the	verticality	aspect	of	AGARU.	This	appears	to	be	the	case	in	(46),	where	
oi-ageru	 profiles	 GOAL-directed	 motion	 along	 the	 horizontal	 axis.	 Note	 that	 the	
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phenomenon	 of	 bleached	 verticality	 applies	 to	 English	 and	 German	 particle	 verbs	 as	
well:	
	
(47)	 A	man	walked	up	to	me	and	asked	for	a	cigarette.	
(48)	 John	met	up	with	his	sister	in	a	coffee	shop.	
	
(49)	 Der	Läufer	hat	wieder	zur	Gruppe	aufgeschlossen.	(aufschließen)	
	 The	runner	caught	up	with	the	field	again.	
	
(50)	 Der	Lastwagenfahrer	ist	zu	dicht	aufgefahren.	(auffahren)	
	 The	truck	driver	drove	to	close	to	the	car	in	front.	
	
Although	at	first	glance	the	vertical	dimension	seems	to	play	no	role	in	any	of	the	above	
scenes,	 Lindner	 (1981:	 181)	 suggests	 that	 GOAL-directedness	 may	 be	 rooted	 in	
verticality	after	all,	pointing	out	that	entities	subjectively	increase	along	the	vertical	axis	
as	distance	from	the	conceptualizer	decreases.	Consider	the	following	sentence	pair:	
	
(51)	 Mary	walked	up	to	me.	
(52)	 Mary	walked	up	to	John.	
	
In	 (51)	 the	 TR	 of	 walked	 up	 (Mary)	 moves	 closer	 towards	 the	 observer,	 thereby	
occupying	more	space	 in	 the	visual	 field	–	with	 the	most	salient	 increase	 in	size	being	
the	 one	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis.	 As	 GOAL	 of	 Mary’s	 PATH,	 the	 observer	 perceives	 an	
increased	height	in	the	TR.	In	(52),	on	the	other	hand,	no	such	increase	is	perceived	by	
the	 observer	 directly.	 Here	 the	 experience	 of	 increased	 height	 can	 only	 be	 obtained	
“virtually”,	i.e.	by	the	observer	mentally	putting	himself	in	John’s	place.	Naturally,	then,	
this	 experience	 of	 vertical	 increase	 becomes	 less	 and	 less	 salient	 where	 GOAL	 and	
conceptualizer	do	not	coincide.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	5	
	
				However,	 returning	 to	 (46),	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 oi-ageru	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 only	
instance	 of	 V-AGARU	 indicating	 non-vertical	 GOAL-oriented	motion	 in	 physical	 space.	
Furthermore,	oi-ageru	has	a	second	use	different	from	the	one	in	(46):	
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(53)	 Inu-ga	 hitsuji-wo	 oka-no	 ue-ni	 oi-age-ta.	 	 	
	 Dog-NOM	 sheep-ACC	 hill-LK	 top-DAT	 chase-AGERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	dog	chased	the	sheep	up	the	hill.’	 	
	
In	the	above	sentence	oi-ageru	indicates	caused	motion	into	an	upwards	direction.	The	
verticality	aspect	is	fully	intact	here.	Considering	this,	it	is	possible	that	the	usage	in	(46)	
has	 developed	 by	 invited	 inferencing	 from	 the	 one	 in	 (53),	 i.e.	 from	 chase	XY	 into	an	
upwards	direction	to	simply	catch	up	to	XY.	In	other	words,	the	meaning	extension	could	
be	 more	 contextual	 than	 conceptual	 in	 nature.	 In	 fact,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	
plausible	 account,	 since	 it	 would	 also	 explain	 why	 the	 transitive	 form	 -ageru	 is	 used	
instead	of	-agaru.	
				Nevertheless	it	was	worth	pointing	out	the	connection	between	increase	in	hight	and	
GOAL-oriented	motion	–	firstly,	for	the	sake	of	cross-linguistic	comparison	and	secondly,	
because	it	may	partly	explain	the	following	sense	of	V-AGARU.		
	
12.2.4.	GOAL-oriented	Non-spatial	Movement	(Bleached	Verticality)	(fig.	7)	
	
(54)	 Tarô-ga	 yotei-wo	 isshûkan	 kuri-age-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 plans-ACC	 one	week	 reel	in-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	moved	up	his	plans	by	a	week.’	 	
	
The	verb	kuru	in	its	original	spatial	sense	profiles	caused	motion	of	a	thin,	linear	object	
towards	the	conceptualizer:	
	
(55)	 Ito-wo	 kuru	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Thread-ACC	 coil	up	 ‘To	coil	up	a	thread’	 	 	 	 	
	
While	such	motion	prototypically	 involves	elevation	to	handlevel,	 it	will	also	affect	the	
shape	of	an	object,	 i.e.	 a	 thread	of	wool	will	 take	 the	shape	of	ball,	 a	 line	will	 take	 the	
shape	 of	 a	 coil,	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 these	 cases	 GOAL-directed	 motion	 (towards	 the	
conceptualizer)	 coincides	 with	 an	 increase	 along	 the	 salient	 vertical	 axis	 (see	 fig.	 6).	
Both	aspects	are	preserved	throughout	the	metaphorical	mapping:		
	
• The	entity	is	“elevated	to	handlevel“	and	therefore	moved	into	the	domain	of	
action	and	actuality	(cf.	They	moved	up	the	grand	opening	to	January).	
• The	entity	“increases	in	size“,	and	therefore	importance,	as	it	becomes	less	
distant	from	the	conceptualizer.		
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FIGURE	6:	schematic	depiction	of	ito-wo	kuru	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	7:	schematic	depiction	of	yotei-wo	kuri-ageru	
	
12.2.5.	Spatial	Extension	along	the	Vertical	Axis	
	
(56)	 Tarô-ga	 hako-wo	 tsumi-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 boxes-ACC	 pile-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	piled	up	the	boxes.’	 	 	 	
	
(57)	 Hanako-ga	 nobi-agat-te,	 hon-wo	 tor-ô	to	shi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 stretch-AGARU-TE	 book-ACC	 take-INT-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	stretched	and	tried	to	take	the	book.’	 	
	
(58)	 Tarô-ga	 isu-kara	 tachi-agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 chair-ABL	 stand-AGARU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	stood	up	from	the	chair.’	 	 	 	
	
This	sense	corresponds	to	(IIa)	of	the	simplex	verb.	Here,	-AGARU	encodes	various	ways	
in	which	 an	 entity	may	 extend	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis	without	 undergoing	 a	 complete	
change	 of	 location.	 In	 (56),	 for	 instance,	 several	 uniplex	 entities	 (discrete	 boxes)	 are	
piled	onto	one	another,	resulting	in	the	vertical	extension	of	a	multiplex	entity	(the	pile).	
(57)	 and	 (58),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 encode	 vertical	 extension	of	 the	TR	 into	 an	upright	
position.				
				Note	 that	 canonical	 standing	 posture	 is	 commonly	 associated	 with	 readiness	 for	
activity,	giving	rise	to	the	metaphor	READY	IS	UP:	
	
(59)	 Tarô-ga	 chôsen-ni	 tachi-agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 challenge-DAT	 stand-AGARU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	stood	up	to	the	challenge.’	 	 	 	 	
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(60)	 Pasokon-ga	 tachi-agat-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 PC-NOM	 stand-AGARU-PAST	 ‘The	PC	booted	up.’	 	 	 	 	
	
It	is	thus	unsurprising	that	we	should	find	similar	expressions	in	English	and	German:	
	
(61)	 Is	anyone	up	for	some	ice	cream?	
	
(62)	 Seine	Freunde	haben	ihn	wieder	aufgerichtet.	(aufrichten)	
	 His	friends	lifted	his	spirits	again.	
	
12.2.6.	Abstract	Extension	along	the	Vertical	Axis	
	
(63)	 Korekutâ-tachi-ga	 ôkushon-de	 kaiga-no	 nedan-wo	 seri-age-ta.	 	 	
	 Collector-PL-NOM	 auction-INS	 painting-LK	 price-ACC	 make	bid-AGERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	collectors	bid	up	the	painting’s	price	at	the	auction.’	 	 	
	
This	corresponds	to	sense	(IIb)	of	the	simplex	verb.	I.e.,	the	abstract	TR	is	conceived	of	
as	an	object	successively	extending	along	the	vertical	dimension.		
	
12.2.7.	Multidimensional	Spatial	Extension	(fig.	8)	
	
(64)	 Ashi-ga	 hari-agat-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Foot-NOM	 swell-	AGARU-RES	 ‘The	foot	is	swollen	up.’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(65)	 Zenshin-no	 kekkan-ga	 fukure-agari,	 hageshi-ku	 myaku-wo	 ut-ta.	 	 	
	 Whole	body	 blood	vessel	 swell-AGARU.CONJ	 intense-INF	 pulse-ACC	 beat-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	blood	vessels	in	his/her	body	swelled	up	and	the	heart	beat	intensely.’	 	 	
	
As	pointed	out	by	Lindner	(1981:	152),	vertical	extension	is	sometimes	accompanied	by	
a	 simultaneous	 extension	 into	 other	 dimensions.	 Put	 in	 another	way,	 when	 an	 object	
grows	 in	 size,	 its	 increase	 along	 the	 vertical	 dimension	 is	 typically	 the	 most	 salient	
change.	Consequently,	vertical	extension	can	stand	metonymically	for	overall	growth:		
	
(66)	 My	foot	is	all	swollen	up.	
	
(67)	 Die	Kröte	hat	sich	aufgebläht.	(aufblähen)	
	 The	toad	blew	itself	up	into	a	bloated	state.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	8	
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12.2.8.	Vertical	Encroachment	(fig.	9)	
	
(68)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-no	 kami-wo	 kari-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-LK	 hair-ACC	 trim-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	cropped	the	hair	at	the	back	of	Tarô’s	head.’	 	
	
(69)	 Atama-ga	 hage-agat-te	iru	 node,	 fuke-te	 mieru.	 	 	
	 Head-NOM	 bald-AGARU-RES	 because	 grow	old-TE	 look	 	 	
	 ‘Because	his	hair	has	receeded,	he	looks	old.’	 	
	
We	have	already	discussed	some	similar	processes	under	(III).	The	above	examples	(68)	
and	(69)	feature	a	region	made	up	of	some	substance	(in	this	case	hair),	which	is	then	
subsequently	encroached	upon	along	the	vertical	dimension	by	the	process	encoded	by	
the	 V1.	 As	 such,	 this	 sense	 bears	 a	 strong	 family	 resemblance	 to	 what	 I	 have	 called	
substractive	completion.	However,	it	differs	from	the	latter	in	that	it	actually	involves	the	
vertical	dimension	in	physical	space.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	9:	The	hatched	area	marks	the	unprocessed	region	of	the	LM.	
	
12.2.9.	Completion	1:	Subtractive	Completion	
	
(70)	 Arubamu-wa	 hyakumanmai-wo	 uri-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Album-TOP	 1.000.000	units-ACC	 sell-AGERU-PAST	 ‘The	album	sold	1.000.000	units.’	 	 	 	
	
(71)	 Tarô-ga	 isshûkan	 kake-te,	 hon-wo	 yomi-age-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 one	week	 spend-TE	 book-ACC	 read-AGERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	finished	the	book	within	a	week.’	 	
	
(72)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-no	 ketten-wo	 kazoe-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-LK	 shortcomings-ACC	 count-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	enumerated	Tarô’s	shortcomings.’	 	 	 	
	
This	 sense	 is	 analogous	 to	 sense	 (III)	 of	 the	 simplex	 verb.	 Here,	 too,	 we	 have	 some	
abstract	 region	 which	 is	 gradually	 being	 processed	 until	 the	 processed	 region	
completely	coincides	with	the	initial	unprocessed	region.	Recall	from	our	discussion	of	
(III)	 that	the	exact	capacity	of	the	 initial	region	is	not	always	known	from	the	onset	of	
the	 process.	 For	 example,	 (70)	 does	 not	 necessarily	 entail	 that	 the	 album	 sold	 out	
completely.	What	it	means	is	that	one	million	units	make	up	the	final	sales	figure,	a	fixed	
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amount	 which	 is	 then	 (i.e.	 after	 the	 fact)	 construed	 as	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 initial	
unprocessed	region.	In	other	cases,	such	as	(71),	it	is	natural	to	assume	that	the	region’s	
capacity	is	known	before	its	being	processed	(i.e.,	it	is	easy	for	Tarô	to	know	how	many	
pages	 his	 book	 consists	 of	 and	 to	 track	 his	 reading	 progress	 vis-a-vis	 the	 book’s	
thickness).		
				As	 for	 the	 topic	 of	 incrementality:	The	 entities	 in	 (70)-(72)	behave	 like	 incremental	
themes	 insofar	 as	 progress	 is	 measured	 against	 how	much	 of	 the	 entity’s	 region	 has	
been	 processed.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	we	 are	 not	 necessarily	 able	 to	 tell	 the	 processed	
amount	by	inspecting	the	entity.	I.e.,	if	there	is	no	bookmark	in	Tarô’s	book	we	will	not	
be	 able	 to	 deduce	 his	 reading	 progress,	 since	 reading	 does	 not	 cause	 any	 perceptible	
change	of	state	in	the	affected	object	(unlike	mowing	or	eating).		
				Below	are	some	corresponding	examples	from	English	and	German:	
	
(73a)	 He	ate	up	the	whole	pizza.	
	
(73b)	 Er	hat	die	ganze	Pizza	aufgegessen.	(aufessen)	
(same	as	73a)	
	
(74a)	 She	used	up	all	her	money.	
	
(74b)	 Sie	hat	ihr	ganzes	Geld	aufgebraucht.	(aufbrauchen)	
(same	as	73a)	
	
(75)	 Hans	hat	das	Gedicht	aufgesagt.	(aufsagen)	
	 Hans	recited	the	poem	(completely).	
	
(76)	 Helga	hat	alle	Präsidenten	aufgezählt.	(aufzählen)	
	 Helga	recited	(the	names	of	)	all	the	presidents.	
	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 the	 German	 verbs	 in	 (75)	 and	 (76)	 not	 only	 imply	
completive	 aspect	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 public	 accessibility.	 I.e.,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
conflation	of	the	completive	and	access	senses,	both	rooted	in	the	spatial	meaning	of	the	
preposition	auf.		
				On	 a	 related	 sidenote,	 all	 German	 examples	 exhibit	 some	 leniency	 in	 respect	 to	
completive	aspect:	
	
(77)	 Hans	hat	die	Pizza	nur	zur	Hälfte/halb	aufgegessen.	
	 Hans	ate	only	half	the	pizza.	
	
(78)	 Helga	hat	das	Gedicht	nur	zu	einem	Drittel	aufgesagt.	
	 Helga	only	recited	a	third	of	the	poem.	
	
In	contrast,	the	following	strike	us	as	very	odd,	if	not	outright	infelicitous:	
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(79)	 (??)	 John	ate	up	only	half	of	the	pizza.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(80)	 *Tarô-ga		 hon-wo	 tochû-made	 yomi-age-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 book-ACC	 halfway	 read-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
It	seems	that	sentence	(77)	construes	the	complete	consumption	of	the	pizza	as	part	of	
the	non-actual	domain	and	 its	partial	 consumption	as	part	of	 the	real	world.	Sentence	
(79),	on	the	other	hand,	construes	both	complete	consumption	and	partial	consumption	
as	actual,	resulting	in	a	paradoxical	state	of	affairs.	The	same	applies	mutatis	mutandis	to	
(78)	and	(80),	 respectively.	The	exact	reason	 for	 this	 is	unclear.	We	might	suspect	 the	
semantics	of	auf-	or	zur	Hälfte/halb	or	some	combination	thereof	to	be	responsible	for	
this	phenomenon.	
	
12.2.10.	Completion	2:	Achievement	of	Sufficient	State	(fig.	10)	
	
(81)	 Men-ga	 yude-agat-tara,	 utsuwa-ni	 moru.	 	 	 	
	 Noodles-NOM	 cook-AGARU-when	 bowl-DAT	 pile.	 	 	 	
	 ‘Once	the	noodles	are	cooked,	put	them	into	a	bowl.’	 	
	
(82)	 Tarô-ga	 karada-wo	 kitae-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 body-ACC	 train-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	built	up	his	body.’	 	 	 	
	
(83)	 Isha-ga	 kanja-no	 jôtai-wo	 tetteiteki-ni	 shirabe-age-ta.	 	 	
	 Doctor-NOM	 patient-LK	 condition-ACC	 thoroughly	 examine-AGERU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	doctor	examined	the	patient’s	condition	thoroughly.’	 	
	
This	 sense	 is	 related	 to	 the	 preceding	 one	 in	 that	 V-AGARU	 codes	 a	 GOAL-directed	
process.	 Here,	 however,	 progress	 is	 not	 achieved	 in	 a	 manner	 of	 encroaching	
consumption.	Instead,	the	GOAL	is	defined	as	some	salient	state	on	a	value	scale.	In	(81)	
this	 is	 the	 state	 of	 being	 sufficiently	 cooked2,	 in	 (82)	 presumably	 the	 state	 of	 being	
sufficiently	fit,	and	in	(83)	the	state	of	being	sufficiently	certain.	As	implied	by	Lindner,	it	
is	plausible	to	think	of	the	sufficient	state	sense	as	an	extension	via	the	metaphor	MORE	IS	
UP:	 „Scalar	 organization	 immediately	 calls	 to	mind	 an	 extension	of	 vertical	UP-1	 –	 the	
brighter	something	is,	the	higher	its	state	is	on	the	scale	of	brightness.	By	virtue	of	this	
extension	 of	 verticality,	 UP	 will	 code	 any	 increase	 in	 degree,	 that	 is,	 any	 positive	
increment	 along	 a	 given	 scale“	 (Lindner	 1981:	 204).	 Note	 that	 the	 GOAL	 state	 is	 not	
necessarily	absolute	–	what	is	deemed	“sufficient“	may	vary	according	to	personal	taste,	
needs,	 or	 from	 situation	 to	 situation	 (e.g.,	 some	 like	 their	 noodles	more	al	dente	 than	
others;	 see	 [81]).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 substractive	 completion	 sense	 will	 not	 admit	 to	 the	
																																																								
2	As	the	data	in	Himeno	(1976)	shows,	verbs	of	food	preparation	are	prototypical	for	this	sense.	
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setting	 of	 ad	 hoc	 GOALS	 (e.g.,	 it	 is	 non-debatable	 at	 which	 point	 a	 book	 is	 read	
completely).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	10	
				We	 find	 an	 interesting	 subtype	 of	 the	 sufficient	 state	 sense	 in	 German,	 where	 auf-	
codes	the	restoration	of	an	entity	to	its	former	desirable	state	(see	Güler	1986:	96):	
	
(84)	 Er	hat	die	Suppe	aufgewärmt.	(aufwärmen)	
	 He	reheated	the	soup.	
	
(85)	 Sie	hat	das	Sofa	aufgepolstert.	(aufpolstern)	
	 She	reupholstered	the	sofa.	
	
(86)	 Ich	muss	die	Batterie	aufladen.	
	 I	have	to	recharge	the	battery.	
	
Now	recall	(17)	from	above:	
	
(87)	 Kuruma-no	 batterii-ga	 agat-te	shimat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Car-LK	 battery-NOM	 AGARU-IRR-PAST	 ‘The	car’s	battery	is	drained.’	 	 	 	
	
Since	 the	 two	 completion	 senses	 may	 code	 GOAL-directed	 processes	 into	 opposite	
directions,	sentences	like	the	following	are	easily	accounted	for:	
	
(88)	 Die	Batterie	ist	aufgebraucht	und	muss	wieder	aufgeladen	werden.		
	 The	battery	is	used	up	and	needs	to	be	charged	up	again.	
	
	Here	 aufbrauchen	 codes	 the	 battery’s	 depletion	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 substractive	
completion,	while	aufladen	codes	it’s	restoration	to	full	capacity	in	terms	of	the	sufficient	
state	sense.		
	
12.2.11.	Some	Notes	on	Reflexive	TRs	
	
As	 Lakoff	 (1990b:	 430)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 Lindner’s	 1981	 study	 is	 renowned	 for	 the	
discovery	of	reflexive	trajectors.	Since	the	above	analysis	has	shown	that	the	senses	of	
Japanese	 V-AGARU	 and	 English	 V	 up	 (as	 well	 as	 German	 auf-V)	 are	 often	 similarly	
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motivated	 in	 terms	of	 image	 schematic	 topology,	we	might	 expect	 to	 find	 instances	of	
reflexive	-AGARU.	Are	there	any?	
				Consider	the	following	examples	of	reflexive	up	and	auf-:	
	
(89)	 Mary	rolled	up	the	carpet.	
	
(90)	 Marie	hat	den	Teppich	aufgerollt.	(aufrollen)	
	 (same	as	89)	
	
Reflexive	TRs	 are	 special	 in	 that	 “the	 trajector	 and	LM	are	 identified	with	 each	other,	
that	is,	the	trajectory	of	the	object	is	defined	relative	to	the	object	itself”	(Lindner	1981:	
186).	I.e.,	in	the	above	examples	“each	subpart	serves	as	both	trajector	and	LM	to	other	
subparts,	 which	 amounts	 to	 a	 change	 in	 the	 object’s	 shape.	When	 each	 of	 an	 object’s	
subparts	 has	 other	 subparts	 as	 its	 goal	 of	 appraoch,	 the	 object	 becomes	 compact,	 its	
subparts	more	tightly	integrated”	(Lindner	1981:	186).		
				Interestingly,	Himeno	(see	1976:	103)	lists	some	instances	of	V-AGARU	that	appear	to	
code	a	similar	change	of	shape,	namely	a	“reduction	in	form”	(katachi	no	shukushô):	
	
(91)	 Tarô-ga	 rôrukâten-wo	 maki-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 roller	shade-ACC	 roll-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	rolled	up	the	roller	shade.’	 	 	 	
	
(92)	 Hanko-ga	 sode-wo	 makuri-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 sleeve-ACC	 roll-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	rolled	up	her	sleeve.’	 	 	 	
	
(93)	 Tarô-ga	 kami-wo	 ori-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 paper-ACC	 fold-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	folded	up	the	paper.’	 	 	 	
	
Although	the	entities	 in	all	of	 these	scenes	do	become	more	compact	as	a	result	of	 the	
process	coded	by	-AGARU,	I	would	hesitate	to	call	them	“true”	reflexive	TRs	in	Lindner’s	
sense.	That	 is,	 in	(91)-(93)	the	LM	seems	to	be	the	general	vertical	PATH	taken	by	the	
entity’s	active	zone	rather	 than	the	entity	 itself.	 In	 (91),	 for	example,	 there	 is	a	salient	
subpart	–	the	lower	end	of	the	curtain	–	which	moves	into	an	upward	direction.	In	cases	
like	 (92),	 where	 the	 active	 zone	 is	 salient	 enough	 to	 assume	 the	 role	 of	 grammatical	
object,	this	metonymic	shift	is	even	more	obvious:	
	
(92a)	 Hanko-ga	 sode-wo	 makuri-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 sleeve-ACC	 roll-AGERU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	rolled	up	her	sleeve.’	 	 	 	
	
(92b)	 Hanko-ga	 sode-no	 suso-wo	 makuri-age-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 sleeve-LK	 cuff-ACC	 roll-AGERU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	rolled	up	the	cuff	of	her	sleeve.’	 	
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I	therefore	suggest	to	categorize	(91)-(93)	as	cases	of	spatial	ascension,	exhibiting	a	part	
-->	whole	metonymic	shift.		
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13.	TÔRU	and	the	PATH	TRAVERSAL	Schema	
	
The	intransitive/transitive	pair	tôru/tôsu	can	be	schematically	characterized		
as	follows:	
	
(A)	 X-ga	 Y-wo	 Z-ni	 tôsu	
	 X	CAUSE	 Y	TRAVERSE	 Z	(PATH)	 	
	
(B)	 	 Y-ga	 Z-wo	 tôru	
	 	 Y	TRAVERSE	 Z	(PATH)	 	
	
TRAVERSAL	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 a	 moving	 entity	 and	 its	 PATH,	 leading	 from	 a	
SOURCE	 to	 a	 GOAL.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 conceptual	 content	 of	 TÔRU	 is	 roughly	
equivalent	with	the	notion	of	movement	along	a	terminal	PATH.	Note	that	TRAVERSAL	
is	less	specific	than	the	PENETRATION	image	schema,	which	characterizes	semantically	
related	 prepositions	 such	 as	 English	 through	 and	 German	 durch.	 For	 instance,	 the	
TRAVERSAL	 of	 a	 flat,	 2-dimensional	 “floor”	 surface	 –	 compatible	 with	 TÔRU,	 but	 not	
with	through	or	durch	–	 is	not	an	 instance	of	PENETRATION.	This	will	be	discussed	 in	
more	detail	below.	
	
13.1.	The	Senses	of	TÔRU		
	
13.1.1.	Sense	(Ia):	LM	is	a	Volume	in	Physical	Space	(fig.1)	
	
(1)	 Tarô-ga	 rôka-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 corridor-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	went	through	the	corridor.’	 	 	 	
	
(2)	 Hanako-ga	 shatsu-no	 sode-ni	 te-wo	 tôshi-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 shirt-LK	 sleeve-DAT	 hand-ACC	 TÔSU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	put	her	hand	through	the	shirt	sleeve.’	 	 	
	
(3)	 Tankensha-ga	 fukai	 mori-ya	 numa-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	
	 Explorer-NOM	 deep	 forests-and	 swamps-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 	
	 ‘The	explorer	made	his	way	through	deep	forests	and	swamps.’	 	
	
(4)	 Kaibô-de	 dangan-ga	 kanzô-wo	 tôt-ta	 koto-ga	 wakat-ta.	 	
	 Autopsy-INS	 bullet-NOM	 liver-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 NMLZ-NOM	 understand-PAST	 	
	 ‘The	autopsy	revealed	that	the	bullet	pierced	the	liver.’	 	
	
(5)	 Tarô-ga		 nohara-wo	 tôt-te,	 machi-e	 mukat-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 field-ACC	 TÔRU-TE	 town-ALL	 head	for-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	crossed	the	field	and	headed	for	the	town.’	 	
	
This	 sense	 profiles	 the	 PATH	 of	 the	 TR	 through	 a	 three-dimensional	 volume	 in	 the	
spatial	 domain.	 Note	 the	 gradual	 differences	 along	 the	 parameters	 of	 enclosure	 and	
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phase	of	matter.	The	tube-like	LMs	in	(1)	and	(2)	are	vertically	bounded	and	constitute	
prototypical	cases	of	three-dimensional	PATHs.	The	LM	in	(3)	 is	unbounded	at	the	top	
and	therefore	lacks	full	enclosure.	However,	the	active	zone	actually	being	traversed	still	
encompasses	the	TR	along	all	three	dimensions,	since	the	trees	exceed	the	TR	in	height.	
This	is	not	the	case	in	(5):	While	the	LM	is	not	exactly	a	flat	two-dimensional	surface	–	
we	can	imagine	the	ground	covered	by	shrubs	and	grasses	of	varying	sizes	–	a	human	TR	
will	typically	exceed	it	in	height.	It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	this	ratio	of	height	between	
LM	and	TR	 constitutes	 a	 cut-off	 point	 for	 the	 categories	described	by	English	 through	
and	German	durch,	which	partially	overlap	with	TÔRU.		
	
(6)	 Anna	ran	through	the	forest.	
(7)	 Anna	ran	through/??over	the	cornfield.	
(8)	 Anna	ran	over/*through	the	lawn.	
	
(9)	 Anna	lief	durch	den	Wald.	
(10)	 Anna	lief	durch/??über	das	Kornfeld.	
(11)	 Anna	lief	über/*durch	den	Rasen.	
	 (based	on	Kaufmann	1993:227)	
	
As	 these	 examples	 show,	 through/durch	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 three-dimensional	 space	
requires	the	LM	to	be	of	sufficient	height	vis-a-vis	the	TR.	As	Kaufmann	(1993:	227)	puts	
it,	 “a	 two-dimensional	 object	 such	 as	 a	 lawn	 cannot	 include	 a	 three-dimensional	 one.”	
What	 consitutes	 “sufficient	 height”	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	matter	 of	 degree.	 In	 regards	 to	 the	
similar	 case	of	 in(to)	 vs	on(to)	Hawkins	 (1988:	254)	observes	 fuzzy	 cases	 such	as	 the	
following:	
	
(12)	 She	placed	Mary	Jane’s	drink	securely	in	its	coaster	
	
“When	 confronted	 with	 this	 particular	 example,	 one	 native	 speaker	 of	 English	 (not	
myself!)	noted	that	the	preposition	in	is	appropriate	only	if	the	coaster	has	a	perceivable	
‘lip’.	[…]	Without	such	a	lip,	the		appropriate	preposition	would	be	on”	(Hawkins	1988:	
254).	We	will	see	in	the	next	section,	however,	that	the	height	criterion	is	not	crucial	in	
the	case	of	TÔRU,	i.e.	that	TÔRU	cross-cuts	the	categories	through/durch	and	over/über.		
				Another	 salient	parameter	 is	phase	of	matter,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 consistency	of	 the	
LM,	 ranging	 from	completely	empty	 to	 completely	 solid.	For	 instance,	while	 the	LM	 in	
(1)	 is	 empty,	 the	 forest	 and	 swamp	 in	 (3)	 are	 interspersed	with	 solid	 objects	 or	 of	 a	
higher	 overall	 density,	 thereby	 posing	 impediments	 to	 PATH	 traversal.	 Thus,	phase	of	
matter	often	 features	prominently	 in	 the	target	domain	of	metaphorical	mappings,	e.g.	
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when	 someone	 has	 to	 hack	 their	 way	 through	 a	 “thicket	 of	 regulations”	 to	 obtain	 a	
business	license.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	1	
	
13.1.2.	Sense	(Ib):	LM	is	a	“Floor”	Surface	in	Physical	Space	(fig.	3)	
	
(13)	 Tarô-ga	 hashi-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 bridge-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	crossed	the	bridge.’	 	 	 	
	
(14)	 Kuruma-ga	 kôdô-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Car-NOM	 highway-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 ‘The	car	drove	down	the	highway.’	 	 	 	
	
(15)	 Kyûkyûsha-ga	 basu	yûsen	rên-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Ambulance-NOM	 bus	priority	lane-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	ambulance	drove	on	the	bus	priority	lane.’	
	
As	mentioned	above,	the	LMs	in	(13)-(15)	are	incompatible	with	through	or	durch.	One	
cannot	go	through	a	bridge	or	lane	in	English,	since	these	objects	lack	vertical	extension.	
It	might	be	argued	that	this	is	not	true	if,	for	example,	the	bridge	has	handrails	on	each	
side.	However,	such	handrails	would	not	be	part	of	the	bridge’s	active	zone,	i.e.	it	is	the	
flat	 surface	of	 the	bridge	 that	 is	being	 traversed,	not	 the	rails.	That	 is,	 if	we	 imagine	a	
prototypical	 3D-volume	 as	 a	 cube,	 then	 a	 2D-surface	 corresponds	 to	 the	 cube’s	
underside	or	“floor”	(see	fig.	2).	In	this	way	the	volume	and	surface	senses	of	TÔRU	are	
connected	via	a	3D-cube	-->	2D-square	image	schema	transformation.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	2:	volume	to	“floor”	transformation	
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				Still,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	 the	 scenes	 in	 (13)-(15)	 include	 the	possibility	of	 the	TR	
facing	some	sort	of	resistance	or	challenge	on	its	PATH.	For	example,	it	is	dangerous	to	
cross	 a	 shaky	 bridge	 spanning	 a	 river,	 even	with	 no	 physical	 obstacle	 in	 the	way.	 As	
mentioned	 in	 the	 preceding	 section,	 this	 concept	 of	 resistance	 or	 challenge	 is	 often	
metaphorically	expressed	in	terms	of	dense	phase	of	matter	in	the	physical	realm.	This	
is	not	 to	say	that	any	of	 the	sentences	 in	(13)-(15)	are	actually	metaphorical.	 I	merely	
suggest	that	there	are	conceptual	parallels	between	the	traversal	of	a	dense	volume	and	
facing	 resistance/challenge	 –	which	 by	 association	may	 allow	 for	 the	 construal	 of	 the	
above	LMs	as	somewhat	“abstractly	3-dimensional“.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	3	
	
13.1.3.	Sense	(Ic):	LM	is	a	“Wall”	Surface	in	Physical	Space	(fig.	6)	
	
(16)	 Hanako-ga	 tera-no	 mon-wo	 tôt-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 temple-LK	 gate-ACC	 TÔRU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	passed	through	the	temple	gate.’	 	
	
(17)	 Tarô-ga	 hari-ni	 ito-wo	 tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 needle-DAT	 thread-ACC	 TÔSU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	threaded	the	needle.’	 	 	
	
(18)	 Kono	 kappa-ga	 ame-wo	 tôsa-nai.	 	 	 	
	 This	 raincoat-NOM	 rain-ACC	 TÔSU-NEG.	 ‘This	raincoat	is	waterproof.’	 	 	
	
Again,	if	we	visualize	a	prototypical	volume	as	a	cube,	the	cube’s	boundary	preceding	the	
GOAL	corresponds	to	a	2D	“wall”	(see	fig.	4).	This	is	another	variant	of	the	3D-cube	-->	
2D-square	 image	 transformation	 postulated	 in	 the	 section	 above.	 The	 term	 “wall”	 is	
somewhat	 inadequate	 (and	 therefore	 put	 in	 quotation	marks)	 because	 the	 2D	 surface	
LM	can	be	solid	(18)	as	well	as	empty	(17).1	Conversely,	if	one	zooms	in	on	a	2D-“wall”	
one	ends	up	with	a	3D-volume.	Thus,	 the	 image-schema	transformation	works	 in	both	
ways.	If	granularity	is	sufficiently	increased	(via	a	magnifying	glass,	a	microscope,	etc.),	
even	a	“2D”	LM	of	one	millimeter	can	be	construed	as	a	3D-volume	(see	fig.	5).		
																																																								
1	Whether	the	LM	in	(16)	is	construed	as	solid	or	empty	depends	on	the	existence	or	absence	of	a	closed	
door.		
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13.1.4.	Sense	(Id)	LM	is	a	Mass	of	Unspecified	Dimensionality	in	Physical	Space	
	
(19)	 Kinzoku-ga	 denki-wo	 tôsu.	 	 	 	 	
	 Metal-NOM	 electricity-ACC	 TÔSU	 ‘Metal	conducts	electricity.’	 	 	 	
	
As	examples	like	these	show,	the	LM	does	not	necessarily	need	to	be	specified	along	the	
dimensionality	 parameter.	 Though,	 as	 our	 encyclopedic	 knowledge	 tells	 us,	 electrical	
conductivity	 involves	a	PATH	and	 therefore	an	at	 least	one-dimensional	LM.	From	the	
fact	 that	 TÔRU	 is	 inherently	 dependent	 on	 a	 PATH,	 we	 can	 conclude	 the	 verb’s	
incompatibility	with	zero-dimensional	point-like	LMs.		
	
13.1.5.		Sense	(II):	LM	is	a	Temporal	Expanse	(fig.	7)	
	
(20)	 Hitotsu-no	 kimono-de	 natsu	 fuyu	 tôsu	 hito-ga	 iru.	
	 One-LK	 garment-INS	 summer	 winter	 TÔSU	 people-NOM	 exist	
	 ‘There	are	people	who	wear	the	same	garment	through	summer	and	winter.’	
	
(21)	 Tarô-ga	 sanjikan	 tôshi-te	 hon-wo	 yon-da.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 three	hours	 TÔSU-TE	 books-ACC	 read-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	read	books	for	three	hours	straight.’	
	
(22)	 Hanako-ga	 hiru-mo	 yoru-mo	 tôshi-te	 hatarai-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 day-also	 night-also	 TÔSU-TE	 work-PAST	 ‘Hanako	worked	day	and	night.’	 	
	
In	 this	metaphorically	 derived	 usage	 type	 the	 TR	 follows	 a	 linear	 PATH	 through	 time	
rather	than	space.	Although	in	the	above	sentences	the	temporal	LM	can	be	construed	as	
a	 one-dimensional	 SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	 structure	 (i.e.	 a	 horizontal	 line),	 it	 should	 be	
mentioned	 that	 the	 parameter	 phase	 of	matter	 –	 which	 normally	 only	 applies	 to	 3D-
volumes	–	can	be	of	some	relevance	in	the	temporal	domain.	A	hard	winter	and	an	easy	
youth	are	obviously	very	different	in	respect	to	how	much	resistance	a	TR	encounters	on	
its	way	through	them.	However,	this	 is	an	observation	of	a	more	general	nature	and	is	
not	necessarily	relevant	to	the	specific	examples	above.		
					
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	7	
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				Note	 further	 that	 this	 sense	 is	 incompatible	 with	 tôru	 and	 instead	 requires	 a	
somewhat	grammaticalized	form	of	tôsu.	A	similar	grammaticalized	variant,	the	complex	
postposition	wo	tôshite,	will	be	discussed	further	below.		
	
13.1.6.	Sense	(III)	LM	is	a	Non-spatial,	Non-temporal	Expanse	
	
(23)	 Hôan-ga	 teikô-ni	 at-ta	 ga,	 kekkyoku	 gikai-wo	 tôshi-ta.	
	 Bill-NOM	 resistance-DAT	 meet-PAST	 CONJ	 eventually	 congress-ACC	 TÔSU-PAST	
	 ‘The	bill	met	with	resistance	but	eventually	passed	congress.’	
	
(24)	 Hanako-ga	 ganko-ni	 jibun-no	 iken-wo	 tôshi-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 stubbornly	 self-LK	 opinion-ACC	 TÔSU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	subbornly	pushed	through	her	opinion.’	
	
(25)	 Kono	 sakka-ga	 ‘kitsune	udon’	 to		 iu	 pen	nêmu-de	 tôt-te	iru.	
	 This	 author-NOM	 ‘Kitsune	Udon’	 QT	 call	 pen	name-INS	 TÔRU-PROG	
	 ‘This	author	is	known	by	the	pen	name	‘Kitsune	Udon’.’	
	
(26)	 Tarô-ga	 shinbun	kiji-ni	 me-wo	 tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 newspaper	article-DAT	 eyes-ACC	 TÔSU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	skimmed	through	the	newspaper	article.’	
	
In	this	sense	the	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	structure	of	TÔRU	is	mapped	onto	other	abstract	
domains.	As	shown	by	(23),	 the	phase	of	matter	parameter	may	play	a	significant	role.	
Here	 gikai	 (parliament)	 plainly	 denotes	 a	 political	 institution,	 not	 simply	 a	 locus	 in	
physical	 space.	Nevertheless,	 the	TR	 encounters	 resistance	 on	 its	 PATH.	Resistance	 in	
physical	space	typically	entails	a	LM	of	some	density	or	an	empty	LM	interspersed	with	
solid	obstacles.	In	(23)	this	notion	is	mapped	onto	the	target	domain,	giving	rise	to	the	
concept	of	resistance	in	the	social	realm.	Such	agonist	–	antagonist	constellations	can	be	
observed	with	respect	to	through/durch	in	English	and	German	as	well:	
	
(27)	 The	president	pushed	the	bill	through	parliament.	
(28)	 Die	Regierung	peitschte	das	neue	Gesetz	durch	den	Bundestag.	
	
In	these	cases	the	metaphorical	mappings	are	roughly	as	follows:	
	 SOURCE:	physical	space	 TARGET:	policy	making	
	 	 	
TR:	 -	physical	object	(e.g.	traveller)	 -	abstract	object	(e.g.	bill)	
SOURCE:	 -	point	of	departure	 -	drafting	of	the	bill	
PATH	(LM):	 -	physical	PATH	through	space	 -	abstract	PATH	through	institution	
GOAL:	 -	point	of	arrival	 -	passing	of	the	bill	
Impediments:	
(LM’s	phase	
of	matter)	
-	physical	obstacles	
	(e.g.	mud,	stones,	trees,	rivers)	
-	institutional	obstacles		
(e.g.	political	opposition,	laws,	
regulations,	etc.)	
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Therefore,	when	considering	the	use	of	TÔRU	in	the	abstract	domain,	we	can	make	the	
following	observation	 regarding	 the	parameter	of	dimensionality:	Where	 the	notion	of	
resistance	is	salient,	such	as	(23)	and	(24),	phase	of	matter	will	necessarily	play	a	role.	In	
these	cases	the	abstract	LM	is	construed	as	a	volume	capable	of	 including	obstacles	or	
impeding	traversal	through	a	higher	density.	 In	other	cases,	such	as	(25)	and	(26),	the	
dimensionality	parameter	does	not	feature	prominently	and	the	LM’s	dimensionality	is	
therefore	less	clear-cut.	
				We	can	 further	note	 that	 several	LMs	cannot	be	overtly	 realized	by	 lexical	material.	
Examples	of	such	sub-lexical	LMs	are	given	in	(24)	and	(25):	
	
(24’)	 Hanako-ga	 ganko-ni	 jibun-no	 iken-wo	 (??)-ni	 tôshi-ta.	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 stubbornly	 self-LK	 opinion-ACC	 (??)-DAT	 TÔSU-PAST	 	
	
(25’)	 Kono	 sakka-ga	 ‘kitsune	udon’	 to	 iu	 pen	nêmu-de	 (??)-wo	 tôt-te	iru.	
	 This	 author-NOM	 ‘Kitsune	Udon’	 QT	 call	 pen	name-INS	 (??)-ACC	 TÔRU-PROG	
	
In	 both	 cases	 the	 LM	 corresponds	 to	 some	 vague	 communicative	 PATH.	 Here,	 the	
impossibility	of	filling	the	lexical	gap	reflects	the	highly	abstract	nature	of	the	LM.	Such	
constructions,	being	not	readily	analyzable,	usually	become	idiomatic.		
	
13.1.7.	Sense	(IV):	LM	is	an	Instrument	(wo	tôshite)	
	
(29)	 Oto-ga	 kabe-wo	tôshite	 mimi-ni	 todoi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Sound-NOM	 wall-WO	TÔSHITE	 ears-DAT	 reach-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	sound	was	audible	through	the	wall.’	
	
(30)	 Gakusha-ga	 bôenkyô-wo	tôshite	 hoshi-wo	 kansoku	 shi-ta.	 	 	
	 Scholar-NOM	 telescope-WO	TÔSHITE	 stars-ACC	 observation	 do-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	scholar	observed	the	stars	through	a	telescope.’	
	
(31)	 Ryôgawa-wa	 bengoshi-wo	tôshite	 kôshô	 shi-te	iru.	 	 	 	
	 Both	sides-TOP	 lawyers-WO	TÔSHITE	 negotiation	 do-PROG	 	 	 	
	 ‘Both	sides	are	negotiating	through	their	respective	lawyers.’	
	
(32)	 shujinkô-wa	 samazama-na	 keiken-wo	tôshite	 seichô	 suru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 protagonist-TOP	 various-COP.ATT	 experiences-WO	TÔSHITE	 growth	 do	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	protagonist	matures	by	going	through	various	experiences.’	
	
As	 these	 examples	 show,	 the	 complex	 postposition	 wo	 tôshite	 marks	 its	 LM	 as	 an	
instrument.	Since	wo	tôshite	is	a	grammaticalized	variant	within	the	TÔRU	network,	it	is	
worth	 asking	what	PATHs	 and	 instruments	may	have	 in	 common.	 In	 order	 to	 answer	
this	 question,	 consider	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 action	 chain.	 According	 to	 Langacker	 (1991:	
292),	an	action	chain	follows	the	flow	of	energy	from	an	energy	source	(or	head)	to	an	
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energy	sink	 (or	 tail).	For	example,	 in	 the	sentence	A	waiter	cracked	the	ice	with	a	rock	
(1991:	292)	the	waiter	is	the	energy	source	and	the	ice	is	the	energy	sink.	However,	the	
energy	 is	 not	 transmitted	 directly	 from	 waiter	 to	 ice.	 There	 is	 an	 intermediary,	 an	
instrument,	 through	 which	 the	 energy	 travels	 from	 waiter	 to	 ice,	 i.e.	 the	 rock.	 It	 is	
therefore	 natural	 to	 construe	 instruments	 as	 PATHs,	 because	 the	 image	 schematic	
structure	of	a	prototypical	action	chain	is	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.		
				Unsurprisingly,	the	same	phenomenon	can	be	observed	cross-linguistically.	In	regards	
to	 the	 English	 preposition	 through,	 Radden	 (1989:	 571)	 notes:	 “The	 spatial	 idea	 of	
passing	 through	 a	 tunnel	 or	 a	 channel	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 figurative	 meaning	 of	 a	
determinate,	 ‘channelled’	 means	 […]”	 In	 a	 similar	 vein	 Smith	 (1987)	 points	 out	 the	
parallels	between	spatial	and	instrumental	uses	of	German	durch:	
	
(33)	 Er	warf	den	Ball	durch	das	Fenster.	[He	threw	the	ball	through	the	window.]	
(34)	 Das	Haus	wurde	durch	Feuer	zerstört.	[The	house	was	destroyed	by	fire.]	
	 	
	 (from	Smith	1987:	445f.)	
	
Following	Langacker’s	 action	 chain	model,	 he	notes	 that	 “the	LM	of	 durch	 serves	 as	 a	
conduit	of	sorts	 in	both	of	 these	examples:	[…]	as	a	concrete	object	 through	which	the	
ball	 moves,	 and	 […]	 as	 an	 instrument	 through	 which	 force	 or	 energy	 moves”	 (Smith	
1987:	 446).	 Therefore,	 returning	 to	 the	 case	 of	wo	tôshite,	 it	 seems	only	 natural	 for	 a	
verb	which	is	strongly	associated	with	the	PATH	schema	to	gradually	take	on	the	role	of	
an	instrumental	marker.		
				Although	wo	tôshite	 is	aptly	described	as	an	instrumental	marker,	 it	should	be	noted	
that	instrumentality	is	not	a	clear-cut	concept	but	a	scalar	one.	Based	on	the	above	data,	
a	 scale	 of	 instumentality	would	 look	 something	 like	 this	 (taking	 into	 account	 that	 the	
following	is	possibly	an	oversimplification):	
	
(35)	 Spatial	PATH	-->	physical	instrument	-->	abstract	instrument/manner	-->	cause	
	
A	given	 instance	may	be	 located	on	any	point	on	 this	 continuum.	 (29),	 for	example,	 is	
located	towards	the	left	end	of	this	scale,	since	the	LM	is	actually	a	spatial	entity	through	
which	the	TR	travels.	On	the	other	hand,	a	sentence	 like	(32)	would	gravitate	towards	
the	right	end	of	the	scale,	since	here	the	abstract	LM		of	wo	tôshite	(experience)	initiates	
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a	 maturing	 process.	 This	 conflation	 of	 instrument	 and	 cause	 is	 also	 reflected	 by	 the	
competition	between	wo	tôshite	and	the	SOURCE	marker	ni	yotte3:	
	
(36a)	 Tarô-ga	 kono	 keiken-ni	yotte	 seichô		 shi-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 this	 experience-NI	YOTTE	 growth	 do-PAST	 	 	
	
(36b)	 Tarô-ga	 kono	 keiken-wo	tôshite	 seichô	 shi-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 this	 experience-WO	TÔSHITE	 grow	 do-PAST	 	 	
	
			 ‘Tarô	matured	through	this	experience.’	
	
Causal	uses	of	PATH	prepositions	are	known	from	English	and	German	as	well:	
	
(37)	 An	immense	number	of	people	are	killed	through	traffic	accidents	every	year.	
	 	
(38)	 Jedes	Jahr	verliert	der	Staat	Geld	durch	Steuerhinterziehung.	
	 Every	year	the	state	loses	money	through	tax	evasion.	
	 ([37]	from	Radden	1989:571)	
	
Considering	 the	 image	 schematic	 structure	 of	 the	 action	 chain,	 the	 cause-instrument-
link	 is	hardly	surprising.	 In	a	prototypical	action	chain	 the	SOURCE	(the	agent)	affects	
the	PATH	(the	instrument),	which	in	turn	affects	the	GOAL	(the	theme).	I.e.,	we	have	a	
causal	 chain	 of	 the	 type	 agent	 -->	 instrument	 -->	 theme.	 However,	 as	 Langacker	 (e.g.	
1991:	 295ff.)	 and	 Talmy	 (e.g.	 2003a:	 357ff.)	 have	 pointed	 out,	 construal	 changes	
depending	on	our	distribution	of	 attention.	Again,	 consider	Langacker’s	 example	 from	
above:	
	
(39)	 A	waiter	cracked	the	ice	with	a	rock.	
	
The	causal	chain	 in	this	scene	 is	waiter	-->	rock	-->	ice.	According	to	this	construal,	 the	
waiter,	 being	 an	 animate	 intentional	 entity,	 causes	 the	 ice	 to	 crack.	 Although	 he	 only	
affects	 the	 ice	 indirectly	 through	 the	 rock,	 he	 is	 the	 original	 SOURCE	of	 energy	 in	 the	
causal	chain.	But	what	if	we	eclipse	the	waiter	from	our	construal	of	the	scene?	
	
(40)	 The	rock	cracked	the	ice.	
	
This	 sentence	 could	 be	 used	 in	 a	 context	 where	 the	 waiter’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 ice-
cracking	event	is	deemed	less	relevant	than	the	instrument’s.	E.g.:	He	tried	an	ice	pick,	a	
paperweight	and	a	rock.	But	only	the	rock	cracked	the	ice.	 In	 this	case,	 the	 instrument’s	
																																																								
3	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	ni	yotte	see	Matsumoto	(1998b).	As	he	notes,	the	causal	use	is	the	
oldest	among	the	abstract	uses	of	ni	yotte,	followed	by	its	use	as	a	marker	of	means	(1998b:	40).	So,	here	
too,	we	have	evidence	for	the	close	connection	between	causality	and	instrumentality.		
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level	of	agency	is	heightened,	while	the	original	energy	source	is	backgrounded.	We	are	
familiar	 with	 similar	 cases	 of	 “transferred	 agency“	 from	 the	 so	 called	 middle	
construction:	
	
(41a)	 The	employee	sells	the	car.	
(41b)	 The	car	sells	well.	
(41c)	 The	car	(virtually)	sells	itself.	
	
I	will	not	discuss	the	middle	construction	 itself	here,	since	such	a	discussion	would	be	
far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	For	the	present	purpose,	I	am	merely	interested	in	
the	shift	of	agency	from	(a)	to	(c).	In	(41a)	the	employee’s	actions	are	the	main	cause	of	
the	 car’s	 selling.	 In	 (41b)	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 car	 seems	 to	 be	 more	 salient	 than	 the	
employee’s	sales	pitch.	And	finally,	in	(41c)	the	car’s	quality	is	the	only	salient	factor	–	so	
much	so,	that	it	is	construed	as	“selling	itself”	without	any	human	assistance.	The	upshot	
is	this:	 If	 the	energy	source	is	removed	from	the	causal	chain,	 it	 is	only	natural	 for	the	
next	element	downstream	to	take	its	place.	
				Thus,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 action	 chain	model,	 the	 conflation	 of	 instrument	 and	 cause	 is	
straightforwardly	accounted	for:	Instruments,	as	intermediary	elements,	are	adjecent	to	
the	 energy	 source	 (the	 cause).	 Consequently,	 if	 the	 original	 energy	 source	 is	
backgrounded/gapped,	the	instrument	becomes	the	“next-best	energy	source”	and	may	
therefore	be	construed	as	cause.		
	
13.2.	The	Senses	of	V-TÔRU	
	
13.2.1.	LM	is	an	X-dimensional	Expanse	in	Physical	Space	
	
(42)	 Ame-ga	 fuku-no	 ura-made	 shimi-tôt-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Rain-NOM	 clothes-LK	 backside-ALL	 soak-TÔRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	rain	soaked	through	to	the	lining	of	the	clothes.’	
	
(43)	 Kawa-no	 mizu-ga	 suki-tôt-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 River-LK	 water-NOM	 become	transparent-TÔRU-RES	 ‘The	water	of	the	river	is	clear.’	 	 	 	
	
(44)	 Tarô-ga	 ita-ni	 kugi-wo	 tsuki-tôshi-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 board-DAT	 nail-ACC	 thrust-TÔSU-PAST	 ‘Tarô	drove	a	nail	through	the	board.’	 	
	
(45)	 Kaze-ga	 ie-no	 naka-wo	 fuki-tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Wind-NOM	 house-LK	 inside-ACC	 blow-TÔSU-PAST	 ‘Wind	blew	through	the	house.’	 	 	
	
This	sense	of	V-TÔRU	is	analogous	to	its	simplex	counterpart	in	the	spatial	domain.	That	
is,	 the	 TR	 traverses	 the	 LM	 in	 the	manner	 expressed	 by	 the	 V1.	 As	with	 the	 simplex,	
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there	 is	 variance	 along	 the	 parameters	 of	 dimensionality	 and	 phase	 of	 matter.	 For	
instance,	 the	 LM	 in	 (44)	 is	 two-dimensional	 and	 solid,	while	 the	 LM	 in	 (45)	 is	 three-
dimensional	and	empty.	Since	I	have	already	commented	on	these	parameters	above,	I	
have	opted	for	a	less	fine-grained	distinction	in	the	case	of	V-TÔRU.4		
	
13.2.2.	LM	is	a	Temporal	Expanse	(Extended	Process)	
	
(46)	 Hanako-ga	 sannenkan	 onaji	 kutsu-wo	 haki-tôshi-ta.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 three	years	 same	 shoes-ACC	 wear-TÔSU-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	wore	the	same	shoes	for	three	straight	years.’	
	
(47)	 Tarô-ga	 hyakkiro-no	 michi-wo	 aruki-tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 hundred	kilometers-LK	 road-ACC	 walk-TÔSU-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	walked	a	road	of	hundred	kilometers	all	the	way	down.’		
	
(48)	 Kono	 hon-wo	 yomi-tôsu	 no-ni	 isshûkan	 kakat-ta.	 	
	 This	 book-ACC	 read-TÔSU	 NMLZ-DAT	 one	week	 take-PAST	 	
	 ‘It	took	a	week	to	read	through	this	book.’	
	
(49)	 Hanako-ga	 uso-wo	 tsuki-tôshi-te,	 iki-te	 ki-ta.	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 lies-ACC	 tell-TÔSU-TE	 live-TE	 come-PAST	 ‘Hanako	lived	a	lie	(all	her	life).’	
	
This	 sense	 is	 analogous	 to	 its	 simplex	 counterpart	 in	 the	 temporal	 domain.	 However,	
here	the	LM	of	-tôsu	is	the	process	profiled	by	the	V1.	The	V1,	in	turn,	takes	as	its	LM	the	
direct	 object	 of	 the	 sentence	 (marked	by	wo).	 In	 (46),	 for	 example,	 the	V1	haku	 takes	
kutsu	as	its	LM,	yielding	the	structure	(sannenkan	onaji)	kutsu-wo	haku.	This	structure	is	
a	temporal	expanse	and	an	instance	of	the	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	image	schema:	
	
SOURCE:	 Beginning	of	process,	i.e.	start	wearing	shoes	
PATH:	 Duration	of	process,	i.e.	temporal	portion	during	which	shoes	are	worn	
GOAL:	 End	of	process,	i.e.	stop	wearing	shoes	
	
The	V2	-tôsu	takes	this	temporal	expanse	as	its	LM.	That	is,	in	terms	of	image	schematic	
structure	the	TR	(Hanako)	is	construed	as	moving	through	this	temporal	expanse	in	the	
same	way	it	would	move	through	a	spatial	expanse	–	from	SOURCE	to	GOAL.		
				Further,	-tôsu	–	like	its	simplex	counterpart	–	does	not	focus	on	either	the	SOURCE	or	
the	GOAL	but	on	the	PATH	portion.	To	illustrate	this	point,	consider	that	both	V-kiru	and	
V-tôsu	presuppose	the	whole	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	structure	as	background	(or	base,	in	
																																																								
4	Of	course,	in	such	matters	of	granularity	–	and	therefore	schematicity	–	judgement	varies	from	author	to	
author.	For	example,	Sugimura	(2012:	54f.)	goes	so	far	as	to	postulate	seperate	senses	for	individual	
lexical	items	such	as	fuki-tôsu	(blow	through)and	mi-tôsu	(see	through).		
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Langackarian	terms),	but	differ	as	to	what	portion	of	the	structure	is	“in	spotlight”	(see	
also	fig.	8):	
	
(47a)	 Tarô-ga	 hyakkiro-no	 michi-wo	 aruki-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 hundred	kilometers-LK	 road-ACC	 walk-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
(47b)	 Tarô-ga	 hyakkiro-no	 michi-wo	 aruki-tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 hundred	kilometers-LK	 road-ACC	 walk-TÔSU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
The	 V2	 -kiru	 contributes	 the	 conceptual	 content	 of	 the	 SPLIT	 schema	 and	 therefore	
profiles	the	portion	where	discontinuity	emerges	(the	GOAL	as	point	of	segmentation).	
In	 contrast,	 -tôsu	 contributes	 the	 conceptual	 content	 of	 the	 PATH	 schema	 and	 thus	
profiles	 the	 portion	 between	 SOURCE	 and	 GOAL.	 These	 different	 focus	 properties	 can	
explain	why	(50a)	is	acceptable,	while	(50b)	is	not:	
	
(50a)	 Hanako-ga	 isshûkan	 hon-wo	 yomi-tôshi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 one	week	 books-ACC	 read-TÔSU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
(50b)	 *Hanako-ga	 isshûkan	 hon-wo	 yomi-kit-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 one	week	 books-ACC	 read-KIRU-PAST	 	 	 	
	
According	 to	 image	 schematic	 structure,	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 in	
dimensionality	between	PATHs	on	the	one	hand	and	SOURCEs	and	GOALs	on	the	other:	
A	 PATH	 has	 at	 least	 one	 dimension	 (its	 most	 schematic	 depiction	 is	 a	 line)	 while	
SOURCEs	and	GOALs	are	zero-dimensional	(their	most	schematic	depiction	 is	a	point).	
In	 other	 words,	 isshûkan	 requires	 an	 extended	 process,	 whereas	V-kiru	 is	 temporally	
punctual.	Of	course,	one	can	observe	the	opposite	of	this	as	well:	
	
(51a)	 Goji	nijuppun-ni	 yatto	 kono	 hon-wo	 yomi-kit-ta.	 	 	
	 17:20h-DAT	 finally	 this	 book-ACC	 read-KIRU-PAST	 	 	
	
(51b)	 *Goji	nijuppun-ni	 yatto	 kono	 hon-wo	 yomi-tôshi-ta.	 	 	
	 17:20h-DAT	 finally	 this	 book-ACC	 read-TÔSU-PAST	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FIGURE	8:	V-tôsu	vs	V-kiru	
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Note	in	passing	the	similar	opposition	between	certain	uses	of	the	German	particle	verbs	
durch-V	(PATH	focus)	and	aus-V	(GOAL	focus):			
	
(52a)	 Ich	habe	die	ganze	Nacht	durchgeschlafen.	
(52b)	 *Ich	habe	die	ganze	Nacht	ausgeschlafen.	
	
	
13.3.	Related	Constructions:	N-no	tôri	(N-dôri)/V-tôri	
	
(53)	 Isha-no	 iu	 tôri-ni	 shi-nasai.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Doctor-LK	 say	 TÔRI-DAT	 do-IMP	 ‘Do	as	the	doctor	says.’	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(54)	 Yosô	 dôri-no	 tenkai	 dat-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Expectation	 TÔRI-LK	 development	 COP-PAST	 ‘Things	played	out	as	expected.’	 	 	 	
	
(55)		 Setsumeisho-ni	 kai-te	aru	 tôri-ni	 yat-ta	 ga	 uma-ku	 ika-nakat-ta.	
	 Instructions	manual-DAT	 be	written	 TÔRI-DAT	 do-PAST	 CONJ	 good-INF	 go-NEG-PAST	
	 ‘I	did	it	according	to	the	instructions	manual,	but	it	didn’t	work.’	
	
Finally,	let	us	briefly	consider	the	N-no	tôri/V-tôri	construction,	which	may	be	viewed	as	
an	instance	of	a	larger	family	of	metaphorical	“way-constructions”	found	across	various	
languages.	Compare	(53)-(55)	with	the	following	examples	from	English	and	German:	
	
(56)	 Severe	budget	cuts	are	the	only	way	to	save	this	company	from	bankrupcy.	
	
(57)	 I	followed	in	the	footsteps	of	my	father	and	became	an	actor.	
	
(58)	 Ich	kann	Dir	nicht	folgen,	bitte	erkläre	es	noch	einmal.	
I	can’t	follow	you,	please	explain	it	again.	
	
(59)	 Der	Weg	zum	Erfolg	ist	mit	vielen	Steinen	gepflastert.	
The	road	to	success	is	a	rocky	one.	
	
Again,	 such	 expressions	 show	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 space-time-homology	 in	 language	
and	 thought.	 As	we	 have	 established,	 a	 terminal	 continuous	 process	 is	 understood	 in	
terms	of	the	SOURCE-PATH-GOAL	schema.	However,	there	are	multiple	possiblilities	as	
to	what	 happens	 between	 the	 onset	 and	 the	 end	 of	 a	 process,	 just	 as	 there	 are	 often	
multiple	 paths	 leading	 to	 the	 same	 physical	 destination.	 Thus,	 doing	 something	 in	 a	
certain	manner	(or	something	happening	in	a	certain	manner)	is	analogous	to	following	
a	 particular	 path	 to	 a	 physical	 destination.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 follows	 from	 the	 EVENT	
STRUCTURE	METAPHOR	 (Lakoff	 2006:	 204ff.)	 that	manner	 should	 be	mapped	onto	 spatial	
navigation.		
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Case	Studies:	Summary	
	
As	hypothesized,	the	preceding	studies	have	shown	that	each	verb	under	consideration	
is	based	upon	a	particular	image	schema.	But	what	exactly	does	it	mean	to	say	that	the	
semantic	structure	of	KAKARU	is	centered	around	the	image	schema	CONTACT;	or	that	
the	semantic	structure	of	DERU	is	centered	around	the	EXIT	schema?		
				As	Lakoff	(1990b:	438)	cautions,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	prediction	and	
motivation.	The	super-schemas	postulated	at	the	outset	of	each	case	study	do	not	allow	
us	 to	 predict	 the	 senses	 of	 the	 respective	 verbs.	 For	 example,	 the	 most	 schematic	
meaning	of	DERU	–	 	movement	out	of	a	container	–	underspecifies	even	the	categorial	
prototype	 (spatial	 exit),	 since	 it	 says	 nothing	 about	 the	 dimensionality	 of	 the	 TR,	 the	
boundedness	 of	 the	 LM,	 and	 so	 forth.	 Likewise,	 the	 schema	 is	 too	 impoverished	 to	
predict	senses	that	involve	metonymy	and/or	metaphor.	For	instance,	we	have	analyzed	
the	access	sense	of	DERU	as	an	extension	of	the	prototype	via	the	primary	metaphor(s)	
IN	IS	INACCESSIBLE/OUT	IS	ACCESSIBLE	(see	10.1.5.).	But	this	information	is	not	included	in	the	
super-schema;	nor	do	we	have	any	a	priori	guarantee	that	a	language	will	make	use	of	a	
given	metonymical	or	metaphorical	extension	just	because	it	is	theoretically	available.	In	
other	cases,	the	most	schematic	meaning,	although	pervasive,	does	not	even	cover	all	the	
senses.	As	we	have	seen,	some	senses	of	AGARU	such	as	subtractive	completion	hardly	
involve	the	vertical	dimension	at	all	(see	12.1.5).		
				What	 the	 case	 studies	 have	 given	 us	 instead	 is	 an	 account	 of	 the	 individual	 senses’	
motivatedness.	 Image	 schematic	 structure	 in	 tandem	 with	 mechanisms	 of	 meaning	
extension	puts	us	 in	a	position	 to	explain,	a	posteriori,	why	a	given	sense	exists.	From	
this	perspective,	the	high-level	schemas	of	the	verbs	considered	here	are	an	indicator	of	
their	vast	semantic	potential.	To	recapitulate,	 let	us	consider	the	major	mechanisms	of	
meaning	extension	and	their	relation	to	image	schematicity.		
				Schemas	such	as	EXIT,	SPLIT,	or	PATH	are	 ideal	candidates	 for	metaphorical	 source	
domains	 in	 virtue	 of	 being	 among	 our	most	 basic	 experiential	 gestalts.	 In	 some	 cases	
they	will	serve	as	source	domains	for	multiple	primary	metaphors	at	once.	For	instance,	
the	concepts	of	transfer,	access	and	excess	are	all	related	to	our	experiences	with	things	
leaving	 CONTAINERS	 –	 and	 hence	 the	 EXIT	 schema	 (see	 chapter	 10).	 Furthermore,	
SPACE,	 as	 the	 primary	 domain	 of	 exprience,	 imposes	 its	 structure	 upon	 a	 variety	 of	
other	 domains	 such	 as	 TIME	 or	 SOCIAL	 RELATIONS.	 Subdomains	 like	 TEMPORAL	
DISCONTINUITY	or		SOCIAL	DISCONNECTION	are	subsequently	understood	in	terms	of	
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the	 SPLIT	 schema	 	 (chapter	 11),	 while	 “movement”	 through	 ACTIVITIES	 and	
INSTITUTIONS	is	understood	in	terms	of	PATH	TRAVERSAL	(chapter	13),	and	so	forth.		
				The	potential	for	metonymy	is	no	less	impressive.	It	is	unsurprising	that	a	basic	spatial	
schema	 such	 as	 CONTACT	 serves	 as	 a	 point	 of	 access	 for	 a	 multitude	 of	 associated	
concepts,	 including	 SUPPORT,	 FORCE,	 ELICITED	 EFFECT,	 RESTRAINT,	 and	 CONTROL	
(see	chapter	9).	Although,	considering	the	common	basis	of	experiential	correlation,	the	
difference	 between	 metonymical	 mapping	 and	 primary	 metaphor	 is	 not	 always	
apparent	 and	most	 likely	 a	matter	 of	 degree.	 As	 a	 subtype	 of	metonymy,	 active-zone	
phenomena	 deserve	 particular	 attention.	 Exemplary	 in	 this	 regard	 are	 the	 profiling	
properties	of	the	various	senses	of	KIRU,	where	focal	prominence	changes	between	the	
LM	as	a	whole,	the	obsolete	portion	of	the	LM	and	the	point	of	segmentation	(see	11.1.).		
				Finally,	 we	 have	 seen	 how	 image	 schema	 transformations	 function	 as	 a	 source	 of	
polysemy.	This	 is	 illustrated	by	the	senses	of	KAKARU,	which	variously	feature	a	zero-
dimensional	 TR	moving	 towards	 a	 goal,	 a	 one-dimensional	 TR	 extending	 (“growing”)	
towards	a	goal,	and	a	one-dimensional	 link-type	TR	(see	9.1.).	Other	examples	 include	
the	volume,	 floor	and	wall	LMs	of	spatial	TÔRU	(see	13.1.)	as	well	as	the	ascension	and	
extension	senses	of	AGARU	(e.g.	12.1.1.;	12.1.3.).1		
				Perhaps	 most	 crucially,	 we	 have	 succeeded	 in	 showing	 that	 grammatical	 V2s	 are	
inherently	 meaningful.	 Their	 meaning	 reflects	 the	 image	 schematic	 structure	 of	 their	
simplex	 counterparts	 and	 is	 derived	 via	 the	 same	mechanisms	 of	 semantic	 extension	
responsible	 for	 the	 complex	 category	 strucuture	 of	 the	 simplex.	 It	 was	 argued,	 for	
example,	that	the	conceptual	structure	of	inchaotive	V-dasu	–	a	metaphorical	extension	
of	 the	EXIT	schema	–	 is	closely	related	to	the	access	sense	of	 the	simplex	(see	12.2.6.).	
Analogous	cases	have	been	made	for	the	remaining	image	schema	verbs.	In	conclusion,	
then,	 the	 senses	 of	 the	 simplex	 and	 the	 V2	 are	 best	 understood	 as	 constituting	 an	
internally	coherent	semantic	category.		
				
					
				
					
																																																								
1	As	in	the	latter	case,	image	schema	transformations	and	active	zone	phenomena	often	go	hand	in	hand.	
E.g.,	a	one-dimensional	extending	TR,	when	reduced	to	its	active	zone,	will	yield	a	zero-dimensional	
moving	TR.			
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PART	III:	BEYOND	THE	NETWORK	
	
	
14.	Compositional	Disparity	
	
14.1.	But	What	about	Syntax?	
	
The	 case	 studies	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 mainly	 been	 concerned	 with	 image	 schematic	
structure.	 Specifically,	 they	 show	how	 image	 schemas,	 in	 tandem	with	other	 cognitive	
phenomena	 such	 as	 conceptual	 metaphor	 and	 metonymy,	 play	 a	 vital	 role	 in	
polysemisation	 processes.	 A	 particularly	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 this	 is	 the	 semantic	
connection	between	the	spatial	senses	of	simplex	verbs	and	the	more	abstract	senses	of	
grammatical	V2s.	For	example,	we	have	seen	how	spatial	dasu	and	inchoative	V-dasu	are	
related	to	one	another	via	the	shared	EXIT	schema.		
				“But	what	about	syntax?”,	one	might	ask.	Indeed,	it	is	no	exaggeration	to	say	that	the	
majority	of	 the	 literature	on	 Japanese	V-V	compounds	 is	about	 “classical”	questions	of	
argument	structure	–	often	explicitly	or	implicitly	presupposing	a	generative	framework	
that	 treats	 syntax,	 semantics,	 and	 the	 lexicon	 as	 distinct	 linguistic	 components.	 How,	
then,	are	such	questions	addressed	within	a	meaning-based	approach	to	 language	that	
views	lexicon	and	grammar	as	a	continuum?	Although	I	cannot	possibly	answer	(or	even	
consider)	all	open	questions,	I	can	–	based	on	the	preceding	case	studies	–	at	least	show	
how	an	alternative	way	of	framing	some	of	the	main	issues	might	lead	to	new	insights.	I	
will	 start	 by	 examining	 some	 earlier	 theory-neutral	 suggestions	 on	 how	 to	 classify	
Japanese	V-V	compounds	according	to	their	compositional	properties,	before	eventually	
discussing	more	recent	work,	 including	Kageyama’s	(e.g.	1993,	1996,	2009)	 influential	
distinction	of	syntactic	vs	lexical	compounds.		
	
14.2.	V-V	Compounds	in	Teramura	(1969),	Nagashima	(1976),	and	Yamamoto	
(1984)	
	
One	 of	 the	 earliest	 classifications	 of	 Japanese	 V-V	 compounds	 from	 a	 compositional	
perspective	 is	 Teramura	 (1969),	 who	 recognizes	 two	 kinds	 of	 components:	 A	 given	
V1/V2	 is	 “independent“	 (jiritsu)	only	 if	 it	preserves	 its	original	meaning	as	part	of	 the	
compound,	 otherwise	 it	 counts	 as	 an	 “attached“	 (fuzoku)	 element.	 The	 independent	 vs	
attached	dichotomy	yields	the	following	four	permutations.		
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Type	I:	 independent	V1	 independent	V2	
E.g.:	hashiri-saru	(run-leave)	-->	run	away;	mochi-ageru	(hold-lift)	-->	lift	up	
	
Type	II:	 independent	V1	 attached	V2	
E.g.:	hashiri-komu	(run-inwards	movement)	-->	run	into;	mi-ageru	(look-raise)		
-->	look	up	(at)	
	
Type	III:	 attached	V1	 independent	V2	
E.g.:	tori-osaeru	(take-catch)	-->	catch	(a	criminal);	uchi-nagameru	(hit-gaze)	-->	
look	at	sth.	while	absorbed	in	thought	
	
Type	IV:	 attached	V1	 attached	V2	
E.g.:	tori-nasu	(take-do)	-->	mediate	(between	parties);	nori-dasu	(ride-put	out)		
-->	start	(to	do),	embark	on	
	
In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Nagashima	 (1976)	 suggests	 that	 a	 V-V	 compound	 consists	 of	 a	
modifying	element	(shûshoku	yôso)	and	a	modified	element	(hishûshoku	yôso).	Based	on	
this	distinction,	he	postulates	two	types	of	compounds:	
	
Type	I:	 v1	(modifying,	lower	case	v)	 V2	(modified,	uppercase	V)	
Requirement:	Both	[N-ga	N-wo/ni	v1]	and	[N-ga	N-wo/ni	V2]	are	acceptable.	
E.g.:	 Tarô-ga	 ki-wo	 kiri-taosu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 tree-ACC	 cut-knock	down	 ‘Tarô	cuts	down	the	tree.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	 Tarô-ga	 ki-wo	 kiru.	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	 Tarô-ga	 ki-wo	 taosu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Type	II	 V1	(modified)	 v2	(modifying)	
Requirement:	[N-ga	N-wo/ni	V1]	is	acceptable,	but	[N-ga	N-wo/ni	v2]	is	not.	
E.g.:	 Inu-ga	 kodomo-ni	 kami-tsuku.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Dog-NOM	 child-DAT	 bite-stick	to	 ‘The	dog	bites	the	child.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	 Inu-ga	 kodomo-wo	 kamu.	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	 *Inu-ga	 kodomo-ni	 tsuku.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
It	 is	worthy	of	mention	that	Nagashima’s	use	of	constructional	templates	marks	a	shift	
towards	syntactic	tests	as	a	method	of	categorizing	V-V	compounds.	Where	Teramura’s	
dependent	 vs	 independent	 distinction	 is	 based	 on	 the	 somewhat	 vague	 notion	 of	
“preserving	 the	original	meaning”	of	 a	given	component,	Nagashima’s	 templates	make	
for	 a	 more	 technical	 approach	 –	 although	 he	 ultimately	 fails	 to	 specify	 what	 kind	 of	
acceptability	he	has	in	mind.1				
																																																								
1	Presumably,	Nagashima	has	native	speaker	judgements	in	mind.	However,	a	native	speaker	may	accept	
or	dismiss	a	sentence	for	various	reasons.	He	apple	eat	is	structurally	flawed	(ungrammatical),	while	She	
drank	solid	stone	conflicts	with	what	we	know	about	drinking	(Chomsky’s	famous	example	Colorless	green	
ideas	sleep	furiously	exemplifies	the	issue).		
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				Critisizing	 Teramura’s	 meaning	 preservation	 criterion	 as	 too	 subjective	 and	
Nagashima’s	 categorization	 attempt	 as	 not	 comprehensive	 enough	 (note	 that	 there	
seems	 to	 be	 no	 place	 in	 his	 model	 for	 Teramura’s	 Type	 IV	 compounds),	 Yamamoto	
(1984)	suggests	an	account	of	V-V	compounds	based	on	the	notion	of	“case	government”	
(kaku	shihai).	According	to	Yamamoto,	every	verb	has	a	fixed	number	of	argument	slots	
for	 “case	 components”	 (kaku	 seibun),	 which	 define	 its	 valence	 (ketsugôka).	 The	 verb	
hashiru	(run),	for	example,	has	a	subject	argument	slot	for	the	case	component	[N-ga],	as	
in	 [Tarô-ga]	hashiru	(Tarô	 runs),	 and	 therefore	a	valence	of	1.	 Since	miru	 (watch)	has	
two	 argument	 slots,	 it	 has	 a	 valence	 of	 2:	 [Kodomo-ga]	 [terebi-wo]	miru	 (The	 child	
watches	television).	And	oshieru	(teach)	with	its	three	argument	slots	has	a	valence	of	3:	
[Sensei-ga][seito-ni][rekishi-wo]	oshieru	 (The	teacher	teaches	the	student	history).	That	
is,	 hashiru	 governs	 nominative	 case	 (N-ga),	miru	 governs	 nominative	 and	 accusative	
case	 (N-wo)	and	oshieru	 governs	nominative,	accusative,	and	dative	case	 (N-ni).	Based	
on	how	the	valence	properties	of	the	compound	interact	with	the	valance	properties	of	
each	individual	verb,	Yamamoto	(1984)	argues	for	the	following	categorization:		
	
--Type	I:	Both	V1	and	V2	exhibit	case	government--	
	
Kodomo-ga	 naki-sakebu.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Child-NOM	 cry-scream	 ‘The	child	cries	and	screams	(cries	intensely).’	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	Kodomo-ga	naku.	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	Kodomo-ga	sakebu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Haha-ga	 kodomo-wo	 daki-kakaeru.	 	 	 	 	 	
Mother-NOM	 child-ACC	 embrace-hold	 ‘The	mother	cradles	the	child.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	Haha-ga	kodomo-wo	daku.	 	 	 	 	
-->	Haha-ga	kodomo-wo	kakaeru.	 	 	 	 	
	
--Type	II:	Only	V1	exhibits	case	government--	
	
Oyu-ga	 waki-tatsu.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Water-NOM	 boil-stand	 ‘The	water	seethes.’	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	Oyu-ga	waku.	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Oyu-ga	tatsu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Hanako-ga	 okashi-wo	 tabe-sugiru.	 	 	 	 	 	
Hanako-NOM	 sweets-ACC	 eat-exceed	 ‘Hanako	eats	too	many	sweets.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	Hanako-ga	okashi-wo	taberu.	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Hanako-ga	okashi-wo	sugiru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																																													
Note	that	inu-ga	kodomo-ni	tsuku,	by	default,	is	neither	“ungrammatical“	nor	nonsensical	(It	can	be	read	as	
The	dog	accompanies	the	child).	It	becomes	infelicitous	only	when	read	as	an	alternative	to	inu-ga	kodomo-
ni	kami-tsuku	–	which	brings	us	back	to	Teramura’s	notion	of	meaning	preservation.		
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--Type	III:	Only	V2	exhibits	case	government--	
	
Fuun-ga	 uchi-kasanaru.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Misfortune-NOM	 hit-pile	up	 ‘(I)	have	a	streak	of	hard	luck.’	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Fuun-ga	utsu.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
-->	Fuun-ga	kasanaru.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Fuchûi-ga	 jiko-wo	 hiki-okosu.	 	 	 	 	 	
Negligence-NOM	 accidents-ACC	 pull-cause.	 ‘Negligence	leads	to	accidents.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Fuchûi-ga	jiko-wo	hiku.	 	 	 	 	
-->	Fuchûi-ga	jiko-wo	okosu.	 	 	 	 	
	
--Type	IV:	Neither	V1	nor	V2	exhibit	case	government--	
	
Tarô-ga	 (nyûsu-wo	 kii-te)	 tori-midasu.	 	 	 	 	
Tarô-NOM	 (news-ACC	 listen-TE)	 take-disturb	 ‘Tarô	gets	upset	(listening	to	the	news).’	 	 	 	
-->	*Tarô-ga	(nyûsu-wo	kii-te)	toru.	 	 	 	
-->	*Tarô-ga	(nyûsu-wo	kii-te)	midasu.	 	 	 	
	
Keisatsu-ga	 inshu	unten-wo	 tori-shimaru.	 	 	 	 	 	
Police-NOM	 drunk	driving-ACC	 take-tighten		 ‘The	Police	crack	down	on	drunk	driving.’	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Keisatsu-ga	inshu	unten-wo	toru.	 	 	 	 	
-->	*Keisatsu-ga	inshu	unten-wo	shimaru.	 	 	 	 	
	
Within	this	model	a	 failed	substitution	test	shows	that	a	given	V1/V2	does	not	exhibit	
case	government	over	the	compound’s	argument(s).	For	example,	Yamamoto	(1984:	38)	
claims	 that	 the	 result	 of	 substituting	 the	 simplex	 tatsu	 for	waki-tatsu	 in	Oyu-ga	waki-
tatsu,	 i.e.	 *Oyu-ga	 tatsu,	 is	 “ungrammatical“	 (hibun).	 However,	 this	 use	 of	 the	 term	
“ungrammatical”	begs	the	question,	since	the	sentence	is	not	structurally	flawed	in	the	
Chomskyan	sense.	In	other	words,	in	a	generative	framework	the	sentence	Oyu-ga	tatsu	
would	 not	 violate	 any	 “syntactic	 rules”.	 So	what	 else	 could	 Yamamoto	 have	meant	 by	
“ungrammatical”?	 If	we	 look	at	 the	 sentences	marked	by	an	asterisk,	 it	 becomes	 clear	
that	the	V1/V2	in	question	either	requires	a	different	interpretation	vis-a-vis	its	use	in	
the	compound	or	becomes	difficult	to	interpret	at	all,	thus	changing	the	meaning	of	the	
sentence	 or	 rendering	 it	 outright	 incomprehensible.	 Viewed	 in	 this	 light,	 Yamamoto’s	
grammatical/ungrammatical	 distinction	 is	 not	 so	 different	 from	 Teramura’s	 meaning	
preservation	 criterion.	 In	 fact,	 if	 we	 take	 Teramura’s	 examples	 from	 above	 and	 run	
Yamamoto’s	substitution	tests	with	them,	it	turns	out	that	all	of	Teramura’s	independent	
verbs	exhibit	case	government	in	Yamamoto’s	sense,	while	the	attached	verbs	do	not.		
	
14.3.	Compositional	Disparity	as	an	Umbrella	Term	
	
The	 dichotomies	 independent	 vs	 attached	 and	 case	 government	 vs	 no	 case	 government	
agree	 with	 our	 intuition	 that	 within	 some	 V-V	 compounds	 V1	 and	 V2	 behave	 in	 a	
 158 
somewhat	 asymmetrical	 manner.	 Moreover,	 this	 asymmetry	 concerns	 the	 level	 of	
discription	which	is	traditionally	known	as	argument	structure.	Consider	the	following	
examples:		
	
(1)	 Kuchi-ga	 kawaki-kit-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouth-NOM	 become	dry-KIRU-RES	 ‘(My)	mouth	is	all	dried	up.’	 	 	 	 	
	 -->	Kuchi-ga	kawai-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 -->	*Kuchi-ga	kit-te	iru.		 	 	 	 	
	
(2)	 Hanako-ga	 uta-wo	 utai-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 song-ACC	 sing-DASU-PAST	 ‘Hanako	started	singing	a	song.’	 	 	 	
	 -->	Hanako-ga	uta-wo	utat-ta.	
	 -->	*Hanako-ga	uta-wo	dashi-ta.	
	
(3)	 Sagishi-ga	 okane-wo	 damashi-tot-ta.	 	 	
	 Scammer-NOM	 money-ACC	 deceive-take-PAST	 ‘The	scammer	took	the	money	by	deception.’	 	
	 -->	*Sagishi-ga	okane-wo	damashi-ta.	 	
	 -->	Sagishi-ga	okane-wo	tot-ta.	 	
	
(4)	 Tarô-ga	 ji-wo	 kaki-nagut-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 characters-ACC	 write-beat-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	wrote	the	characters	in	a	disorderly	manner.’	
	 -->	Tarô-ga	ji-wo	kai-ta.	
	 -->	*Tarô-ga	ji-wo	nagut-ta.	
	
	
In	 each	of	 these	examples	either	V1	or	V2	 is	 somehow	 incompatible	with	at	 least	one	
argument	 of	 the	 compound.	 I	 am	 deliberately	 using	 the	 vague	 gloss	 somehow	
incompatible	 to	 indicate	 that	 we	 have	 little	 beyond	 the	 intuition	 that	 “something	 is	
off“	until	we	are	able	to	specify	what	exactly	that	is.	As	a	convenient	umbrella	term,	I	will	
refer	to	the	asymmetry	displayed	by	the	above	examples	as	compositional	disparity.		
	
14.4.	Salience	and	Abstract	Entities:	Some	Compounds	with	Grammatical	V2s	
	
Let	us	begin	our	inquiry	into	compositional	disparity	by	examining	the	kind	of	verbs	that	
have	been	the	focus	of	this	study:	image	schema	verbs	functioning	as	grammatical	V2s.	
Recall	that	these	V2s	may	have	highly	abstract	TRs	or	LMs.		
	
(5)	 Ame-ga	 furi-dasu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Rain-NOM	 fall-DASU	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(6)	 Kuchi-ga	 kawaki-kiru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Mouth-NOM	 become	dry-KIRU	 	 	 	 	 	
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(7)	 Hon-wo	 yomi-kakeru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Book-ACC	 read-KAKERU	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(8)	 Karada-wo	 kitae-ageru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Body-ACC	 train-AGERU	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(9)	 Uso-wo	 tsuki-tôsu.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Lie-ACC	 tell-TÔSU	 	 	 	 	 	
	
I	have	argued	 (see	10.2.6.)	 that	 -dasu	 in	 (5)	 is	an	extension	 from	 the	ACCESS	sense	of	
DERU.	What	becomes	accessible	in	(5)	is	not	merely	a	THING	(rain)	but	rather	a	state	of	
affairs.	Therefore,	the	TR	of	the	V2	-dasu	corresponds	to	the	abstract	proposition	that	it	
rains.	 	 The	 LM	 of	 -dasu	 is	 no	 less	 abstract.	 By	 application	 of	 the	 metaphor	 IN	 IS	
INACCESSIBLE/OUT	 IS	 ACCESSIBLE,	 the	 LM	 of	 -dasu	 corresponds	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 sensory	
inaccessibility.	 In	 other	 words,	 that	 it	 rains	 (i.e.	 the	 TR)	 emerges	 from	 the	 realm	 of	
sensory	inaccessibility	(i.e.	the	LM).	It	is	crucial	to	note	that	the	TR	of	-dasu	and	the	TR	of	
furi-dasu	are	not	the	same	entity.	Instead,	the	TR	of	 furi-dasu	corresponds	to	the	TR	of	
the	V1	furu,	i.e.	rain	(ame).	Thus,	we	might	say	that	in	competing	for	the	place	of	clausal	
TR	and	grammatical	 subject,	 the	TR	of	 furu	 prevails	over	 the	TR	of	 -dasu.	Or,	 to	use	a	
genetics	metaphor,	furi-dasu	“inherits”	its	TR	from	furu.		
				How,	then,	is	this	competition	for	subjecthood	decided?	The	straightforward	answer	is	
that	 the	 element	 with	 the	 highest	 cognitive	 salience	 is	 expected	 to	 prevail.	 But	 what	
exactly	 does	 “cognitive	 salience”	 refer	 to?	 According	 to	 Langacker	 (1991:	 308)	 “a	
prototypical	subject	ranks	highly	with	respect	to	all	four	topicality	factors:	it	is	agentive,	
human,	definite,	and	the	figure	within	the	profiled	relationship.”	In	the	case	of	(5),	both	
candidates	are	tied	in	terms	of	the	first,	third,	and	fourth	factor:	It	seems	dubious	to	say	
that	one	is	more	agentive	or	definite	than	the	other,	and	both	are	TR	of	their	respective	
verbs	 furu	 and	dasu.	This	 leaves	us	with	 the	 third	criterium	as	 the	most	 relevant	one:	
their	 places	 on	 the	 empathy	 hierarchy.	 Langacker	 (1991:	 307)	 –	 based	 on	 previous	
research	 by	 Silverstein	 (1976),	 Deane	 (1987),	 and	 Kuno	 and	 Kaburaki	 (1977)	 –	
postulates	the	following	order	of	entities,	ranked	“according	to	their	potential	to	attract	
our	empathy”:	
	
speaker	>	hearer	>	human	>	animal	>	physical	object	>	abstract	entity	
	
According	 to	 this	 hierarchy,	 abstract	 entities	 offer	 the	 lowest	 potential	 for	 human	
identification	 and	 therefore,	 all	 other	 things	 being	 equal,	 have	 the	 lowest	 cognitive	
 160 
salience.	Returning	 to	 (5),	 this	means	 that	a	meteorological	phenomenon	such	as	rain,	
while	not	anthropomorphic	or	even	very	concrete,	 is	 still	much	 less	abstract	and	 thus	
more	empathy-enducing	 than	a	 state	of	 affairs,	 i.e.	 (the	 fact,	 circumstance,	 etc.)	 that	it	
rains.	Note	in	passing,	that	conceptual	metaphor	theory	lends	additional	support	to	such	
an	 assumption.	 A	 great	 many	 (though	 not	 all)	 metaphorical	 mappings	 illustrate	 the	
abstract	in	terms	of	the	more	concrete,	make	non-sense-perceptible	entities	tangible	in	
terms	of	sense-perceptible	ones.	Take	the	following	examples:	
	
(10)	 Ah,	I	see	your	point.	 (UNDERSTANDING	IS	SEEING)	
(11)	 Our	uncle	left	this	world	too	early.	 (DEATH	IS	DEPARTURE)	
(12)	 He	used	a	dirty	trick.	 (AMORAL	IS	DIRTY)	
(13)	 She’s	a	towering	figure	in	her	field.	 (SIGNIFICANT	IS	BIG)	
	
The	most	obvious	examples	are	cases	of	personification:	
	
(14)	 The	Grim	Reaper	came	for	him.	 (DEATH	IS	A	REAPER)	
(15)	 Time	is	not	on	our	side.	 (TIME	IS	AN	ADVERSARY)	
	
Fauconnier	 and	 Turner	 (2003:	 322),	 in	 their	 book	 on	 conceptual	 blending,	 are	 quite	
unambiguous	on	the	matter	of	anthropocentrism	and	cognitive	salience:	“Human	beings	
are	 evolved	 and	 culturally	 supported	 to	 deal	 with	 reality	 at	 human	 scale	 –	 that	 is,	
through	direct	action	and	perception	inside	familiar	frames	[…].”		
				Furthermore,	note	that	the	conceptual	content	of	the	V1	furu	is	already	part	of	the	TR	
of	the	V2	dasu.	Thus,	promotion	of	the	TR	of	dasu	to	subjecthood	would	result	in	lexical	
redundancy2:	
	
(16)	 *[Ame-ga	 furu	 no]-ga	 furi-dasu.	 	 	 	
	 [Rain-NOM	 fall	 NMLZ]-NOM	 fall-DASU	 	 	 	
	
So	in	conclusion,	what	can	be	said	about	the	compositional	disparity	of	furi-dasu?	Why	is	
(17b)	a	felicitous	sentence	while	(17c)	is	not?	
	
(17a)	 Ame-ga	furi-dasu.	
(17b)	 Ame-ga	furu.	
(17c)	 *Ame-ga	dasu/deru.	
	
As	stated	above,	the	TR	of	the	V2	dasu	is	a	state	of	affairs,	i.e.	an	abstract	entity	ranked	
extremely	 low	 on	 the	 empathy	 hierarchy.	 As	 such,	 it	 remains	 schematic	 and	
unelaborated.	Due	to	its	low	cognitive	salience	it	is	a	bad	candidate	for	subjecthood	vis-
																																																								
2	See,	however,	the	active	zone	account	of		inchoative	-dasu	below	(14.5.3.),	which	offers	an	elegant	
solution	to	the	redundancy	issue.		
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a-vis	 the	 less	 abstract	 TR	 of	 the	 V1,	 i.e.	 ame.	 The	 infelicity	 of	 (17c)	 is	 now	 easily	
explained:	There	is	a	mismatch	of	TRs.	The	compound	furi-dasu	requires	the	TR	of	dasu	
to	 be	 a	 state	 of	 affairs.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 under	 the	 metaphor	 IN	 IS	
INACCESSIBLE/OUT	IS	ACCESSIBLE	 states	 of	 affairs	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 as	 physical	 things	
moving	out	of	a	container	–	thereby	yielding	an	inchoative	reading.	While	(17c)	could	be	
accommodated	somehow	(e.g.	rain	coming	out	of	the	clouds,	etc.),	we	cannot	expect	it	to	
have	 an	 inchoative	 reading	 without	 a	 state	 of	 affairs-type	 TR.	 Conversely,	 if	 we	
substitute	ame	with	such	a	TR,	we	do	get	the	desired	reading:	
	
(16)	 *[Ame-ga	 furu	 no]-ga	 deru.	 	 	 	
	 [Rain-NOM	 fall	 NMLZ]-NOM	 DERU	 	 	 	
	
	
While	 (17d)	 is	 not	 generally	 considered	 felicitous	 either,	 the	 intended	 inchoative	
meaning	is	easily	recognized.		
				Let	us	now	briefly	consider	the	remaining	sentences	(6)	through	(9).	As	I	have	argued	
earlier	(see	11.2.3.2.),	 the	LM	of	the	V2	kiru	 in	kawaki-kiru	 is	the	timeline	itself.	Again,	
this	is	a	highly	abstract	entity	which	remains	unelaborated	(i.e.	linguistically	unrealized)	
and	is	not	inherited	as	either	subject	or	object	by	the	compound.	The	substitution	test	in	
(18c)	fails	due	to	the	absence	of	a	timeline-type	LM.		
	
(18a)	 kuchi-ga	kawaki-kiru.	
(18b)	 kuchi-ga	kawaku.	
(18c)	 *kuchi-ga	kiru.	
	
In	(18a)	the	V1	kawaku	profiles	a	scalar	process	whose	GOAL	portion	serves	as	point	of	
segmentation	 (POS),	 i.e.	 the	 end-point	 of	 the	 process	 profiled	 by	 kawaku	 marks	 the	
transtion	from	dynamic	to	static.	This	 is	what	makes	the	timeline	itself	a	salient	frame	
element	in	the	first	place.	However,	with	no	such	V1	there	is	nothing	in	(18c)	to	suggest	
the	existence	of	a	timeline-type	LM.		
				Moving	 on	 to	 (7),	 the	 LM	 of	 the	 V2	 kakeru	 is	 the	 process	 profiled	 by	 the	 V1.	
Metaphorically,	kakeru	indicates	that	the	TR	makes	CONTACT	with	the	frontal	boundary	
of	that	process	(see	9.2.3.).	Since	a	book	and	the	process	of	reading	a	book	are	two	very	
different	entities,	the	substitution	test	cannot	yield	the	desired	inchoative	reading:		
	
(19a)	 Hon-wo	yomi-kakeru	
(19b)	 *Hon-wo	kakeru/*Hon-ni	kakaru	
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As	with	the	V2	-dasu,	we	get	closer	to	the	intended	reading	by	replacing	the	LM	of	the	
compound	with	the	appropriate	abstract	entity.	(Though,	again,	the	result	is	not	entirely	
felicitous.)	
	
(19c)	 *[Hon-wo	 yomu	 no]-ni	 kakaru	 	 	 	
	 [Book-ACC	 read	 NMLZ]-DAT	 KAKARU	 	 	 	
	
				Sentence	(8)	 is	an	 instance	of	what	 I	have	called	–	building	on	Lindner	(1981)	–	 the	
achievement	 of	 sufficient	 state	 sense	 of	 AGARU.	 Here	 the	 V1	 kitaeru	 profiles	 a	 scalar	
process.	 The	 TR	 corresponds	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 progress	 on	 that	 scale	 towards	 some	
sufficient	state	(i.e.	the	LM).	In	the	case	of	kitae-ageru,	kitaeru	evokes	a	fitness	scale.	The	
TR	 thus	 corresponds	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 fitness	 which	moves	 towards	 –	 and	 eventually	
coincides	 with	 –	 the	 state	 of	 sufficient	 fitness.	 Note	 that	 both	 TR	 (degree)	 and	 LM	
(sufficient	 state)	 are	 quite	 abstract	 and	 remain	 sublexical.	 Crucially,	 the	 TR	 is	 too	
abstract	to	compete	with	karada	for	overt	realization.	Analogous	to	the	above	examples,	
the	substitution	test	fails	due	to	a	mismatch	of	entity	types:	
	
(20a)	 Karada-wo	kitae-ageru.	
(20b)	 *Karada-wo	ageru./*Karada-ga	agaru.	
	
Paraphrase	closest	to	the	intended	reading:	
	
(20c)	 Karada-no	 kitae	guai-ga/wo	 (jûbun-na	 tokoro-made)	 agaru/ageru.	
	 Body-LK	 degree	of	fitness-NOM/ACC	 (sufficient-COP.ATT	 point-ALL)	 AGARU/AGERU	
	
				Finally,	 -tôsu	 in	 (9)	 requires	 its	 LM	 to	be	 a	 temporal	PATH	 (see	13.2.2.).	 This	PATH	
corresponds	to	the	process	profiled	by	the	V1	(uso-wo)	tsuku.	I.e.,	in	(9)	the	TR	traverses	
the	process	of	 telling	 lies.	 In	other	words,	 the	TR	metaphorically	 traverses	 the	path	of	
telling	 lies	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 spatial	 expanse.	 The	 closest	 paraphrase	 for	 the	 intended	
reading	would	look	something	like	this:	
	
(21a)	 Uso-wo	tsuki-tôsu.	
	
(21b)	 *[Uso-wo	 tsuku	 no]-wo	 (saisho-kara	 saigo-made)	 tôru.	 	
	 [Lies-ACC	 tell	 NMLZ]-ACC	 (beginning-ABL	 end-ALL)	 TÔRU	 	
	
Again,	 the	more	 abstract	 TR	 of	 -tôsu	 cannot	 compete	with	 the	 TR	 of	 the	 V1	 for	 overt	
realization,	and	the	substitution	test	fails	to	evoke	the	desired	interpretation,	since	uso	
does	not	profile	a	process/temporal	expanse:	
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(21c)	 *Uso-wo	tôsu/*Uso-wo	tôru	
	
				To	summarize:	The	asymmetry	between	lexical	V1	and	grammatical	V2	in	(5)-(9),	or	
more	 specifically,	 the	 “incompatibility“	 of	 the	 V2	 with	 at	 least	 one	 argument	 of	 the	
compound,	is	the	result	of	a	mismatch	between	entity	types.	In	each	case,	the	compound	
in	its	entirety	evokes	at	least	one	highly	abstract	frame	element	(e.g.	a	state	of	affairs,	a	
timeline,	 a	 degree	 of	 progress,	 etc.)	 not	 evoked	 by	 either	 the	 V1	 or	 V2	 alone.	 The	 V2	
takes	at	least	one	such	entity	as	a	sublexical	TR/LM.	However,	because	of	their	abstract	
nature,	these	entities	are	not	salient	enough	to	compete	with	the	V1’s	TR/LM	for	overt	
realization	as	subject	or	object.	In	other	words,	if	a	V2	in	(5)-(9)	is	not	compatible	with	
some	argument	of	 the	compound	(as	 indicated	by	a	 failed	substitution	test),	 there	 is	a	
simple	reason:	That	argument	does	not	match	the	V2’s	TR/LM	(or	even	its	entity	type).	
The	 corresponding	 TR/LM	 of	 the	 V2	 remains	 unelaborated,	 i.e.	 is	 “missing”	 from	 the	
level	of	lexical	realization.		
	
14.5.	Grammatical	V2s	and	“Fake	Transitivity”		
	
Up	to	this	point	I	have	claimed	that	several	grammatical	V2s,	such	as	-dasu	and	-kakeru	–	
despite	 being	 morphologically	 marked	 as	 transitive	 –	 should	 really	 be	 considered	
intransitive	 (see	 9.2.3.;	 10.2.).	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 has	 been	 touched	 upon	 in	 the	
respective	 case	 studies	 and	 pertains	 to	 the	 image	 schematic	 topology	 and	 TR-LM	
arrangement	for	these	V2s:		
	
(22)	 inchoative	-dasu	
	 schema:	EXIT	(state	of	affairs[TR],	CONTAINER[LM])	
	 metaphor	at	work:	IN	IS	INACCESSIBLE,	OUT	IS	ACCESSIBLE	
	 	
(23)	 inchoative	-kakeru	
	 schema:	CONTACT	(thing/person[TR],	process[LM])	
	 metaphor	at	work:	STATES	ARE	LOCATIONS	
	
Observe	that	in	the	above	schemas	the	LM	is	a	location	rather	than	a	participant,	which	
is	 characteristic	 for	 an	 intransitive	 relation,	 whereas	 a	 transitive	 relation	 obtains	
between	two	participants	(Langacker	1991:	343ff.).	In	fact,	it	is	not	at	all	uncommon	for	
verbs	to	have	transitive	form	without	being	true	transitives.	One	example	of	this	is	the	
setting-subject	construction	in	English:	
	
(24a)	 Thursday	saw	yet	another	startling	development.	
(24b)	 *Yet	another	startling	development	was	seen	by	Thursday.	
	 (from	Langacker	1991:	346)	
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Since	 the	 TR,	 elaborated	 by	Thursday,	 profiles	 a	 setting	 rather	 than	 a	 participant,	 the	
clause	 fails	 to	passivize.	This	 is	not	 the	case	 if	both	TR	and	LM	are	participants	 (Mary	
saw	John	-->	John	was	seen	by	Mary).		
				In	conclusion,	then,	the	fact	that	several	grammatical	V2s	profile	abstract	intransitive	
relations	 despite	 being	 morphologically	 transitive	 is	 unproblematic	 in	 light	 of	 the	
participant	vs	setting/location	distinction.		
	
14.6.	Other	Sources	of	Compositional	Disparity	
	
At	this	point	we	have	identified	the	abstract	nature	of	the	TR/LM	of	several	grammatical	
V2s	as	one	source	of	compositional	disparity.	Of	course,	there	are	many	V-V	compounds	
that	 do	 not	 feature	 grammatical	 component	 verbs,	 but	 still	 display	 compositional	
disparity.	How	can	we,	for	instance,	account	for	the	“missing	arguments”	(Wittfeld	2013)	
of	 lexical	–	lexical	 type	compounds?	 In	 the	 following	 I	will	postulate	several	additional	
sources	of	compositional	disparity:	
	
14.6.1.	“Subordination”,	Conceptual	Autonomy,	and	Discourse	Context	
	
Consider	the	following	sentences:		
	
(25)	 Tarô-ga	 (Jirô-kara)	 okane-wo	 damashi-tot-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 (Jirô-ABL)	 money-ACC	 deceive-take-PAST	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	took	money	(from	Jirô)	by	deception.’	
	 -->	Tarô-ga	okane-wo	tot-ta.	
	 -->	Tarô-ga	Jirô-wo	damashita.	
	 -->	*Tarô-ga	okane-wo	damashi-ta.	
	
(26)	 Tarô-ga	 (Jirô-kara)	 pasokon-wo	 yuzuri-uke-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 (Jirô-ABL)	 computer-ACC	 yield-receive-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	received	a	computer	by	(Jirô’s)	yielding.’	
	 -->	Tarô-ga	pasokon-wo	uke-ta.	
	 -->	Jirô-ga	pasokon-wo	yuzut-ta	
	 -->*Tarô-ga	pasokon-wo	yuzut-ta.	
	
(27)	 Sûtsu-ga	 ki-kuzure-ta.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Suit-NOM	 wear-crumble-PAST	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	suit	has	lost	its	shape	due	to	(someone)	wearing	it.’	
	 -->	(??)	Sûtsu-ga	kuzure-ta.	
	 -->	Dareka	[someone]-ga	sûtsu-wo	ki-ta.		
	 -->	*Sûtsu-ga	ki-ta.	
	
In	(25)	the	LM	of	the	V1	is	not	overtly	realized	as	direct	object.	In	(26)	and	(27)	the	TR	
of	 the	 V1	 is	 not	 overtly	 realized	 as	 subject	 (although	 in	 the	 first	 two	 sentences	 the	
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“missing”	 participant	 can	 optionally	 appear	 as	 an	 oblique).	 In	 order	 to	 explain	 the	
participant	 profiling	 properties	 of	 these	 compounds,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 they	
instantiate	a	certain	type	of	construction	in	which	the	V1	designates	a	manner,	means,	
or	 cause	 that	 modifies	 the	 event	 profiled	 by	 the	 V2.	 While	 the	 classification	 of	
compounds	 into	 various	 constructional	 schemas	 is	 hardly	 a	 new	 idea,	 their	 so-called	
“argument	 selection”	 properties	 are	 usually	 accounted	 for	 within	 the	 list-and-rules	
paradigm	of	Generative	Grammar	(e.g.	Kageyama	1993;	Yumoto	1996;	Matsumoto	1998;	
Fukushima	2005).	In	this	section	I	will	sketch	out	a	salience-based	account	that	does	not	
depend	on	the	postulation	of	semantically	vacuous	structures.		
				Let	us	begin	with	the	observation	that	the	V1s	in	the	above	sentences	are	equivalent	to		
English	adverbial	clauses	in	several	key	respects.	According	to	Langacker	(1991,	2008),	
the	 following	 are	 some	 characteristics	 of	 subordinate	 clauses	 (of	 which	 adverbial	
clauses	are	a	subtype):		
	
(i)	Subordinate	clauses	serve	 to	modify	another	structure.	Accordingly,	 the	 function	of	
an	adverbial	clause	is	to	“qualify	the	main-clause	process	with	respect	to	factors	such	as	
time,	means,	cause,	and	purpose	[...].”	(Langacker	2008:	419)	
	
(ii)	 One	 or	 more	 participants	 of	 the	 event	 designated	 by	 the	 subordinate	 clause	 will	
often	be	absent	from	the	level	of	linguistic	realization,	i.e.	they	will	not	appear	as	overt	
nominals.	(Langacker	1991:	420)		
	
(iii)	A	subordinate	clause	 is	often	morphologically	marked	by	 the	 lack	of	a	 finite	verb.	
Such	a	clause	has	no	temporal	profile	and	is	thus	ungrounded,	i.e.	it	makes	no	reference	
to	the	time	of	the	speech	event.	(Langacker	1991:	421)	
	
These	properties	are	illustrated	by	(28a)	and	(28b):	
	
(28a)	 John	makes	a	living	[by	stealing	puppies].	(“missing”	TR	in	subordinate	clause)	
(28b)	 John	makes	a	living	[by	stealing].	(“missing”	TR	and	LM	in	subordinate	clause)	
	
As	Langacker	(2008:	413)	notes,	“[a]temporalization	of	the	clausal	process	–	viewing	it	
holistically	rather	than	sequentially	–	is	one	step	in	the	direction	of	its	nominalization.”	
The	 main	 difference	 pertains	 to	 the	 level	 of	 autonomy:	 An	 atemporal	 relation	 still	
contains	 a	 schematic	 TR/LM	 as	 part	 of	 its	 profile	 and	 is	 therefore	 conceptually	
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(30a)	 Climbing	is	a	great	way	to	stay	in	shape.		
(30b)	 [Climbing	Mt.	Rushmore]	is	a	great	way	to	stay	in	shape.	
	 	
(31a)	 I	stay	in	shape	by	regular	climbing.	
(31b)	 I	stay	in	shape	[by	climbing	regularly].	
	
In	(30a)	climbing	is	clearly	a	nominal	(profiling	a	thing).	Here	the	load	of	salience	is	on	
the	 activity	 itself.	 Schematic	 participants	 hardly	 enter	 the	 picture	 and	 are	 therefore	
relegated	 to	 the	 base.	 The	 sentence	 is	 about	 the	 beneficial	 effect	 of	 the	 activity	 –	
regardless	of	who	climbs	what.	In	(30b),	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	the	activity	of	climbing	a	
certain	 object	 that	 is	 claimed	 to	 be	 beneficial,	 not	 the	 act	 of	 climbing	per	 se.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 schematic	 LM	 (elaborated	 by	Mt.	 Rushmore)	 is	 now	 salient	 enough	 to	 be	
profiled	 and	 climbing	 is	 consequently	 understood	 as	 profiling	 a	 relation.	 Hence,	
compared	 to	 (30a),	climbing	becomes	significantly	more	 “clause-like”,	while	 still	being	
“thing-like”	 enough	 to	 function	 as	 subject	 of	 the	matrix	 sentence.4	Moving	 on	 to	 (31a)	
and	(31b),	the	difference	is	quite	subtle:	(31a)	construes	climbing	as	a	thing5,	(31b)	as	a	
relation.	 Arguably,	 the	 salience	 of	 schematic	 participants	 is	 slightly	 higher	 in	 (31b),	
albeit	only	minimally.	In	(31b),	too,	the	focus	is	clearly	on	the	activity	itself,	leaving	TR	
and	 LM	 unelaborated.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 subordinate	 clause	 displays	 a	 characteristic	
tendency	towards	conceptual	autonomy.	The	fact	that	climbing	could	be	interpreted	as	
either	nominal	or	 clausal	 if	we	removed	 the	modifier	regular(ly)	 further	attests	 to	 the	
close	semantic	relationship	between	the	respective	variants.6		
				Returning	 to	 the	 Japanese	 compounds,	 we	 encounter	 striking	 similarities.	 First,	 as	
noted	 above,	 the	 V1	 functions	 much	 like	 an	 adverbial	 clause	 in	 that	 it	 specifies	 the	
manner,	means,	or	reason	pertaining	 to	 the	event	designated	by	 the	V2.	Secondly,	 like	
English	–ing	 (or	 the	 infinitival	 complement	 to	V)	 the	 grammatical	 form	of	 the	 V1,	 the	
ren’yôkei	(or	“continuative	form”),	has	a	tendency	towards	conceptual	autonomy.	In	fact,	
like	English	–ing,	it	is	(I)	always	ungrounded	and	(II)	has	a	semantic	variant	that	profiles	
a	thing	instead	of	a	relation.	This	is	illustrated	below:	
																																																								
4	Note	that	the	TR	still	remains	unelaborated.	Is	a	schematic	TR	part	of	the	profile	in	(30b),	but	not	in	
(30a)?	A	tentative	answer	is	that	the	high	salience	of	the	LM	in	(30b)	will	automatically	raise	the	
schematic	TR	to	some	level	of	prominence.	Thus	the	TR	would	pass	the	salience	threshold	for	profiling,	
while	still	not	salient	enough	for	elaboration.	
5	The	nominal	character	is	indicated	by	the	adjective	regular.	A	search	on	the	internet	reveals	similar	
usages,	such	as	the	headline	“Study:	Regular	Running	Can	Increase	Your	Life”	
(http://running.competitor.com/2012/05/news/study-regular-running-can-increase-your-life_51953,	
retrieved	16	Oct.	2016)	
6	We	can	say	that	in	sentences	like	I	stay	fit	by	running/climbing/lifting/etc.	the	construction	V-ing	
“straddles	the	fence“	between	clausal	and	nominal	(see	Tuggy’s	[1993:285]	remarks	on	polysemy).		
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(32a)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-wo	 damashi,	 okane-wo	 nusun-da.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 deceive	 money-ACC	 steal-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	deceived	Jirô	and	stole	(his)	money.’	 	 	
	
(32b)	 Tarô-ga	 Jirô-wo	 damashi,	 okane-wo	 nusumu	 deshô	 ka.	
	 Tarô-NOM	 Jirô-ACC	 deceive	 money-ACC	 steal	 COP.POL.CON	 Q	
	 ‘Will	Tarô	deceive	Jirô	and	steal	(his)	money?’	 	
	
(33)	 Tarô-wa	 sagi-to	 damashi-de	 kut-te		iru.	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-TOP	 fraud-and	 deception-INS	 eat-PROG	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	makes	a	living	by	fraud	and	deception.’	 	 	 	
	
As	shown	in	(32a)	and	(32b),	the	ren’yôkei	causes	atemporalization.	The	clause	headed	
by	damashi	contains	no	reference	to	the	time	of	the	speech	event	and	thus	depends	on	
the	 second	 clause’s	 finite	 verb	 for	 temporal	 grounding.	 In	 sentence	 (33)	damashi	 is	 a	
nominal	 and	 profiles	 a	 thing,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 instrumental	 marker	 de	 and	 the	
conjunction7	with	 sagi	 (fraud).	 This	 semantic	 variant	 of	 the	 ren’yôkei	 is	 similar	 to	 the	
nominalizer	–ing	(e.g.	30a)	in	that	it	reifies	a	process	and	relegates	its	participants	to	the	
base.	 Like	 a	 deverbal	 nominal	 in	 English,	 this	 variant	 can	 enter	 into	 N-N	 compounds	
such	 as	kodomo-damashi	 (child’s	 play)	 or	damashi-e	 (trompe	 l’loeil)	 (cf.	 rock	climbing,	
eating	contest,	etc.).		
				Given	 that	 atemporalization	 is	 the	 first	 step	 towards	 nominalization,	 and	 therefore	
conceptual	 autonomy,	 the	polysemy	of	 the	 ren’yôkei	 comes	 as	no	 suprise.	 Considering	
that	 the	 nominalized	 ren’yôkei	 directs	 the	 spotlight	 of	 prominence	 away	 from	 the	
participants	and	at	the	activity	itself,	it	stands	to	reason	that	its	conjunctive	variant,	too,	
retains	this	tendency	to	some	degree.	In	all	of	these	respects	the	argument	runs	parallel	
to	the	one	regarding	–ing.		
				On	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 considerations	 we	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 account	 for	 any	
“missing”	participants	in	terms	of	salience.	In	some	cases,	the	fact	that	the	LM	of	damashi	
in	damashi-toru	is	not	overtly	realized	as	direct	object	can	be	interpreted	as	a	reflection	
of	its	low	prominence.	In	this	respect	the	V1	is	not	unlike	its	nominal	counterpart	in	(33).	
Observe	that	(33)	is	primarily	about	Tarô’s	methods,	not	about	his	victims.				
				On	the	other	hand,	one	can	hardly	overstate	the	importance	of	discourse	context	when	
talking	about	salience.	On	many	occasions,	the	victim’s	identity	will	be	inferable	without	
explicit	 mention.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 norm	 rather	 then	 the	 exception,	 we	 can	 alternatively	
interpret	 its	 inability	 to	 manifest	 as	 direct	 object	 as	 the	 syntactic	 consequence	 of	 a	
																																																								
7	Unlike	English	and,	the	particle	to	can	only	link	nominals.		
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usage-based	effect:	In	accordance	with	the	Gricean	maxims	of	quantity,	information	that	
constitutes	 “common	 ground”	 need	 not	 be	 explicitly	 mentioned.8	The	 same	 applies,	
mutatis	 mutandis,	 to	 the	 TR	 of	 yuzuri	 in	 (26).	 Consider	 the	 following	 stretches	 of	
discourse:	
	
(34a)	 Tarô:	Sono	pasokon,	saikin	katta	no?	
	 Tarô:	That	computer,	did	you	buy	it	recently?	
	 Hanako:	Un,	kono	aida	yasuku	yuzuri-uketa.	
	 Hanako:	Yeah,	bought	it	(off	someone)	for	cheap	a	couple	of	days	ago.	
	
(34b)	 Tarô:	Sono	pasokon,	Jirô-no	yatsu	ja	nai?	
	 Tarô:	Isn’t	that	Jirô’s	computer?	
	 Hanako:	Un,	kono	aida	yasuku	yuzuri-uketa.	Atarashii	no	kau	kara,	mô	iranai	tte.	
	 Hanako:	Yeah,	bought	it	(off	him)	for	cheap	a	couple	of	days	ago.		He	said	he’ll	buy	a	new	one,	so	
he	doesn’t	need	it	anymore.	
	
In	 (34a)	 the	 V1	 puts	 the	 load	 of	 salience	 on	 the	 manner	 of	 acquisition.	 While	 the	
existence	of	a	schematic	seller/yielder	is	vaguely	presupposed,	its	identity	is	construed	
as	irrelevant.	I.e.,	with	regards	to	its	TR,	the	V1’s	behavior	resembles	that	of	a	deverbal	
nominal.9	In	 (34b),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 seller’s/yielder’s	 identity	 is	 easily	 inferred	
from	the	preceding	utterance	and	does	not	need	to	be	restated.	We	could	come	up	with	
analogous	 examples	 for	 ki-kuzureru,	 but	 I	 believe	 the	 gist	 of	 the	 argument	 should	 be	
clear	 by	 now.	 In	 summary,	 when	 a	 participant	 remains	 unelaborated,	 it	 is	 either	 not	
salient	enough	 to	 be	 stated	 explicitly	 or	 it	 is	 already	 part	 of	 the	 discoursive	 “common	
ground”	(and	therefore	too	salient	to	be	stated	explicitly).	As	shown	in	(34a)	and	(34b),	
both	cases	complement	each	other,	and	thus	every	utterance	needs	to	be	analyzed	on	its	
own	terms.			
	
14.6.2.	Active	Zones	
	
(35a)	 Hannin-ga	 higaisha-wo	 shime-koroshi-ta.	 	
	 Criminal-NOM	 victim-ACC	 choke-kill-PAST	 ‘The	criminal	choke	the	victim	to	death.’	
	
(35b)	 *Hannin-ga	 higaisha-wo	 shime-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Criminal-NOM	 victim-ACC	 choke	 	 	 	 	
	
(35c)	 BUT:	 Hannin-ga	 higaisha-no	 kubi-wo	 shimeta.	 	 	
	 	 Criminal-NOM	 victim-LK	 throat-ACC	 choke	 	 	
	 ‘The	criminal	choked	the	victim’s	throat.’	 	 	
																																																								
8	The	second	maxim	of	quantity	states:	“Do	not	make	your	contribution	more	informative	than	is	required”	
(Grice	1975:	45).	
9	As	mentioned	above,	a	subtle	difference	between	clausal	vs	nominal	-ing/conjunctive	vs	nominal	
ren’yôkei	is	that	the	former	variants	profile	schematic	participants,	but	often	leave	them	unelaborated,	
whereas	the	latter	variants	relegate	participants	to	the	base.	Thus,	there	is	a	prominence-cline	for	
participants	along	the	lines	of:	part	of	the	base	-->	schematically	profiled,	but	unelaborated	-->	elaborated.		
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(36a)	 Sairen-ga	 nari-wataru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Siren-NOM	 sound-cross	 ‘The	siren	resounded	(throughout	the	area).’	 	 	 	 	
	
(36b)	 *Sairen-ga	 wataru.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Siren-NOM	 cross	 	 	 	 	 	
	
We	have	already	encountered	active	zone	phenomena	throughout	the	case	studies	(see	
e.g.	 12.1.3.).	 Recall	 that	 they	 serve	 “to	 accommodate	 the	 greater	 cognitive	 salience	 of	
concrete	objects	over	abstract	entities,	wholes	over	parts,	and	so	on”	(Langacker	1987:	
272).	 In	 (35a)	 shime-korosu	 evokes	 the	 throat	 as	 the	 active	 zone	 of	 the	 victim	 (part	 -	
whole	relation).	The	victim	as	a	whole	is	deemed	more	salient	than	the	body	part	and	is	
therefore	 licensed	as	direct	object.	(35b),	however,	shows	that	shimeru	without	korosu	
fails	to	trigger	the	part	-->	whole	metonymic	shift	and	therefore	does	not	permit	higaisha	
as	object.	Likewise,	nari-wataru	 in	 (36a)	evokes	 the	 soundwaves	as	active	zone	of	 the	
siren.	Since	 the	siren	 is	 the	 less	abstract	entity,	 it	 is	–	 in	virtue	of	 its	greater	cognitive	
salience	–		licensed	as	subject.	But	without	naru	the	simplex	wataru	does	not	trigger	the	
metonymic	shift	sound	-->	source	and	(36b)	ends	up	infelicitous.		
	
14.6.3.	Towards	an	Active	Zone	Analysis	of	Some	Grammatical	V2s	
	
While	on	the	topic	of	active	zone	phenomena,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	the	profiling	
properties	of	some	grammatical	V2s	bear	an	uncanny	resemblance	to	those	exhibited	by	
so-called	 “raising”-constructions	 (see	 e.g.	 Langacker	 1991,	 1995).	 In	 this	 section	
inchoative	V-dasu	will	serve	as	an	example	to	examine	the	parallels.	
				To	 briefly	 recapitulate,	 I	 have	 treated	 verb-verb	 compounds	 as	 an	 amalgamation	 of	
two	processes,	each	with	their	own	respective	TR/LM	slots.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	
furi-dasu	I	have	claimed	(on	the	basis	of	the	preceding	case	studies)	that	inchoative		
-dasu	has	a	sub-lexical	state	of	affairs	type	TR	along	the	lines	of	that	it	rains,	while	the	TR	
of	 the	 V1	 furu	 is	 elaborated	 by	 a	 thing,	 i.e.	 rain.	 Since	 the	 specifications	 for	 both	 TRs	
clash	 and	 the	 compound	 as	 a	 whole	 can	 only	 have	 a	 single	 TR,	 the	 clausal	 subject	 is	
chosen	according	to	an	empathy	hierarchy,	which	puts	things	above	states	of	affairs.		
				The	most	controversial	part	of	 this	analyisis,	 the	postulation	of	a	sub-lexical	state	of	
affairs-type	TR,	hinges	on	 the	argumentation	 in	chapter	10.2.6.:	Here	 it	was	suggested	
that	V-dasu	is	best	understood	as	a	variant	of	the	simplex	verb’s	access	sense	(recall	the	
arguments	 from	 peceptibility	 and	 non-intentionality).	 This	 access	 sense	 of	 DERU	 is	
arrived	at	via	the	conceptual	metaphor	BECOMING	ACCESSIBLE	IS	EMERGING	FROM	A	CONTAINER	
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with	 its	 entailments	 INACCESSIBLE	 IS	 IN	 and	 ACCESSIBLE	 IS	 OUT.	 The	 EXIT	 schema	 as	
instantiated	by	DERU	has	a	schematic	TR	and	a	schematic	LM:	An	entity	(the	TR)	moves	
out	of	a	CONTAINER	(the	LM).	Under	 the	metaphorical	 inchoative	reading	 this	TR	 is	a	
state	of	affairs	 that	moves	out	of	 the	realm	of	sensory	 inaccessiblity.	At	 the	very	 least,	
this	is	the	correct	TR/LM	configuration	on	the	level	of	image	schematic	structure,	i.e.	as	
pertaining	to	the	image	schema	EXIT	under	the	scope	of	the	aforementioned	metaphor.		
				Let	us	now	consider	the	possibilty	of	an	active	zone	analyisis.	Langacker	(1991:	453ff.,	
1995:	21ff.)	has	convincingly	argued	for	such	an	analysis	to	account	for	the	phenomenon	
known	as	“raising”.	Consider	the	following	sentences	(from	Langacker	1995:	24):		
					
(37)	 [That	Don	will	leave]SBJ	is	likely.	
(38)	 [Don]SBJ	is	likely	to	leave.	
	
	In	(37)	 likely	 takes	a	propositional	subject	(i.e.	that	Don	will	leave),	while	in	the	raised	
sentence	 (38)	 it	 takes	 a	 subject	 nominal	 designating	 a	 thing	 (i.e.	 Don).	 According	 to	
Langacker	 (1995:	 32),	 this	 shift	 is	 easily	 accounted	 for	 once	 we	 realize	 that	 the	
propositional	 subject	 in	 (37)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 active	 zone	 of	 the	 raised	 sentence’s	
subject	 in	 (38).	 As	 shown	 in	 figure	 2	 below,	 both	 sentences	 feature	 exactly	 the	 same	
conceptual	content	but	differ	in	regards	to	their	profiling	properties	(as	indicated	by	the	
bold	 lines).	 In	 both	 cases,	 likely	 situates	 a	 process	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 region	 on	 a	
probability	 scale.	 However,	 while	 (37)	 confers	 primary	 focal	 prominence	 (trajector	
status)	on	the	process	as	a	whole,	(38)	restricts	this	prominence	to	Don,	i.e.	the	process’	
most	salient	participant	(Langacker	1995:	24-25).	Langacker	points	out	that	this	sort	of	
metonymic	 shift	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 “raising”	 phenomena.	 In	 fact,	 the	 involvement	 of	
processual	active	zones	is	nothing	out	of	the	ordinary	at	all:		
	
For	example,	when	I	say	This	barber	is	fast,	I	do	not	imply	that	the	barber	himself	–	qua	person	or	physical	
object	–	falls	within	a	certain	region	on	a	scale	of	rapidity.	It	is	rather	a	characteristic	activity	in	which	the	
barber	 engages,	 such	 as	 shaving,	 cutting	 hair,	 or	 even	 running	 (the	 default	 for	 people	 in	 general),	 that	
directly	interacts	with	the	scale	and	is	thus	the	subject’s	active	zone	with	respect	to	fast.	(Langacker	1991:	
456)	
	
He	 further	 notes	 that	 a	 shift	 of	 prominence	 from	 process	 to	 participant	 is	 not	
unexpected,	 considering	 that	 the	 latter	 –	per	default	 –	makes	 for	 a	more	 prototypical	
subject	(recall	the	empathy	hierarchy	from	above):	
	
Because	a	processual	participant	 is	conceptually	autonomous	and	usually	 less	abstract	 than	the	process	
itself,	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 active	 zone	 and	profiled	 participant	 once	 again	 enables	 the	 spotlight	 of	
main-clause	focal	prominence	to	fall	on	an	entity	of	greater	cognitive	salience.	(Langacker	1991:	456)	
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competing	 for	 subjecthood	 and	 the	 one	 with	 higher	 cognitive	 salience	 prevails	 in	
accordance	with	the	emapthy	hierarchy.	The	main	difference	 is	 that	 I	have	treated	the	
process	itself	as	a	sub-lexical	TR	(due	to	its	prominence	within	the	scope	of	metaphor),	
while	I	believe	that	Langacker	would	avoid	such	an	interpretation.	On	the	other	hand,	I	
know	 of	 no	 comprehensive	 treatment	 of	 Japanese	 grammatical	 V2s	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 Cognitive	 Grammar.	 I	 will	 therefore	 merely	 point	 out	 that	 this	 is	 a	
potentially	promising	area	for	future	research.	After	all,	it	stands	to	reason	that	an	active	
zone	 account	 could	work	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 grammatical	 V2s,	 including	V-kakeru	 and	V-
tôsu:	 Here,	 nominals	 like	hon	 and	uso	 would	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 focal	 prominence	
instead	 of	 their	 processual	 active	 zones	 hon-wo	 yomu	 no	 and	 uso-wo	 tsuku	 no	 (see	
examples	[7]	and	[9]).		
	
14.6.4.	Partial	Metaphorical	Mappings	
	
(40a)	 Tarô-ga	 ji-wo	 kaki-nagut-ta.	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 characters-ACC	 write-beat-PAST	 	
	 ‘Tarô	wrote	the	characters	in	a	disorderly	manner.’	 	
	
(40b)	 *Tarô-ga	 ji-wo	 nagut-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 characters-ACC	 beat-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	
Consider	 the	 conceptual	 metaphor	 THEORIES	 ARE	 BUILDINGS,	 exemplified	 by	 expressions	
such	as	Your	theory	has	a	shaky	foundaton,	The	argument	collapsed,	and	so	on.	As	Lakoff	
and	Johnson	note,	only	certain	parts	of	 the	source	domain	are	mapped	onto	the	target	
domain:	
	
The	parts	of	the	concept	BUILDING	that	are	used	to	structure	the	concept	THEORY	are	the	foundation	and	
the	outer	shell.	The	roof,	internal	rooms,	staircases,	and	hallways	are	parts	of	a	building	not	used	as	part	
of	the	concept	THEORY.	Thus	the	metaphor	THEORIES	ARE	BUILDINGS	has	a	“used”	part	(foundation	and	
outer	shell)	and	an	“unused”	part	(rooms,	staircases,	etc.).	(Lakoff	and	Johnson	2003:	52)	
	
As	 (40)	 shows,	 this	 partial	 nature	 of	 metaphorical	 mappings	 can	 have	 bearing	 on	
argument	realization.	The	aspect	of	naguru	(beat,	hit)	which	is	in	focus	throughout	the	
mapping	 is	 the	 chaotic/disorderly/violent	 manner	 of	 the	 activity.	 The	 force	 dynamic	
aspects	 of	naguru	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 (i.e.	 energy	 transfer	 and	patient)	 are	non-salient	
elements	of	 the	 source	domain	 that	 remain	 “unused”.	The	 closest	paraphrase	of	 (40a)	
using	naguru	would	be	something	like:	
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(41)	 Tarô-ga	 ji-wo	 naguru	 yô-ni	 kai-ta.	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 characters-ACC	 beat	 like	manner-DAT	 write-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	wrote	the	characters	in	a	beating-like	manner.’	 	 	
	
The	point	 is	 that	 there	 can	be	no	paraphrase	of	 (40a)	 featuring	 the	LM	of	naguru	 (i.e.	
something	that	gets	hit),	because	the	corresponding	entity	is	excluded	from	the	scope	of	
the	metaphor	on	which	the	compound	is	based.			
	
14.7.	Lexicon	vs	Syntax?	Towards	a	Unified,	Schema-based	Account		
	
Up	until	 now	we	have	 looked	 at	 various	 cases	 of	 compositional	 disparity	 and	 thereby	
sketched	out	the	foundations	of	an	account	of	argument	structure	that	does	not	violate	
the	content	requirement		(Langacker	1987:	53f.).	The	argument	structure	phenomena	we	
have	 encountered	 above	 are	 not	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 procedural	 grammatical	 rules	
(which	 are	 not	 themselves	 symbolic	 units),	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	 of	 cognitive	 salience.	
Furthermore,	 we	 have	 assumed	 the	 lexicon-grammar	 continuum,	 which	 makes	 no	
principled	 distinction	 between	 lexical	 and	 grammatical	 elements	 (see	 1.2.;	 Langacker	
1990:	29).	On	this	view,	the	difference	between	a	“lexical”	V2	such	as	-asaru	in	kai-asaru	
(buy-scavange	-->	go	about	shopping	for	sth.)	and	a	“grammatical”	V2	such	as	-dasu	 in	
warai-dasu	 (laugh-DASU	 -->	start	 laughing/burst	out	 in	 laughter)	pertains	 to	 that	unit’s	
degree	of	schematicity.	While	the	former	codes	rather	specific,	conceptually	rich	content,	
the	latter	codes	conceptually	lean	content	of	a	more	structural	type.		
				However,	this	perspective	is	by	no	means	prevalent	in	the	contemporary	discussion	of	
Japanese	 V-V	 compounds.	 Instead,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 literature	 assumes	 a	
compartmentalized	 view	 of	 grammar	 with	 a	 sharp	 distinction	 between	 lexicon	 and	
syntax	(see	e.g.	Fukushima	2005,	Yumoto	2008,	Kageyama	2009).	On	this	view,	there	are	
two	 fundamentally	 different	 kinds	 of	 Japanese	 V-V	 compounds:	 “Lexical”	 compounds	
(goiteki	fukugô	dôshi)	assembled	in	the	lexical	component	(or	“module”)	of	the	grammar	
and	 “syntactic”	 compounds	 (tôgôteki	 fukugô	 dôshi)	 assembled	 in	 the	 syntactic	
component.	Proponents	of	 this	dichotomy	claim	that	evidence	comes	from	a	variety	of	
linguistic	tests.	Specifically,	“lexical”	and	“syntactic”	compounds	exhibit	distinct	behavior	
in	the	following	cases	(based	on	Yumoto	2008:	2):		
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--Test	1:	sô	suru--	
	
(42a)	 *Tarô-ga	 ason-de	 bakari	 iru	 no-wo	 mi-te,	 Jirô-
mo	
sô	 shi-kurashi-
ta.	
(lexical)	
	 Tarô-
NOM	
play-
PROG	
only	 PROG	 NMLZ-
ACC	
see-
TE	
Jirô-
too	
so	 do-live-
PAST	
	
	 Intended	meaning:	‘Seeing	that	all	Tarô	did	was	play,	Jirô,	too,	idled	his	time	away.’	 	
	
(42b)	 Tarô-ga	 mada	 hashit-te	
iru	
no-wo	 mi-te,	 Jirô-
mo	
sô	 shi-tsuzuke-ta.	 (syntactic)	
	 Tarô-
NOM	
still	 run-PROG	 NMLZ-
ACC	
see-
TE	
Jirô-
too	
so	 do-continue-
PAST	
	
	 ‘As	Jirô	saw	that	Tarô	was	still	running,	he	continued	doing	so	as	well.’	 	
	
--Test	2:	o-V	ni	naru--	
	
(43a)	 Shachô-wa	 o-asobi-kurashi		 ni-nat-ta.	 (lexical)	 	 	 	
	 CEO-TOP	 HON-play-live	 HON-PAST	 ‘The	CEO	idled	his	time	away.’	 	 	 	
	
(43b)	 *Shachô-wa	 o-asobi		 ni	nari-kurashi-ta.	 (lexical)	 	 	 	 	
	 CEO-TOP	 HON-play	 HON-live-PAST	 Intended	meanding:	same	as	(36a)	 	 	 	 	
	
(44a)	 Seinsei-wa	 tegami-wo	 o-kaki		 ni	nari-hajime-ta.	 (syntactic)	 	 	 	 	
	 Teacher-TOP	 letter-ACC	 HON-write	 HON-begin-PAST	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	teacher	began	writing	a	letter.’	 	 	
	
(44b)	 *Sensei-wa	 tegami-wo	 o-kaki-hajime	 ni-nat-ta.	 (syntactic)	 	 	
	 Teacher-TOP	 letter-ACC	 HON-write-begin	 HON-PAST	 	 	 	
	 Intended	meaning:	same	as	(37a)	 	 	
	
-->	lexical:	[o-V1-V2	ni	naru]	
-->	syntactic:	[o-V1	ni	nari-V2]	
	
--Test	3:	Passivization--	
	
(45b)	 *Kizôhin-ga	 mot-are-yot-ta.	 (lexical)	 	 	 	 	
	 Donation-NOM	 hold-PASS-draw	near-PAST	 Intended	meaning:	same	as	(46a)	 	 	 	 	
	
(46a)	 Tegami-ga	 kak-are-tsuzuke-ta.	 (syntactic)	 	 	 	 	
	 Letter-NOM	 write-PASS-continue-PAST	 ‘The	letter	was	continued.’	 	 	 	 	
	
(46b)	 *Tegami-ga	 kaki-tsuzuker-are-ta.	 (syntactic)	 	 	 	 	
	 Letter-NOM	 write-continue-PASS-PAST	 Intended	meaning:	same	as	(47a)	 	 	 	 	
	
-->	lexical:	[V1-V2-PASS]	
-->	syntactic:	[V1-PASS-V2]	
	
--Test	4:	Light	verb	construction	(N	suru)--	
	
(47a)	 *Kinyû	 shi-komu	 ;	 	 *Jisan	 shi-yoru	 (lexical)	
	 Entry	 do-[inwards	movement]	 	 	 Bringing	 do-draw	near	 	
															Intended	meaning:	‘Fill	in	(a	form	etc.)’						Intended	meaning:	‘bring	along’	
	
(45a)	 Kizôhin-ga	 mochi-yor-are-ta.	 (lexical)	 	 	 	 	
	 Donation-NOM	 hold-draw	near-PASS-PAST	 ‘A	donation	was	brought	(along).’	 	 	 	 	
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(47b)	 Ensetsu	 shi-owaru	 ;	 	 Tôkan	 shi-wasureru	 (syntactic)	
	 Speech	 do-finish	 	 	 Mailing	 do-forget	 	
	 ‘End	a	speech’																											‘forget	to	dispatch	sth.’	
	
Yumoto	 (2008:	 2)	 concludes:	 “The	 fact	 that	 Japanese	 V-V	 compounds	 can	 be	
distinguished	 by	 clear-cut	 formal	 criteria	 provides	 strong	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	
modularity	of	morphology.“	
				This	interpretation	is,	of	course,	inconsistent	with	a	major	guiding	assumption	of	this	
thesis,	 namely	 the	 view	 that	 grammar	 is	 exhaustively	 characterized	 as	 a	 structured	
inventory	of	 symbolic	units.	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 reconcile	 the	above	data	with	
the	basic	principles	of	Cognitive	Linguistics.	 I	believe	 that	 this	 is	 indeed	possible	 if	we	
consider	what	a	bottom-up,	usage-based	approach	to	grammar	entails.	Let	us	begin	by	
looking	 at	 frequency	 effects	 and	entrenchment.10	According	 to	Kageyama	 (2009:	522),	
there	 are	 approximately	 thirty	 syntactic	 V-V	 compounds	 in	 Japanese.	 He	 lists	 the	
following	examples:	
	
	V-hajimeru	(begin	to	V),	V-oeru	(finish	V-ing),	V-tsuzukeru	(continue	V-ing),	V-kakeru	(be	about	to	V),	V-
sokoneru	(fail	to	V),	V-kaneru	(cannot	afford	to	V),	V-wasureru	(forget	to	V),	V-naosu	(V	again),	V-okureru	
(be	late	in	V-ing),	V-sugiru	(V	excessively)		
	
As	 Kageyama	 notes,	 these	 compounds	 are	 all	 highly	 productive,	 as	 opposed	 to	 lexical	
compounds,	which	“lack	full	productivity”	(2009:	522).	If	we	look	at	the	semantics	of	the	
above	V2s,	there	is	nothing	mysterious	at	all	about	their	high	level	of	productivity.	Take	
V-hajimeru	for	instance.	The	V2	hajimeru	places	virtually	no	semantic	restrictions	on	its	
V1	except	that	it	be	a	temporally	extended	event.	Or,	simply	put,	-hajimeru	is	compatible	
with	 just	 about	 anything	 that	has	 a	beginning.	And	 this,	 in	 turn,	 results	 in	near	100%	
productivity.	 However,	 one	 should	 be	 mindful	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 is	 a	 bottom	 up	
process:	 In	 real	 world	 communication	 -hajimeru	 is	 suffixed	 to	 various	 individual	 V1s	
over	the	course	of	myriads	of	different	usage	events,	resulting	in	the	entrenchement	of	
compounds	 such	 as	 tabe-hajimeru	(begin	 to	 eat),	aruki-hajimeru	(begin	 to	walk),	kiki-
hajimeru	 (begin	 to	 listen),	 odori-hajimeru	 (begin	 to	 dance),	 and	 so	 on.	 Through	
continuous	 usage	 each	 compound	 becomes	 entrenched	 in	 the	 cognitive	 system,	 i.e.	 it	
achieves	 unit	 status	 (see	 Langacker	 1987:	 57ff.).	 Once	 a	 large	 number	 of	 these	
compounds	achieve	unit	status,	the	partially	filled	schema	[V-hajimeru]	will	–	as	a	result	
of	 inductive	 reasoning	 –	 achive	 unit	 status	 as	well.	 Keep	 in	mind	 that	 unit	 status	 is	 a	
																																																								
10	The	following	arguments	assume	that	Langacker’s	principles	of	convention	and	usage	(1987:	65f.)	as	
well	as	full	and	partial	sanction	(1987:	66ff.)	apply.	
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matter	 of	 degree.	 Since	 -hajimeru	 appears	 as	 V2	 in	 hundreds	 of	 compounds,	 the	
construction	 [V-hajimeru]	 is	 firmly	 entrenched	 in	 the	 cognitive	 system.	Now,	 compare	
this	 to	 -naguru.	While	 the	compound	kaki-naguru	 (write-beat	 -->	write	 in	a	disorderly	
manner)	 has	 clearly	 achieved	 unit	 status	 through	 repeated	 usage	 (i.e.	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	
relatively	 high	 token	 frequency),	 the	 partially	 filled	 schema	 [V-naguru]	 can	 hardly	 be	
said	to	be	cognitively	entrenched.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	-naguru	does	not	appear	in	
the	V2	 slot	of	 any	other	 compounds.	After	all,	 the	 semantics	of	 -naguru	 are	much	 less	
schematic	than	those	of	-hajimeru,	and	thus	the	former	is	a	lot	more	specific	in	its	choice	
of	 V1.	 In	 conclusion,	 then,	 the	 cognitive	 entrenchment/unit	 status	 of	 lexically	 filled	
constructions	can	be	measured	in	terms	of	token	frequency,	while	the	entrenchment	of	
schematic	constructions	is	best	measured	in	terms	of	how	numerous	their	instantiations	
are,	i.e.	by	type	frequency.		
				Once	 a	 schema	 is	 well-entrenched,	 it	 will,	 in	 turn,	 serve	 as	 a	 template	 to	 sanction	
specific	instances	in	top-down	fashion.	I.e.,	the	compound	yomi-hajimeru	(begin	to	read)	
is	 considered	 “well-formed”,	 because	 the	 schema	 [V-hajimeru]	 is	 a	 firmly	 entrenched	
unit.	 In	 contrast,	 *nuri-naguru	 would	 be	 judged	 as	 “ill-formed”,	 since	 the	 schema	 [V-
naguru]	is	not	a	well-entrenched	unit	at	all:	
	
(48)	 *Tarô-ga	 penki-wo	 nuri-nagut-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-NOM	 paint-ACC	 apply-beat-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 Intended	meaning:	‘Tarô	applied	the	paint	in	a	disorderly	manner.’	 	 	
	
To	 be	 sure,	 it	 is	 not	 inconceivable	 for	 nuri-naguru	 to	 attain	 unit	 status.	 After	 all,	 the	
construction	 is	 based	 on	 an	 already	 well-entrenched	 compound,	 and	 a	 speaker	
community	(or	some	sub-community)	might	 find	the	expression	amusing	or	useful	 for	
some	 reason	 or	 another.	 Through	 repeated	 usage	 the	 novel	 expression	 would	 then	
gradually	become	entrenched	as	well.	But	as	Tuggy	(2005:	254)	notes,	extensions	of	this	
type	 are	 “norm-bending	 and	 quite	 creative”.	 So	 as	 a	 rule	 of	 thumb,	 instances	 are	
sanctioned	by	well-entrenched	schemas.	Conversely,	if	a	schema	is	not	well-entrenched	
it	is	less	likely	to	sanction	a	particular	instance.	On	the	other	hand,	if	a	unit	is	extremely	
well	entrenched	it	is	not	only	fit	to	sanction	instances	in	virtue	of	full	schematicity	(e.g.	
[edible	 thing	 –	 soup]	 -->	 tomato	 soup),	 but	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 give	 rise	 to	 novel	
expressions	in	virtue	of	partial	schematicity	([edible	thing	–	soup]	-->	primordial	soup).		
				I	will	now	argue	that	this	interplay	between	entrenchment	and	sanction	is	responsible	
for	the	results	in	(42)-(47).	Once	again,	consider	the	examples	listed	above	by	Kageyama.	
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Observe	that	all	of	these	“syntactic”	compound	schemas	are	extremely	well	entrenched.	
Schemas	like	[V-hajimeru],	[V-tsuzukeru]	or	[V-wasureru]	are	instantiated	by	myriads	of	
different	 lexical	 items.	For	 instance,	 [V-tsuzukeru]	 effortlessly	 serves	as	a	 template	 for	
[hashiri-tsuzukeru]	 (continue	 to	 run),	 since	 [V-tsuzukeru]	 is	 deeply	 entrenched	 in	 the	
cognitive	system	and	stands	in	a	relation	of	full	schematicity	to	[hashiri-tsuzukeru].	But	
what	about	 the	relation	between	[V-tsuzukeru]	and,	say,	 the	 light	verb	construction	[N	
suru]?	 This	 is	 the	 aforementioned	 case	 of	 partial	 schematicity.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 [V-
tsuzukeru]	 requires	 an	 antecedent	 of	 the	 type	 [V],	 which	 clearly	 clashes	 with	 the	
specifications	 of	 [N	 suru]:	 [V]	 is	 a	 simplex	 verb	 whereas	 [N	 suru]	 is	 a	 composite	
construction	consisting	of	a	noun	and	the	light	verb	suru.	On	the	other	hand,	[V]	and	[N	
suru]	are	quite	similar	 insofar	as	 they	are	both	 instances	of	 the	 [PROCESS]	schema.	 In	
other	words,	it	only	takes	a	small	generalization	to	license	[N-suru]	in	the	[V]-slot	of	[V-
tsuzukeru],	thereby	giving	rise	to	the	schema	[N	shi-tsuzukeru].	In	analogous	fashion	the	
same	holds	true	for	[sô	suru],	 [o-V	ni	naru],	and	the	passive	construction.	By	extending	
the	 category	 [V]	 to	 all	 processes	 and	 not	 just	 simplex	 verbs	 we	 arrive	 at	 the	 meta-
schema	[PROCESS-tsuzukeru].		
				Now	 compare	 this	 to	 what	 adherents	 of	 the	 dichotomy	 call	 “lexical	 compounds“.	
Schemas	for	these	compounds	come	in	different	degrees	of	entrenchment.	On	the	high	
end	of	the	spectrum	we	have	well-entrenched	schemas	like	[V-komu]	(as	in	hairi-komu	
[enter])	with	a	 considerable	number	of	 instances.	On	 the	 low	end	of	 the	 spectrum	we	
have	 schemas	 like	 [V-asaru]	 or	 [V-naguru]	with	 only	 one	 or	 two	 instances	 (kai-asaru	
[buy-scavange	 -->	 go	 around	 shopping	 for	 sth.];	 yomi-asaru	 [read-scavange	 -->	 read	
what	one	can	get	one’s	hands	on];	kaki-naguru	[write-beat	-->	write	disorderly]).	These	
latter	 schemas	 are	 not	well-entrenched	 at	 all	 and	 lack	 unit	 status.	 They	 are	 therefore	
unfit	to	sanction	further	instances	despite	a	relation	of	full	schematicity.	Naturally	then,	
they	 are	 even	 less	 fit	 to	 sanction	 extensions	 of	 the	 schema	 via	 partial	 schematicity.	
Simply	put,	[V-asaru]	cannot	be	extended	to	[PROCESS-asaru],	since	[V-asaru]	does	not	
even	have	unit	status.	This	is,	of	course,	an	extreme	example.	[V-komu]	is	a	much	better	
candidate	 for	 unit	 status,	 but	 still	 not	 nearly	 as	well-entrenched	 as	 [V-tsuzukeru],	 [V-
hajimeru],	etc.	–	and	thus	still	unfit	to	give	rise	to	[PROCESS-komu].		
				From	a	usage-based	perspective,	“lexical”	compounds	are	more	deeply	entrenched	on	
the	non-schematic	level	than	on	the	schematic	level	(e.g.	kai-asaru	is	better	entrenched	
than	[V-asaru]),	whereas	“syntactic”	compounds	tend	to	be	more	deeply	entrenched	on	
the	schematic	level	(e.g.	[V-hajimeru]	is	better	entrenched	than	its	instances).	It	is	easy	
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to	see	how	this	affects	composition.	To	illustrate,	consider	kaki-hajimeru	(begin	to	write)	
and	 the	 honorific	 construction	 [o-V	ni	naru].	 Between	kaki-hajimeru	 and	 [V-hajimeru],	
the	 latter	 is	 much	 better	 entrenched.	 Consequently,	 it	 makes	 more	 sense	 for	 [o-V	 ni	
naru]	 to	 elaborate	 the	 V-slot	 of	 [V-hajimeru],	 then	 for	 the	 less	 well-entrenched	 kaki-
hajimeru	 to	 elaborate	 the	 V-slot	 of	 [o-V	 ni	 naru].	 That	 is,	 the	 composition	 works	 as	
follows:	The	verb	kaku	elaborates	the	V	slot	of	[o-V	ni	naru],	yielding	o-kaki-ni	naru.	The	
result,	o-kaki	ni	naru,	then	elaborates	the	V	slot	of	[V-hajimeru]	(for	this	[V-hajimeru]	is	
extended	 to	 [PROCESS-hajimeru]).	 Note,	 that	 on	 this	 account	 the	 fully	 elaborated	
compound	kaki-hajimeru	does	not	even	partake	 in	the	composition.	Now,	contrast	 this	
with	the	case	of		kai-asaru	and	[o-V	ni	naru].	Between	kai-asaru	and	[V-asaru]	the	former	
is	much	better	 entrenched	 than	 the	 latter.	Thus,	 it	makes	more	 sense	 for	kai-asaru	 to	
elaborate	the	V	slot	of	[o-V	ni	naru]	than	for	[o-V	ni	naru]	to	elaborate	the	V-slot	of	the	
non-unit	[V-asaru].		
				Let	us	summarize:	The	morphological	“inseparability”	of	so-called	lexical	compounds	
is	straightforwardly	accounted	for	in	light	of	their	low	schematicity.	A	compound	such	as	
kai-asuru	 is	 filled	with	 lexical	material	 in	both	 the	V1-	 and	V2-slot	 (by	kau	and	asaru,	
respectively).	In	contrast,	the	partially	filled	construction	[V-asaru]	cannot	license	other	
constructions	due	to	 its	 insufficient	degree	of	entrenchment.	E.g.,	 since	[V-asaru]	 lacks	
unit	status,	its	V1	slot	cannot	be	elaborated	by,	say,	the	light	verb	construction	[N	suru]	–	
hence	the	infelicity	of	[N	shi-asaru].	 In	the	case	of	“syntactic”	compounds,	on	the	other	
hand,	 the	 partially	 filled	 construction	 is	 better	 entrenched	 than	 the	 fully	 elaborated	
construction.	E.g.,	[V-hajimeru]	is	extremely	well-entrenched;	arguably	more	so	than	the	
fully	elaborated	[tabe-hajimeru].	Consequently,	“syntactic”	compounds	can	license	other	
PROCESS-type	 constructions	 (such	 as	 the	 light	 verb-,	 the	 honrific-,	 or	 the	 passive-
construction)	in	their	V1-slot	by	way	of	full	or	partial	sanction	–	hence	the	felicity	of,	say,	
[N	 shi-hajimeru].	 Of	 course,	 all	 of	 this	 is	 still	 rather	 programmatic.	 But	 the	 above	
considerations	 show	 that	 the	 linguistic	data	presented	by	proponents	of	 the	 lexical	 vs	
syntactic	dichotomy	does	not	compel	us	to	a	modular	view.		
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15.	Embodiment	and	the	Scope	of	Metaphor	in	German	and	Japanese	
	
At	several	points	during	the	course	of	this	thesis	I	have	considered	cross-linguistic	data.	
Recall,	 for	 instance,	 the	 discussion	 of	 -kakaru	 and	 German	 an.	 A	 cross-cultural	
perspective	 on	 embodied	 experience	 certainly	 seems	 interesting	 enough	 to	 warrant	
closer	inspection.	At	the	same	time,	a	comprehensive	treatment	of	the	topic	would	be	far	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	I	will	instead	restrict	myself	to	a	small-scale	comparative	
study	of	German	and	Japanese.	Specifically,	I	will	consider	three	source	domains	directly	
based	 in	 embodied	 experience:	 weight,	 edge	 properties,	 and	 surface	 properties.	 The	
question,	 then,	 is	whether	 these	will	have	similar	or	different	scope	 in	both	 languages.	
Will	we	 end	 up	with	 the	 same	metaphors	 in	 German	 and	 Japanese?	 Since	 our	 source	
domains	are	directly	embodied,	and	given	the	universal	nature	of	human	physiology,	we	
should	expect	only	subtle	variance.	
				I	have	chosen	metaphor	as	a	tool	of	analysis	for	practical	reasons.	Each	source	domain	
will	likely	correspond	to	an	overseeable	number	of	target	domains.	Thus,	the	amount	of	
data	 remains	 manageable,	 whereas	 “raw”	 image	 schemas	 such	 as	 CONTAINER,	
CONTACT,	etc.	correspond	to	countless	linguistic	expressions.		
			Before	proceeding,	I	should	mention	the	vast	body	of	existing	research	on	the	topic	of	
metaphor	and	culture.1	Of	these	studies,	a	significant	number	focus	on	specific	emotion	
concepts	such	as	anger	(e.g.	Lakoff	and	Kövecses	1987;	Munro	1991;	Matsuki	1995;	Yu	
1995)	 or	 love	 (e.g.	 Kövesces	 1988,	 Yang	 2002).	 These	 works	 share	 a	 common	
methodology	 in	 that	 they	 start	 with	 the	 target	 domain	 and	 work	 their	 way	 towards	
various	source	domains.	I.e.,	the	the	range	of	metaphor	is	a	primary	concern.	In	contrast,	
I	have	opted	for	the	opposite	direction	from	directly	embodied	source	to	target,	in	order	
to	examine	cross-linguistic	variance	(or	lack	thereof)	in	metaphorical	scope.	
	
	
15.1.	(I)	The	Weight	Scale:	Heavy	and	Light	
	
15.1.1.	(Ia)	EFFORTFUL	ACTIVITY	IS	HANDLING	HEAVY	OBJECTS	
	
Consider	the	following	German	sentences:	
	
(1)	 Das	ist	ein	schweres	Stück	Arbeit.		
This	is	a	hard	[heavy]	piece	of	work.	
	
(2)	 Wenn	wir	uns	anstrengen,	können	wir	die	Aufgabe	stemmen.	(colloq.)	
																																																								
1	See	Kövecses	(2005)	for	a	representative	book-length	study.	
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If	we	work	hard	we	can	finish	[lift	up]	the	task.	
	
(3)	 Er	hört	schwer	und	kann	dich	nur	mit	Mühe	verstehen.	
His	hearing	is	bad	[‘he	hears	heavily’],	so	he	has	trouble	understanding	you.	
	
(4)	 Das	Rätsel	war	schwer	zu	lösen.	
The	puzzle	was	hard	[heavy]	to	solve.	
	
(5)	 Ich	habe	Rückenschmerzen	und	kann	nur	leichte	Arbeit	verrichten.	
I	have	a	backache	and	can	only	perform	light	work.	
	
(6)	 Wenn	du	lauter	sprichst,	kann	ich	dich	leichter	verstehen.	
If	you	speak	up	I	can	understand	you	better	[lighter].	
	
(7)	 Diese	Mathematikaufgabe	ist	leicht.	
This	math	problem	is	easy	[light].		
	
This	metaphor	is	experientially	grounded	in	a	metonymical	relationship	between	source	
and	 target	 domain.	Dealing	with	heavy	objects	 is	 a	 prototypical	 instance	of	 exercising	
effort,	giving	rise	to	a	strong	experiential	correlation	between	the	two.	Consequently,	the	
source	 concept	 of	 weight	 is	 extended	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 effortful	 activity,	 e.g.	 sense-
perceptual	 (3,6)	 or	mental	 (4,7).	 In	 (8)	we	 encounter	 a	 seemingly	 similar	 expression	
from	Japanese:	
	
(8)	 Omoi	 shigoto-wo	 makas-are-te,	 sutoresu-ga	 tamaru.	 	
	 heavy	 work-ACC	 entrust-PASS-TE	 stress-NOM	 accumulate	 	
	 ‘I’m	entrusted	with	high	responsibility	jobs	and	stress	is	adding	up.’	 	
	
However,	note	that	the	weight	coded	by	omoi	in	the	above	sentence	is	not	coupled	with	
the	 target	 domain	 of	 EFFORT	 but	 rather	 with	 the	 target	 domain	 of	 PSYCHOLOGICAL	
BURDEN	(see	also	[16]	below).		
			Due	to	the	lack	of	expressions	corresponding	to	(1)-(9)	we	conclude	that	the	metaphor	
EFFORTFUL	ACTIVITY	IS	HANDLING	HEAVY	OBJECTS	does	not	seem	to	exist	in	Japanese.	
				
	
15.1.2.	(Ib)	ABSTRACT	BURDENS	ARE	PHYSICAL	WEIGHTS	
	
(09)	 Große	Verantwortung	lastet	auf	ihren	Schultern.	
Great	responsibility	rests	on	her	shoulders.	
	
(10)	 Er	neigt	zu	Schwermut.	
He	is	prone	to	depression.	
	
(11)	 Ich	möchte	niemandem	zur	Last	fallen.	
I	don’t	want	to	be	a	burden	to	anyone.	
	
(12)	 Mit	ihrer	Tat	hat	sie	Schuld	auf	sich	geladen.	
She	incured	guilt	[‘piled	guilt	onto	herself’]by	what	she	did.	
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(13)	 Ein(e)	leichte(s)	Verletzung/Strafe/Erkältung/Vergehen	
A		minor	[light]	injury/punishment/cold/offense	
	
(14)	 Was	für	eine	Erleichterung!	Mir	fällt	ein	Stein	vom	Herzen!	
What	a	relief!	That’s	a	load	off	my	chest!	
	
(15)	 Omoi	 sekinin-wo	 seou	 	 	 	 	
	 Heavy	 responibility-ACC	 shoulder	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘To	bear	a	heavy	responsibility’	 	
	
(16)	 (Sekinin-no)	 omoi	 shigoto-wo	 makas-are-te,	 ki-ga		 omoi	 	
	 (Responsibility-NOM)	 heavy	 work-ACC	 entrust-PASS-TE	 mind-NOM	 heavy	 	
	 ‘I’m	being	left	with	high-responsibility	jobs	and	I	am	feeling	depressed.’	 	
	
(17)	 Tanin-no	 onimotsu-ni	 nari-taku-nai.	 	 	 	 	
	 Others-LK	 baggage-DAT	 become-DES-NEG	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘I	don’t	want	to	become	a	burden	to	others.’	 	
	
(18)	 Hannin-ga	 jûhan-wo	 okashi-te,	 jûbatsu-wo	 uke-ta.	 	 	
	 Criminal-NOM	 serious	crime-ACC	 commit-TE	 severe	punishment-ACC	 receive-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘The	perpetrator	commited	a	serious	[heavy]	crime	and	received	severe	[heavy]	punishment.’	 	
	
(19)	 Karui	 byôki/hanzai/sekinin	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Light	 illness/crime/responsibility	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(20)	 Toriaezu	 karui	 kimochi-de	 yat-te	mi-te.	 	 	 	
	 For	now	 light	 feeling-INS	 do-try-IMP	 	 	 	
	 ‘For	now,	try	doing	it	without	taking	it	to	seriously.’	 	
	
As	evidenced	by	 the	above	sentences,	 the	scope	of	 this	metaphor	 is	nearly	 identical	 in	
German	 and	 Japanese.	 Both	 languages	 express	 psychological,	 emotional,	 and	 somatic2	
burdens	 such	 as	 sadness	 and	 responsibility	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	 weight.	 Note	 at	 this	
point	that	omoi	shigoto	in	(16)	emphasizes	the	weight	of	social	obligation	and	burden	of	
expectation,	whereas	ein	schweres	Stück	Arbeit	 in	 (1)	merely	 emphasizes	 the	 required	
degree	 of	 effort.	 Furthermore,	 German	 and	 Japanese	 share	 a	 common	 folk	 theory	 of	
justice	as	balance	(see	Johnson	1990:	90)	in	the	domains	of	law	and	morality:	The	weight	
of	 the	 punishment/atonement	 must	 match	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 crime/guilt	 in	 order	 to	
restore	equilibrium.		
				As	 for	 the	grounding	of	 the	metaphor,	we	 can	observe	parallels	between	 the	 effects	
physical	weight	and	abstract	burdens	have	on	their	“bearer“.	Note	that	carrying	a	heavy	
object	has	two	important	implications:	
	
• Incapacitation:	The	weight	limits	the	bearer’s	abilities	and	potential	for	action.	
																																																								
2	The	characterization	of	somatic	burdens	such	as	injury	or	sickness	(e.g.	[15],	[21])	as	“abstract“	may	
seem	dubious.	However,	the	point	is	that	injury	and	sickness	do	not	necessarily	involve	the	sensation	of	
physical	weight	on	the	body.		
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• Exhaustion:	The	weight	will	incrementally	affect	the	physical	condition	of	the	
bearer.	
	
Now	compare	this	to	the	“symptoms”	of	depression	and	responsibility.		
	
Depression	
• Incapacitation:	A	depressed	person	is	unable	to	use	his/her	abilities	and	
potential	to	the	fullest.	
• Exhaustion:	A	depressed	person	will	often	feel	fatigued	and	unmotivated.	
	
Responsibility	
• Incapacitation:	Being	responsible	entails	self-restraint.	(Inability	to	“do	as	you	
please”)	
• Exhaustion:	Not	living	up	to	one’s	responsibilities	entails	negative	consequences.	
Awareness	of	these	consequences	can	be	psychologically	exhausting.	
	
Thus,	depression,	responsibility,	guilt,	etc.	are	like	physical	weight	insofar	as	they	cause	
incapacitation	 and	 exhaustion	 within	 their	 respective	 domains.	 In	 virtue	 of	 these	
correspondences	the	latter	can	serve	as	source	domain	for	the	former.		
	
	
15.1.3.	(Ic)	INTENSITY	IS	WEIGHT	
	
If	ABSTRACT	BURDENS	ARE	PHYSICAL	WEIGHTS,	then	the	intensity	of	the	burden	is	proportional	
to	 the	amount	of	weight.	We	have	seen	this	entailment	at	work	above	 in	both	German	
and	Japanese	in	expressions	such	as	schwere/leichte	Krankheit	and	omoi/karui	byôki.	In	
the	case	of	German,	it	is	interesting	to	observe,	however,	that	the	intensity	entailment	of	
weight	 has	 been	 extended	 from	 the	 domain	 of	 abstract	 burdens	 to	 the	more	 general	
domain	of	negatively	evaluated	phenomena:		
	
(21)	 Er	hat	sich	schwer	betrunken.	
He	got	totally	[heavily]	drunk.	
	
(22)	 Alle	waren	schwer	enttäuscht	von	ihm.	
Everyone	was	exremely	[heavily]	disappointed	of	him.	
	
Although	I	suppose	it	would	still	be	possible	to	view	(21)	and	(22)	as	instantiations	of	
the	 abstract	 burden	 sense,	 the	 usage	 of	 schwer	 seems	 to	 have	 a	 more	 general	
augmentative	function	in	these	cases.	This	becomes	even	more	evident	in	examples	like	
the	following:	
	
(23)	 Sie	ist	schwer	in	Ordnung.	
She’s	a	real	trouper	[‘She	is	heavily	decent’].	
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(24)	 Alle	waren	schwer	beeindruckt	von	dieser	Leistung.	
Everyone	was	extremely	[heavily]	impressed	by	this	accomplishment.	
	
(25)	 Das		möchte	ich	doch	schwer	hoffen!	
I	sure	[heavily]	hope	so!	(uttered	as	a	warning)	
	
In	 these	 rather	 colloquial	 expressions	 schwer	 already	 functions	 as	 an	 augmentative	
adverb	along	the	lines	of	very.	Only	(25)	shows	traces	of	the	abstract	burden	sense	and	
its	negative	connotations,	as	the	sentence	is	usually	uttered	as	a	threat	or	warning.	Note	
in	passing	that	it	is	not	uncommon	for	negatively	evaluated	content	words	to	take	on	an	
augmentative	function,	especially	in	colloquial	speech	styles:		
	
(26)	 Sick	car,	dude!	
	
(27)	 Kono	 konbini-no	 poteeto,	 yabai	 umai!	 	 	
	 This	 convenience	store-LK	 fries	 dangerously	 tasty	 	 	
	 ‘The	fries	at	this	convenience	store	are	the	bomb!’	 	
	
In	summary,	the	grammaticalization	path	for	schwer	in	German	can	be	roughly	sketched	
out	as	 follows,	whereby	the	original	meaning	of	physical	weight	gradually	 fades	out	 in	
favor	of	 the	 intensity	aspect:	 (intensity	of)	abstract	burdens	 -->	 intensity	of	negatively	
evaluated	phenomena	-->	usage	as	augmentative	marker.	
	
	
15.1.4.	(Id)	IMPORTANCE	IS	WEIGHT		
	
(28)	 Seine	Stimme	hat	in	der	Partei	großes	Gewicht.	
His	voice	carries	great	weight	within	the	party.	
	
(39)	 Wir	müssen	Risiken	und	Vorteile	gegeneinander	abwägen.	
We	must	consider	[weigh]	both	the	risks	and	benefits.	
	
(30)	 Diese	Faktoren	fallen	nicht	weiter	ins	Gewicht.	
These	factors	are	irrelevant	[do	not	carry	any	weight].	
	
(31)	 Kono	 gakkô-wa	 bunkei-yori	 rikei-ni	 omoki-wo	 oku.	 	
	 This	 school-TOP	 humanities-ABL	 sciences-DAT	 weight-ACC	 put	 	
	 ‘This	school	lays	emphasis	on	the	sciences	rather	than	the	humanities.’	 	
	
(32)	 Keizai-wo	 jûshi	[‘heavy’-‘view’]	 shi-ta	 atarashii	 seisaku	 	 	
	 Economics-ACC	 importance	 do-PAST.ATT	 new	 policy	 	 	
	 A	new	policy	focusing	on	economics	 	
	
Earlier,	we	have	 seen	 that	 there	 is	 a	 strong	experiential	 correlation	between	handling	
heavy	 objects	 and	 exercising	 effort.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 we	 can	 hypothesize	 that	
importance	 and	weight	 are	 tied	 in	human	experience	 as	well.	Heavy	objects	 generally	
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require	more	resources,	such	as	force,	attention,	and	time,	to	be	dealt	with.	For	example,	
moving	a	heavy	rock	out	of	the	way	will	require	a	certain	amount	of	strength,	possibly	
the	application	of	tools,	and	so	forth.	In	short,	the	task	will	make	itself	more	salient	vis-a-
vis	the	handling	of	a	light-weight	object.	(In	this	sense,	the	heavy	object	“cannot	be	taken	
lightly.”)	 The	 metaphor	 is	 prominent	 in	 both	 German	 and	 Japanese	 and	 often	
instantiated	by	parallel	expressions	such	as	Schwer=punkt/jû=ten	(“heavy=point”		
-->	emphasis).	
	
	
15.1.5.	(Ie)	RESPECT/DIGNITY	IS	WEIGHT	
	
The	 fact	 that	 importance	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 weight	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 social	
domain	as	well.	Someone	whose	function	or	status	in	society	is	deemed	important	is	also	
more	 likely	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 respectable	 and	 dignified.	Metonymically,	 this	 evaluation	
carries	over	 to	 that	person’s	actions,	 thoughts,	manner	of	speech,	and	so	on.	Similarly,	
certain	 abstract	 entities	 such	 as	 ideals	 or	moral	 values	 are	 not	merely	 important,	 but	
command	respect	from	a	social	perspective.		
	
(33)	 Yamada-sensei-wa	 omomi-no	 aru	 kata	 desu.	 	 	
	 Yamada-teacher-TOP	 weight-NOM	 exist.ATT	 person	 COP.POL	 	 	
	 ‘Mr.	Yamada	carries	an	air	of	dignity	about	him.’	 	
	
(34)	 Shachô-ga	 omoomoshii	[omoi	=	heavy]	 kuchô-de	 ensetsu-wo	 hajime-ta.	 	 	
	 CEO-NOM	 solemn	 tone-INS	 speech-ACC	 begin-PAST	 	 	
	 ‘In	a	solemn	tone,	the	CEO	began	his	speech.’	 	
	
(35)	 Kojin-no	 kenri-wo	 sonchô	[‘respect-heavy’]	 suru.	 	 	 	
	 Individual-LK	 rights-ACC	 value	 do	 	 	 	
	 ‘To	value	the	rights	of	the	individual’	 	
	
On	the	other	end	of	the	scale	lack	of	respect	is	conceptualized	as	lack	of	weight:	
	
(36)	 Hanako-ga	 Tarô-wo	 keibetsu	[‘light-disregard’]-no	 me-de	 mi-te	iru.	 	 	
	 Hanako-NOM	 Tarô-ACC	 contempt-LK	 eye-INS	 view-PROG	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	views	Tarô	with	contempt.’	 	
	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	 this	metaphor	 seems	 to	 be	much	more	 prominent	 in	
Japanese	than	in	German,	where	linguistic	instantiations	such	as	Würdenträger	(“bearer	
of	dignity”	-->	dignitary)	are	quite	rare.	
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15.2.	(II)	Edge	Properties:	Sharp	and	Dull	
	
15.2.1.	(IIa)	Synaesthetic	Mappings	
	
(37)	 ein	scharfes	Chili	
a	spicy	[sharp]	chili	
(taste)	
	 	 	
(38)	 ein	scharfer/stechender	Geruch	
a	pungent	[sharp/piercing]	smell	
(scent)	
	 	 	
(49)	 ein	scharfes	Zischen/ein	dumpfes	Geräusch	
a	sharp	hissing/a	dull	noise	
(sound)	
	 	 	
(40)	 ein	scharfes/stumpfes	Licht	
a	strong/dull	light	
(vision)	
	
(41)	 shita-wo	 sasu	 aji	 	 	 	 	
	 tongue-ACC	 pierce.ATT	 taste	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘a	spicy	taste’	 	
	
(42)	 hana-wo	 sasu	 nioi	 	 	 	 	
	 nose-ACC	 pierce.ATT	 smell	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘a	pungent	smell’	 	
	
(43)	 surudoi/nibui	 oto	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘a	sharp/dull	 sound’	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(44)	 surudoi/nibui	 hikari	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘a	glaring	[sharp]/dull	 light’	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Synaesthetic	metaphor	is	characterized	by	mappings	from	one	sense	perceptual	domain	
to	 another	 sense	 perceptual	 domain.	 Some	 metaphors	 are	 possibly	 grounded	 in	
functional	 similarities	between	 the	 respective	 sense	perceptual	 faculties.	 For	 example,	
eating	a	hot	chili	pepper	can	result	 in	a	pain-like	sensation	not	dissimilar	to	the	tissue	
damage	caused	by	a	sharp	object.	That	is,	someone	eating	spicy	food	might	experience	a	
sensation	as	if	pierced	or	cut	by	a	sharp	object.	Such	phenomena	are	closely	related	to		
Sadamitsu’s	 (2001)	 Co-occurrence	 Condition	 of	 Sensations	 which,	 based	 on	 Lehrer	
(1978),	holds	that	“[t]he	mapping	between	the	sensory	modalities	which	can	co-occur	is	
preferable	to	that	between	those	which	cannot”(Sadamitsu	2001:	126).	In	other	words,	
mappings	between	domains	such	as	touch	-->	taste	and	taste	-->	scent3	are	so	common,	
because	 the	 respective	 sense	 perceptual	 faculties	 often	 function	 in	 unison.	 However,	
since	eating	spicy	food	does	not	actually	involve	tissue	damage	caused	by	a	sharp	object,	
one	might	hesitate	to	speak	of	a	strict	experiential	correlation	in	Grady’s	(1997a,	1997b)	
sense	(see	4.1.).		
																																																								
3	For	a	discussion	of	directionality	see	also	Yamanashi	(1988)	and	Shen	(1997).	
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				Note	 that	 the	 extensions	 to	 the	domains	of	 sound	and	vision	 likely	 involve	 a	higher	
degree	of	semantic	bleaching	than	the	aforementioned	extensions	to	taste	and	scent.	For	
example,	 a	 sharp	 object	 and	 a	 glaring	 light,	 despite	 causing	 different	 sensations	 and	
being	 perceived	 in	 different	ways,	 are	 still	 broadly	 similar	 in	 that	 both	 involve	 sense	
data	of	unpleasant	intensity.		
	
	
15.2.2.	(IIb)	UNPLEASANT	INTENSITY	IS	SHARPNESS	
	
(45)	 Er	versuchte,	der	Diskussion	die	Schärfe	zu	nehmen.	
He	tried	to	reduce	the	severity	[sharpness]	of	the	discussion.	
	 	
(46)	 Deine	spitzen	Bemerkungen	sind	unnötig.	
Your	pointed	remarks	are	unnecessary.	
	 	
(47)	 Scharfe	Munition/Ein	scharfer	Hund	
armed	[sharp]munition/a	vicious	[sharp]	dog	
	
(48)	 Surudoi	 goki-de	 aite-wo	 ii-makasu	 	 	 	
	 Sharp	 tone-INS	 opponent	 speak-defeat	 	 	 	
	 ‘To	argue	down	one’s	opponent	in	a	sharp	tone’	 	
	
(49)	 Toge-no	 aru	 iikata-wo	 suru	 	 	 	
	 Thorn-NOM	 exist.ATT	 manner	of	speaking-ACC	 do	 	 	 	
	 ‘To	use	harsh	language.’	 	
	
(50)	 Surudoi	 metsuki-no	 hito	 	 	 	 	
	 Sharp	 gaze-LK	 person	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘A	person	with	a	sharp	gaze’	 	
	
In	the	previous	section	we	have	seen	that	the	concept	of	sharpness	has	been	extended	to	
include	 general	 unpleasant	 intensity	 in	 the	 sense	 perceptual	 domain.	 As	 the	 above	
examples	show,	this	sense	can	be	further	extended	to	apply	to	more	abstract	domains	as	
well.	In	both	German	and	Japanese	the	metaphor	seems	to	show	an	affinity	towards	the	
domain	 of	 verbal	 expression,	 often	 referring	 to	 a	 potentionally	 hurtful	 manner	 of	
communication	 (and	 thereby	 piggybacking	 on	 the	 metaphor	 EMOTIONAL	 DISTRESS	 IS	
PHYSICAL	 INJURY).	 Some	 applications,	 however,	 go	 beyond	 this	 central	 aspect.	 The	
intensity	 in	 (47),	 for	 instance,	 refers	 to	 the	 state	 of	 being	 potentially	 dangerous.	 (50)	
implies	 that	 the	 conceptualizer	 is	 unpleasantly	 affected	 on	 an	 emotional	 level,	 but	
without	reference	to	the	verbal	domain.		
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15.2.3.	(IIc)	PRECISION	IS	SHARPNESS	
	
(51)	 Die	Konturen	sind	gestochen	scharf.	
The	contures	are	razor-sharp.	
	 	
(52)	 Mit	ihren	scharfen	Augen	kann	sie	alles	erkennen.	
With	her	sharp	eyes	she	can	see	everything.	
	 	
(53)	 Wir	müssen	die	Unterlagen	einer	scharfen	Prüfung	unterziehen.	
We	must	subject	the	documents	to	a	severe	[sharp]	audit.	
	
(54)	 Kare-no	 shinkei-ga	 hari-no	 yô-ni	 togat-te	iru.	 	 	
	 3S.M-LK	 nerves-NOM	 needle-LK	 like	manner-DAT	 become	sharp-RES	 	 	
	 ‘He	is	extremely	perceptive.’	 	
	
(55)	 Surudoi	 kansatsuryoku	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Sharp	 observation	skills	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(56)	 Kankaku-no	 surudoi/nibui	 hito	 	 	 	 	
	 Senses-LK	 sharp/dull	 person	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘A	person	with	sharp/dull	senses’	 	
	
The	 experiential	 correlation	 here	 is	 that	 sharp	 objects	 lend	 themselves	 to	 precise	
operations.	For	example,	the	use	of	scissors,	knifes,	etc.	as	tools	usually	results	in	clearly	
demarcated	 boundaries.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 entails	 ease	 of	 distinction.	 And	 the	 better	 our	
ability	 to	 distinguish	 becomes,	 the	 more	 likely	 we	 are	 to	 make	 correct	 judgements.	
Consider	(51):	The	most	salient	aspect	of	sharp	contours	 is	a	clear-cut	demarcation	of	
boundaries.	This	means	that	we	are	in	an	ideal	position	to	differentiate	between	figure	
and	ground	in	a	visual	scene.	A	sharp	photo	will	leave	no	doubt	as	to	where	one	object	
ends	 and	 another	 one	 begins.	 The	 very	 same	 effect	 (i.e.	 the	 ability	 to	 make	 pricise	
distinctions)	is	achieved	by	high	visual	acuity	(see	52)	and	–	via	extension	to	the	other	
faculties	–	by	sense	perceptual	acuity	 in	general	 (e.g.	54,	56).	Similarly,	 a	 severe	audit	
(see	 53)	 entails	 making	 precise	 distinctions	 between	 relevant	 and	 irrelevant	
information.	
	
	
15.2.4.	(IId)	INTELLIGENCE	IS	SHARPNESS	
	
(57)	 Ihr	Verstand	ist	scharf	wie	ein	Skalpell	
Her	mind	is	razor-sharp	[sharp	like	a	lancet]	
	 	
(58)	 Eine	messerscharfe	Analyse	(by	metonymy:	RESULT	for	INSTRUMENT)	
A	razor-sharp	analysis	[An	analysis	as	sharp	as	a	knife]	
	
(59)	 Tarô-wa	 zunô-ga	 surudoi.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-TOP	 brain-NOM	 sharp	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	has	a	sharp	mind.’	 	
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(60)	 Hanako-wa	 nakanaka-no	 kiremono	[kiru	=	to	cut]	 desu.	 	 	 	
	 Hanako-TOP	 quite-LK	 brilliant	person	 COP.POL	 	 	 	
	 ‘Hanako	is	quite	brilliant.’	 	
	
Both	German	and	 Japanese	seem	 to	 share	a	 folk	 theory	according	 to	which	ANALYTICAL	
THINKING	 IS	 DISASSEMBLING	 COMPLEX	 OBJECTS.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 following	
expressions	from	German:	
	
(61)	 Ein	Problem	in	seine	Bestandteile		zerlegen	
To	break	down	a	problem	into	smaller	components	
	 	
(62)	 Die	wesentlichen	Bausteine	der	Theorie4	
The	major	components	[building-blocks]	of	the	theory	
		
In	 the	 case	 of	 Japanese,	 the	 most	 striking	 example	 is	 probably	 the	 verb	 wakaru	
(understand,	 comprehend)	 which	 is	 etymologically	 related	 to	wakareru	 (divide,	 split	
into).		
				Thus,	 if	 analytical	 thinking	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 decomposition,	 it	 follows	 by	
metaphorical	 entailment	 that	 an	 able	 mind	 is	 a	 sharp	 instrument	 (since	 sharp	
instuments	are	ideal	for	disassembling	objects).		
	
	
15.2.5.	Excursion:	Overlap	of	Metaphors	in	a	Single	Expression	
	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	 some	 expressions	 seem	 to	 instantiate	 multiple	
metaphors	at	once.	Recall	(53)	from	above:	
	
(53)	 Wir	müssen	die	Unterlagen	einer	scharfen	Prüfung	unterziehen.	
We	must	subject	the	documents	to	a	severe	[sharp]	audit.	
	
I	 have	 categorized	 this	 under	 the	precision	 reading,	 since	most	 native	 speakers	 agree	
that	 accuracy	 and	 precision	are	 the	main	 aspects	 here.	 However,	we	 can	 hardly	 deny	
that	the	other	target	domains	discussed	above	play	a	role	as	well.	The	expression	scharfe	
Prüfung,	 best	 translated	 as	 severe	 audit,	 at	 least	 implies	 some	 amount	 of	 unpleasant	
intensity.	 And	 since	 such	 an	 activity	 requires	 analytical	 rigor,	 the	 target	 domain	 of	
intelligence	is	activated	as	well.	A	similar	conflation	can	be	noted	regarding	expressions	
such	as	(57)	and	(59):	
	
(57)	 Ihr	Verstand	ist	scharf	wie	ein	Skalpell	
Her	mind	is	razor-sharp	
																																																								
4	See	also	Grady	(1997a,	1997b)	on	the	conceptual	metaphor	THEORIES	ARE	BUILDINGS.	
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(59)	 Tarô-wa	 zunô-ga	 surudoi.	 	 	 	 	
	 Tarô-TOP	 brain-NOM	 sharp	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Tarô	has	a	sharp	mind.’	 	
	
As	 I	have	argued	above,	 the	 INTELLIGENCE	IS	SHARPNESS	metaphor	 is	an	entailment	of	 the	
metaphor	 ANALYTICAL	 THINKING	 IS	 DISASSEMBLING	 COMPLEX	 OBJECTS.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
there	 are	 metaphorical	 links	 between	 sense	 perception	 and	 mental	 activity	 in	 both	
German	and	Japanese:	
	
(62)	 Ich	sehe	momentan	keine	Lösung.	
I	don’t	see	a	solution	at	the	moment.	
	 	
(63)	 Das	klingt	nach	einem	guten	Plan.	
Sounds	like	a	good	plan.	
	
(64)	 Anata-no	 keikaku-wa	 subete	 omitôshi	 da.	 	 	
	 2S-LK	 plan-TOP	 all	 see-through	 COP	 	 	
	 ‘I’ve	completely	seen	through	your	plan.’	 	
	
(65)	 Keiji-ga	 hannin-wo	 kagi-dashi-ta.	 	 	 	 	
	 Detective-NOM	 perpetrator-ACC	 sniff-DASU-PAST	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	detective	found	out	who	the	perpetrator	was.’	 	
	
These	 are	 all	 instances	 of	 a	 higher-level	metaphorical	 system	 called	 the	Mind-as-Body	
Metaphor	(Sweetser	1991:	28ff.).	The	point	is	that	expressions	like	(57)	and	(59)	can	be	
seen	as	instances	of	both	the	precision	and	the	intelligence	reading.	I.e.,	the	MIND-AS-BODY	
metaphor	 and	 the	 ANALYTICAL	 THINKING	 IS	 DISASSEMBLING	 COMPLEX	 OBJECTS	 metaphor	
simultaneously	 construe	 the	 mind	 as	 a	 sharp	 object.	 In	 fact,	 it	 might	 be	 possible	 to	
subsume	 the	 intelligence	 under	 the	precision	 reading.	However,	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	keep	
them	seperate	here	to	draw	attention	to	a	relatively	prominent	folk	model	of	analytical	
thinking.	Either	way,	the	exact	distinction	is	of	little	concern	for	the	present	purpose.	
	
	
15.3.	(III)	Surface	Properties:	Smooth	and	Rough	
	
15.3.1.	(IIIa)	ABSTRACT	REFINEMENT	IS	SMOOTH,	LACK	OF	ABSTRACT	REFINEMENT	
IS	ROUGH	
	
These	mappings	are	entailments	of	the	highly	schematic	ontological	metaphor	ABSTRACT	
SUBSTANCE	 IS	RAW	MATTER	 –	 a	 prominent	 consequence	 of	which	 is	 the	 view	 of	 ABSTRACT	
DEVELOPMENT	 AS	 AN	 ARTISANAL	 PROCESS.	 For	 instance,	 humans	 and	 their	 skills	 are	
understood	 as	 being	 shaped	 by	 external	 and	 internal	 forces	 in	 a	 teleological	 manner	
towards	some	desired	end	state.	This	is	evidenced	by	German	expressions	such	as	sich	
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bilden	 (lit.	 to	 form,	shape,	build	oneself),	which	refers	 to	 the	process	of	self-education,	
including	 personal	 maturation	 aspects.	 Similarly,	 in	 Japanese	 we	 have	 phrases	 like	
seishin-wo	kitaeru	(lit.	forge	one’s	mind).		
				Given	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 see	why	 abstract	 refinement	 is	 conceptualized	 as	
smooth,	and	lack	thereof	as	rough:	The	raw	untreated	material	which	marks	the	starting	
point	of	the	developmental	path	is	coarse	and	rough,	and	gradually	becomes	smooth	and	
refined,	as	it	is	subjected	to	the	artisanal	treatment.	To	illustrate,	consider	the	following	
examples.	
	
Manners	and	personality:	
	
(66)	 Er	benahm	sich	wie	ein	ungehobelter	Klotz.	
He	conducted	himself	uncouthly	[like	a	rough-hewn	brick].	
	 	
(67)	 Sie	beindruckte	durch	geschliffene	Manieren.	
Her	polished	manners	left	an	impression.	
		
(68)	 arappoi	 kotobazukai	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 rough	 language	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
(69)	 Seikaku-no	 kado-ga	 tore-te,	 maru-ku	 ochitsuku.	 	 	
	 Personality-LK	 edges-NOM	 come	off-TE	 round-INF	 calm	down	 	 	
	 ‘(His/her)	personality	became	more	mellow.’	 	
	
Skill:	
	
(70)	 Er	ist	ein	Rohdiamant.		
Though	unrefined,	he	has	great	potential	[He	is	a	rough	diamond].	
	 	
(71)	 Ich	muss	mein	Englisch	aufpolieren.	
I	have	to	brush	up	on	[polish]	my	English.	
	
(72)	 Ude-wo	 migaku	 	 	 	 	 	
	 arm-ACC	 polish	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘to	improve	one’s	skill’	 	
	
(73)	 Arakezuri-no	 senshu	 da	 ga,	 mikomi-ga	 aru.	 	
	 Rough	hewn-LK	 athlete	 COP	 CONJ	 expectation-NOM	 exist	 	
	 ‘The	athelte	is	still	rough	around	the	edges	but	shows	promise.’	 	
	
	
	
15.3.2.	(IIIb)	GOOD	DEVELOPMENT	IS	SMOOTH,	BAD	DEVELOPMENT	IS	ROUGH	
	
These	 are	 entailments	 of	 the	 event	 structure	 metaphor	 (Lakoff	 2006:	 213).	 More	
specifically,	the	relevant	mappings	are:	
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• PURPOSEFUL	ACTIVITIES	ARE	JOURNEYS	
• MEANS	ARE	PATHS	
• DIFFICULTIES	ARE	IMPEDIMENTS	TO	MOTION	
	
In	other	words,	if	means	are	paths,	then	smooth	surface	structure	is	preferable,	since	it	
poses	no	impediments	to	motion:		
	
(74)	 Sie	hat	zukünftigen	Generationen	den	Weg	geebnet.	
She	has	paved	the	way	for	future	generations.	
	 	
(75)	 Vor	uns	liegt	ein	steiniger	Weg.	
A	rocky	road	lies	ahead	of	us.	[I.e.,	difficulties	are	to	be	expected]	
	
(76)	 Kôshô-ga	 nameraka-ni	 shinkô	 shi-ta.	 	 	 	
	 Negotiation-NOM	 smoothly	 progress	 do	 	 	 	
	 ‘The	negotiation	progressed	smoothly.’	 	
	
(77)	 Gengo	gakushû-wa	 dekoboko	michi.	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Language	learning-TOP	 bumpy	road	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘Language	learning	is	a	bumpy	road.’	 	
	
As	indicated	by	these	examples,	a	particularly	salient	aspect	of	the	smooth-rough	scale	is	
the	force	dynamic	notion	of	 friction.	As	evidenced	by	the	CONFLICT	IS	FRICTION	metaphor,	
friction	is	generally	considered	as	something	negative:	
	
(78)	 Es	kam	zu	Reibungen	zwischen	Russland	und	der	Türkei.	
Friction	ensued	between	Russia	and	Turkey	
	
(79)	 Iken-ga	 masatsu	 shi-te	iru.	 	 	 	 	
	 Opionions-NOM	 friction	 do-PROG	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘There	is	a	conflict	of	opinion.’	 	
	
Note,	however,	that	some	amount	of	friction	is	needed	since	MAKING	A	MISTAKE	IS	SLIPPING:		
	
(80)	 Ein	bedauerlicher	Ausrutscher	
An	unfortunate	slip-up	
	 	
(81)	 Bei	ihrer	Erklärung	geriet	sie	ins	schlingern.	
She	had	difficulty	giving	an	explanation	[started	to	swerve].	
	
(82)	 Shiken-ni	 suberu	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Test-DAT	 slip	 	 	 	 	 	
	 ‘To	fail	a	test’	 	
	
In	 summary,	 then,	 both	German	 and	 Japanese	metaphorically	 express	 the	 difficulty	 of	
developmental	paths	in	terms	of	smooth,	rough,	or	slippery	surface	structure.		
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15.4.	Observations	and	Explanations	
	
In	 this	 chapter	 we	 have	 taken	 a	 brief	 look	 at	 embodiment	 from	 a	 cross-cultural	
perspective	by	examining	three	source	domains	and	their	metaphorical	scope	in	German	
and	Japanese.	The	results,	summarized	in	table	1,	can	be	broken	down	into	the	following	
observations:		
	
• All	metaphors	except	(Ia)	occur	in	both	languages.	
• Cross-linguistic	variance	still	occurs,	but	is	more	likely	to	be	encountered	at	the	
specific	level	of	linguistic	realization	rather	then	at	the	general	level	of	embodied	
experience.		
• 	As	(Ia)	shows,	not	all	primary	metaphors	are	instantiated	cross-linguistically.	
	
How	 can	we	 account	 for	 these	 results?	 First,	 there	 is	 the	 almost	 identical	 scope	 of	 all	
three	source	domains	in	German	and	Japanese.	Why	is	it	that	two	genetically	unrelated	
languages	 have	 so	 many	 metaphors	 in	 common?	 As	 stated	 above,	 this	 result	 was	
anticipated	 and	 is	 straightforwardly	 answered	by	 the	 choice	 of	 source	domains.	 Since	
our	 focus	 in	this	chapter	 is	on	the	relation	between	embodiment	and	culture,	all	 three	
source	domains	were	chosen	from	a	set	of	properties	that	directly	pertain	to	the	level	of	
embodied	 experience.	 Based	 on	 contemporary	 research	 (e.g.	 Grady	 1997a,	 1997b;	
Lakoff	and	Johnson	1999;	Kövecses	2005),	Yu	points	points	out	that	“primary	metaphors	
derive	directly	from	our	experience	and	very	often	from	our	common	bodily	experience	
and	 therefore	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 universal,	 whereas	 complex	 metaphors	 are	
combinations	of	primary	metaphors	and	cultural	beliefs	and	assumptions	and,	 for	that	
reason,	 tend	 to	 be	 culture-specific”	 (Yu	 2008:	 248).	 In	 other	 words,	 metaphors	 are	
located	 on	 a	 spectrum	 somewhere	 between	 being	 directly	 based	 and	 being	 only	 very	
indirectly	based	on	embodied	experience.	And	 since	 the	 source	domains	 considered	 in	
this	chapter	are	directily	embodied,	and	given	the	universal	nature	of	human	physiology,	
it	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 we	 ended	 up	 almost	 exclusively	 with	 cross-linguistically	
viable	metaphors,	many	of	which	are	primary.		
				Still,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 cross-linguistic	 variance	 is	 a	 non-issue.	 To	 illustrate	 this	
point,	 consider	 (Ic).	 The	metaphor	 INSTENSITY	 IS	WEIGHT	 is	 present	 in	 both	German	 and	
Japanese.	 Yet,	 in	 Japanese	 it	 is	 only	 applicable	 to	 the	 domain	 of	ABSTRACT	BURDENS	
while	 in	 German	 it	 is	 applicable	 to	 a	 much	 wider	 range	 of	 phenomena.	 This	 is	 also	
reflected	on	the	linguistic	level	by	the	use	of	schwer	(heavy)	as	an	augmentative	marker.	
Another	obvious	example	of	variance	is	metaphor	(Ie).	Again,	RESPECT/DIGNITY	IS	WEIGHT	
is	found	in	both	languages.	But	as	soon	as	we	consider	the	level	of	linguistic	expression,	
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Concluding	Remarks	and	Prospects	
	
The	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 show	 that	 the	 V2s	 under	 consideration	 are	
inherently	meaningful.	It	was	argued	that	their	contribution	to	the	compound	can	only	
be	 fully	 appreciated	 when	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 a	 complex	 lexical	 network	 that	
subsumes	both	grammatical	V2s	and	 their	 simplex	counterparts.	The	 five	 case	 studies	
elucidated	the	structure	of	these	networks.	All	five	verbs	under	analysis	were	shown	to	
have	a	basic	image	schematic	meaning	at	the	root	of	their	highly	polysemous	structure.	
Mechanisms	 of	 semantic	 extension	 such	 as	 metaphor,	 metonymy,	 and	 image	 schema	
transformation	 “latch	 onto”	 these	 basic	 spatial	 schemas	 to	 yield	 bundles	 of	 naturally	
interrelated	 meaning	 variants.	 Thus,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 present	 evidence	 for	 the	
motivatedness	of	individual	senses	in	accordance	with	general	principles	of	cognition.	In	
particular,	 the	senses	of	the	V2	turned	out	to	be	metaphorical	extensions	 into	abstract	
domains	based	on	the	same	image	schematic	structures	as	the	senses	of	the	simplex.	
				Given	the	results	of	the	case	studies,	I	have	argued	that	the	metaphorical	motivation	of	
the	 respective	V2s	 has	 important	 “syntactic”	 implications	 (chapter	 14).	 Their	 peculiar	
“argument	structure”	properties	were	reframed	as		profiling	phenomena	and	explained	
in	terms	of	salience.	The	proposed	account	holds	that	certain	participants	of	the	relation	
profiled	 by	 the	 V2	 are	 too	 abstract,	 and	 therefore	 not	 prominent	 enough,	 to	 overtly	
appear	as	subject	or	object	nominals.	Based	on	Langacker’s	(e.g.	1991,	1995)	treatment	
of	 “raising”	 constructions,	 it	 was	 speculated	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 these	 abstract	
participants	 might	 best	 be	 analyzed	 as	 an	 active	 zone	 phenomenon	 (14.6.3.).	
Furthermore,	the	so-called	lexical	vs.	syntactic	distinction	–	a	dominant	paradigm	in	the	
study	 of	 Japanese	 V-V	 compounds	 –	 was	 fundamentally	 called	 into	 question	 and	 the	
contours	 of	 an	 alternative	 usage-based	 account	 were	 sketched	 out	 	 in	 terms	 of	
schematicity	and	frequency	effects	(14.7.).		
				Finally,	 we	 have	 observed	 some	 striking	 cross-linguistic	 similarities	 throughout	 the	
thesis.	The	parallels	between	DERU	and	out,	AGARU	and	up,	or	KAKARU	and	German	an	
come	to	mind.	It	seems	that	certain	conceptual	mappings,	especially	those	pertaining	to	
primary	metaphors,	tend	to	be	less	language-specific	than	others.	In	chapter	15	this	was	
investigated	 by	 comparing	 the	metaphorical	 scope	 of	 three	 source	 domains	 –	weight,	
edge	properties,	 and	 surface	properties	 –	 in	 Japanese	 and	German.	 The	 results	 suggest	
that	 directly	 embodied	 source	 domains	 such	 as	 these	 are	 likely	 to	 be	mapped	 onto	 a	
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similar	 (though	 not	 necessarily	 identical)	 set	 of	 target	 domains	 across	 different	
languages	due	to	the	universal	nature	of	basic	bodily	experience.		
				In	 conclusion,	 then,	 we	 have	 presented	 a	 psychologically	 realistic	 account	 of	 the	
semantic	 structure	 of	 image	 schema	 verbs,	 shown	 the	 inextricable	 relation	 between	
simplex	and	V2,	and	argued	in	favor	of	a	meaning-based	approach	to	some	long-standing	
syntactic	questions.	Yet,	a	study	such	as	this	has	its	limitations,	and	in	many	respects	we	
have	merely	scraped	the	tip	of	the	iceberg.	Two	issues	in	particular	deserve	to	be	singled	
out.	 (I)	 The	 complete	 story	 of	 image	 schema	 verbs	 should	 undoubtedly	 include	 a	
historical	 account	 of	 their	 polysemy,	 based	 on	 diachronic	 corpora.	 The	 present	 thesis	
has	taken	a	predominantly	theoretical	perspective	on	polysemy,	and	while	I	believe	that	
the	arguments	presented	are	sound	and	coherent,	they	should	by	all	means	be	checked	
against	 a	 broad	 empirical	 basis	 –	 ideally	by	 tracing	 the	process	of	 semantic	 extension	
and	grammaticalization	from	the	earliest	written	sources	to	the	present	day.	(II)	One	of	
this	 thesis’	 most	 serendipitous	 discoveries	 is	 probably	 the	 salience-based	 nature	 of	
“argument	selection”.	Two	major	avenues	for	further	research	present	themselves:	First,	
the	pursuit	of	an	active	zone	account	regarding	the	profiling	properties	of	grammatical	
V2s.	Secondly,	the	role	of	conceptual	autonomy,	discourse	context,	and	frequency	effects	
in	 the	 case	 of	 non-grammatical	 compounds.	 And	 last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 schema-based	
alternative	 to	 the	 traditional	 lexical	vs.	syntactic	 dichotomy	will	 require	backing	 in	 the	
form	 of	 copious	 amounts	 of	 quantitative	 data.	 I	 hope	 to	 have	 layed	 out	 the	 basic	
theoretical	groundwork	here,	so	that	future	studies	may	tackle	these	issues.		
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